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ABSTRACT  
Since the end of the Cold War private military companies––conflict 
entrepreneurs that kill or train others to kill, typically in foreign lands––have 
proliferated at an alarming rate. Curiously, the primary consumer of this new 
service are not weak states looking to consolidate their monopoly of force 
(although this has happened) but strong states like the United States of 
America, which possesses the greatest monopoly of force in the world. This 
thesis examines how and why this has occurred.  
 The reappearance of private military actors is also a harbinger of a 
wider trend in international relations: the emergence of neomedievalism. The 
erosion of the taboo against mercenarism signals a return to the pre-
Westphalian norm of the Middle Ages, when states did not enjoy the 
monopoly of force and subsequent special authority in world politics. Instead, 
the medieval system was polycentric in nature with authority diluted and 
shared among state and non-state actors alike. Because the return to the status 
quo ante of the Middle Ages is occurring worldwide, it is best described as 
‘globalised neomedievalism’. 
Globalised neomedievalism is a non-state-centric and multipolar world 
order characterized by overlapping authorities and allegiances on a local and 
global scale. It does not imply worldwide atavism. States will not disappear, but 
will matter less than they did a century ago. Nor does neomedievalism connote 
chaos and anarchy; the global system will persist in a durable disorder that 
contains rather than solves problems. A key challenge of neomedievalism is 
the commodification of conflict: offering the means of war to anyone who can 
afford it will change warfare, why we fight and the future of war. The 
implications of this are enormous since it suggests that international relations 
in the twenty-first century will have more in common with the twelfth century 
than the twentieth.  
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Epitaph on an Army of Mercenaries 
  
These, in the day when heaven was falling, 
The hour when earth's foundations fled, 
Followed their mercenary calling, 
And took their wages, and are dead. 
  
Their shoulders held the sky suspended; 
They stood, and earth's foundations stay; 
What God abandoned, these defended, 
And saved the sum of things for pay. 
  
––A.E. Housman 
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Chapter  1 
  
Medieval  Modernity  
 
 
There’s never a new fashion but it’s old 
––Geoffrey Chaucer 
 
  
It is a familiar story. A superpower goes to war and faces a stronger than 
expected insurgency in distant lands, yet has insufficient forces to counter it 
due to political and military constraints. Owing to this, the superpower decides 
to hire contractors, some of which are armed, to support its war effort. The 
armed contractors prove to be both a blessing and a curse, providing vital 
security services to the campaign, yet at times killing innocent civilians in their 
zeal, causing strategic setbacks and damaging the superpower’s legitimacy. 
Without these contractors it would be hard for the superpower to wage war 
but with them it is difficult to win. 
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 The armed contractors in question are not in Iraq or Afghanistan but 
Northern Italy, and the year is not 2007 but 1377. The superpower in question 
is not the United States of America (US) but the Papacy under Pope Gregory 
XI, who was fighting the anti-papal league led by the Ducate of Milan.1 The 
tragic killing of civilians by armed contractors did not occur in Baghdad but 
Cesena, 630 years earlier. The military companies employed were not DynCorp 
International, Triple Canopy or Blackwater but the Company of the Star, 
Company of the Hat and the White Company.  
This last company was a transalpine military firm led by Englishman 
Sir John Hawkwood, one of the most in-demand mercenaries of his day. He 
achieved international fame as a mercenary and served as ambassador 
alongside Geoffrey Chaucer, received angry letters from Saint Catherine of 
Siena and joined Flemish chronicler Jean Froissart and the Italian humanist 
Francis Petrarch at a lavish wedding feast for King Edward III’s son. 2 
Contemporaries admired and reviled him. According to the fourteenth-century 
Italian storyteller Franco Sacchetti, two Franciscan monks encounter 
Hawkwood near his fortress at Montecchio. The monks greet him with the 
standard salutation: ‘May God grant you peace’. Hawkwood coldly replies: 
‘And may God take away your alms’. Shocked by this rudeness the monks 
demand explanation. ‘Don’t you know that I live by war’, Hawkwood answers, 
‘and peace would destroy me? And as I live by war so you live by alms’. ‘And 
                                                
1 John M. Najemy, A History of Florence, 1200-1575 (Wiley-Blackwell, 2006), 151-155. 
2 William Caferro, John Hawkwood: An English Mercenary in Fourteenth-Century Italy (The Johns Hopkins 
University  Press, 2006), 2.  
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so’, Sacchetti adds, ‘he managed his affairs so well that there was little peace in 
Italy in his times’.3 
The parallels between medieval and modern private armies are 
uncanny. Today, the United States and other countries employ contractors to 
fulfill security-related contracts in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. In the late 
Middle Ages, such men were called condottieri––literally, ‘contractors’––who 
agreed to perform security services described in a written contract or condotte. 
Both modern and medieval contractors were organised as legal corporations, 
selling their services to the highest or most powerful bidder for profit. Both 
have functioned as private armies, primarily offering land-based combat skills 
rather than naval (or aerial) capabilities and deploying force in a military 
manner rather than as law enforcement or police. Both have been international 
in composition. Although the mercenary companies in the high Middle Ages 
fought mostly in Northern Italy, their ranks swelled with men from every 
corner of Europe and even Muslim Saracens from the Levant. Private armies 
today also gravitate to where the fighting is, such as Iraq and Afghanistan, yet 
employ personnel and subcontractors from all over the world. The list of 
likenesses goes on and is explored in Chapter 3, but suffice it to say that 
today’s private armies share DNA with their ancestors. 
                                                
3 Franco Sacchetti, Il Trecentonovelle, novella CLXXXI (Torino: Einaudi, 1970), 528-529. For more on 
Hawkwood’s interesting life, see: William Caferro, John Hawkwood: An English Mercenary in Fourteenth-
Century Italy, (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006); J. Temple-Leader and G. Marcotti, 
Sir John Hawkwood: The Story of a Condottiere, trans. Leader Scott  (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1889); R.A. 
Pratt, “Geoffrey Chaucer, Esq., and Sir John Hawkwood,” ELH 16, no. 3 (1949), 188-193; K. Fowler, 
“Sir John Hawkwood and the English Condottieri in Trecento Italy,” Renaissance Studies 12, no. 1 (1998), 
131-48. 
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Unlike today, the Middle Ages knew no taboo against mercenaries. 
Despite Machiavelli’s protestations, the mercenary profession was considered a 
respectable albeit bloody trade, and often the lesser sons of nobility, such as 
Duke Werner of Urslingen, Count Konrad von Landau and Giovanni de’ 
Medici, sought careers as mercenary captains.4 There was no stigma attached to 
hiring a private army; it was considered no different than employing an 
engineering company to repair one’s city walls or commissioning an artist to 
paint portraits of one’s family. The commodification of conflict resulted in a 
thriving market for force, as the services of private armies or ‘free companies’, 
as they were known, went to the highest or most powerful bidder. Despite the 
power of states today, a similar phenomenon has begun to resurface. The 
norm against hiring private international violence is eroding, as evidenced by 
military companies’ employment in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. Firms such 
as DynCorp International, Triple Canopy, Aegis Defence Services, Armour 
Group, Military Professional Resources Inc. (MPRI), Blackwater USA 
(rebranded ‘Xe’ and again as ‘ACADEMI’) and others have sprouted into a 
multibillion-dollar industry in a world searching for security.5  
                                                
4 Niccolò Machiavelli was no stranger to mercenaries in Northern Italy, and no doubt came into contact 
with them as the minister in charge of Florence’s defences, 1503–06. He makes his opinions on 
mercenaries plain in Chapter XII of The Prince: ‘they are disunited, ambitious, without discipline, 
unfaithful; gallant among friends, vile among enemies; no fear of God, no faith with men’. Carafano 
disputes this traditional account of Machiavelli on mercenaries, and argues that the early ‘translators got it 
wrong’: James Jay Carafano, Private Sector, Public Wars: Contractors in Combat--Afghanistan, Iraq, and Future 
Conflicts (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008), 19. 
5 Blackwater Worldwide rebranded itself as Xe (and pronounced ‘zee’ ) on February 13, 2009. Xe stands 
for the chemical Xenon, an odourless, non-combustionable gas. However, Xe spokeswoman Anne 
Tyrrell said there was no meaning in the new name (Dana Hedgpeth, “Blackwater Sheds Name, Shifts 
Focus,” The Washington Post, February 14, 2009). Xe rebranded itself again in December 2011 as 
‘ACADEMI’. To avoid confusion, this thesis will refer to Blackwater/ACADEMI simply as ‘Blackwater’. 
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It is tempting to brand modern military firms as mercenaries akin to 
their predecessors, but direct comparisons are difficult. The free companies 
were far more brutal than modern private armies, following the customs of 
warfare in the Middle Ages.6 Modern companies also typically do not offer the 
relative level of offensive combat power that the free companies did. Nor are 
modern military corporations capable of independently waging military 
campaigns, as the free companies routinely did; today’s companies generally 
assist large national armies in support roles rather than act as a stand-alone 
force, although this could change in the foreseeable future. Despite these 
important differences, it would be equally misguided to suggest that there is no 
resemblance between private armies of the Middle Ages and today. At their 
core both are for-profit actors on the battlefield, and when they have been 
hired their presence has complicated the outcome of wars and with it world 
politics in similar ways.   
Not surprisingly, the rapid expansion of the private military industry in 
recent years has received copious attention in scholarship and popular 
literature alike. Yet despite the volumes of ink spilt on the subject, rigorous 
analysis remains thin. The military firms themselves are stubbornly opaque and 
their work is politically sensitive, meaning that there is no viable data on the 
                                                
6 Direct comparisons between the free companies of the Middle Ages and private military firms today is 
fraught with difficulty, since warfare has changed significantly in the past thousand years. For example, 
the measure of a war atrocity is greatly different. In 1377, mercenaries under John Hawkwood 
deliberately slaughtered more than 2,000 civilians as a punitive measure in the ‘bloodbath’ of the city of 
Cesena, which provoked ire against Pope Gregory XI. In comparison, Blackwater contractors killed 
seventeen Iraqi civilians in Bagdad by mistake in 2007, which sparked global outrage around the world. 
Such an act would merit little notice in the Middle Ages because the moral standards for warfare were 
more brutal.  
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industry overall. In the absence of real information, reactionary left-wing and 
right-wing ideological critiques have pervaded the discourse, politicising and 
polarising the debate. What genuine study has occurred is narrow and limited 
to a few aspects of the industry: the legal status of civilian armed contractors 
on the battlefield; accountability issues relating to monetary fraud, waste and 
abuse; and the experiences of high-profile companies such as Blackwater in 
Iraq and Afghanistan. Meanwhile, the broader questions remain relatively 
unexplored. Why have strong states elected to employ private military forces 
after centuries of their prohibition? Does the privatisation of war change 
warfare, and if so, how? What does the return of private armies augur for the 
future of international relations? 
This thesis investigates these questions and contends that the parallels 
between the private military companies of the Middle Ages and modern era go 
beyond contract warfare. The return of private armies signifies a fundamental 
shift in the organisation and distribution of power within the international 
system. In the state-centric Westphalian world order, states are the only actors 
in international politics, the only subjects of international law, and the only 
entities that can legitimately use force to impose their authority. Mercenaries 
are strictly outlawed because they can threaten a state’s monopoly of force to 
assert its authority. The re-emergence of private military force suggests a 
change in this system, toward a pre-Westphalian order when states did not 
enjoy the monopoly of force or special authority in world politics. Instead, the 
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international order is returning to the polycentric status quo ante of the Middle 
Ages, when authority was diluted and shared among state and non-state actors 
alike. But unlike in the European Middle Ages, the change is occurring on a 
worldwide scale.  
The emerging world environment is best characterised as globalised 
neomedievalism: a non-state-centric, multipolar world of overlapping 
authorities and allegiances on a local and global scale. This does not imply 
worldwide atavism or recidivism. States will not disappear, but they are already 
mattering less than they did in the twentieth century, increasingly sharing the 
world stage with international organisations (IOs), non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs), multinational corporations (MNCs), politicised ethnic 
and religious groups, armed non-state actors, and super-empowered 
individuals. The return of private armies is a harbinger of this trend continuing 
and perhaps intensifying. This thesis explores the topic in five chapters:  
Chapter 1 briefly examines the precepts of the Westphalian order, its 
dominance in international relations theory, its conceptual demise after the 
Cold War and the ensuing theoretical dissonance. Following this, the chapter 
reviews the intellectual lineage of neomedievalism as a metaphor to explain 
post-Westphalian international relations. It also considers gaps in the literature 
that this thesis aspires to fill––namely, considering neomedievalism as more 
than a metaphor if viewed through the prism of private armies.  
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Chapter 2 examines the evidence for neomedievalism and finds some 
substantiation for its emerging presence since the end of the Cold War. It uses 
the analytical framework devised by international relations theorist Hedley Bull 
in his book The Anarchical Society to test for neomedievalism. In this book Bull 
considers alternative models for world governance, such as ‘new medievalism’, 
but concludes the evidence lacked sufficient ‘utility and viability’ to displace 
the ‘international society’ of states. 7 However, Bull was writing at the height of 
the Cold War, when global politics was dominated by two super-powerful 
states. Now that the Cold War is over and non-state actors play a larger role in 
world affairs, it is time to reassess Bull’s initial investigation. Accordingly, this 
chapter examines the evidence for neomedievalism using Bull’s five-fold 
framework: (1) the technological unification of the world, (2) the regional 
integration of some states, (3) the disintegration of other states, (4) the rise of 
transnational organisations and (5) the restoration of private international 
violence. Four of these five areas are well documented in post-Cold War 
scholarship. Conspicuously absent from the literature, however, is a rigorous 
analysis of the last characteristic of neomedievalism––the restoration of private 
international violence––due to lack of information on today’s emerging private 
military industry.  
Chapter 3 investigates the restoration of private international violence 
in depth. It asks: Why has privatised force re-emerged after a 400-year hiatus? 
                                                
7 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (New York: Columbia University  
Press, 2002), 245. 
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Why have strong states led this development rather than weak ones looking to 
consolidate their monopoly of force? What does this augur for the future of 
warfare and international relations? In search of answers, this chapter probes 
private military history––especially contract warfare during the Middle Ages––
for parallels with today, examines the exile and return of private military actors 
over the past four centuries, analyses today’s market for force, and considers 
the academic literature on the topic and its gaps. It also offers a new typology 
of contractors working in conflict zones that can help structure future thinking 
on the topic. Lastly, it finds parallels between the market for force in Middle 
Ages and today and elucidates the timeless advantages and disadvantages of 
contract warfare.  
Chapter 4 examines how the private military industry functions within 
the emerging neomedieval order through the tragic case of Liberia, where the 
United States hired DynCorp International, one of the largest military 
companies in the world, to demobilise and then rebuild Liberia’s military ‘from 
the ground up’ (the actual language taken from the US government contract) 
after Charles Taylor’s exile in 2003. It is the first time in two centuries that one 
sovereign nation hired a private company to raise another sovereign nation’s 
armed forces. This is an ideal case because Liberia is a microcosm of 
neomedievalism (albeit a worst case scenario), DynCorp is an excellent 
representative of the industry, Africa is a useful location since the industry will 
likely seek new markets there once the Iraq and Afghanistan ‘bubbles burst’, 
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and building armies is an area that the industry seeks to enter because it is 
more profitable than simple executive protection and convoy security. The 
case exposes some of the inner workings of private military industry, how 
these companies function, how they alter international outcomes and how the 
industry will behave in a larger neomedieval setting in the years to come. 
Chapter 5 considers the implications of the return of private military 
actors to global politics, ramifications for the future of armed conflict and 
consequences for international relations, namely the emergence of globalised 
neomedievalism. It suggests that this shift in international relations will not 
result in chaos and anarchy but subsist in a kind of ‘durable disorder’ that 
contains rather than solves problems.8 
Lastly, in the spirit of transparency, the author was a program manager 
for DynCorp International and played a principal role in the business 
development, conceptualisation and implementation of the company’s Liberia 
program from its inception in 2004. While critics may charge this unduly 
influences the objectivity of the analysis, an insider’s account is required since 
the private military industry is notoriously opaque and academics, journalists 
and others are reflexively denied access to data. This lack of information has 
led to serious misunderstandings regarding the private military industry and a 
sizable gap in the literature on the restoration of private international violence 
compared to the other four components of neomedievalism. This thesis 
                                                
8 The term ‘durable disorder’ was coined by Alain Minc and popularized in the English language by Philip 
Cerny: A. Minc, Le Nouveau Moyen âge (Gallimard, 1993); P.G. Cerny, “Neomedievalism, Civil War and 
the New Security Dilemma: Globalisation as Durable Disorder,” Civil Wars 1, no.1 (1998): 36-64.  
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aspires to help fill this gap and shed light on this murky industry. Only a 
former industry insider who is no longer beholden to its interests can reveal its 
inner machinations.9   
The Rise and Fall of the Old World Order 
To understand how the arena of international relations might be changing, it is 
first important to understand how it developed into the state-centric order we 
live under today. In 1648 the Thirty Years’ War ended with the signing of the 
Peace of Westphalia, and supposedly gave birth, with Dutch jurist Hugo 
Grotius as midwife, to the modern international system of states. The 
orthodox reading of the Westphalian order holds that it delivered humanity 
from medieval anarchy by organising the world into distinct geopolitical units–
–states––that could claim absolute authority within their territorial boundaries 
while recognizing other states as global peers. The Westphalian order married 
legitimate sovereign rule to physical territory, organised by state, and stateless 
authorities like the Papacy retained no authority at all. Perhaps this is why 
Pope Innocent X referred to the Peace of Westphalia as ‘null, void, invalid, 
iniquitous, unjust, damnable, reprobate, inane and devoid of meaning for all 
time’.10  
Unfortunately for Innocent, the following four centuries saw the 
Westphalian state-centric model of sovereignty become the normative 
                                                
9 The author’s views are his alone, and do not represent DynCorp International, the United States 
government, the government of Liberia or any other entity. 
10 Quoted in Norman Davies, Europe: A History (New York: Harper Collins, 1998), 568.  
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structure of international relations.11 This international system of absolutist 
states created two spheres of politics: inside and outside the state.12 To keep 
control inside their territory, states actively participated in constructing 
citizenship and nationalism, outlawing all armed non-state actors, such as 
mercenaries, who could physically threaten the government’s existence. The 
state’s exclusive claim to the use of violence to compel obedience is, according 
to Weber, the very definition of the state, which is ‘a human community that 
(successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force 
within a given territory’.13  
For international politics outside the state, sovereigns made treaties 
with other sovereigns, sometimes sought to expand forcibly into their 
neighbours’ territory, and excluded other states from interfering in their 
internal politics. Over time, states developed stronger controls over their own 
borders and built professional and standing national armies to use violence 
against other states––that is, fight wars––or what Clausewitz famously explains 
as the ‘continuation of politics by others means’, ‘a duel on a larger scale’.14 
Clausewitz’s seminal book On War is perhaps the best rationale of the 
                                                
11 The fundamental elements of state sovereignty were codified in the 1933 Montevideo Convention on 
the Rights and Duties of States and include three main components: a permanent population, a defined 
territory and a functioning government. An essential requirement of state sovereignty is the capacity to 
assert authority over state territory to the exclusion of other states. In accordance with Article 2 (1) of the 
UN (UN) Charter, the world organisation is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all 
member states. In 1949 the International Court of Justice (ICJ) stipulated that ‘between independent 
States, respect for territorial sovereignty is an essential foundation of international relations’ (ICJ Reports, 
1949, p. 4.) and it is ‘the fundamental principle of state sovereignty on which the whole of international 
law rests’ ( ICJ Reports, 1986, para. 263). 
12 R.B.J. Walker, Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1992). 
13 H.H. Gerth, and C. Wright  Mills, ed., From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (London: Routledge, 2003), 
77-128. 
14 Carl von Clausewitz, On War (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1976),  87, 75. 
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Westphalian way of war, which is fundamentally between states. States seek to 
check other states’ power though the Machiavellian calculus of national 
interests and balance-of-power politics, with military might as the ultimate 
arbiter. Stability is sustained by natural balancing within the system, as rival 
powers co-operate to prevent any single state from gaining too much power. 
Hence, the Westphalian order maintains global governance with the state as 
the prime actor in international relations.15  
 The canonical reading of the Westphalian world order has dominated 
international relations theory in Europe and North America for the last fifty 
years. In 1948, on the 300th anniversary of Westphalia, legal scholar Leo Gross 
published a widely read article that describes the treaty in utopian terms as ‘the 
majestic portal which leads from the old into the new world’ and credits it with 
‘the outstanding place…[in] the evolution of international relations’.16 On the 
treaty’s 350th anniversary, David Boucher asserted that it ‘provided the 
foundation for, and gave formal recognition to, the modern states system in 
Europe’ and also ‘sanctioned the formal equality and legitimacy of an array of 
state actors, while at the same time postulating the principle of balance as the 
                                                
15 Balance of power theory is not unique to the Westphalian system and is as old as history itself. In the 
eighteenth century, Charles Davenant showed it was familiar to the ancients both as political theorists 
and as practical statesmen. However, today’s understanding of balance of power theory holds that only 
states are the ‘balancers’ in world politics, as epitomised by the neorealist school. In the European Middle 
Ages and elsewhere, non-state actors also played a significant role in ‘balancing’ threatening powers.    
16 Leo Gross, “The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948,” American Journal of International Law 42, no. 1 (1948): 
28, 26. This article was originally published in the American Journal of International Law and later 
included in a reader edited by Richard Falk and Wolfram Hanrieder (1968), and again in a posthumous 
collection of essays by Gross (1993). In the introduction to this last volume, the editor Alfred P. Rubin, 
writes that this essay remains ‘timeless’ and ‘seminal’; it ‘popularized the phrase and the notion of a 
“Westphalia constitution” for the international order’ (Gross 1993, x). This even though Gross checked 
for and found little evidence in the language of the treaties to support his claims. For more critique on 
Gross, see: Andreas Osiander, “Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth,” 
International Organization 55, no. 2 (2001):  264–65. 
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mechanism to prevent a preponderance of power’.17 According to The Penguin 
Dictionary of International Relations, ‘a number of important principles, which 
were subsequently to form the legal and political framework of modern 
interstate relations, were established at Westphalia. It explicitly recognized a 
society of states based on the principle of territorial sovereignty’. 18  Hans 
Morgenthau claims that key ‘rules of international law were securely 
established in 1648’ and ‘the Treaty of Westphalia ... made the territorial state 
the cornerstone of the modern state system’.19 In discussing the ‘Westphalia 
principles’, Seyom Brown states that ‘even to this day two principles of 
interstate relations codified in 1648 constitute the normative core of 
international law: (1) the government of each country is unequivocally 
sovereign within its territorial jurisdiction, and (2) countries shall not interfere 
in each other’s domestic affairs’.20 Hendrik Spruyt affirms that ‘the Peace of 
Westphalia ... formally acknowledged a system of sovereign states’21; Frederick 
Parkinson argues that the treaty ‘spelt out in full the terms on which the new 
international diplomatic order was to be based’22; Mark Zacher speaks of ‘the 
Treaty of Westphalia of 1648 which recognized the state as the supreme or 
sovereign power within its boundaries and put to rest the church’s 
                                                
17 David Boucher, Political Theories of International Relations: From Thucydides to the Present (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1998),  289, 225. 
18 Graham Evans and Richard Newnham, The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations (London: Penguin 
Books, 1998). 
19 Hans Morganthau and Kenneth Thompson, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace  (New 
York: McGraw-Hill,1985), 294. 
20 Seyom Brown, International Relations in a Changing Global System: Toward a Theory of the World Polit y 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), 74. 
21 Hendrik Spruyt, The Sovereign State and Its Competitors (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), p. 27. 
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Publications, Inc, 1977), 33. 
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transnational claims to political authority’23; and Michael Sheehan states that 
treaty ‘formally recognized the concept of state sovereignty’.24 The list of 
quotes goes on.25  
The state-centric Westphalian order is also the dominant paradigm of 
global politics. It is so ingrained in policy-makers’ understanding of 
international relations that after the tragic events of 11 September 2001 many 
in the United States found it inconceivable that a non-state actor, al-Qa’ida, 
could orchestrate such an attack without help from a state. No less a figure 
than James Woolsey, the former director of the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA), said it was unlikely––if not impossible––for al-Qa’ida to act alone and 
without state sponsorship. In an interview with the television show Good 
Morning America, he said: ‘We particularly need to look hard at whether there 
may be some state––in my mind, most likely, Iraq––that is working together 
with bin Laden’s group’.26 Nor was he alone. Others at the highest levels of the 
United States government spent years misguidedly looking for links between 
al-Qa’ida and states like Iraq but to no avail. The United States invaded Iraq in 
                                                
23 Mark W. Zacher, “The Decaying Pillars of the Westphalian Temple: Implications for International 
Order and Governance,” in Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics ed. James N. 
Rosenau and Ernest-Otto Czempiel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 59. 
24 Michael Sheehan, The Balance of Power: History and Theory  (USA: Routledge, 1996), 38. 
25 See for example: Philip Kerr, “The Outlawry of War,” Journal of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 7 
(November 1928), 361-68; K.N. Waltz, Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis, rev. ed. (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2001); F.W. Wayman and P.F. Diehl, eds., Reconstructing Realpolitik  (Michigan: 
University of Michigan Press, 1994); M. E. Brown, O.R. Cote, Jr., S.M. Lynn-Jones, and S.E. Miller, eds., 
Theories of War and Peace (Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1998); M.I. Midlarsky, ed., Handbook of War 
Studies (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989). A recommended critique of Westphalia that is consistent with this 
thesis is: E. Keene, Beyond the Anarchical Society: Grotius, Colonialism and Order in World Politics (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002).  
26 “Transcript: Ex-CIA Director James Woolsey,” Good Morning America, October 10, 2010, accessed 
October 24, 2010, http://abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=92346&page=1.  See also: Aram Roston, The 
Man Who Pushed America to War: The Extraordinary Life, Adventures, and Obsessions of Ahmad Chalabi (New 
York: PublicAffairs, 2009), 182. 
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part because of suspected ties between the regime and the terrorist 
organisation.27 Such is the strength of the Westphalian orthodoxy and fervent 
bias towards states as the central political unit of international relations.  
The Rise… 
Even as its real effect on international relations is undeniable, the Westphalian 
order represents an ideal type rather than a historical actuality. Contrary to the 
frequent assumption in the international relations literature, the language of the 
treaties of Munster and Osnabruck, which comprise the Peace of Westphalia, 
does not clearly articulate an international system of states.28 The centuries 
between 1400 to 1700 witnessed the gradual consolidation of political 
authority from the fragmented sovereignty of the Middle Ages––where the 
church, emperor, king, princes, cities, monasteries and the like all made 
competing and overlapping claims of authority––to a centralized system under 
which states claimed the sole authority to make rules, enforced through their 
claim to the monopoly of force.29 Under the Westphalian ideal, states were the 
only actors in international politics and the only subjects of international law. 
                                                
27 For example, in the lead up to the Iraq War US President George W. Bush alleged that Iraqi President 
Saddam Hussein and al-Qa’ida ‘have had high-level contacts that go back a decade’ and ‘Iraq could 
decide on any given day to provide a biological or chemical weapon to a terrorist group or individual 
terrorists. Alliance with terrorists could allow the Iraqi regime to attack America without leaving any 
fingerprints’. See: The White House, “President Bush Outlines Iraqi Threat”, Press release, October 7, 
2002.   
28 Osiander, “Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth,” 265. 
29 Janice E. Thomson, Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 223. 
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As John Gerard Ruggie explains, in states ‘the public domain, the interstate 
sphere, and the realm of governance were largely coterminous’.30 
Over time, the states’ mutually buttressing claims––political authority 
and monopoly of force––grew strong enough that the state became the 
dominant actor in world politics, making the provision of security a crucial 
historical variable in the rise of the state. According to Charles Tilly, states 
arose as a ‘security racket … trading protection to merchants and others in 
returned for revenues and other services, and in the process for providing a 
framework for the organisation of production, exchange and accumulation’.31 
Mancur Olson describes the state as a ‘stationary bandit’ that evolved from 
‘roving bandits’. Under this metaphor, roving bandits plunder the goods of 
others and move on to their next victim, creating a Hobbesian anarchy, while 
stationary bandits, operating under a tyranny, exploit locals like a mafia crime 
lord yet also enjoy a stable life not ‘on the run’. However, this gives the 
stationary bandit an incentive to provide some semblance of government, as 
he must protect his community from roving bandits.32 Similarly, the state 
outlawed and stigmatised competing armed actors, such as mercenaries and 
pirates, who could threaten the ruler’s security racket.33 The Papacy, once the 
powerful adversary of kings and princes in the Middle Ages, lost all territorial 
                                                
30 John Gerald Ruggie, “Reconstituting the Global Public Domain—Issues, Actors, and Practices,” 
European Journal of International Relations 10, no. 4 (2004): 505. 
31 Charles Tilly, “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime,” in Bringing the State Back In, ed. 
Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1985): 169–191, 212. 
32 Mancur Olson, Power and Prosperity: Outgrowing Communist and Capitalist Dictatorships (Basic Books, 2000). 
33 This phenomenon will be discussed in Chapter 3. 
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control by 1870, and its authority was largely relegated to the sphere of 
morality. By the end of the nineteenth century, the Westphalian state system 
had completely replaced the medieval order. 
 At the beginning of the twentieth century European states were 
empires of such strength that they could successfully make claims to 
controlling territory and monopolising violence beyond their borders and into 
Africa, Asia and the Americas. From 1880 to 1914 European state politics 
played out on a global scale, in the crises of Fashoda, various Balkans wars on 
the Hapsburg-Ottoman frontier, the Great Game of Anglo-Russo competition 
in Central Asia and economic competition in China. New and non-European 
states also sought a place in the new world order, as the United States and 
Japan embarked on colonial conquests and even bested European powers on 
occasion, in the Spanish-American War (1898) and the Russo-Japanese War 
(1904-05). European state hegemony went so far that France, under the 
Second Republic, declared Algeria an integral part of its own territory.  
 The Great War of 1914-18––World War I––is an extreme expression 
of Clausewitzian warfare between industrialized states. It was labelled the first 
world war because its battlefields spanned the globe, by then mostly colonized 
by European powers.34 In addition to the horrific losses of life in battles such 
as the Somme, Verdun, Gallipoli and Jutland, World War I also claimed the 
Hapsburg and Ottoman empires as causalities and seriously enfeebled 
Germany, which lost all its colonies and was made to pay debilitating war 
                                                
34 Arguably, the Seven Years War (1756–63) was actually the first world war between states. 
  
19 
reparations under Article 231 (the so-called war guilt clause) of the Treaty of 
Versailles in 1919. However, this heinously destructive test of the Westphalian 
order did not invalidate it. In one generation, Japan’s imperial pursuits put it in 
direct competition with the United States, Italy’s imperial conquests took it 
deep into northeast Africa, and Germany rebounded to threaten European 
powers once more under the Nazi regime.  
 On the first of September 1939, World War II erupted and marked the 
zenith of the Westphalian order and the extreme of Clausewitzian warfare. The 
war’s toll knew no clemency. The Axis countries of Germany and Japan 
suffered total defeat and occupation by other states, and Italy was rendered 
ineffectual as a world power. The Allied countries of Britain and France were 
also grievously wounded and retreated from their colonies in the decades to 
follow. The Suez Canal crisis in 1956 demonstrated that the old-world powers 
were no longer the leading actors on the world stage, replaced by the younger 
United States and Soviet Union. However, warfare had changed significantly. 
Armed with world-destroying nuclear weapons, the United States and Soviet 
superpowers sought power without tempting direct confrontation, and 
therefore fought a cold war through allied states, proxy wars, and economic 
competition. Not surprisingly, international relations thinking during this era 
remained state-centric, from the English School to the political realism of 
Hans Morgenthau and George Kennan to the idealism of E.H. Carr, which 
still held the state as the principal actor in world politics. 
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…and Fall 
In 1989 the Berlin Wall fell and the Cold War ended, leaving a single state 
standing, the United States. To some observers this signified the everlasting 
triumph of the liberal-democratic state over all others and the Darwinian 
resolution of the Westphalian system. In a widely read article and bestselling 
book, The End of History and the Last Man, Francis Fukuyama asserted that the 
end of the Cold War was nothing short of the ‘end of history’.35 Noting that 
the historical origins of the phrase can be found in the writings of Hegel and 
later Marx, Fukuyama argued that the advent of Western liberal democracy 
may have signalled the terminus of humanity’s sociocultural evolution and the 
ultimate structure of government: ‘what we may be witnessing is not just the 
end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of post-war history, 
but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind’s ideological 
evolution and the universalisation of Western liberal democracy as the final 
form of human government’.36 
 Unfortunately for Fukuyama, the future also had a say: with a single 
victor under the Westphalian order, the world grew more chaotic. The liberal-
democratic enterprise did not spread to weaker states within the international 
system, naturally buttressing it; instead, many weaker states faltered even more. 
Some states lost control of their territory, as in the conflicts in the Balkans, 
                                                
35 For the article, see: Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?” The National Interest, (Summer 1989): 3-
18. For the book: Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (Free Press, 2006). Fukuyama 
maintained this position throughout the 1990s, and even after the events of 11 September 2001: F. 
Fukuyama, “History and September 11,” in Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future of Global Order, ed. Ken 
Booth and Tim Dunne (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002), 28.   
36 Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?,” 4. 
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Indonesia and Western Sudan. Some states, such as Liberia and Somalia, failed 
altogether. Weak states by definition have lost their monopoly of force, 
resulting in intrastate conflicts and large swaths of ungoverned spaces in which 
armed non-state actors––separatist groups in northern Mali, pirates in Somalia 
and violent extremists in Yemen––have almost free rein. International criminal 
organisations exploit weak states, such as the narco-state of Guinea Bissau. 
Transnational terrorists such as al-Qa’ida threaten weak and strong states alike. 
 The character of warfare is also changing, as conflicts are fought over 
identity and other intangibles rather than territory, a significant departure from 
the Westphalian-Clausewitzian way of war, which is primarily concerned with 
claiming territory as a measurement of sovereignty. Rather than fighting for 
traditional national interests, such as a capital city, modern wars are often 
fought by and for one ethnic group against another ethnic group.37 According 
to the Peace and Conflict Instability Ledger of 2010, there are at least 132 
minority groups actively seeking independence from their host countries, and 
eighteen of these groups employ violence to achieve such change.38 Militaries 
no longer fight other militaries, and in the contemporary system an estimated 
90 per cent of casualties of warfare are civilians.39  
                                                
37 Ethnic here indicates a broad category of political organisation that may include cultural, tribal, 
religious, geographical, linguistic, ideological and other related concerns. 
38 J. Joseph. Hewitt, et al., Peace and Conflict 2010 (College Park, MD: Boulder Center for International 
Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland Paradigm Publishers, 2010), 5. 
39 Adam Roberts, “Lives and Statistics: Are 90% of War Victims Civilians?,” Survival 52, no. 3 (2010): 
115-36; see also Cristian Cantir and Philip Schrodt, “Neomedievalism in the Twenty-First Century: 
Warlords, Gangs and Transnational Militarized Actors as a Challenge to Sovereign Preeminence  (paper, 
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 Sovereignty is eroding not only inside states; it is also being corroded 
from outside them. After the Cold War ended, non-state actors like the UN 
began to interfere in the domestic politics of states in direct contravention of 
its own charter, which enshrines the Westphalian principle of non-interference 
in the domestic politics of states.40 The UN even authorized the most extreme 
of intrusions: military intervention into a state’s sovereign territory against its 
will as seen in Northern Iraq, Rwanda, Somalia, the former Yugoslavia 
(Bosnia), Haiti, Liberia, Kosovo and Sierra Leone. Also, multinational 
companies such as the Fortune 500 have greater political sway in world affairs 
today than a half-century ago––greater, perhaps, than some states. It can 
hardly be argued that the Gabon is more influential than Exxon Mobil. 
Similarly, there are now some 25,000 international NGOs with programs in 
almost every corner in the world.41 Their individual purposes range widely, 
from providing humanitarian services to acting as watch dogs of states’ alleged 
bad behaviour. Amnesty International, which monitors states’ human rights 
violations, has over a million members in some ninety countries and territories 
and a research staff of more than 300, and it has become effective at bringing 
international pressure to bear on regimes through adroit worldwide media 
name-and-shame campaigns. NGOs have shaped international relations in 
                                                
40 Article 2 (4) on the UN Charter stipulates: ‘All Members shall refrain in their international relations 
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state’. 
Article 2 (7) stipulates: ‘Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the UN to intervene in 
matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to 
submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the 
application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII’. 
41 Joel Krieger, ed., The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2001), 599. 
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other ways too. The International Campaign to Ban Land Mines, a coalition of 
NGOs, was the prime mover in the Mine Ban Treaty of 1997 and won that 
year’s Nobel Peace Prize in recognition of its efforts.  
 A good illustration of the decline of the Westphalian order and the 
changes in the current international system is phenomenon of fragile states. In 
the Westphalian system, according to realists, weak states represented an 
opportunity for stronger states to claim more territory by subsuming, 
controlling or otherwise annexing them. The age of European colonialism was 
partly driven by this rationale. Yet since the Cold War ended, strong states 
have generally avoided becoming enmeshed in the internal dynamics of weak 
states. Few states wished to intervene in the Rwandan genocide of 1994, and 
even regional neighbours with realists’ interests found the idea of capturing the 
country unappealing. There is no better evidence of the threat posed by fragile 
states than the United States’ own assessment of the situation. In a complete 
reversal of Clausewitzian Cold War thinking, the National Security Strategy of 
2002––the cornerstone document of United States strategy––plainly states that 
‘America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing 
ones’.42  
 In the contemporary system, when intervention does occur it is usually 
by non-state actors. Typically, NGOs help identify a need for intervention and 
petition international organisations, not strong states, to establish a 
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peacekeeping mission, the objective of which is to re-establish order rather 
than conquer of territory. NGOs such as Save Darfur pressured the 
international community through a globalised media campaign that helped 
form a joint UN and African Union (AU) peacekeeping mission to end the 
ongoing genocide in Darfur. Another international body, the International 
Criminal Court (ICC), issued an arrest warrant for Omar Hasan Ahmad al-
Bashir, the president of Sudan, for the crime of genocide. Multinational 
companies such as Pacific Architects and Engineers have supported these 
ongoing missions by building, maintaining and operating the bases used by the 
peacekeepers. Clearly, states are no longer the sole actors in international 
relations as once conceived under the Westphalian system. 
The State is Dead, Long Live the State! 
In the twenty years since Fukuyama’s end of history, it seems that state 
sovereignty is eroding on most fronts, and thus, the Westphalian system with 
it. The problems with the Westphalian order in the post-Cold War world have 
raised serious doubts regarding its long-term viability, and many have 
suggested that we have entered a post-Westphalian era, spawning a surge in 
debate among theorists. At one of the spectrum, some have pronounced the 
state dead, from professor and businessman Kenichi Ohmae, in his book The 
End of the Nation State, to the president of the European Union (EU), Herman 
Van Rompuy, who declared that ‘the time of the homogenous nation state is 
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over’.43 At the other end of the spectrum are those who dismiss the decline of 
the state, like reports of Mark Twain’s death, as an exaggeration, and think it is 
‘too early to schedule a wake for the sovereign-state system’.44  
Yet Fukuyama has reconsidered his earlier position. As an intellectual 
leader in the neoconservative movement and founding member of the 
influential neoconservative think tank Project for the New American Century, 
he supported the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and subsequent nation-building 
efforts there.45 Even as Iraq devolved into pandemonium, he continued to 
maintain his faith that the West offers an ‘attractive package’ of ‘the material 
prosperity of market economies and the political and cultural freedom of 
liberal democracy’.46 However, he finally abandoned this conviction in 2006, 
during the nadir of the Iraq War and its apparent rejection of democracy as 
expected by him. That same year he recanted his neoconservative beliefs and 
many of the ideas that informed his earlier writings: Neoconservatives, he 
wrote in The New York Times, ‘believed that history can be pushed along with 
the right application of power and will. Leninism was a tragedy in its Bolshevik 
version, and it has returned as farce when practiced by the United States. 
                                                
43 Kenichi Ohmae, The End of the Nation State: The Rise of Regional Economies (New York: Free Press 
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44 Stephen D. Krasner, “Abiding Sovereignty,” International Political Science Review 22, no. 3 (2001): 229-51. 
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were Elliott Abrams, Gary Bauer, William J. Bennett, Jeb Bush, Dick Cheney, Eliot A. Cohen, Midge 
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Neoconservatism, as both a political symbol and a body of thought, has 
evolved into something I can no longer support’.47  
 Some scholars view the role of the state as shifting from the primary 
authority in international relations to an enforcement agency for decisions 
other actors make within the system. This polyarchical decision-making 
network creates governance gaps that challenge the system as a whole, 
demanding greater multifunctional co-ordination mechanisms. According to 
Ruggie, ‘other social actors are drawn into playing public roles to compensate 
for governance gaps and governance failures at global and national levels ––
though it must be said that in some instances those gaps and failures exist in 
the first place because the private sector has succeeded in curtailing the scope 
of the public sector’.48 As governance has replaced government, the ability to 
reach collective decisions or agreements on complex issues has diminished and 
‘entropy’ within the system has increased.49 Establishing global agreement on 
key social, economic, justice, security and environmental issues has proven 
elusive and time consuming.  
 Many view the Westphalian state undergoes not only a change in role, 
but a more fundamental transformation, in the aftermath of the Cold War. 
Philip Bobbitt argues that territorial sovereign state has become obsolete in the 
increasingly borderless world of globalisation and has been replaced by the 
                                                
47 Francis Fukuyama, “After Neoconservatism,” The New York Times, February 19, 2006. 
48 Ruggie, “Reconstituting the Global Public Domain,” 30. 
49 Cerny, “Neomedievalism, Civil War and the New Security Dilemma,” 49; see also Mark Duffield, 
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‘market-state’, in which the relationship between the government and its 
citizens resembles that between a corporation and consumers. 50  Robert 
Jackson contends that poorer Westphalian states, especially in the developing 
world, are morphing into ‘quasi-states’ where government institutions are weak 
and the states subsist on the largesse of the international community, which he 
argues rewards incapacity and inequality with additional aid, making quasi-
states shells of ‘negative sovereignty’. 51 Ulrich Beck is less pessimistic; he 
believes the traditional state is ‘antiquated but also indispensible’ and should 
give way to ‘transnational states’ that are ‘strong states, whose power to shape 
politics develops out of co-operative answers to globalisation.’ 52  Unlike 
traditional Westphalian states, transnational states are not islands of supreme 
authority but garner power by working across boundaries, geographical or 
otherwise, with other globalised entities. These and other conceptions of the 
state in transformation all recognize the possible obsolescence yet current 
necessity of states as the basic unit of global political organisation. 
 However, others loosen the state’s primary position in the international 
system by emphasizing its historical contingency. Friedrichs suggests that the 
sovereign state system may be a historically unique anomaly which ‘had a 
beginning, and will also have an end’ and Korbrin observes that ‘territorial 
                                                
50 Phillip Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace, and the Course of History (USA: Anchor Books, 2002); 
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51 Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993). 
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sovereignty is not historically privileged’. 53  A historical understanding can 
disabuse us of the notion that the state is timeless and natural, as history is 
replete with alternative models of human political organisation, from tribes to 
kingdoms to empires.54 Others dismiss the evolutionary nature of the state, 
seeing it as a construction derivative of a specific place and time. Both Wight 
and Rosenberg trace the gradual development of the state system from the 
Peace of Lodi (1454) that founded the Italian Concert and the first system of 
collective security to the Congress of Utrecht (1713) when, as Wight observes, 
‘the state system is there’.55  Similarly, Spruyt views the emergence of the 
sovereign state as occurring not during the Peace of Westphalia but centuries 
earlier in France, where it competed against several other types of political 
organisation in Europe: church, feudal lords and empire. The state was not a 
successor to but rather a competitor against these other forms of political 
organisation, and eventually emerged as the dominant force in Europe due to 
its superior ability to exploit trade. Guéhenno argues that the state is a passing 
political form, ‘a European exception, a precarious transition between the age 
of kings and the “neo-imperial” age’.56 Agnew reminds us that ‘the spatial 
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scope of political organisation has not been set for all time in a particular 
mode. The territorial state is not a sacred unit beyond historical time’.57  
Still others contend that Westphalia is a myth altogether. Krasner 
dismisses the link between 1648 and the creation of the state, claiming that ‘the 
conventional view that the Peace of Westphalia of 1648 marks a turning point 
in history is wrong’, although in a later books he softens this stance a bit by 
using the term ‘Westphalian sovereignty’ while acknowledging its historical 
inaccuracy.58 Others are less soft. Keene dissects the intellectual genealogy of 
the state system and concludes it is ‘good propaganda’ developed by counter-
revolutionaries 200 years ago in their struggle to contain the French 
Revolution, the Napoleonic imperial system and French expansionism. 59 
Osiander goes even further: ‘We cannot be moving “beyond Westphalia”’, he 
bluntly avers, ‘if “Westphalia” as generally understood today in IR 
[international relations theory] is really a figment of the nineteenth-century 
imagination, stylised still further, and reified, by the discipline of IR itself in the 
twentieth century’.60 P. Michael Phillips concurs: ‘The treaties were no more a 
“majestic portal” to a new world of law and reason than was C. S. Lewis’s 
magic wardrobe an entry to the land of Narnia, where animals talk’.61 
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One theme throughout this rich debate is clear: The strong hegemonic 
claims of the Westphalian order are no longer absolute in the post-Cold War 
era. Non-state actors are now also political actors on the world stage, making 
an international state-centric system impossible. At the same time, alterative 
and often older conceptions of political order along ethnic, cultural, tribal and 
religious lines of identification are re-emerging and even eclipsing identity 
based on nationality. State-centric theories can no longer satisfactorily account 
for these changes, and an alternative model is needed to comprehend the 
shifting world we inhabit.  
The Post-Westphalian World: Globalised Neomedievalism 
As mentioned above, globalised neomedievalism describes a non-state-centric, 
multipolar international system of overlapping authorities and allegiances on a 
simultaneously local and global scale. The concept is loosely based on the 
world order of the high European Middle Ages, in which international 
relations are not dominated by states; it is globalised in the sense that the 
dynamic shapes global politics rather than those of a single continent.62 The 
                                                                                                                       
Journal of International Law 42, no. 1 (1948): 28. The reference to the wardrobe used as the magic portal 
from the real world to the magical Kingdom of Narnia is from C. S. Lewis, The Lion, the Witch, and the 
Wardrobe (New York: Harper Collins, 2005). 
62 The European Middle Ages is typically thought to span from the fall of the Roman Empire (476 CE) 
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of the Church in all aspects of life, from art and architecture to the Crusades to recapture the Holy Land. 
The emergence of the state was slowed by the power of international Christendom. Also during this 
period, scholastic philosophers attempted to reconcile faith and reason, codes of chivalry and courtly 
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multiplicity of actors within this system combine to create a durable disorder, 
in which a single authority can neither impose greater stability nor cause the 
system to collapse. 
The Neomedieval Imagination 
The idea of a new Middle Ages might make some instinctively recoil, as the 
concept has been long abused over the centuries, starting with the 
Enlightenment’s branding it the Dark Ages in what might be considered a 
propagandist ploy. For many it signifies little more than ignorance, stagnation, 
and barbarism on a continental scale, as professed by one of history’s greater 
pessimists, Friedrich Nietzsche: ‘I am greatly worried about the future in which 
I fancy I see the Middle Ages in disguise’.63 Given the wars of the twentieth 
century, Nietzsche was prescient to worry about the future but unfair to 
compare it to the medieval era, which was far more complex, rich and 
vivacious than he suggests.  
For Nietzsche, the Middle Ages connote insecurity, but for others they 
signify past glory. Composer Richard Wagner, Nietzsche’s one-time mentor, 
dedicated much of his life to writing a cycle of four epic operas, or music-
dramas, as he termed them, titled The Ring of the Nibelung, based on medieval 
Norse sagas and the Nibelungenlied. Later, these and other medieval images 
                                                                                                                       
love emerged to govern appropriate behaviour and the use of mercenaries was widespread. The Late 
Middle Ages (c. 1300–1500) witnessed state resurgence, the Hundred Years War and a crisis within the 
Church resulting in the Western Schism. Mercenaries remained common but the beginnings of the 
modern standing armies emerged during this period. 
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became the allegorical bedrock for much of the Nazi aesthetic, led by Adolf 
Hitler, a failed artist and fervent admirer of Wagner. Beyond Hitler’s shared 
anti-Semitism with the composer, he frequently attended Wagner operas at the 
Bayreuth festival, where King Ludwig II of Bavaria, another medieval romantic 
and builder of the fantastical Neuschwanstein castle, had constructed a special 
theatre to enshrine Wagner’s music-dramas. Wagner’s heirs were ardent 
supporters of Hitler and furnished him paper for writing Mein Kampf during his 
imprisonment.64 German and Austrian fascination with medieval legends went 
beyond Wagner and informed occult Aryan secret societies that began in the 
fin de siècle period and later influenced Nazi ideology. The Order of the New 
Templars, the Edda Society, and the writings of Guido von List and Jörg Lanz 
von Liebenfels anticipated many of the political doctrines and institutions of 
the Third Reich.65 Fortunately, such abuses of medieval history came to a fiery 
end in 1945, as Berlin burned like Valhalla at the end of The Ring of the Nibelung. 
The allure of the Middle Ages is not unique to Nazis and inspired 
countless other fancies too, including J.R.R. Tolkien’s The Lord of the Rings, 
which spawned an entire genre of fantasy literature, film, and games in the 
twentieth century: the Harry Potter books, The Chronicles of Narnia, Excalibur, 
Dragon Slayer, Dragonquest, Dungeons and Dragons, Ladyhawke, Tristan and Isolde, to 
name a few. The reams of pseudo-medieval pulp that line bookstores and fill 
movie scripts demonstrate that the Middle Ages is anything but dead in 
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popular culture. Medievalist Umberto Eco identifies ten types of Middle Ages 
in the popular imagination: as a pretext or setting for a story; as an ironic 
revisitation of our past to speculate about our cultural infancy or senility; as a 
barbaric age; as a romantic age; as the philosphia perennis of the Church; as 
national identity (e.g., the Third Reich); as an era of doomed decadence; as 
philological reconstruction; as tradition, exemplified by the Knights Templar, 
Rosicrucians, or neo-Kabbalists; and as expectation of the millennium and end 
of time.66 Ultimately, the past is what the present makes of it. As Christopher 
Coker observes, ‘the Middle Ages that lived in the twentieth-century 
imagination was interpreted in strictly twentieth-century terms, in that unique 
way employed by the modern era of looking at history as the creation and 
invention of modern man’.67 
Neomedievalism in International Relations Theory 
The Middle Ages has also made an appearance in international relations 
theory. The notion of neomedievalism was first introduced by Francis 
Wormuth shortly after World War II and was followed by Arnold Wolfers in 
1965. For Wormuth, neomedievalism meant disorder. He used it to articulate a 
possible dystopian future for Europe, which could have reacted to the horrors 
of World War II by rejecting modernity and reverting back to the old regime 
of the Middle Ages. Such a development would entail non-state actors, such as 
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the Church, once again entering the political sphere and undermining state 
authority and the international state system. Wormuth interpreted the post-war 
European political landscape as the ‘reassertion of the theocratic and 
authoritarian ideal of the Middle Ages in Spain [and the] convulsive reaction 
against modernism in Italy, Germany, and Austria’. He noted the rise of 
powerful Christian democratic parties throughout the continent, which he 
claimed were ‘dedicated to a return to the Middle Ages and supported by the 
largest single Christian Church’.68 Given these assumptions, he direly saw the 
world plunged back into violent barbarism, where religious dogma would 
trump secular reason and those holding unorthodox opinions would be burned 
at the stake.  
 Fortunately, Wolfers’s treatment of neomedievalism was more 
measured than Wormuth’s. Wolfers conceptualized it as an alternative to the 
Westphalian state-centric approach to international relations theory, arguing 
that future generations might find medieval thinkers such as St. Augustine and 
Dante more relevant to international affairs than present-day theorists, since 
the future could have more in common with the past than the present. It was 
not ‘fantastic’, he argued, to imagine a future in which the system of sovereign 
states gave ground to a nebulous and unstructured international system, which 
he termed new medievalism. Such a development would ‘blur the dividing lines 
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between domestic and foreign policy’ and produce a world of ‘double loyalties 
and overlapping realms of power’.69  
Ultimately, Wolfers dismissed new medievalism as insufficient to 
describe global politics in the early 1960s, instead reaffirming the belief of the 
day that the interstate system remained fundamental to international relations. 
Moreover, he envisioned the trajectory of the Westphalian system extending 
beyond the handful of strong states in the developed world and into 
developing countries. This conclusion is not surprising given that he was 
writing at the apogee of the Cold War, a very Westphalian-Clausewitzian 
engagement, in an academic field dominated by state-oriented realists who 
were also witnessing the decolonialisation of Africa and other continents and 
expected the former colonies to evolve into strong states. Even the pejorative 
terms used to describe these emerging polities as third world and undeveloped belie 
the evolutionary assumptions built into Westphalian theory. The very idea of a 
stateless medieval international-relations theory must have seemed oxymoronic 
to many of Wolfers’s peers, since global politics was generally conceived as 
interstate by nature. As E.H. Carr noted, it was difficult for his contemporaries 
to imagine a world where political power was not determined on the basis of 
the state and territorial control.70 Regardless of Wolfers’s conclusions, history 
has developed in directions he initially hypothesized. 
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 Hedley Bull picked up the mantle of neomedievalism in the mid-1970s 
in his seminal work, The Anarchical Society. In this book, he explored several 
alternative models of world order that he compared and contrasted to the 
Westphalian state system, including Wolfers’s new medievalism.71 In the case 
of new medievalism, he imagined a future where ‘sovereign states might 
disappear’, replaced by ‘a system of overlapping authority and multiple 
loyalty’.72 Such a system would seem to invite instability and even anarchy, but 
it was balanced and centred, according to Bull, by the dual universalism of 
empire and Church. In such a world order, no single ruler or state was 
sovereign in the sense of being supreme over a given territory and its 
contained population, akin to the modern state. Instead several authorities––
Holy Roman Emperor, pope, prince, city-state, monastic order, guild, and so 
forth––shared or competed for authority over vassals and resources in a single 
geographical area. According to Bull, a neomedieval world order could be said 
to exist 
if modern states were to come to share their authority over 
their citizens, and their ability to command their loyalties, on 
the one hand with regional and world authorities, and on the 
other hand with sub- state or sub-national authorities, to such 
an extent that the concept of sovereignty ceased to be 
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applicable, then a neo-mediaeval form of universal political 
order might be said to exist.73 
Such a world order characterised by the multiplicity of authorities and 
allegiances ‘represents an alternative to the system of states’.74  
 After consideration, Bull dismissed the presence of neomedievalism in 
the world for lack of evidence––again not surprising given that he was writing 
during the Cold War, when states reigned supreme in both international 
relations theory and practice. He conceded that a secular ‘neo-medieval order’ 
might be possible, and that armed non-state actors such as the East India 
Company, papal states until 1870, and Barbary corsairs had played a role in the 
Westphalian system.75 Despite these factors, he doubted that neomedievalism 
would be more orderly than the international society of states, and therefore 
rejected the idea as lacking sufficient ‘utility and viability’ to displace the state 
system of his day. 76  However, he acknowledged, ‘our view of possible 
alternatives to the states system should take into account the limitation of our 
own imagination and our own inability to transcend past experience’.77 
 Neomedievalism lay dormant until after the Cold War, which left only 
one major superpower––the United States––standing after centuries of 
competition among great powers. As noted earlier, to some this event marked 
the victory of the liberal democratic state as the ultimate form of human 
government and the ‘end of history’, denoting a peaceful international order 
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forever more.78 Other theorists were less sanguine, and observed the exact 
opposite: Rather than marking the zenith of the Westphalian system and world 
peace, they warned that the state system was perilously in danger of 
fragmentation and even disintegration. Martin van Creveld noted this 
development as early as 1991, observing a decline in Clausewitzian interstate 
warfare without a comparable decline in organised violence. He concluded that 
as fragile states eroded, they would lose their monopoly of force and armed 
non-state actors would concomitantly rise to challenge states and each other. 
This in turn would transform warfare from Clausewitzian campaigns to 
persistent low-intensity conflict fought by non-state actors, such as insurgents, 
terrorists, militias, and bandits. Moreover, unlike Clausewitz’s famous dictum 
that all war is political, these ‘new wars’ might or might not have a political 
aim. For some combatants, the end of warfare is war itself. Lastly, he predicted 
that conventional militaries were ill-prepared for this new foe since they were 
tooled to destroy near-peer militaries rather than defeat armed non-state actors 
such as insurgents.79 In hindsight, van Creveld was correct: Today’s militaries 
no longer fight other militaries and the overwhelming majority of casualties in 
warfare are civilians.80  
 Almost a decade later, van Creveld observed that the post–Cold War 
era was epitomized by ‘political splintering, decentralisation, even 
disintegration’. This led to ‘vast’ increases of power by non-state actors who 
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wielded ever-increasing influence in international relations. With political 
decentralisation, populations would feel allegiance to pluralities of political 
units, whether they were sovereign states, religious communities, multinational 
corporations, or ethnic groups. These political units might occasionally go to 
war against one another, and would likely take the form of enduring low 
intensity conflict, such as an insurgency. Moreover, these conflicts would be 
bloody, since armed non-state actors were unconstrained by or uninterested in 
international laws of war, which were constituted to govern interstate conflict. 
As van Creveld concluded, ‘this process is fast taking us back to the Middle 
Ages’.81 
 The evidence for neomedievalism that Bull sought but failed to find 
during the Cold War is plentiful in the post–Cold War era, alongside a 
resurgence of interest in the idea. Treatments of this concept have spanned 
both popular and scholarly fields. Popular writings on the idea tend to 
sensationalise it, foretelling nightmarish scenarios such as Robert Kaplan’s 
widely read article, ‘The Coming Anarchy’, which assumes civil war 
experiences in West Africa as the model for the future collapse of civilisation, 
leaving readers believing that they must invest in a castle for survival in the 
twenty-first century.82 Similarly, Alain Minc’s bestselling Le Nouveau Moyen Age 
portrays the future as disorder but disguises it as the Middle Ages. As he makes 
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clear, ‘the new Middle Ages, like the old ones, correspond to a mobile world 
without a centre, where nothing is definitively fixed’.83 He goes on to describe a 
future less reminiscent of the Middle Ages and more evocative of the 
Hobbesian state of nature, which exists as ‘war of all against all’ where life is 
‘solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short’.84 Such all-or-nothing dichotomous 
approaches to the Middle Ages versus modernity, disorder versus order, betray 
an unexamined prejudice toward the status quo of the Westphalian system. 
However, such hyperbolic and ahistorical readings of the past do not serve the 
present, and would be better termed as depictions of neobarbarism or a new 
Dark Age. 
  Fortunately, international relations theorists have been more 
circumspect in their approach to neomedievalism. Rather than viewing the 
Middle Ages as apocalyptic anarchy, many view them as functional chaos, 
which Alain Minc labels durable disorder.85 Rather than rationalizing the paradox 
in conventional state-centric international relations theory, neomedievalism 
instead acknowledges the fundamental reorganisation and redistribution of 
power in the system from state to non-state actors, and seeks to reorient 
international relations theory away from state-centrism and toward an 
unstructured system of overlapping authorities and allegiances to understand 
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global politics.86 As Kobrin explains, the neomedieval metaphor is a way to 
‘overcome the inertia imposed by our immersion in the present and think 
about other possible modes of political and economic organisation’.87  
 The ‘other possible modes’ are what Wolfers and Bull once supposed 
decades ago but were reluctant to support––namely, the decline of the state 
system. However, by the 1990s many theorists were observing just this. 
Friedrichs ventured that the nation-state system ‘may be coming to an end’, 
leaving a vacuum for other entities to fill in ‘a less homogeneous 
configuration’. Moreover, this trend would be global and ‘the individual’s 
allegiances are increasingly directed towards groups other than the state. This 
creates a situation of overlapping authority and multiple loyalty’.88 Mathews 
envisioned the sovereign state system replaced by a new medievalism of 
overlapping structures of authority within the same territory.89 In general, 
neomedievalists have adopted Bull’s definitions and assumptions––detailed in 
the next chapter––but apply them to the post–Cold War world, where the 
primacy of the state has waned.  
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 Many see the state system as torn between the opposed forces of 
globalisation and fragmentation, and either resist or give way to the idea of a 
new world order that appears anarchical to state-centric thinkers.90 However, 
to neomedieval adherents this new world order maintains its own logic, and 
congruent with Bull’s original formulation. 91  Verdery explains that a 
neomedieval order ‘parcels out’ political authority among various rulers rather 
than concentrating it in a single sovereign, while Caporaso describes medieval 
authority as ‘parcellized, personalized, and despatialized’. 92  Anderson uses 
neomedievalism to conceive of shared territoriality in the European Union, 
and Hirst and Thompson observe that international politics is returning to 
a polycentricism that will soon rival the Middle Ages.93 Both Gottlieb and 
Maier investigate conflicts between the nation and state and look for 
possible solutions in earlier times when sovereignty was ‘divided’ and not 
inherently territorial.94 Lipschutz articulates a global civil society similar to 
pre-Westphalia that was trans-European and supranational, and Kobrin 
argues that we are witnessing the end of the modern era and the onset of 
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what he calls the ‘postmodern political economy’, which is neomedieval: 
‘Time’s arrow may not be unidirectional. Change may not take the form of 
an evolutionary progression where each era is built upon the existing 
foundations or structures of its predecessor’.95  
 Perhaps Cerny and Duffield offer the best description of the 
neomedieval environment, which consists of several interlocking and mutually 
buttressing elements regarding overlapping jurisdictions among states and 
other actors. 96 As the international community and economy grows more 
complex and intertwined, private and non-governmental sectors increasingly 
move into functions, such as the provision of force, that were the sole domain 
of states. Territorial boundaries, both within and across states, become more 
fluid. Borders are no longer lines on a map but organic spaces organised by 
non-state authorities, such as ethno-linguistic groupings and cultural 
affiliations, as seen in much of sub-Saharan Africa, the Kurds in the Middle 
East, and Pashtu in the Central Asia. The increasing inequality and isolation of 
various marginalised groups push them toward non-state polities 97  while 
identity politics, ethnicity and multiple and fragmented loyalties grow more 
important, as amply demonstrated by the ethnic conflicts in the Balkans, Iraq, 
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Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) 
and elsewhere. Property rights, legal statutes and conventions are contested, a 
particular problem in societies with strong minority groups and weak rule of 
law. The number of ungoverned spaces and lawless areas, such as the slums of 
Jamaica, the tribal territory on the Afghanistan and Pakistan border or the 
trans-Sahel region of Africa, increase. Lastly, the disparity between the 
developed and undeveloped world increases. As Paul Collier explains, there is 
‘a group of countries at the bottom that are falling behind, and often falling 
apart’, which he calls the ‘bottom billion’ that ‘coexist with the twentieth 
century, but their reality is the fourteenth century: civil war, plague, 
ignorance’.98 Worse, according to Mike Davis in his book Planet of Slums, the 
majority of this continued growth will occur in the poor urban areas of the 
developing world, the population of which he estimates will double to four 
billion over the next generation and critically stress already over-burdened 
government institutions.99 Taken as a whole, these interlinked factors create a 
system of ‘durable disorder’ that contains rather than solves problems.100 
 Nearly all writers explicitly state that neomedievalism is a metaphor––
not a theory––even as it offers a way to comprehend the weakening of state 
power and the rise of non-state actors in global politics, which the conceptual 
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blinders of state-centrism cannot grasp. 101  As Friedrichs explains, the 
neomedieval analogy is a ‘macro-analytical tool’ aiding in the 
reconceptualisation of world politics ‘after Westphalia’,102 contextualizing the 
‘contradictory phenomena’ of rising violence in international politics alongside 
the decline of interstate warfare, the loss of the state’s monopoly of force to 
warlords and private military companies, and state failure.103 No neomedievalist 
writers have pronounced the state dead. Cerny describes the ‘hollowing out’ of 
the state as its core national institutions are being challenged but not ‘filled in’ 
by multiple layers of non-state entities, creating governance gaps.104 Morss, 
Berzins and Cullen all identify significant challenges to the state’s authority 
from supranational, international and subnational actors yet do not concede 
the state’s obsolescence.105 O’Hayon asserts that neomedievalism ‘offers a non-
zero sum conception of sovereignty’ that does not destroy the state but rather 
‘unbundles’ its territoriality, authority and sovereignty.106 Verdery and Duffield 
depict neomedievalism as the distribution of political authority among 
different actors that create zones of authority with overlapping boundaries 
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and, at the same time, no universal centre of competence.107 At its core, the 
metaphor of neomedievalism challenges the notion that state hegemony is 
natural and immutable, thus going beyond neorealism and neoliberalism, 
which allow for inter-state institutions such as NGOs and international 
organisations but are grounded in state-centricity. 108  Proponents of 
neomedievalism claim that it offers a valuable alternative perspective to current 
conundrums in understanding international politics. But at what point does the 
analogy become a theory? Writers, if they address this question at all, do so 
only obliquely. Friedrichs warns that understanding fragmentation, integration 
and state predominance in the international system through the conceptual 
lens of neomedievalism might strike some as a theoretical insinuation.109 Cantir 
and Schrodt claim that neomedievalism can change international relations 
theory not through ‘a Kuhnian revolution but a Lakatosian statement that a 
new perspective can explain the same phenomena conventional international 
relations theories can, as well as more material that remains untouched by 
these approaches’. 110  Neomedievalism holds promise as a theory for 
understanding a non-state-centric international system, but as Cantir and 
Schrodt caution, ‘neomedievalism’s implicit assertion of superiority to state-
centric approaches, however, still lacks a serious theoretical justification 
backed up by works in the philosophy of science’.111  
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More Than a Metaphor 
However, in practice, neomedievalism is more than a metaphor, and perhaps is 
best understood as an ideal or pure type. An ideal type imagines a hypothetical 
concept in the abstract that acts as a scheme for understanding a complex 
phenomenon, as direct analysis of the proverbial real world is difficult because 
it is too complex, messy and ambiguous to derive a clear understanding of root 
causes, correlations and concepts. This is especially true in the social sciences, 
which do not enjoy the same degree of observable, empirical and measurable 
data as the natural sciences do to advance knowledge. The ideal type is a useful 
methodological middle ground between overly broad theoretical speculation 
and too-narrow historical example because it allows the investigator to isolate 
key variables yet clears the mists of excessive complexity.  
 Implicit in Plato’s forms as well as Aristotle’s constitutions, the ideal 
type was later honed as a social science technique by Max Weber at the 
beginning of the twentieth century. Initially Weber conceived of the ideal type 
as a means of replacing intuition when analysing the behaviours of societies 
with different values and worldviews (Weltanschauungen). 112  This requires 
creating a ‘pure’ idealization of the world that is fictional and ‘cannot be found 
empirically anywhere in reality’ and then comparing it against the real world.113 
As such, the ideal type has no external validity because it does not correspond 
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to any historical actuality, yet it renders information for analysis by functioning 
as a comparative benchmark. Clausewitz uses the methodology in On War by 
establishing an idealized version of war, which he calls absolute war, and 
compares it to war in practice, which he terms real war. From this he derives a 
good number of his conclusions about the nature of war. 114  By tracking 
changes over time between ideal and real worlds, we can search for patterns in 
the skeins of history and induce where the real world might be heading.  
Weber later reconceptualized the ideal type to accommodate empirical 
observations of the societies he studied, and this kind of ideal type serves as 
the main mode of inquiry for this thesis, buttressed by a case study. Rather 
than creating an ideal type for strictly comparative analysis against the real 
world, he reimagines it as a blueprint to understand a complex situation. Like 
the first ideal type, it is an abstract construct that does not exist in reality. 
However, it differs in that it emphasizes one or more key attributes of the 
phenomenon being studied to measure real-world events and organise them 
into a comprehensive theoretical whole. As he explains, ‘an ideal type is 
formed by the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view’ 
according to which ‘concrete individual phenomena … are arranged into a 
unified analytical construct’.115 Such an ideal type is not meant to serve as the 
basis of a comparative analysis but rather as a basic blueprint to understand a 
greater phenomenon. Its main advantage over a highly theoretical idea or a 
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specific historical example is that it can examine complex situations without 
the limitations of either. Unlike a theory, an ideal type need not claim validity 
in terms of a reproduction of or correspondence with social reality; its validity 
need be ascertained only in terms of adequacy. Unlike a specific historical 
example, it can capably investigate supra-historical events that span time and 
place. This thesis hopes to find evidence for neomedievalism as an ideal type, 
with an eye toward a general theory.  
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Chapter  2 
  
Evidence o f   
Global ised Neomedieval ism  
 
 
The further back you look, the further forward you can see 
––Winston Churchill 
 
 
Life at the court of King Roger II of Sicily (1095–1154) might prove surprising 
to modern readers, who perhaps associate the Middle Ages with ignorance, 
violence and suffering––the proverbial Dark Ages. Life in medieval Sicily was 
comparatively safe, urbane and globalised. The architecture of the king’s 
Palazzo Reale in Palermo, like the society surrounding it, was infused with 
Norman, Arab and Byzantine influences. Upon entering its doors, a time 
traveller would hear French, Latin, Greek, Arab and Hebrew freely spoken on 
topics ranging from the international silk trade, the latest news from the distant 
Levant of the Second Crusade or the protection of minorities under Roger’s 
laws, which blended Christian Norman law, sharia and Justinian Roman code. 
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Courtiers swapping scuttlebutt at the portcullis might include the Arab 
geographer Muhammad al-Idrisi, the Greek historian Nilus Doxopatrius and 
the archdeacon of Catania, who translated Plato’s Meno and the Phaedo, brought 
from Constantinople, into Latin. The king himself, though Norman, spoke 
fluent Arabic and was fond of Arabic culture. He employed Muslim scholars, 
poets and scientists, and used Arab troops and siege engines in his campaigns 
for southern Italy. His chief enemy was not a rival state but the pope, who 
hired mercenaries to raid Roger’s lands in southern Italy. However, Pope 
Innocent II was not the only non-state actor with power in Roger’s world; he 
also had to contend with societies such as the Templar knights, semi-
autonomous cities such as Bari and families with great reach such as the 
Bavarian houses of Welf and Babenberg. This medieval world order, though 
perhaps more chaotic than our own, did not collapse into anarchy for want of 
a strong state-centric system. 
 In The Anarchical Society, Hedley Bull proposed five criteria to test for 
the possibility of neomedievalism in the modern era: the technological 
unification of the world, the regional integration of states, transnational 
organisations, the disintegration of states, and the restoration of private 
international violence.116 Writing in 1977, Bull examined each of these features, 
and though he found some substantiation of neomedievalism (e.g., the 
European Community), he concluded, as mentioned in the previous chapter, 
that the evidence lacked sufficient ‘utility and viability’ to refute the state 
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system of his day.117 However, since the end of the Cold War scholars have re-
assessed these themes, albeit rarely through the lens of neomedievalism, and 
have found compelling proof for at least four of the five features of 
neomedievalism. Significantly, these conditions are causally linked and 
mutually reinforcing. Taken together, they have created a parallel international 
political economy that competes––and at times is at war with––the legitimate 
political economy of Bull’s society of states. 
The Technological Unification of the World 
For thirteenth-century Venetians, the world was ‘flat’ in that it was globally 
connected across boundaries and borders, both natural and artificial. The 
geography of their imagination saw a planet of endlessly changing trade routes, 
networks and opportunities that extended over land and sea. Venetian 
merchants such as Marco Polo travelled through the known world and beyond 
by ship or caravan in search of new markets and merchandise ranging from 
spices and gems to salt and slaves. The world also came to Venice as it was a 
hub of international trade and a clearinghouse of goods from Africa, the 
Middle East and Western Europe. Such cosmopolitan bustle moved 
Shakespeare to exclaim through Antonio in The Merchant of Venice that ‘the 
trade and profit of the city / Consisteth of all nations’.118  
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Venetian trade was synonymous with globalisation as the city’s traders 
forged partnerships and complex networks with distant lands that cut across 
ethnic and religious divisions. Arabs, Jews, Turks, Greeks and Mongols 
became trading partners even when they seemed to be political enemies. 
Cultures, customs, and language intermingled that endure to this day. For 
example, the English word arsenal comes from the Italian arzenale, which can 
mean a place to store weapons or a dockyard and was the term Venetians used 
to describe a large wharf in their city renowned as a centre of shipbuilding. 
Arzenale in turn is derived from the Arabic dar as-sina’ah, which literally means 
‘house of manufacture’ or ‘workshop’. In 1886, a London football club was 
named for the Royal Arsenal, Woolwich, where the original players worked. 
Medieval Venice was globalisation incarnate.119 
Eight hundred years later the world is ‘flat’ once more, levelled not by 
ship and caravan but by jet plane and telecommunication. The contemporary 
technological unification of the world and subsequent globalisation is one of 
the most widely studied phenomena of the post–Cold War era, in both 
scholarly and popular literatures, and has been called the ‘the leitmotif of our 
age’.120 The sheer scale and scope of worldwide interconnectedness through 
technology has touched every sphere of life: political, economic, social, 
cultural, intellectual. Globalisation is a broad concept that defies easy 
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definition, and descriptions of the phenomenon range widely from the narrow 
‘integration of the world-economy’ to the expansive ‘growth of supra-
territorial relations between people’.121 In general, globalisation refers to the 
growing interconnectedness and interdependence among individuals, families, 
communities, states and regions around the world, enabled through technology 
and linking their fates together in profound ways. This has transformed the 
geography of social relations, liberating people from their ties to physical 
territory and creating networks that are relatively distanceless and borderless. 
Unification in this context does not infer a single utopian international society, 
since fragmentation and unevenness also characterise globalisation.122 Rather, it 
simply refers to the crescendo of interconnectedness due to technological 
revolution. On a planet knit together by myriad worldwide transportation 
possibilities and technological communications taking place almost 
instantaneously, national borders––and those who control them––matter less. 
 Globalisation is not a new phenomenon; as sceptics of contemporary 
globalisation have argued, in some ways the world was more connected in the 
period between 1870 and 1914 than it is now. Paul Hirst and Grahame 
Thompson contend that current cross-border activities have not upended the 
state. First, they claim that advocates of globalisation do not present sufficient 
evidence that supranational actors are consistently decisive over states in the 
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international system. International organisations that have the power to shape 
markets, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), are 
comprised of states, and the majority of multinational corporations operate 
from specific country bases, leaving the state in control of economic affairs 
through regulation, taxes and welfare spending. Lastly, the internationalisation 
of trade, capital flows and the monetary system is hardly unique to the present 
day. To demonstrate this, they compare the present world economy to that of 
the belle époque. Using various macroeconomic measures, they show that the 
integration of a century ago equals present levels. They acknowledge the vast 
historical variations between the two time periods, but aver that their purpose 
is simply to ‘register a certain scepticism over whether we have entered a 
radically new phase in the internationalisation of economic activity’.123 They 
conclude that internationalism does not create a supra-territorial ‘global order’, 
and that the most important relationships in the international system are still 
among states. However, a weakness of their argument lies in treating 
globalisation as a purely economic phenomenon, and then drawing broad 
political, social and cultural inferences from an essentially economic analysis. 
Meanwhile, hyperglobalists claim that today’s globalisation is 
historically unique and will subsume the state by undermining its ability to 
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control its economy, society and ultimately destiny. Common slogans such as 
‘think globally, act locally’ and the awkward term ‘glocalisation’ encapsulate 
Roland Robertson’s wonderful neo-Parsonian description of globalisation as a 
‘two-fold process involving the universalisation of particularism and the 
particularisation of universalism’. 124  Anthony Giddens classically describes 
globalisation as the stretching of social connections between the local and the 
distant on an intense worldwide scale. 125  These processes side-step state 
boundaries and the clutches of sovereignty, a condition which has garnered 
many arguments and labels, such as ‘supra-territoriality’, ‘borderless world’, 
‘retreat of the state’, ‘epochal transformation’, ‘epochal shift’, ‘paradigm shift’, 
‘the end of the world as we know it’, and the constant reframing of the ‘new’ 
(e.g., ‘the new freedom of capital’, ‘new speed, new polarisation’, ‘new 
extraterritoriality’, ‘new expropriation’, ‘new global elite’, etc.). 126  Directly 
challenging Hirst and Thompson’s thesis, David Held, Anthony McGrew, 
David Goldblatt, and Jonathan Perraton claim that the distinctions of 
territorial power are eroding and being replaced with ‘a new geography of 
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power and privilege which transcends political borders and regions’.127 Their 
book, Global Transformations: Politics, Economics, and Culture, is one of the most 
cited works on the topic and considered seminal by many.128 Bull himself 
concedes, after he wrote The Anarchical Society, that although globalisation is 
responsible for many new ills in the contemporary world, it has also fostered 
‘the growth of a cosmopolitan moral awareness’.129 
 To date, of course, states have not disappeared, but nor can 
globalisation be facilely dismissed as ‘globaloney’. 130  Cheap and accessible 
modern technology has transformed global politics by radically increasing the 
velocity, breadth and depth of information sharing and interaction among 
humans, unifying the world in fundamental ways at the expense of states’ 
absolute power. Even most sceptics acknowledge that we exist in something 
more than an international economy because the economic fortunes of states, 
non-states and regions are so interlinked. Production, trade and finance have 
become homogenised and consumerism has fostered an integrated world 
economy, which until recently has boomed. According to the World Bank, the 
gross domestic product (GDP) of the world multiplied by an incredible factor 
of forty-five over the past four decades, from $1.35 trillion in 1960 to $61.1 
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trillion in 2008. From 2000 to 2008 alone, world GDP nearly doubled.131 When 
there is an economic recession in one country, it can affect the world, as seen 
with the East Asian recession of 1997, collapse of the Argentinean economy in 
2002, and the United States sub-prime mortgage crisis in 2007. Nearly 
everywhere jobs, production, savings and investments are connected.  
 The financial interdependence has bred a durable disorder, internally 
chaotic but stable overall, within the international system. The global 
economic integration of commerce, finance and production has linked the 
economic destinies of state and non-state actors alike. This, in turn, 
incentivises all actors to work collectively to maintain a stable status quo and 
create conditions of global constancy that ensure continuing profitable 
markets. Walter Russell Mead calls this ‘sticky power,’ which has the potential, 
he claims, to ‘help stabilize Iraq, bring rule of law to Russia, and prevent armed 
conflict between the United States and China’.132 Whether a country can wield 
‘sticky power’ on a grand strategic level, as Mead asserts, is questionable.133 
Regardless, it is a useful concept that illustrates one aspect of neomedievalism: 
Sticky power promotes a stable yet laissez-faire order, by which countries have 
less incentive to challenge each other because their economies are intertwined. 
A good example of sticky power is the relationship between the United 
States and China. As of May 2010, China owned $867.7 billion or nearly a 
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quarter of United States sovereign debt, and this significant investment 
discourages each power from bellicose confrontation with the other. 134 
However, this durable disorder is uneasy, as some United States policymakers 
fear that China might try to leverage its large holdings of United States debt 
against United States policies it opposes. Chinese government officials are 
reported to have suggested that China could diversify its investments of 
foreign exchange reserves away from dollar-denominated assets to those that 
offer higher rates of returns. Or, China could dump, or threaten to dump, a 
large share of its holdings to prevent the United States from implementing 
trade sanctions against China’s currency policy or challenging China on its sub-
standard human rights record. However, despite occasional sabre rattling by 
both countries, it seems unlikely that the United States and China will seriously 
challenge each other, at least in the near future, as their economies are too 
dependent on each other. As in the Middle Ages, durable disorder prevails 
because actors are incentivised to maintain stability. 
Beyond Markets 
Globalisation extends past economics and into other spheres of human activity 
consistent with neomedievalism. Modern telecommunications and 
transportation technologies have transformed social organisation by linking 
distant communities together in ways that were beyond comprehension in 
Bull’s day. Now far-flung ethnic groups, diaspora communities and Benedict 
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Anderson’s imagined communities can unite in ways that were unthinkable a 
generation ago. 135  Since 1998, mobile telephone subscriptions have risen 
exponentially, from 5 per cent to 68 per cent globally, and internet use has 
grown from 400 million users in 2000 to 1.8 billion by 2009. This expansion is 
not limited to the developed world, either: The digital divide between the 
developed and developing world is closing. In the developing world, mobile 
telephone subscriptions have increased 45 per cent and internet use 17 per 
cent over the past ten years.136 All trends seem to indicate that these numbers 
will continue to increase.  
 The technological unification of distant communities has resulted in 
the deterritorialisation of politics by facilitating non-territorial polities based on 
identity, religion, ethnicity and culture that compete with the state for the 
loyalty of individuals, creating mixed allegiances. An extreme example of this is 
the case of the DC Five, in which five young American Muslims living in the 
suburbs of Washington, DC became radicalized by local Islamic militant 
groups and Muslim critiques of the war in Afghanistan on the internet. Over 
time, their primary loyalty shifted from their country to their religious identity 
as Muslims, and in June 2009 they left Washington and flew to Pakistan to 
enter an al-Qa’ida training camp to wage jihad against United States forces in 
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Afghanistan. They were captured by Pakistani anti-terrorism units and 
sentenced to ten years in prison.  
Another example of shifting allegiances is the case of Faisal Shahzad––
the Times Square bomber––a Pakistani-American who attempted to detonate a 
car bomb in New York City in May 2010. Born in Kashmir, he attended a 
Pashtu Muslim school in Saudi Arabia and then moved to the United States to 
study business and work as a financial analyst. Before his attempted bombing, 
there was no indication of violence or radical tendencies. He was, however, 
‘inspired’––his word––by the radical sheik Anwar al-Awlaki, who lives in 
Yemen and preaches on the internet for faithful Muslims around the world to 
wage jihad against the United States in Afghanistan.137 Through the internet, al-
Awlaki connected Shahzad to the Pakistani Taliban’s Baitullah Mehsud, who 
arranged for Shahzad’s terrorist training at a camp in Pakistan. In his suicide 
video he praises Mehsud and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, founder of al-Qa’ida in 
Iraq (also known as Al-Qa’ida in Mesopotamia), and says: ‘The attack on the 
United States will be a revenge for all the mujahedeen and oppressed 
Muslims…. Eight years have passed since the Afghanistan war and you shall 
see how the Muslim war has just begun and how Islam will spread across the 
world’.138 Modern technology has created a unified world in which ‘politics 
everywhere, it would seem, are related to politics everywhere else’.139 
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  Technological transcendence of physical borders allows politics to 
bypass the state and distinctions between domestic and international affairs 
lose their validity as political affairs become globalised. This creates a second 
and concomitant transformation within the international system, namely the 
denationalisation of authority. Since human community is no longer fully 
constrained by physical proximity, the state and its role in physically mediating 
relationships between people becomes less important and powerful in global 
politics. Instead, societies are increasingly organised on a trans-national, trans-
regional or trans-continental basis. 140  Technology, in short, has realized 
Marshall McLuhan’s ‘global village’,141 producing an international neomedieval 
environment where physical boundaries and the notion of a supreme authority 
in a given territory are increasingly irrelevant.  
The Regional Integration of States 
In the late fourteenth century Europe had a problem: it had two popes. In 
1378 a papal schism over politics rather than theology split the Catholic 
Church as two men simultaneously claimed to be the true pope, one seated in 
Rome and the other in Avignon, plunging Europe into strife as kings, princes, 
priests, abbots and individuals were forced to choose sides in what became 
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known as the Great Schism. 142  After several decades, a false start at 
reconciliation at Pisa, and a third pope later, resolution was finally achieved at 
the Councils of Constance from 1414 to 1418, which restored the single 
papacy to Rome in addition to other important Church matters.143 It also 
marked two other significant events in the history of states and sovereignty. 
First, it was the first ecumenical council organised along national rather than 
religious lines and presided over by an emperor instead of a pope. According 
to Martin Wight, this was the genesis moment of the modern state system: 
‘The modern secular sovereign state-system arose from the ruins of the 
medieval international papal monarch. The dividing line between the two is 
clearly marked by the Council of Constance’.144 Second, the famous Haec sancta 
decree stripped the pope of his supreme authority and vested it into a council 
or assembly of members from different states and church organisations. 
Moreover, this representative assembly had power over any single authority, 
even the pope.145 
Like the Council of Constance, the regional and worldwide integration 
of states pool their sovereignty into international organisations, such as the 
UN, that can claim authority over individual member states for the greater 
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good. The idea would be anathema to traditional Westphalian idealists but 
modern times call for pre-modern measures, especially to meet the challenges 
of globalisation. As the benefits of interconnectedness grow, so do the 
difficulties, and there has been recognition that transnational problems such as 
climate change and terrorism require global solutions. This has led to an 
expansion in both size and scope of international organisations, also known as 
intergovernmental organisations.  
A century ago there were a dozen or so international organisations, 
which were European and existed mostly to coordinate international economic 
transactions and technical matters, such as railroad and telegraph standards.146 
Today there are over 355 international organisations ranging from regional 
organisations, such as the African Union, European Union and Organisation 
of American States, to issue-oriented international organisations, such as the 
World Intellectual Property Organisation, World Trade Organisation and 
International Criminal Police Organisation (INTERPOL).147 The European 
Union, Organisation of American States, and International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) are primarily comprised of states, maintain formal procedures, and 
generally focus on a region or single policy issue. Meanwhile, UN work has 
become more important across many policy issues. 
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In theory, international organisations allow states to pool their 
sovereignty for their collective interests and co-ordinate their efforts in dealing 
with transnational issues. This is not an affront to the state system, according 
to Bull, because the integration of several smaller states into a larger one does 
not countermand the primacy of sovereignty. Nor would Bull view a hybrid 
form of interstate governance, such as the UN, as a threat to sovereignty 
because states nominally control it. However, the power of international 
organisations has grown significantly since Bull’s day at the expense of states 
and the salience of the state system.  
 The core concern surrounding today’s international organisations is the 
axiomatic question: Is the sum greater than the whole of the parts? Have 
international organisations transcended the hive-mind of their constituent 
states and become unique political actors in their own right? If so, they can 
challenge states’ authority and compete for the allegiance of their citizens, 
which would indicate neomedievalism. Intergovernmentalists, like Bull, answer 
this question with a clear no. International organisations are firmly controlled 
by states, which would not act against their own interests by empowering an 
international organisation to behave as a sovereign. From their realist’s 
perspective, states create these institutions to preserve and potentially expand 
their interests as well as to facilitate negotiations; ultimately, integration is little 
more than a series of bargains among states. Owing to this, Stanley Hoffman, 
an early proponent of the intergovernmentalist position, observes that ‘any 
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international system would be likely to produce diversity rather than synthesis 
among the units’ because states would not willingly relinquish power by 
submerging their sovereignty into a collective.148 
 Supranationalists, however, consider the possibility that some 
international organisations may develop into political actors in their own right, 
whether states permit it or not. The creation of common institutions with 
independent decision making authority that infringes on state sovereignty, 
combined with supranational laws, allows some international organisations to 
impose constraints on member states and act with a degree of autonomy not 
originally envisaged. Supranationalists view the commission within the 
European Union as the primary driver of the integration process rather than its 
member states. A prominent neomedieval theme within European studies is 
the shift of loyalties from the member states toward a new centre of authority 
and decision-making within the European Union, producing an autonomous 
institution. Ernst Haas explains political integration as ‘a process where actors 
shift their loyalties and expectations toward a new centre, whose institutions 
posses or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states. The end 
result of a process of political integration is a new political community, 
superimposed over the pre-existing ones’.149 International organisations thus 
                                                
148 Ben Rosamond, Theories of European Integration (Hampshire, UK: Palgrave, 2000), 76; Stanley Hoffmann, 
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erode the state system by challenging the state’s monopoly on authority and 
allegiance, and the trend of them doing so is on the rise.  
  Many international organisations today aspire for power within the 
international system and flex their authority by establishing supranational legal 
regimes that directly intervene in the domestic affairs of states. This creates 
mixed authorities in the system, pitting state law against international law. 
According to one theorist, the European Union ‘is a highly developed system 
for mutual interference in each other’s domestic affairs, right down to beer and 
sausages’.150 Similarly, the governing principles of the Organisation for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), comprised of fifty-six member states, 
covers a swath of domestic political concerns including democratic 
procedures, treatment of minorities, gender issues, and freedom of the press. 
According to its Charter for European Security, the OSCE affirms its 
commitment to ‘eliminate all forms of discrimination against women’, the 
‘obligation to conduct free and fair elections’, and a commitment to 
‘independent media’. 151 The charter reads less like a security agenda and more 
like a domestic political program for states, overseen by an international 
organisation.  
 Some international organisations even uphold a doctrine of intrusive 
verification, allowing them to invasively investigate selected domestic political 
affairs within a state on pain of international sanction. At present, this is most 
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151  OSCE, Istanbul Summit 1999 (Istanbul: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 1999), 
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readily seen in the realm of arms control. The International Atomic Energy 
Agency has conducted compulsory inspections of weapons sites in Iraq, Iran 
and North Korea to ensure compliance with the nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty. In 2005 the organisation won the Nobel peace prize for its work, 
which defenders of sovereignty might find unsettling. However, intrusive 
verification is not limited to countries in the so-called Axis of Evil.152 The 
Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, which the OSCE helps manage, 
mandates that parties to the treaty must declare the location of their heavy 
weapons, which are also limited by the treaty, and allow inspections.153 Nor is 
intrusive verification limited to the security sphere. The IMF and Organisation 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) maintain invasive 
systems of economic surveillance and compliance as part of loan 
conditionality. In the social and political arena, international courts claim 
jurisdictions which compete with states in their own territories to try 
individuals for committing crimes against international––that is, supranational–
–law. The Strasbourg Court of Human Rights investigates crimes committed 
within states and then renders judgment, potentially against state officials, in 
accordance with the court’s interpretation of international law. The 
International Criminal Court (ICC) is an even more powerful example. 
                                                
152 George W. Bush, “State of the Union Address, 29 January 2002,” Quoted in Ben Barber, “US Weighs 
N. Korea Speech,” Washington Times 22 (2002). 
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 A Sum Greater Than Its Parts 
Established in 2002, the ICC is a permanent tribunal at The Hague that 
prosecutes individuals for genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and 
the crime of aggression (although at present it cannot exercise jurisdiction over 
the crime of aggression). Its mandate is to buttress not states but another 
international organisation, the UN, and to ‘guarantee lasting respect for and 
the enforcement of international justice’.154 The criminal code it enforces is 
sourced in the 1998 treaty known as the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, which establishes the court and spells out the law on genocide, 
crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crimes of aggression. So far, 111 
countries are party to the statute, though three of the five veto powers on the 
Security Council––China, Russia and the United States––have not signed up. 
They are concerned that the court’s authority would impede their own, 
restricting their latitude in areas ranging from warfare to domestic law 
enforcement.  
 The ICC fosters overlapping authorities and allegiances by displacing 
national law and placing international legal obligations directly on individuals 
rather than their governments. It does this in several ways. First, in a vivid 
departure from the Westphalian order, the ICC claims universal jurisdiction at 
the expense of member states’ domestic jurisdictions. Universal jurisdiction 
elevates the ICC to a political actor on the world stage by replacing 
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government with governance and defining criminal conduct for all persons, 
including senior officials of states and military personnel.155 In some cases the 
court may investigate and try citizens of states that have not signed or ratified 
the Rome Statute.156 The ICC even issues arrest warrants for heads of state 
such as Sudan’s president Omar Al-Bashir or Libya’s president Moammar 
Gadhafi for ‘crimes against humanity’.  
Second, the court attempts to supplant justice for foreign policy. Many 
who desire an independent judiciary within global politics often presume that 
the foreign policy of states impedes international justice, as demonstrated by a 
senior European Union commissioner, Emma Bonino, during the Rome treaty 
negotiations when she asserted that ‘foreign policy may well be the last vanity 
of nations’.157 This assumes that judicial activities function in isolation from 
other international processes, which is wrong as demonstrated by Scotland’s 
decision to release Abdelbaset Ali al-Megrahi, the ‘Lockerbie bomber’, for 
reasons of justice and compassion. According to Kenny MacAskill, Scottish 
cabinet secretary for justice, he was ‘bound by Scottish values to release him’ 
and allow him to die in his home country.158  
                                                
155 For more on how governance has replaced government, see: R.A.W. Rhodes, “The New Governance: 
Governing Without Government,” Political Studies 44, no. 4 (1996): 652-667. 
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Despite MacAskill’s noble intentions, international politics soon caught 
up with Scottish justice. Megrahi received a hero’s welcome in Tripoli by 
Gaddafi himself, who boasted a ‘big victory’ causing international uproar. 
Victim’s groups were outraged and the Scottish parliament was recalled from 
its summer break to question the government’s decision. The United 
Kingdom’s prime minister, David Cameron, expressed regret over the decision 
and United States’ president Obama bluntly exclaimed, ‘I think all of us here in 
the United States were surprised, disappointed and angry about the release’.159 
Later MacAskill recalled his decision was a ‘matter of great regret’, 
demonstrating that foreign policy can never be disassociated from judicial 
action that crosses national borders.160 
 Third, the court circumvents member-state oversight through weak 
checks and balances, allowing the ICC to function more autonomously. The 
Rome treaty gives broad authority to the ICC’s prosecutors yet does not make 
them accountable to states. Nor is the court directly answerable to the UN 
because it is legally and functionally independent. Unlike with other courts of 
international law, such as the International Court of Justice, the UN does not 
retain the sole power to refer a case to the ICC and the Rome treaty waters 
down the veto power of the Security Council. Under the treaty, any case 
proposed by the prosecutor and approved by the judges will proceed unless 
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there is full support by the permanent five to stop a case. This departs from 
past practices, such as the ad hoc tribunals for Rwanda and the Former 
Republic of Yugoslavia, which required a Security Council vote for each case 
to move forward. Without Security Council oversight, it is difficult for states to 
restrain overzealous and unaccountable prosecutors who seek to politicize 
justice and exploit the court’s unprecedented authority.  
Under the treaty, the ICC prosecutor may only be removed in the 
event of serious misconduct or breach of duty, but in reality a roving 
prosecutor is not easily restrained since he or she is limited solely by a pre-trial 
chamber that determines whether the prosecutor may go forward and issues 
orders and warrants. Other ambiguities abound within the court’s constitution: 
definitions and elements of crimes, nebulous criterion for judges, jurisdiction 
or the mechanism by which a trial commences, rules of evidence and 
procedure and state cooperation obligations versus sovereign privilege. The 
lack of rigor and oversight of the court renders it an actor in rather than a 
servant of international relations. 
 Fourth, the overlapping authorities of the ICC with states within a 
given territoriality produce mixed allegiances among individuals, who face the 
dilemma of whether their duty is to national or international law. Nowhere is 
this predicament more apparent than soldiers in wartime, who are expected to 
obey lawful orders in combat; those who fail to do so face court martial to 
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maintain military effectiveness and discipline.161 It is unclear how soldiers might 
act in combat if they believed that, by following the orders of their superior 
officer, they could be arrested, tried and incarcerated at The Hague. Such 
confusion over the duelling mandates of state versus ICC authority is deadly in 
war, which is why President Bush instructed soldiers deploying to Iraq that 
‘every person who serves under the American flag will answer to his or her 
own superiors and to military law, not to the rulings of an unaccountable 
international criminal court’. 162  Mixed authorities have begotten mixed 
allegiances, a distinctly neomedieval trait. 
The Theocracy of Human Rights 
The supranational role of the ICC is part of a wider post–Cold War trend of 
transferring the locus of sovereignty from the state to the individual, 
legitimised by human rights, which can be understood as a fundamental force 
for neomedievalism. Analogous to Church doctrine, human rights are 
principally concerned with the physical and moral well being of people; also, 
they are distinctly European in origin, making their vision of justice 
ethnocentric to some. 163  Nonetheless, human rights are an increasingly 
important political instrument in international relations, even sanctioning 
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military interventions in Kosovo, Somalia, Rwanda, Timor Leste and other 
countries since the early 1990s. The concept of human rights allows 
international organisations, such as the UN, to act as self-proclaimed guardians 
of individuals’ human rights versus a state’s right to rule––again, creating an 
authority that overlaps and competes with state sovereignty. 
 The intellectual archaeology of human rights is complex, Christian, and 
European. The idea that human rights represent universal moral laws that 
override state laws stems from the Western Christian doctrine of natural law, 
as espoused by Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, Hugo Grotius and others.164 In 
the Middle Ages, when popes and princes vied for the fealty of individuals in 
the same territory, the duality between natural and civil law created overlapping 
authorities and allegiances. Emperors, kings and princes exercised authority in 
ways analogous to modern states. They passed and enforced laws, collected 
taxes, adjudicated disagreements between citizens and entered into diplomatic 
relations with other kingdoms and fealties. While these secular leaders looked 
after the physical welfare of their subjects, the Church ministered to those 
same subjects’ spiritual well being and claimed universal jurisdiction in the 
name of God. The pope had many ways to extend the Church’s political 
authority, however. The Church could issue directives to the faithful that 
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contravened the laws of the civil government. The pope could ex-
communicate kings and all their subjects, denying them entry to heaven and 
delegitimising them on earth in the eyes of the pious. The Church also 
extracted resources from land, at the expense of kingdoms, through the tithe 
tax and other schemes. It could raise or hire armies to march against 
uncooperative kings or persuade allied kingdoms to fight on behalf of the 
Church to secure their souls’ salvation (and often treasure for their temporal 
comfort). Lastly, the Church maintained papal states until 1870, which could 
threaten neighbours. These and other elements of power made the Church a 
formidable and overlapping competitor to territory-based kingdoms.  
 The contest between sacred and temporal authorities provoked strife 
throughout the Middle Ages, as exemplified by the investiture controversy in 
the eleventh and twelfth centuries. It began as a dispute between the Holy 
Roman Emperor and the pope over control of ecclesiastical appointments, or 
investitures, of church officials such as bishops and abbots, but grew into a 
wider conflict over authority between a series of popes and kings. Before the 
conflict, the papacy nominally appointed church officials in foreign lands, since 
in practice secular authorities chose them. Pope Gregory VII challenged this in 
1075 by asserting the Dictatus Papae, a collection of canons, or Church laws, 
which decreed that the Church was founded by God alone and therefore the 
papacy was the sole universal power. This gave it authority to select or remove 
clergy, move them from see to see, and––significantly––even depose kings.  
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 Henry IV, the Holy Roman Emperor, ignored the pope’s decree and 
sent a letter to Gregory VII calling for the election of a new pope. To make his 
intentions plain, his letter to the pope opens with ‘Henry, King not through 
usurpation but through the holy ordination of God, to Hildebrand, at present 
not pope but false monk’ and concludes with ‘I, Henry, king by the grace of 
God, with all of my Bishops, say to you, come down, come down, and be 
damned throughout the ages’.165 Thus war began between factions aligned with 
the pope and the emperor––Guelphs versus Ghibellines––a conflict that 
persisted in Italy into the fifteenth century, as portrayed by the duelling 
Montague and Capulet families in Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet. Opportunistic 
princes also seized the occasion to rebel against their lieges, exchanging the 
yoke of the emperor for that of the pope and vice versa. The controversy later 
spread to other corners of Europe, in England between King Henry I and 
Pope Paschal II and also in France. After fifty years of war, the Concordat of 
Worms resolved the controversy in 1122 with the collapse of the German 
empire, a condition that would haunt central Europe until the reunification of 
Germany in the late nineteenth century. Nor is this issue strictly historical. 
Today this duelling authority is re-emerging in China, which ordains its own 
bishops for its state-run Catholic Church whom the Vatican then promptly 
excommunicates. In the words of one Catholic cardinal, ‘it’s war’. 166  The 
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foundation of Church supremacy was not based on territory but on claims to 
the moral sphere of individuals’ lives. 
 Similarly, international organisations hold sway over states by making 
universal claims of authority concerning the welfare of individuals by means of 
human rights. Not coincidently, human rights is built upon the moral edifice of 
Western Christian notions of natural law and focuses on the well being of 
individuals within states, issuing international laws that can contravene state 
laws. 167  The ICC’s claim of universal jurisdiction is based on the court’s 
commitment to the natural or ‘inalienable’ rights inherent in every human.168  
Like the Church in the Middle Ages, the global authority claimed by 
the human rights regime based on the universality of human rights remains 
controversial. In 1948 Saudi Arabia and South Africa abstained from endorsing 
the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), a foundational 
document of human rights. The universalism of human rights also challenges 
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the right of a state to determine its own norms of justice and cultural identity, 
which is a human rights violation in itself: ‘everyone may enjoy his economic, 
social and cultural rights, as well as his civil and political rights’.169 Concerns 
that the universality of human rights would threaten the customs of non-
Western peoples led to the Declaration of Indigenous Rights, adopted in 
Panama in 1984 by the NGO World Council of Indigenous People. Similarly, 
the Vienna Declaration on Human Rights in 1993 acknowledges ‘the 
significance of national and regional particularities and various historical, 
cultural and religious backgrounds’ in the face of human rights’ universalism. 
The Bangkok Declaration of Human Rights of 1993 asserts that human rights, 
as generally conceived, do not accord with ‘Asian values’ that oppose some 
Christian and democratic values.  
Islamic nations also contest the universality of human rights, claiming 
they do not account for values implicit in sharia. The 1982 Iranian 
representative to the UN, Said Rajaie-Khorassani, argued that ‘the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, which represented a secular understanding of 
the Judeo-Christian tradition, could not be implemented by Muslims’.170 This 
position was formalized in the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam 
and adopted by the fifty-six member states of the Organisation of the Islamic 
Conference in 1990. Later, the League of Arab States passed the Arab Charter 
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on Human Rights (2004, entered into force 2008). Each of these challenges to 
the universalism of human rights implicitly proposes a competing world vision 
of justice and legitimacy that sets the groundwork for a neomedieval 
environment of multiple authorities and allegiances. 
Nor is the universalism of human rights uncontested in Western 
scholarship. Academic debate concerning universalism versus cultural 
relativism generally focus on a Western tendency toward universalism and a 
non-Western tendency to highlight cultural identity.171 This is not surprising 
given the Christian-European origins of the concept and the Western values, 
ethics and norms embedded in human rights. Mohammed Ayoob argues that 
human rights smack of colonialism since they stand for Western ideas of 
progress: ‘One cannot help but notice echoes of the “standard of civilization” 
argument’, which risks ‘bifurcating international society into civilized and 
uncivilized zones’. 172  Even human rights advocate Michael Ignatieff 
acknowledges that human rights have a certain ‘imperialistic’ quality:  
Human rights doctrine is now so powerful, but also so 
unthinkingly imperialist in its claim to universality, that it has 
exposed itself to serious intellectual attack. These challenges 
have raised important questions about whether human rights 
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norms deserve the authority they have acquired: whether their 
claims to universality are justified, or whether they are just 
another cunning exercise in Western moral imperialism.173  
Countries where international human rights law and national law 
overlap and even clash are plentiful: in cases of forced child labour in 
developing states such as Uzbekistan, female genital mutilation in countries 
such as Senegal and Yemen, and police abuse in countries like China.174 
Women’s rights in Saudi Arabia provide an excellent example of human rights 
versus state laws. Gender roles in Saudi society do not originate in Western 
liberal notions of equality but sharia and Arabic tribal culture, which are 
patriarchal, with the role of honour (namus) at its centre. Many practices are 
considered objectionable and even illegal under human rights law, which 
demands equal rights for the sexes.175 Saudi law mandates the segregation of 
the sexes (purdah). Women must wear a head-to-toe veil (niqab) in public and, 
regardless of age, must have a male guardian. They may not drive, vote or be 
elected to high political positions, and are discouraged from education.  
 International human rights observers strongly condemn the Saudi 
practices and frequently accuse the country of ‘gender apartheid’.176 The 2009 
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World Economic Forum ranked Saudi Arabia 130th out of 134 countries for 
gender parity.177 Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz defended his 
country’s laws before the UN, saying, ‘it is absurd to impose on an individual 
or a society rights that are alien to its beliefs or principles’.178 Nor is the crown 
prince alone; many women in Saudi Arabia defend their customs and many 
domestic reformers reject the prescriptions of the human rights regime, 
criticizing them for ‘failing to understand the uniqueness of Saudi society’.179 
Even Maha Akeel, a Saudi journalist and critic of her government, agrees that 
the human rights criticisms are ethnocentric, hegemonic and ultimately 
unhelpful: “Look, we are not asking for … women’s rights according to 
Western values or lifestyles…. We want things according to what Islam says. 
Look at our history, our role models’.180  
The universalism of the human rights regime clashes with the 
particularism of state sovereignty, as demonstrated by the ICC’s claim of 
planetary jurisdiction and the issuance of arrest warrants for heads of state. 
Like the medieval Church, the human rights regime seeks to extend its 
authority through its own canons––international laws––that overlap with state 
authority, which is reminiscent of the Middle Ages. 
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A New Covenant 
Perhaps the most central competitor to state authority is the UN, as its post–
Cold War strategy has allowed it to gradually but inexorably elevate itself from 
intergovernmental forum to legitimate international actor rivalling states. It has 
achieved this by offering a new and competing ‘social contract’ with states’ 
citizens resulting in mixed authorities and allegiances. The idea of the social 
contract, a term coined by Jean-Jacques Rousseau, builds on natural law and 
originates with Enlightenment philosophers Thomas Hobbes and John Locke. 
Hobbes introduced the idea of individual ‘natural rights’, which are privileges 
that all humans possess by nature and are not contingent upon man-made 
laws. For Hobbes, individuals possess only the natural right to life, but later 
Locke expanded the concept to ‘human rights’, which include life, health, 
liberty and possessions; these are the basis for the United States Declaration of 
Independence’s pronouncement that every person has the inalienable right to 
life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. Similarly, the human rights articulated 
in the UDHR flow from the ‘inherent dignity’ and ‘equal and inalienable rights’ 
natural to all humans, and therefore are derived from moral imperatives 
superior to those within any system of positive law.181  
 According to contract theorists, all legitimate governments are obliged 
to protect the rights of their citizens. In exchange the citizens consent to live 
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by the state’s rule of law, so long as it does not violate their human rights. As 
the term social contract implies, the legitimacy of any governing authority rests 
on the consent of the governed, as Hobbes makes explicit: ‘the power of the 
mighty (the Leviathan) hath no foundation but in the opinion and belief of the 
people’. 182  Historically this contract or ‘covenant’ as Hobbes describes it, 
referred mainly to the relationship between a state government and its citizens, 
but the UN is engineering a new covenant between itself and all the people of 
the world, bypassing the state for people’s loyalties. Analogous to the Church 
of the Middle Ages, the UN has staked out unique authority in the 
international system by claiming universal jurisdiction over the individuals in 
order to protect their welfare in the name of human rights.  
 Like a Leviathan, the UN now polices states to ensure that they are 
fulfilling their end of the social contract to safeguard the rights of citizens, as 
outlined in the UDHR, rather than according to the states’ own interpretations 
of rights. Accordingly, this new contract promises that the UN will protect 
people from abusive governments that ‘manifestly fail’ to uphold their human 
rights in exchange for individuals’ allegiance to UN principles. This is not a 
fully novel proposition. The UN was founded in the wreckage of World War 
II to monitor governments’ performance in protecting the human rights of 
their citizens, as articulated in the UDHR adopted by the UN General 
Assembly in 1948. The UDHR represents the first global expression of rights 
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to which all human beings are entitled, and though the UN had little power to 
compel states to honour these rights at the time, through recent doctrines such 
as Responsibility to Protect (R2P), the UN has generated authority within the 
international system and legitimize its power by claiming that it is honouring 
its social contract to defend human rights of all people everywhere, even when 
that puts it at odds with the state (see Figure 1). The UN covenant pledges 
peace by curtailing state sovereignty and limiting the ‘vanity of nations’, which 
assumes a certain yet ambiguous path to conflict.183 In its place, the UN calls to 
create a worldwide, UN-led network of international organisations to maintain 
international peace and security through a self-styled cosmopolitanism 
dedicated to the ideals enshrined in the UDHR.  
Figure 1: The Creation of Overlapping Authorities 
 
The increasing authority exerted by the UN on behalf of individuals 
does not infer a reciprocal growth of individual loyalty to the UN––the UN is 
not the Roman Catholic Church. The UN does not command the degree of 
individual allegiance that the Church does either in the Middle Ages or today, 
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nor does this thesis suggest it someday will. But this does not diminish some 
of the parallels between the UN and the medieval Church regarding how they 
create and justify overlapping authority with territorial states via the protection 
of individuals’ well-being. The medieval Church defended its heavy-handed 
political involvement in states’ internal affairs by asserting its role as 
ministering to the sacred needs of individuals. Similarly, the UN legitimizes its 
interference in the politics of modern states by asserting its responsibility to 
protect the human rights of all individuals. Such universal claims made on 
behalf of individuals everywhere allow the UN to challenge state rulers, as the 
Church did in the Middle Ages. In this way, the UN is creating overlapping 
authorities as the medieval Church did but not necessarily commensurate 
competing allegiances. 
 The UN’s new role as overseer of states rather than merely a facilitator 
of diplomacy is evident in the muscular rhetoric of Secretary-General Ban Ki-
moon, who says he ‘has an obligation to tell the Security Council––and in this 
case the General Assembly as well––what it needs to know, not what it wants 
to hear’ and that the secretary-general ‘must be the spokesperson for the 
vulnerable and the threatened when their Governments become their 
persecutors instead of their protectors or can no longer shield them from 
marauding armed groups’. He also advises the five permanent members of the 
Security Council, also known as the P5––China, France, Russian Federation, 
the United Kingdom and the United States––to voluntarily curtail their power: 
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‘I would urge them to refrain from employing or threatening to employ the 
veto in situations of manifest failure to meet obligations relating to the 
responsibility to protect … and to reach a mutual understanding to that 
effect’.184 Such proclamations from the UN Secretary-General to states would 
have likely been unthinkable during the Cold War era. But that has changed 
since the Cold War ended. 
The UN Ascension 
The UN perceived the fall of the Berlin Wall as its opportunity to transcend 
the constraints of state sovereignty. A year after the Soviet Union formally 
capitulated, then-UN secretary general Boutros Boutros-Ghali boldly declared 
that ‘the time of absolute sovereignty … has passed; its theory was never 
matched by reality’.185 He then outlined an ambitious new plan for the UN that 
re-imagined a future world order under which the UN, not states, was the 
ultimate arbiter of war and peace. The strategy, contained in a report titled An 
Agenda for Peace, begins by describing a ‘global transition’ to a new world order 
that is distinctly neomedieval in nature. It is characterized by greater regional 
integration, as ‘regional and continental associations of States are evolving 
ways to deepen cooperation and ease some of the contentious characteristics 
of sovereign and nationalistic rivalries’. The report also notes the increased 
disintegration of states due to the technological unification of the world: 
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‘National boundaries are blurred by advanced communications and global 
commerce, and by the decisions of States to yield some sovereign prerogatives 
to larger, common political associations’. This has created overlapping 
authorities and allegiances that has led to conflict, as ‘fierce new assertions of 
nationalism and sovereignty spring up, and the cohesion of States is threatened 
by brutal ethnic, religious, social, cultural or linguistic strife’. The solution, of 
course, is a more muscular UN capable of bringing about world peace and 
justice in the name of human rights: 
In these past months a conviction has grown, among nations 
large and small, that an opportunity has been regained to 
achieve the great objectives of the Charter––a UN capable of 
maintaining international peace and security, of securing justice 
and human rights and of promoting, in the words of the 
Charter, ‘social progress and better standards of life in larger 
freedom’. This opportunity must not be squandered. The 
Organisation must never again be crippled as it was in the era 
that has now passed.186 
 To ensure that the UN is never again ‘crippled’, the report lays out a 
strategy that promotes UN interference in the domestic affairs of states, such 
as a deployed UN force, in the name of safeguarding individuals’ human rights. 
The first component of the strategy is ‘preventative diplomacy’, which involves 
the UN acting as the driving mediator in conflicts, a far cry from its previous 
role as a forum for diplomacy between parties in conflict, as exemplified by the 
United States and Soviet Union during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Furthermore, 
preventative diplomacy allows the UN to conduct fact-finding missions in 
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countries and even permits the deployment of UN-authorized forces to 
militarily stop conflicts before they begin.  
The second element of the strategy is ‘peacemaking’, which is designed 
to bring hostile parties to agreement primarily through peaceful means, such as 
the International Court of Justice or World Court, which is similar to the ICC. 
However, if this is not possible the UN may use ‘peace enforcement’, which 
entails unauthorised military intervention into––some might say invasion of––
a country without its consent, in a stark departure from the principle of 
sovereignty.  
Third is ‘peacekeeping’, involving the traditional deployment of 
military forces in a conflict zone, with the consent of all warring parties, to 
maintain peace. What is new in An Agenda for Peace is the UN aspiration to field 
significantly more peacekeeping missions in the future, thus extending its 
authority and presence globally, with a broader scope of missions and 
capabilities.  
Fourth, the strategy addresses ‘post-conflict peace-building’, which 
involves developing the social, political and economic infrastructure, informed 
by a human rights agenda, to prevent further violence and consolidate the 
peace. Lastly, section VII of the strategy calls for the creation of a worldwide 
network of international organisations, led by the UN, to maintain 
international peace and security. An Agenda for Peace is a sweeping declaration 
of international organisations’ authority over states to manage global power, 
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catalysing the conditions of overlapping authorities within the international 
system. 
 Concomitantly, efforts have been underway to redefine sovereignty in 
ways that bestow new authority to international organisations. As noted in 
Chapter 1, the Westphalian notion of sovereignty held that states were the 
supreme authority within a territory, were obliged to recognize other states as 
peers, and cleaved to the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs 
of those states. Such a notion of sovereignty poses obvious problems to non-
state entities that do not possess territory, such as international organisations. 
The UN solution has been simply to reframe the parameters of sovereignty 
from being territorially based to human rights based. In the wake of the 
Rwandan genocide, Francis Deng, the UN representative of the secretary-
general on internally displaced persons, and his colleagues redefine sovereignty, 
claiming that it can no longer be seen as a protection against interference but 
rather as a charge of responsibility to uphold human rights as enshrined in the 
UDHR.187 Furthermore, they assert that when countries do not conduct their 
internal affairs in ways that meet these human rights standards, other states or 
international organisations––specifically the UN––have a duty to intervene. In 
other words, sovereignty carries a responsibility to promote the welfare and 
dignity of people, and predatory or incompetent states that fail to fulfill their 
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responsibility forfeit their sovereignty. For states, non-interference becomes a 
privilege, not a right. 
  Congruent to Deng’s understanding of sovereignty, the UN also 
reframed ‘security’ away from ‘national security’ to ‘human security’, shifting 
power to international organisations by linking peace to human rights and 
development rather than the traditional security of states. The concept was 
first articulated in the 1994 UN Development Programme’s (UNDP) Human 
Development Report, which radically redefines conflict away from the traditional 
Clausewitzian understanding of the term (see Figure 2). It is no coincidence 
that the report originates from UNDP rather than the UN security wing, the 
UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO). The report argues 
that national security matters less when ‘several states are beginning to 
disintegrate’ and the primary threats to global insecurity stem from failures of 
development––drugs, AIDS, terrorism, pollution, nuclear proliferation, 
corruption––rather than strong rival states. These new threats ‘respect no 
national border’, and ‘the search for human security lies in development, not in 
arms’.188  
By conceptualizing security and development as inextricably linked and 
mutually reinforcing, the UN endows itself with special power because it is one 
of the world’s largest suppliers of development resources and services. 
Formulating human security in terms of the economy, food, health, the 
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environment, the individual, community and politics make the well being of 
the individual central; human security is less concerned with the status of the 
state and its capital and more concerned about the broader range of threats to 
individuals that transcend national borders––another blow to the state-centric 
Westphalian system.  
Figure 2: The UN’s Re-Conceptualisation of “Security” in the Post-Cold 
War World 
 
 
 Following this new strategy for the post–Cold War world and novel 
doctrine of security, the UN began to flex its collective muscle over states in 
the form of armed ‘humanitarian interventions’:189 the UN Assistance Mission 
for Rwanda (UNAMIR) in 1994, the UN Transitional Administration in East 
Timor (UNTAET) in 1999, and the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999. 
Such grave breaches of sovereignty were anathema under the Westphalian 
system but are now a norm in the neomedieval context. Even the world’s 
greatest military superpower endorses the practice, as expressed by President 
Barack Obama in his acceptance speech of the Nobel Peace Prize: ‘I believe 
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that force can be justified on humanitarian grounds, as it was in the Balkans, or 
in other places that have been scarred by war’.190  
 The tension inherent in humanitarian intervention encapsulates that 
between the Westphalian and neomedieval orders. Such extreme violations of 
sovereignty are historically illegal under customary international law, as 
enshrined in the UN Charter itself. Article 2(4) of the Charter forbids ‘the 
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence 
of any state’ while Article 2(7) specifies that the UN cannot ‘intervene in 
matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state’ with 
the possible exception of Chapter VII peacekeeping. Yet, fifty years after it 
was founded, the UN principally authorises today’s humanitarian 
interventions, completing the organisation’s metamorphosis from 
intergovernmental body to global actor. The UN justifies the interventions 
under Article 39 of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which authorizes the 
Security Council to ‘decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with 
Articles 41 and 42, to maintain peace and security’. Article 41 stipulates that 
the Security Council may employ non-military means, such as economic 
sanctions, to enforce peace, while Article 42 empowers the Security Council to 
‘take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or 
restore international peace and security’. A Chapter VII peacekeeping mandate 
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permits a military invasion into a country to maintain international ‘peace and 
security’.  
 Although Chapter VII has been invoked several times since 1948, the 
vast majority of them have taken place after the Cold War, indicating the UN’s 
willingness to exercise this unique authority. The total number of Chapter VII 
resolutions adopted during the Cold War was seventeen, comprising only 2.6 
per cent of all security resolutions. By contrast, from 1990 to 2006 more than 
one-third of all security resolutions were adopted under Chapter VII, averaging 
over twenty per year. In 2005 and 2006, Chapter VII resolutions constituted 
more than 50 per cent of all resolutions, and in 2006 the Security Council 
approved more than forty Chapter VII resolutions.191 During the Cold War, 
the Council was reluctant to violate the principle of sovereignty, given the 
hegemonic strength of the Westphalian order, as demonstrated by the 
Council’s regime of voluntary sanctions in reaction to Rhodesia’s unilateral 
declaration of independence in 1965.192 When armed interventions occurred 
during the Cold War they were rarely justified on humanitarian grounds.193 
However, once the Security Council was freed from the bipolar shackles of the 
Cold War it demonstrated an increased willingness to intervene in countries 
for the sake of human rights, and has done so in Rwanda, East Timor, 
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Kosovo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Somalia, Burundi, Haiti, Côte d’Ivoire 
and the DRC.194  
 At the turn of the millennium, the UN took another giant leap forward 
by evolving the ‘right of humanitarian intervention’ into the ‘responsibility to 
protect’ (R2P) doctrine, demanding a UN intervention in states which fail to 
respect human rights. 195  This shift from a reactive to proactive stance 
originated in the 2001 report entitled The Responsibility to Protect, which answers 
the following question posed by Secretary General Kofi Annan: “if 
humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, 
how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica––to gross and systematic 
violations of human rights that affect every precept of our common 
humanity?”196 Influenced by Deng, the report concludes that sovereignty is not 
a right but a responsibility, and when states fail to protect the human rights of 
their citizens, the international community has a responsibility to protect those 
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individuals, even if it requires a breach of sovereignty such as an armed 
humanitarian intervention. 197  R2P concentrates on halting four crimes in 
particular––genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic 
cleansing––but at its core is a broader concern for human rights.198 
  UN member states unanimously affirmed the R2P doctrine at the 
2005 World Summit,199 and in 2009 Secretary General Ban Ki-moon released a 
report called Implementing the Responsibility to Protect that proposes a three-pillar 
strategy to realise R2P: the responsibility of states to protect their populations, 
national or not; the commitment of the international community to assist 
states in meeting those obligations; and the responsibility of member states to 
respond collectively in a timely and decisive manner when a state is manifestly 
failing to provide such protection. Citing Sovereignty as Responsibility as the new 
model of global authority, Ki-moon urges all states to embrace the ICC and 
the judgments of UN-assisted tribunals as an ‘essential tool’ for justice, noting 
that ‘national authorities should do their best to assist the International 
Criminal Court and other international tribunals in locating and apprehending 
individuals’.200 In a triumph for the human rights regime, R2P has elevated 
humanitarian intervention from an optional right to a duty, and has done so 
with the unanimous consent of states.  
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Spiritual versus Temporal Authorities 
The emerging tension between international organisations and states parallels 
the jostling between popes and kings in the Middle Ages. Wars between sacred 
and secular authorities were not uncommon, and the Church’s hand in the 
temporal affairs of states was omnipresent, from the succession of kings to the 
Crusades. Popes justified this intervention in the affairs of states by asserting 
universal jurisdiction over all human beings in order to minister to the 
salvation of their souls. As Pope Boniface VIII makes clear in a papal bull, ‘the 
temporal authority [is] to be subjected to the spiritual’ and concludes with the 
following statement: ‘We declare, announce and define that it is altogether 
necessary to salvation for every human creature to be subject to the Roman 
pontiff’.201  
The human rights regime promoted by international organisations such 
as the UN and ICC make similar claims. They too assert universal jurisdiction 
over all human individuals regardless of state borders, justified by their duty to 
safeguard human rights as enshrined in the UDHR. Like the Christian canons 
of the Middle Ages, modern human rights are framed as natural laws that 
supersede the positive law of states. The power and legitimacy of international 
law rests upon the ‘faith in fundamental human rights’, as declared in the 
preamble to the UDHR, akin to the religious belief that informs Church 
canons in the Middle Ages. Although more diplomatic than Pope Boniface 
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VIII, Ki-moon makes equally clear that the UN has authority to interfere in 
the domestic affairs of states, even using force if necessary: ‘The State, by 
fulfilling fundamental protection obligations and respecting core human rights, 
would have far less reason to be concerned about unwelcome intervention 
from abroad’.202 
 Such overlapping claims of authority have been contested fiercely, 
both in the Middle Ages and today. Frederick Barbarossa, King of Germany, 
sums up the sentiments of many temporal leaders of his time when he quotes 
the apostle and first pope Peter in defence of a king’s right to rule sans papal 
meddling: ‘Peter informed the world with this teaching, “Fear God, honour 
the king”: whoever shall say that we received the imperial crown as a benefice 
from the lord pope, contradicts the divine institutions and teachings of Peter, 
and shall be guilty of a lie’.203 Similarly, the precedent of R2P and the emerging 
power of the UN to stage military interventions in states worries both strong 
and weak states alike, such as Brazil, the Russian Federation, China, Algeria, 
and Egypt. In 1999, Algerian president Abdelaziz Bouteflika expressed these 
concerns directly in a speech given on the opening day of the General 
Assembly debates: ‘We do not deny that the UN has the right and the duty to 
help suffering humanity, but we remain extremely sensitive to any undermining 
of our sovereignty, not only because sovereignty is our last defence against the 
rules of an unequal world, but because we are not taking part in the decision-
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making process of the Security Council’.204 Even three of the five permanent 
members of the Security Council––the Russian Federation, China, and the 
United States––have expressed trepidation over the precedent set by R2P. Liu 
Zhenmin, the Chinese ambassador to the UN, bluntly said, ‘There must not be 
any wavering over the principles of respecting state sovereignty and non-
interference of internal affairs’.205 Similarly, the United States gave a tepid cheer 
to R2P but qualified its vote with a cautionary statement analogous in content, 
if not in tone, to Barbarossa: ‘the primary responsibility for protecting civilians 
lies with States and their Governments and … international efforts should 
complement Government efforts rather than assume responsibility for 
them’.206 
A succinct example of the rise of international organisations, and by 
extension globalised neomedievalism, is the controversy surrounding the 2010 
Nobel Peace Prize. Consistent with the supranationalist agenda of the human 
rights regime, the Nobel committee awarded the peace prize to imprisoned 
Chinese human rights activist Liu Xiaobo ‘for his long and non-violent 
struggle for fundamental human rights in China’.207 China, which views him as 
a criminal, immediately denounced the award as an affront to China’s 
sovereignty because it challenges the legitimate authority of the state to 
                                                
204 Barbara Crossette, “UN Chief Wants Faster Action to Avoid Slaughter in Civil Wars,” New York Times, 
September 21, 1999. 
205 Liu Zhenmin, “Statement By Ambassador Liu Zhenmin At the Plenary Session of the General 
Assembly on the Question of ‘Responsibility to Protect’,” July 24, 2009, accessed September 23, 2010, 
http://www.china-un.org/eng/hyyfy/t575682.htm. 
206 U.N. Security Council, S/PV.5319, “5319th Meeting Debate Transcript,” December 9, 2005. 
207 “The Nobel Peace Prize 2010 Liu Xiaobo,” Nobelprize.org, July 24, 2011, 
http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2010/press.html. 
  
99 
establish and enforce laws within its territorial boundaries, which is core to the 
Westphalian order. As Foreign Ministry spokesman Ma Zhaoxu said, ‘The 
Norwegian Nobel Committee, by giving the Peace Prize to a convicted person 
in China, shows no respect for the judicial system of China’ and warned 
meddling foreigners that ‘if some people try to change China’s political system 
in this way and try to stop the Chinese people from moving forward, they are 
obviously making a mistake’.208 Additionally, China formally protested Norway, 
cancelled several planned official meetings, and publicly declared that China-
Norway relations had been damaged.209 In defence of the award, Thorbjorn 
Jagland, chairman of the Norwegian Nobel Committee, boldly asserted a 
supranationalist position by claiming that states are subservient to the world 
government embodied in the UN and they must acquiesce to the norms of 
human rights: 
The idea of sovereignty changed … during the last century, as 
the world moved from nationalism to internationalism. The 
UN, founded in the wake of two disastrous world wars, 
committed member states to resolve disputes by peaceful 
means and defined the fundamental rights of all people in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The state, the 
declaration said, would no longer have ultimate, unlimited 
power. Today, universal human rights provide a check on 
arbitrary majorities around the world, whether they are 
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democracies or not. A majority in a parliament cannot decide 
to harm the rights of a minority, nor vote for laws that 
undermine human rights. And even though China is not a 
constitutional democracy, it is a member of the UN, and it has 
amended its Constitution to comply with the Declaration of 
Human Rights.210 
The controversy between China and the Nobel committee is emblematic of 
the larger shift from an international society of states to pluralistic global order 
of multiple authorities, challenging the foundations of the Westphalian order 
and characteristic of the competing authorities and allegiances that comprise 
globalised neomedievalism. 
 Just as globalisation has led to the growing irrelevance of national 
borders, international organisations have corroded the Westphalian order and 
replaced it with their own cosmopolitanism––and they have done this with the 
consent of their member states by framing the debate as one of collective self-
interest above the interests of a single state. Contrary to Bull’s assumption that 
combining smaller sovereign entities into a larger one does not impugn the 
validity of sovereignty, international organisations have proven to be more 
than the sum of their parts. The idea that international organisations could 
authorize an armed intervention into another state against its will would have 
been absolutely unthinkable to Bull; he assumed that global politics would 
remain state centric and other actors, such as the UN, could never deprive ‘the 
concept of sovereignty of its utility and viability’.211 As he wrote after The 
Anarchical Society, ‘The reluctance evident in the international community even 
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to experiment with the conception of a right of humanitarian intervention 
reflects not only an unwillingness to jeopardize the rules of sovereignty and 
non-intervention by conceding such a right to individual states, but also the 
lack of any agreed doctrine as to what rights are’.212  
 Today, sovereignty has in fact receded as governance has replaced 
government, and states are increasingly enforcing laws established by 
international organisations. For McGrew, the potent combination of 
globalisation and the rise of international organisations has created a global 
polity where ‘interests are articulated and aggregated, decisions are made, 
values allocated and policies conducted through international or transnational 
political processes’. 213  This has blurred the barrier between domestic and 
foreign affairs, or in the words of the former president of the International 
Court of Justice, Rosalyn Higgins, ‘the state can no longer protect itself by 
claiming domestic jurisdiction’.214  
 In the span of two decades since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the UN has 
successfully transformed itself from a world stage for international relations 
into an actor upon it. Many international organisations, with the UN leading 
the charge, have successfully asserted their authority among states, which must 
now share authority with external political actors within their own territory. 
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Like the Church of the Middle Ages, the universal appeal of human rights has 
given international organisations growing power to determine the legitimacy of 
rulers and sanction those they deem abhorrent to the welfare of individuals, 
such as the ICC’s decision to investigate Gadhafi for crimes against humanity 
in his brutal repression of an internal revolt.215 They have even formalized a 
doctrine of hostile military intervention against states in gross violation of 
human rights. International power that is not intrinsically rooted in territory 
and claims to safeguarding the universal welfare of all individuals is a potent 
authority. 
Transnational Organisations 
In 1338, a diplomatic mission left Europe and embarked on a perilous journey 
across central Asia to Cathay, today northern China. The envoys’ objective was 
to ‘carry letters and presents’ to the mighty Khan of the Tartars, the Mongol-
Chinese emperor, so that they might strike a treaty, enter formal diplomatic 
relations, and build an embassy at the capital of Armalec. The diplomacy in 
question did not stem from a European state but from a transnational actor, 
the Church. Pope Benedict XII sent John of Marignolli to Cathay after the 
unfortunate ‘martyrdom’ of their last diplomatic mission, and thankfully John 
proved more capable or lucky, spending several years in Cathay and Manzi, 
southern China, acting as a legate to the Khan’s court, building churches, 
                                                
215 “ICC Prosecutor to Open an Investigation in Libya,” Office of the Prosecutor, International Criminal 
Court, March 2, 2011, accessed March 4, 2011, http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/exeres/3EEE2E2A-2618-
4D66-8ECB-C95BECCC300C.htm. 
  
103 
converting pagans to Christianity, and ministering to the faithful. The great 
Khan also maintained an embassy at Avignon, where Pope Benedict XII held 
his court, and in this way both political authorities kept diplomatic relations, 
even though the Church was not a state.216  
The Church was not the sole non-state authority in Europe at the time. 
Medieval international society was teeming with transnational organisations: 
chivalric orders such as the Knights Templar and Knights Hospitaller; 
merchant and craft guilds ranging from apothecaries to wheelwrights; and 
mendicant orders such as the Franciscans, Carmelites, Dominicans and 
Augustinians, all of which depended directly on the charity of the local 
population for their livelihood rather than the Church. 
 Formalized relations between states and transnational actors were not 
uncommon during the Middle Ages and are becoming increasingly less 
uncommon today. Bull defines transnational organisations as any ‘organisation 
which operates across international boundaries, sometimes on a global scale, 
which seeks as far as possible to disregard these boundaries, and which serves 
to establish links between different national societies, or section of these 
societies’.217 In contemporary times, such actors fall into three broad categories. 
The first are NGOs such as Amnesty International, Greenpeace, Médecins 
Sans Frontières, Oxfam and the Red Cross, non-profit organisations that 
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perform important charity work and are also stakeholders in the human rights 
agenda. The second category is multinational corporations (MNCs) such as 
Exxon Mobil, Google, Wal-Mart, Ford and Bank of America, for-profit 
enterprises that maintain affiliates in at least one foreign country. The third 
category is illegal transnational organisations. Transnational terrorist 
organisations, such as al Qa’ida, are motivated principally by ideology but 
resort to terrorism and political violence to achieve their goals. International 
criminal organisations, such as South American drug cartels or organised crime 
in the Balkans, are profit-maximizing entities that resort to crime––often 
violent and sometimes horrific––to make their bottom line. As with 
globalisation and international organisations, the expansion of transnational 
organisations as global political actors has grown exponentially since Bull’s 
time, perhaps beyond what he thought possible. 
The Hagiography of NGOs 
Margaret Mead once said: ‘Never doubt that a small group of thoughtful, 
committed citizens can change the world. Indeed, it is the only thing that ever 
has’. NGOs have taken this advice to heart, and their significance in the world 
has risen dramatically over the decades. A hundred years ago there were 1,083 
NGOs. Today there are over 40,000. 218  NGOs are legally constituted 
organisations that operate independently of government in a non-commercial 
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and non-violent way to proffer charity, such as sheltering the homeless, 
feeding the poor and teaching the young. Benevolence is not new and remains 
a staple of religious organisations’ work around the world. However, NGOs 
have become the modern version of medieval ecclesiastical charities because 
they are key stakeholders in the human rights regime and willing partners to 
international organisations that seek to promulgate human rights as a source of 
political authority.219 Consequently, NGOs have risen alongside international 
organisations as political actors since the end of World War II and especially 
after the Cold War. As The Economist recounts, ‘the end of communism, the 
spread of democracy in poor countries, technological change and economic 
integration––globalisation in short––has created fertile soil for the rise of 
NGOs’.220 Today NGOs have inserted and asserted themselves as actors to be 
reckoned with in global politics.  
 The precise history of NGOs is nebulous. Some date the first NGO 
back to 1674 when the Rosicrucian Order, an educational fraternal 
organisation, was founded. Others believe the first NGO appeared in 1846 
with the formation of the World Evangelical Alliance.221 Regardless, the phrase 
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non-governmental organisation only came into fashion with the establishment of the 
UN in 1945, specifically under provisions in Article 71 of Chapter 10 of the 
UN Charter. This stipulation gives NGOs a consultative role within the UN, 
especially to the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), which codified the 
practice in 1950 by announcing eligibility standards and defining ‘international 
NGOs’ as ‘any international organisation that is not founded by an 
international treaty’.222 ECOSOC emphasized that ‘a clear distinction is drawn 
in the charter of the UN between participation without vote in the 
deliberations of the council and the arrangements for consultation’. 223 
However, from the very beginning this distinction was blurred in practice as 
NGOs have obtained some participation rights that go beyond consultation. 
By the 1990s, many references appear in UN documents to NGOs being in 
‘social partnership’ with governments. 224  The twin births of the UN and 
modern NGOs linked their destinies.  
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 The universe of NGOs is diverse and defies a single description. 
NGOs function at all levels of human society, from a two-person non-profit 
organisation that helps find stray pets new homes in a small town to global 
NGOs such as Amnesty International, which has 2.8 million supporters in 
over 150 countries and territories and won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1977 for 
its work promoting human rights.225 NGOs also work on a wide spectrum of 
issues that touch nearly every aspect of the human condition, but regardless of 
the task at hand, they fall into one of two categories. Operational NGOs seek 
to accomplish good literally from the ground up, such as providing medical 
care to the world’s most needy, as Nobel Peace Prize laureate Médecins Sans 
Frontières (MSF) does. Advocacy NGOs achieve good using a top-down 
strategy of activism to influence key decision-makers to enact change 
commensurate with the NGOs’ objectives. The distinction between 
operational and advocacy organisations, however, is imperfect because a 
growing number of large NGOs engage in both activities. 
 Both categories of NGO derive their political authority from their 
moral authority or what some might term soft power, the ability to get what you 
want through attraction and co-option rather than coercion or payments. It 
stands in contrast to hard power, the archetypical example being war, which 
Clausewitz describes as ‘an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will’.226 
Writing at the finale of the Cold War, Joe Nye coined the term soft power to 
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prescribe how the United States might best wield its superpower status in a 
new unipolar world,227 but the concept in international relations is not new: It 
might quaintly describe the phenomenon known as diplomacy, and the power 
of persuasion can be found in texts dating back to the seventh century BCE in 
the writings of Lao Tzu, Chinese philosopher and Taoist.228 Nor is the notion 
without its academic critics.229 Despite its many flaws, soft power provides a 
convenient short hand to describe how NGOs gain authority in a neomedieval 
system through the perceived moral rectitude of their ideology (i.e., human 
rights) demonstrated through tangible good works and intangible goodwill. As 
Nye explains, ‘When our policies are seen as legitimate in the eyes of others, 
our soft power is enhanced’.230 Like religious orders during the Middle Ages, 
the righteousness of NGOs’ labour is causally linked to their legitimacy, power 
and political authority.231 
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Building a Better World from the Ground Up 
Operational NGOs aid fragile states, which lack either the capacity or will, to 
help their citizens through short-term humanitarian aid or long-term 
development assistance. Myriad NGOs at the local, state and regional levels 
work in building infrastructure to election monitoring to the protection of 
women’s rights. As the UN secretary-general’s 1998 report stated, ‘In terms of 
net transfers, non-governmental organisations collectively constitute the 
second largest source of development assistance’.232 Despite this multitude, a 
handful of major players with programs in multiple countries dominate the 
international NGO. One-quarter of the $2.5 billion of United States 
government funding for relief and development aid in 2000 went to just four 
NGOs: CARE, Catholic Relief Services, Save the Children and World 
Vision. 233  Although all of these large NGOs conduct programmes across 
multiple sectors in some of the world’s most inhospitable places, they generally 
specialise in specific operational niches. CARE is expert in food delivery and 
logistics, MSF provides medical and primary healthcare, Oxfam specialises in 
water and sanitation and Save the Children concentrates on the unique needs 
of children. In addition to their size and knowledge set, they each facilitate 
broad networks of smaller NGOs and other civil society organisations working 
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in their niche areas, and in emergencies, these super NGOs often co-ordinate 
or lead smaller organisations in the field for both humanitarian and 
development operations. 
 Humanitarian NGOs are a primary implementing agency of, and at 
times the driving force behind, international humanitarian action, especially 
since the Cold War, as greater numbers of NGOs have ventured intrepidly 
into conflict zones, which were traditionally the preserve of the Red Cross. 
This is partly due to the humanitarian vacuum created by a seeming increase in 
global demand for humanitarian support in the 1990s coupled with developed 
states’ failure to tackle many of the conflicts in the developing world. Although 
exact figures are lacking, it is estimated that donor countries channel about a 
quarter of their humanitarian spending through NGOs. Denmark channels 36 
per cent of its humanitarian funding through (Danish) NGOs, France 40 per 
cent, and the United States around 60 per cent. 234  Following the 2010 
earthquake in Haiti that killed 200,000 people and left 1.2 million homeless, 
over one hundred NGOs from around the world flocked to Haiti’s assistance, 
providing both supplies and rescuers, playing a vital role in the country’s 
recovery.235 While humanitarian operations remedy immediate crisis, however, 
they do not address the underlying socioeconomic factors that may have led to 
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the crisis in the first place. For that, long-term development operations are 
required. 
 Development operations seek to create and implement long-term 
programs to buttress weak states, protect human rights, and foster sustainable 
growth. As with humanitarian work, international and national development 
agencies increasingly rely on NGOs to design and deliver aid. The UN 
International Labour Organisation is working in Guatemala through a NGO 
called Habitat to introduce better technologies and training in poor 
communities so children can withdraw from work and attend school.236 In 
2000, 44 per cent of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees’s (UNHCR) 
budget was programmed through NGOs, which rely on NGOs as 
‘implementing partners’. Over the past decades the use of NGOs as 
implementing partners has grown exponentially, making NGOs major players 
in international development. From 1970 to 1985 total World Bank 
development aid disbursed through international NGOs increased ten-fold 
and over $7.6 billion of aid was channelled to developing countries through 
NGOs. As of 2000, the World Bank estimated that 54 per cent of all approved 
projects involved NGOs to some degree and over 15 per cent of its total 
overseas development aid is disbursed directly to NGOs.237 This means that 
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NGOs sometimes act not only as the primary representatives of the 
international community, but also increasingly provide public goods when 
states do not. 
 The degree of NGO utilisation in aid is even higher in the United 
States, which provides the most bilateral aid of any country. The Government 
Accountability Office (GAO), an investigative arm of Congress, conducted an 
inquiry into United States foreign aid disbursement and found that ‘USAID 
[the United States Agency for International Development] relies heavily on 
non-governmental organisations to deliver foreign assistance’; in fiscal year 
2000 USAID directed about $4 billion of its $7.2 billion assistance funding to 
NGOs.238 This practise has increased so much that some in the United States 
government quip that USAID has become an ‘accounting shop’ for NGOs.239 
A 2008 GAO report confirms this impression, finding that the focus of 
‘USAID has shifted from conducting its own activities to managing acquisition 
and assistance instruments, which are awarded to and implemented by mainly 
non-governmental organisations’. The investigation discovered that from 2002 
to 2007 USAID’s grants and contracts to NGOs doubled from about $5 
billion to about $10 billion.240 NGOs are now an essential part of delivering not 
only development aid, but also development itself. It is not hyperbole to 
suggest that development depends on NGOs. 
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 Operational NGOs’ abilities to deliver aid to almost any corner of the 
world have placed them on the front lines of modern conflicts. Many NGOs 
have operated in Iraq and Afghanistan or hostile post-conflict areas that UN 
peacekeeping missions occupy. This has made NGOs strategically significant 
transnational actors because aid provision is rapidly becoming a critical 
element of warfare: It makes individuals more secure, as called for by the 
human security paradigm, and addresses popular grievances that give rise to 
insurgencies, as counter-insurgency (COIN) theorists assert.241 Regardless of 
the strategic lens, some of the most effective weapons do not fire bullets in 
modern warfare, and this has placed NGOs front and centre in modern 
military operations. 242  United States military experiences in Iraq and 
Afghanistan have resulted in the adoption of the COIN strategy by General 
David Petraeus, the creation of landmark military doctrine in field manuals 3-
24 ‘Counterinsurgency’ and 3-7 ‘Stability Operations’,243 and the formation of 
provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) to facilitate reconstruction in conflict 
zones. Beyond Iraq and Afghanistan, United States Africa Command 
(AFRICOM), the command responsible for all United States military 
operations in Africa, has sought to work with NGOs to promote development 
and regional stability. AFRICOM’s commander, General Kip Ward, calls this 
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strategy active security, which ties security to development and endeavours to 
prevent the conditions that could lead to future conflicts.244 NGOs would seem 
ideal partners in the so-called war on terror, since they often know the 
indigenous lay of the land better than the United States military, have decades’ 
worth of operational know-how in these tough environments, are 
development experts and have access to places that may be denied to the 
military. 
  However, as independent transnational actors, NGOs have little 
reason to trade their legitimacy for service in the rank and file of United States 
military ambition. International NGOs, regardless of their background, cleave 
to three core values that are fundamentally neomedieval, as codified by the 
International Committee of the Red Cross.245 The first principle is neutrality: 
Aid will not be used to further a particular political or religious standpoint. The 
second is impartiality, meaning that aid is given regardless of race, creed or 
nationality and is based on need alone. The third is independence: NGOs shall 
not act as instruments of a government’s foreign policy. Owing to this, NGOs 
have little desire to acquiesce to state pressure and protest what they see as the 
militarisation of humanitarian aid, which endangers NGO workers on the 
ground. Nancy Lindborg, president of Mercy Corps, a large international 
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NGO that works in conflict zones, explains to Congress: ‘Increasingly, 
insurgents have been invading NGO compounds across Afghanistan in search 
of evidence of cooperation with PRTs and military units…. In Iraq, there have 
been a number of cases when local contractors who “collaborate” with 
Coalition Forces have been threatened and in some cases killed, and numerous 
reconstruction projects that have been attacked and destroyed by insurgents’.246 
 Owing to these concerns, NGOs are reluctant to join forces with states 
unless it serves their own interests. As Jim Bishop of Interaction, a large 
umbrella organisation for many NGOs, makes clear: ‘Humanitarian 
organisations may want to keep some distance between themselves and the 
United States military, especially in environments with potential for violent 
opposition to the United States’.247 That NGOs have the option to ‘distance 
themselves’ and choose who and when to give aid to, even if it happens to be 
to the enemies of a superpower such as the United States, demonstrates that 
NGOs do not inhabit sovereign space as conceived of by the Westphalian 
system. Instead, NGOs operate in what they and the UN call ‘humanitarian 
space’, which they jealously guard.248 This is essentially an overlapping ‘no-state 
sovereignty zone’, in which the NGOs remain faithful to their core principles 
of neutrality, impartiality and independence. That NGOs and the UN can 
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assert the concept of humanitarian space in the countries they work in is not a 
surprise, since those countries are already weak and sometime failed. But that 
they can successfully declare this space in the face of the United States shows 
that NGOs are relatively autonomous transnational actors and beyond the 
reach of state sovereignty. The United States even attempted to broker an 
agreement between its military and the NGO community that honours 
humanitarian space in conflict zones.249 The concept of humanitarian space is a 
driver of neomedievalism, as it establishes NGOs as an independent authority 
in the international system.  
Saving the World from the Top Down 
Just as operational NGOs are implementing partners of international 
development agencies, advocacy NGOs are implementing partners of the 
human rights regime. One observer describes their zeal as ‘religionless 
Christianity’ with an essentially Christian organisational culture yet a secular 
espousal of solidarity for universal rights.250 Advocacy NGOs typically derive 
their legitimacy by claiming to represent the interests of civil society in global 
politics, frequently invoking the mantra that they ‘give voice to the voiceless’, a 
pronouncement that is simultaneously compelling and impossible to prove.251 
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Nimbly wielding soft power, they seek to persuade key decision makers and 
relevant populations to adopt policies, enact domestic laws, establish 
international norms and pass supranational laws that further the NGOs’ goals. 
Advocacy NGOs have become so adept at promoting their causes that they 
are no longer merely enabling partners for the human rights agenda but drivers 
of it, giving them significant political authority. 
 The soft power of advocacy NGOs is founded upon a clear vision of 
the difference between what ought to be versus what is, which the NGOs 
promise to bridge in the name of justice. NGOs use this formula to persuade 
or co-opt others to join their cause. Amnesty International’s vision ‘is of a 
world in which every person enjoys all of the human rights enshrined in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international human rights 
instruments’.252 From this utopian starting point, it is fairly easy to elucidate the 
many deficiencies in the world today, which justify Amnesty International’s 
myriad campaigns, ranging from releasing political prisoners to reducing the 
small arms trade. Advocacy can be conducted through a variety of means, 
including lobbying, public statements, publications, press articles and editorials, 
public demonstrations and street theatre, petitions and documentary film. 
Many large NGOs offer training on activist campaigning, media relations, 
lobbying techniques and coalition building. Amnesty International even 
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produces internal training videos on how to lobby the United States 
congress.253  
 Other NGOs employ more aggressive guerrilla-activism tactics, as in 
the so-called ‘Battle in Seattle’, a massive protest against the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) ministerial conference of 1999. The scale of the 
demonstrations––even the lowest estimates put the crowd at over 40,000––
dwarfed all expectations, collapsed the WTO talks, garnered worldwide media 
attention on the issues the protestors sought to expose and caused future 
meetings to be held in remote locations, such as Doha in 2001.254 The Ruckus 
Society is an NGO that specializes in training activists how to wage non-
violent ‘direct action’ campaigns in military-like boot camps in the woods. 
Experience and books such as The Anarchist Cookbook and The Monkey Wrench 
Gang inform their tactics. 255  The Ruckus Society even produces its own 
‘doctrine’ and field manuals for direct action.256 Greenpeace also maintains elite 
clandestine teams in Europe and North America that function analogously to 
non-violent military Special Forces teams. They are well equipped and trained 
in small-unit tactics, advanced climbing, small boat operations and limited 
surveillance and counter-surveillance techniques. Other groups such as Animal 
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Liberation Front, supported by People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, 
and Earth Liberation Front are even more aggressive, covertly engaging in 
criminal activities such as arson. This has lead the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) to label these groups ‘eco-terrorists’, eco-terrorism being 
defined as the ‘use or threatened use of violence of a criminal nature against 
people or property by an environmentally oriented, subnational group for 
environmental-political reasons, or aimed at an audience beyond the target, 
often of a symbolic nature’.257 It is unclear how these non-violent activist 
groups threaten the security of the world’s greatest military superpower, but it 
is significant that the FBI is willing to use the word terrorist to describe them.258 
 Advocacy NGOs have become effective and independent political 
actors, incredibly skilled at leveraging modern communications technologies to 
mobilize popular support and build multi-continent coalitions to generate 
social movements for change. In 1995 a network of advocacy NGOs formed 
the Coalition for an International Criminal Court, which was significant in 
galvanizing international momentum for the court. The coalition now numbers 
over 2,500 NGOs from 150 countries, and continues to push for ever more 
expansive instruments of supranational law to enforce justice in accordance 
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with human rights norms.259 Another example includes Jubilee 2000, an NGO 
coalition in over forty countries that called for cancellation of third-world debt 
by the year 2000. The International Campaign to Ban Landmines is a global 
network in over ninety countries that works to rid the world of anti-personnel 
landmines and cluster munitions. Its advocacy was important in bringing about 
the Mine Ban Treaty, for which it was awarded the 1997 Nobel Peace Prize. 
The power of NGO coalitions to effect change has increased substantially 
since the end of the Cold War. 
 Many NGOs claim to act as a ‘global conscience’, representing broad 
public interests beyond the purview of individual states and serving as 
watchdogs and whistle-blowers of states that fail to protect human rights, 
reinforcing the emerging social contract between the UN and individuals. 
Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, International Crisis Group and 
others conduct extensive investigations of alleged human rights abuses; if any 
are discovered, the NGOs attempt to pillory the offending nation in a global 
‘name and shame’ campaign designed to besmirch the reputation and 
legitimacy of alleged perpetrators, reminiscent of medieval popes who wielded 
the power of excommunication over kings, or clergy who censured princes to 
undermine the legitimacy of temporal authorities that disagreed with 
ecclesiastical positions. The Save Darfur Coalition has built a network of 180 
NGOs seeking to end the Sudanese government’s ongoing genocide in Darfur. 
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They have tirelessly researched and exposed alleged human rights violations by 
the Sudanese military and their proxy, the janjaweed, non-military gunmen on 
horseback. In 2007, the organisation ran a number of unflattering full-page ads 
in the New York Times and other influential newspapers that personally 
demonized top Sudanese officials for their alleged complicity in the Darfur 
genocide. In retaliation the Sudanese government impeded efforts by 
operational NGOs on the ground, such as the International Rescue 
Committee, by miring their application for visas and travel permits in red 
tape.260 This effectively put a wedge between advocacy and operational NGOs 
over how best to proceed in Darfur, but also demonstrates the potency of 
‘naming and shaming’ campaigns. 
 Ultimately, advocacy NGOs desire stronger supranational laws capable 
of breaking down the barriers of sovereignty, which they believe shield human 
rights–abusing regimes such as Sudan’s. To this end NGOs have long 
advocated for the Rome Statutes, the ICC and other ad hoc international or 
internationalized courts, as well as universal jurisdiction for human rights 
issues. In addition to waging global advocacy campaigns, as the Coalition for 
an International Criminal Court does, some NGOs, such as Amnesty 
International, offer to help governments ‘review and amend their laws’ to 
ensure that the ‘tools for justice’ are in place. Moreover, in a veiled threat, the 
organisation warns that ‘when national authorities fail to respond genuinely to 
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crimes, Amnesty International will campaign for international justice solutions 
to ensure that there is no impunity’.261 Such justice solutions might include a 
military intervention under R2P; Amnesty International is not a pacifist 
organisation.262  
 Advocacy NGOs seek to expand the frontiers of supranational law by 
acting as norm entrepreneurs, promoting concepts of justice that eventually 
become law.263 This can be seen as reversing the way it is understood that 
norms have been created in the past: Though some theorists argue persuasively 
that norms and power cannot easily be disaggregated, the literature on 
transnationalism generally assumes norms exist as an exogenous force on 
states,264 derive from social necessity for cooperation265 and are a cause rather 
than a product of NGO activity.266 Even NGOs themselves typically promote 
norms as morally monolithic and de facto definitive, harkening back to the 
presumed natural law behind human rights and also conveniently overlooking 
the frequent contentions among themselves regarding the specificities of the 
                                                
261 “Campaign for International Justice,” Amnesty International, accessed September 30, 2010, 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/international-justice/background. 
262 Although a strong supporter of R2P, Amnesty International officially has a no-position policy 
regarding humanitarian intervention, neither supporting it nor ruling it out. Other advocacy NGOs, such 
as Human Rights Watch, do support humanitarian interventions. See: Ken Roth, “War in Iraq: Not a 
Humanitarian Intervention,” in Human Rights Watch World Report 2004: Human Rights and Armed Conflict 
(USA: Human Rights Watch, 2004), 13-35. 
263 Cass R. Sunstein, The Second Bill of Rights: FDR’s Unfinished Revolution and Why We Need it More Than Ever 
(USA: Basic Books, 2004); Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and 
Political Change,” International Organization 52, no. 4 (1998): 887-917. 
264 Thomas Risse, et al., ed., The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999); Rosemary Foot, Rights Beyond Borders: The Global Community and the 
Struggle Over Human Rights in China (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
265 Robert Axelrod, “An Evolutionary Approach to Norms,” The American Political Science Review 80, no. 4 
(1986): 1095-1111. 
266 Among theorists who argue that norms, power, and self-interest cannot be disaggregated, see: James F. 
Keeley, “Toward a Foucauldian Analysis of International Regimes,” International Organization 44, no. 1 
(1990): 83-105.; Gary Goertz and Paul F. Diehl, “Toward a Theory of International Norms: Some 
Conceptual and Measurement Issues,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 36, no. 4 (1992): 634-664. 
  
123 
norm.267 Nevertheless,  constructing new norms is an essential component of 
NGOs’ political authority, since, when successful, the new norms reify into 
international behaviour of their choosing.  
According to Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, international 
norms are invented, not discovered, and changes in norms occur in a three-
stage ‘life cycle’. The first stage is ‘norm emergence’, when norm entrepreneurs 
such NGOs attempt to persuade a critical mass of norm leaders––states, 
intergovernmental organisations, other transnational actors––to adopt the new 
norm. If successful, this leads to the second stage, which involves gaining 
increasingly broad acceptance for the norm through a combination of pressure 
for conformity, wish to enhance international legitimation, and desire of 
international leaders to enhance their image. Finnemore and Sikkink term this 
phenomenon a ‘norm cascade’. Once a ‘tipping point’ is reached, the third 
stage, ‘internalisation’, transpires as the norm is taken for granted, codified into 
law and no longer seen as a subject for public debate.268 This pattern of 
‘norming’ is also independently found in the literature of United States legal 
scholars, quantitative research by sociology’s institutionalists or ‘world polity’ 
theorists, epistemologists of science such as Kuhn who considered it a 
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‘paradigm shift’, social movement theorists such as Snow who refer to it as 
‘framing’ and various thinkers in international relations theory.269  
  NGOs’ norm entrepreneurship lends power and legitimacy to 
themselves as transnational actors. Today the norm of not harming non-
combatants or medical personnel in war is fully internalized: It is codified in 
the Geneva Conventions and the Rome Statutes; incorporated into the basic 
training of modern militaries; and violations of this norm, such as acts of 
terrorism, elicit strong condemnation from the international community. 
However, this norm was not always taken for granted, and its originator can be 
traced to a single man: Henry Dunant. A Genovese Swiss banker by 
profession, in June 1859 he was travelling to Italy to meet with French 
emperor Napoléon III to discuss business in Algeria, at that time occupied by 
France. When he arrived at the small town of Solferino on the evening of June 
24, he witnessed the horrific aftermath of the Battle of Solferino, an 
engagement in the Austro-Sardinian War. In a single day, nearly 40,000 soldiers 
on both sides were killed or left to die of their wounds on the field. Shocked 
by the bloodshed and the appalling lack of medical care for the wounded, 
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Dunant deserted his business trip and for several days devoted himself to 
helping treat the wounded. Upon his return to Geneva, he captured his vivid 
memories in a book titled A Memory of Solferino and sent copies to leading 
political and military figures in Europe. Later, he advocated the formation of 
national voluntary relief organisations to help nurse soldiers wounded in war, 
and also called for the development of international treaties to guarantee the 
neutrality and protection of medics and the wounded on the battlefield.  
 To help socialize this emerging norm, Dunant and four leading figures 
in Geneva founded the Committee of the Five in 1863, which eventually 
became the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).270 Its purpose 
was to garner support for the norm and it organised an international 
conference about the norm’s possible implementation, which was attended by 
delegates from Baden, Bavaria, France, Britain, Hanover, Hesse, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Austria, Prussia, Russia, Saxony, Sweden and Spain. The 
conference was a success and interest in its ideas rapidly gained momentum––a 
‘norm cascade’. One year later, the Swiss government invited the governments 
of all European countries, as well as the United States, Brazil and Mexico, to 
attend an official diplomatic conference on the norm, and on August 22, 1864, 
the conference adopted the first Geneva Convention “for the Amelioration of 
the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field”, thus internalizing the 
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norm. In 1901 Dunant received the first Nobel Peace Prize together with 
Frédéric Passy, a leading international pacifist. In five years, Dunant reified the 
norm of protecting non-combatants, injured and medical personnel on the 
battlefield through a three-stage process, creating a transnational actor, the 
ICRC, and changing how modern wars are waged.  
  An anecdote from the floors of the negotiation room where the Rome 
Statutes were signed in 1998 offers a demonstration of just how far NGOs 
have advanced as political actors in international society. Patricia McNerney 
served as general counsel to the United States Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations and was privy to the ‘sausage making’ of the treaty, as Otto von 
Bismarck might describe it. There she was surprised to find that instead of 
dealing with state delegates and ambassadors, some of the poorer countries 
permitted NGOs to represent them instead, and these organisations often 
advocated for their own agendas rather than one consistent with the interests 
of the country. As McNerney describes what she saw, ‘In Rome, I witnessed 
one instance in which an NGO was accredited by a small nation to sit in the 
nation’s chair and speak on behalf of that country. Rather than strengthening 
domestic institutions, such negotiations stretch budgets of small nations and 
inevitably lead to new and costly international institutions located in distant 
cities’.271 NGOs have rendered political authority ambiguous, whether through 
the ‘humanitarian space’ of organisational NGOs that can disregard state 
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sovereignty or the ‘norm entrepreneurship’ of advocacy NGOs that 
precipitates supranational laws.  
MNCs: Modern Marco Polos 
Over $3 trillion flows across national borders each day in today’s globalised 
economy––nearly triple the world’s GDP a century ago.272 This incredible 
economic growth is propelled by MNCs, which are private, for-profit 
organisations with commercial operations and subsidiaries in two or more 
countries. There are many labels for these firms––transnational corporations 
(TNCs), multinational enterprises, global corporations––but regardless of their 
appellation, they are engines in a world financial system that binds together the 
economic fates of nations and has created a global economy so strong that no 
government, even those with the most powerful economies, can withstand 
sustained speculation against its currency, imposing significant constraints on 
national economic policies. This dynamic has given MNCs considerable power 
within international relations, making them, like NGOs, political actors in their 
own right. 
 The precise origins of MNCs are difficult to pinpoint because the 
categorical definition has evolved over the centuries. One of the earliest 
progenitors of modern MNCs are the East Indian companies in the early 17th 
century, such as the Dutch East Indian Company, English (later British) East 
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Indian Company, French East Indian Company, Danish East Indian 
Company, Portuguese East Indian Company, and the Swedish East Indian 
Company. Stockholders rather than kings owned these large firms, which were 
chartered to extract the rents of colonialism and capitalize on the global trade 
emerging during the Age of Discovery. 
 Although each company was headquartered at its home country, the 
firms were expeditionary in nature and maintained vast arrays of offices and 
operations on nearly every continent. Dutch East Indian Company, also 
known as Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC), established trading 
posts in Persia (now Iran), Bengal (now Bangladesh, but then part of India), 
Malacca (Melaka, now in Malaysia), Siam (now Thailand), mainland China 
(Canton), Formosa (now Taiwan) and the Malabar Coast and Coromandel 
Coast in India. Between 1602 and 1796 the VOC sent almost a million 
Europeans abroad on 4,785 ships, netting more than 2.5 million tons of Asian 
trade goods.273 In some cases the companies even administered colonies on 
behalf of an imperial power, as the British East Indian Company did for Great 
Britain in India, the crown jewel of British colonies, in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries. As Edmund Burke, himself a former East India 
Company shareholder and diplomat, described it, ‘The East India Company 
did not seem to be merely a Company formed for the extension of British 
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commerce, but in reality a delegation of the whole power and sovereignty of 
this kingdom sent into the East’.274 
 The East India companies defended their overseas investments with 
might that rivalled states, including the capacity to raise armies and navies, 
build forts, wage war, negotiate treaties, coin money, establish colonies and 
even fly their own flag.275 At its peak in 1669, the VOC was the richest private 
firm the world had ever seen, with over 150 merchant ships, 40 warships, 600 
canons, 50,000 employees including a private army of 10,000 soldiers and a 
dividend payment of 40 per cent on the original investment.276 The British East 
Indian Company colonized India, conquering through annexation and direct 
rule of indigenous states, often by force, or through treaties or subsidiary 
alliances, in which Indian rulers acknowledged the company’s hegemony in 
return for limited internal autonomy.277 By 1765, it employed an army of 9,000 
sepoys, or Indian soldiers, a number that swelled to 100,000 by 1782.278 The 
companies also favoured mercenaries, especially Swiss and German, and 
between 1715 and 1719 the British East Company hired 5,000 European and 
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20,000 Indian mercenaries to retake its fort at Calcutta.279 The companies were 
essentially merchant states. 
 Like megacorporations today, the considerable wealth and influence of 
the larger East Indian Companies gave them political power at home. They 
had the power to set and manipulate European markets by stocking up on 
goods and then holding back sales to drive up prices, creating artificial 
monopolies. Amsterdam merchants in the seventeenth century were 
particularly skilled in these practices, establishing monopolies not only in 
spices from the Far East, but also in Swedish copper, whale products, Italian 
silks, sugar, perfume ingredients and saltpetre (an ingredient of gunpowder). 
Some Dutch merchants had warehouses so large that they could hold 
sufficient grain to feed the entire country for ten to twelve years.280 The VOC 
and other companies used this market power not only to maximise profit, but 
to destroy foreign competition and influence politics by suddenly flooding the 
European market with goods, bankrupting rivals and statesmen opposed to 
their politics.  
 In addition to having overseas might and domestic market power, the 
companies were omnipresent fixtures in European life, from the tea stocked in 
every cupboard to the thousands of people and subsidiary industries that 
depended on them for their livelihoods. To secure their political interests the 
British East Indian Company developed a potent lobby in the English 
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parliament, which also had a vested yet uneasy relationship with the company. 
In 1694 the lobby persuaded the parliament to pass a deregulation act 
permitting tradesmen to establish private trading firms in India, which was 
largely managed de facto by the company. The lobby continued to shape 
parliamentary politics to favour the company’s trade monopoly, and by 1720, 
15 per cent of all British imports originated from India, almost all passing 
through the company. Ultimately, the company became the indispensible 
partner to the crown, ruling colonies in the crown’s name yet for the 
company’s primary benefit. For centuries, East Indian companies were 
political actors on the world stage, and firms like the VOC and the British East 
Indian Company were more significant to global affairs than many European 
states. 
Today’s MNCs share many characteristics with the East Indian 
companies mixed with some neomedieval features. MNCs also are large 
expeditionary corporations with offices and operations all over the world, and 
are political actors in domestic and international politics. Unlike these earlier 
companies, MNCs cannot yet wage war, although this may be changing (see 
Chapter 3). MNCs are neomedieval in that they are not necessarily loyal to a 
single country in the sense that the VOC and British East Indian Company 
were vested in the Netherlands and Great Britain, respectively. MNCs’ 
foremost allegiance is to their shareholders, who may hail from anywhere in 
the world, and their chief concern is profit rather than king and country. 
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MNCs feel no obligation to nationalism; they are increasingly reincorporating 
outside their home country to evade taxes in low-tax states like the Isle of 
Man, British Virgin Islands, and Liechtenstein, which maximises shareholder 
earnings as it garners the wrath of their countries of origin. A GAO report 
found that in 2007, eighty-three of the 100 largest publicly traded United States 
companies, including Citigroup, PepsiCo, and General Motors, had 
subsidiaries in multiple tax havens. Worse, from the United States perspective, 
some of these firms, such as Morgan Stanley, Citigroup and Bank of America, 
received federal bailout money in 2008 and 2009, which amounted to $700 
billion, outraging members of Congress who demanded that the government 
‘shut down these tax dodgers’.281 Tellingly, this has not happened. 
 As the globalised economy has grown, so have MNCs. In 1960 they 
numbered 3,500 with an aggregate stock worth $68 billion. By 2000 there were 
more than 64,000 MNCs worth $7.1 trillion.282 When MNCs expand into other 
countries it is called foreign direct investment (FDI); today  866,000 foreign 
affiliates serve MNCs in every sector and corner of the global economy. 
Governments have aided this expansion by actively seeking FDI, liberalizing 
markets, lowering corporate taxes, creating special economic zones and off-
shore finance centres, relaxing labour and environmental standards, reducing 
restrictions on the repatriation of profits and deregulating ownership by non-
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resident investors. As economist Milton Friedman says, ‘it is possible to 
“produce a product anywhere, using resources from anywhere, by a company 
located anywhere, to be sold anywhere’.283 MNCs account for between 25 and 
33 per cent of world output, 70 per cent of world trade, and 80 per cent of 
international investment.284 The fifty largest MNCs each have annual sales 
revenue greater than the gross national product (GNP) of 142 UN member 
states of the, and firms such as Microsoft, General Electric, Royal Dutch Shell 
and JP Morgan Chase certainly have more clout in global politics than 
countries such as Togo, Belize, Cape Verde or Laos. Chief executive officers 
(CEOs) of MNCs even participate in summit-like meetings with heads of state 
to discuss international politics, as at the World Economic Forum in Davos, 
Switzerland. 
 States that wish to benefit from the riches of globalisation cannot 
afford to ignore MNCs because they are the gateway to global markets and 
control the location and distribution of economic and technological capital. 
Extractive-industry MNCs such as ExxonMobil, British Petroleum and Shell 
control the means of access to most of the world’s oil supply as well as the 
refining of crude oil. Financial-services MNCs such as Goldman Sachs, Bank 
of America and Citigroup are the lubrication of the global economy, as they 
guarantee loans to businesses and governments, invest billions into venture 
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capital, offer insurance for every conceivable thing and engage in international 
currency exchange and trade. Industrial-sector MNCs such as Sony, Ford and 
Coca-Cola manufacture goods and create jobs that enrich nations and please 
politicians. Service-industry MNCs such as Wal-Mart, McDonalds and AT&T 
sell the goods and provide the services that are the face of globalisation, and 
frequently the target of anti-globalisation protestors.285  
 The rise of the globalised economy and MNCs has profoundly affected 
the viability of the Westphalian system. It is no longer possible to regard any 
one country as having its own separate economy, unless it chooses to live in 
total isolation as North Korea has, although its impoverishment is not due to 
poor international trade policy alone. Moreover, countries can no longer 
control financial flows across their borders, reducing their ability to manage 
their own currency and foreign trade. The currency crisis in the 1980s and 
1990s of the dollar, pound, French franc and yen demonstrate that even the 
strongest national economies are helpless against transnational banks and other 
currency speculators. Dependency theorists claim that MNCs and their 
subsidiaries exploit weak states for profit with scant regard for the welfare of 
people or the development of the state, 286  challenging the Westphalian 
orthodoxy, as Gilpin aptly describes: 
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[N]o aspect of the political economy has generated more 
controversy than the global expansion of multinational 
corporations. Some consider these powerful corporations to be 
a boon to mankind, superseding the state, diffusing technology 
and economic growth to developing countries, and interlocking 
national economies into an expanding and beneficial 
interdependence. Other view them as imperialistic predators, 
exploiting all for the sake of the corporate few while creating a 
web of political dependence and economic 
underdevelopment.287 
Authority, Inc. 
According to the Westphalian worldview, MNCs––like all transnational 
actors––are subordinate to states. Only states possess a legal personality in 
international law, with specific rights, protections, privileges, responsibilities 
and liabilities, and as such they are responsible for sub-state actors such as 
MNCs, which in turn derive their entire legal personality from the state. 
Companies are incorporated in a single national jurisdiction, and their entire 
legal existence and all associated rights and duties stem from this fact. As 
Claire Culter comments, following Westphalia the ‘entire edifice of modern 
international law came to be crafted on the foundation of positive acts of 
sovereign consent, evidenced explicitly in treaty law and implicitly in 
customary international law’. 288  
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 Accordingly, MNCs and other transnational actors are not party to 
international relations except indirectly through association with their state. 
Treaties are signed only by states and subsequent international law only 
imposes obligations on states and not on non-state actors. States then codify 
these legal norms through domestic laws.289 This is reflected in the draft of the 
UN Code of Conduct for Transnational Corporations, which calls for MNCs 
to ‘respect the national sovereignty of the countries in which they operate’ and 
notes that an ‘entity of a transnational corporation is subject to the laws, 
regulations and established administrative practices of the country in which it 
operates’.290 The Westphalian orthodoxy demands that international authority 
rest exclusively within the public sphere of states. But this is no longer always 
the case.  
MNCs have emerged as potent private authorities in international 
relations and even provide private governance in lieu of weak states. Following 
the Cold War, Susan Strange observed that power was shifting from states to 
markets, and that ‘the authority of the governments of all states, large and 
small, has been weakened as a result of technological and financial change and 
of the accelerated integration of national economies into one single global 
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market economy’.291 This governance vacuum is filled, in part, by MNCs, 
which have the resources and capabilities to deliver public goods and private 
governance when governments are unable or unwilling to do so. Corporate 
observer Mark Suchman remarks that these efforts are seen as ‘desirable, 
proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, 
values, beliefs and definitions’.292 In 2002, the UN announced that it had 
‘abandoned’ its efforts to rely on governments in weak states to stop the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic and turned to MNCs to provide anti-retroviral drugs. 
This shift in policy was ‘an acknowledgement that companies have the 
resources to find health solutions where governments and NGOs are 
overstretched or failing’,293 and endowed MNCs with political authority in the 
process. 
 MNCs’ political authority is also growing in strong states, as these 
firms take on roles that were once historically reserved for the government 
alone. One example of this is the development of the Trade-Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) provision of the WTO, negotiated at 
the end of the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) in 1994. The agreement proposed to resolve conflicts arising from the 
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many forms of intellectual property regulation that applied to WTO members 
and their citizens. The driving force behind the agreement’s outcome was an 
ad hoc United States-based intellectual property committee, comprised of 
twelve MNCs that began as an initiative of Pfizer and IBM. The committee 
had the power to place items on the agenda, develop the standards to be 
negotiated, and determine the outcome, specifically arguing that the best 
course of action would be to set minimum standards rather than try to 
harmonise all intellectual property rules.294 In the end, the TRIPS agreement 
favoured the MNCs’ interests, and thus, as Susan Sell observes, ‘twelve 
corporations made public law for the world’.295  
 The conflation of public and private spheres of governance has led to 
the fragmentation of authority and the politicisation of the MNC. Ruggie 
discusses ‘private authority’ and ‘private governance’ in terms of the ‘apparent 
assumption by MNCs and global business associations of roles traditionally 
associated with public authorities, sometimes in conjunction with CSOs [Civil 
Society Organisations or NGOs], but more widely on their own.’296 Palazzo 
and Scherer observe that corporations are increasingly assuming social 
responsibilities typically regarded as activities of the political system. Vogel 
argues that MNCs have taken on responsibilities in developing countries that 
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were once the sole prevue of NGOs.297 Kobrin believes ‘that over time new 
transnational governance institutions will evolve which are not public in the 
sense of solely state-based, but which will have the authority and power to 
judge violations and impose sanctions. At that point, the distinction between 
public and private authority may have lost meaning’.298 Strange argues that 
MNCs are increasingly exercising ‘parallel authority alongside governments’ in 
matters of economic management because they have power over the location 
of industry and investment, technological innovation, management of labour 
relations, and the extraction of resources from host countries; in short, ‘we can 
conclude that while MNCs do not take over from the governments of states, 
they have certainly encroached on their domains of power’.299 The neomedieval 
fragmentation of authority within the international system has empowered and 
politicized MNCs. 
 As MNCs have emerged as political actors in international relations 
there has been a corresponding effort to provide them with direct rights under 
international law. Cutler remarks that MNCs are ‘increasingly functioning as 
participants in the direct creation, application and enforcement of 
transnational law’, blurring the boundary between public and private 
authorities in international relations.300 International treaties, multilateral trade 
agreements like the Doha Development Round of the WTO, regional pacts 
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such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and bilateral 
free trade agreements between countries all accord considerable legal rights to 
MNCs. These include the right to resort to international law to challenge states 
by claiming de facto discrimination or the infringement of property rights, as 
well as the right to submit disputes to binding arbitration under the 
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes.301 That MNCs 
now have rights under international law evidences their evolution—along with 
international organisations and NGOs—from vassals of international relations 
to political actors within it. 
  International law is historically founded on the a priori assumption 
that states are the sole creators of general international law; the term itself is 
derived from Latin and literally means the ‘law between states’. Legal scholar 
Anthony Arend speculates that if the ‘world were to move into something 
resembling a neomedieval structure, international law as we know it would 
change fundamentally’.302 He expects that ‘general law will come through the 
many interactions of the multiple international actors’, suggesting a more 
complex process than in the past. 303  Given this complexity, crafting 
international law will likely become what Horst Rittel and Melvin Webber term 
a ‘wicked problem’: a challenge so intractable that it is difficult to define, has 
                                                
301 International Council on Human Rights, Beyond Voluntarism: Human Rights and the Developing International 
Legal Obligations of Companies (International Council on Human Rights Policy, 2002); Sol Picciotto, “Rights, 
Responsibilities and Regulation of International Business,” Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 42, no. 1 
(2003): 138; David Kinley and Junko Tadaki, “From Talk to Walk: The Emergence of Human Rights 
Responsibilities for Corporations At International Law,” Virginia Journal of International Law 44, no. 4 
(2004): 931-1023. 
302 Anthony C. Arend, Legal Rules and International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 178. 
303 Ibid, 185. 
  
141 
no patent or linear solution and has few (if any) ways of confirming whether 
the solution was found or not. 304  Upon examining Bull’s neomedieval 
framework, Arend concludes that the future world order ‘lies in balance’ 
between the Westphalian system and neomedievalism. A decade later it seems 
that the global trend lines are tipping the scales towards a neomedieval order. 
Al-Qa’ida, Globalised Crime, and More Mordreds of Modernity 
As the benefits of globalisation have extended the capacity and reach of 
MNCs, they also have abetted terrorists, insurgents, guerrillas, warlords, 
militias, pirates, organised crime syndicates and other illegal transnational 
actors that use violence to attain their objectives. What make these actors 
particularly pernicious and ‘illegal’ are not just their violation of law but also 
their use of violence. At first glance, these furtive organisations can be 
categorized into two types based on their goals: commercial gain versus a 
political cause. However, in reality the distinction between these unlawful for-
profit and non-profit transnational actors is blurry, as frequently one supports 
the other and many armed political movements engage in blatant profiteering 
in the name of their cause. Regardless of their purpose, the rise of illegal 
transnational organisations––and the threats they pose to states––are 
undeniable trends since the end of the Cold War.  
 Perhaps there is no greater example of how transnational actors can 
terrorise states than the events of 11 September 2001. The topic of terrorism 
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since al-Qa’ida’s attacks in the United States is one of the most (over)covered 
issues in scholarly and popular discourse, and a full analysis of its many eddies 
is not required here. Suffice it to say that before 11 September, experts 
considered terrorism to be a peripheral threat to international security. That 
nineteen individuals could organise halfway around the world in a failed state 
and mount a strategic attack on the greatest superpower in the world with low-
grade technology (e.g., box cutters) seemed preposterous. Even after the 
attacks, many remained prisoners of the state-centric Cold War paradigm and 
could not believe that a non-state actor could execute a terrorist act of such 
magnitude. Former CIA director James Woolsey counselled that it was 
unlikely, if not impossible, for al-Qa’ida to act alone and without state 
sponsorship. In an interview with the television show Good Morning America, he 
said: ‘We particularly need to look hard at whether there may be some state––
in my mind, most likely, Iraq––that is working together with bin Laden’s 
group’.305  
 Today terrorism continues to be a central concern of international 
security. United States president George W. Bush even declared a ‘war on 
terror’, representing a clear departure from the Westphalian threat model of 
strong states and stronger militaries.306 This war, also known as the ‘long war’, 
suggests an ambiguous yet enduring global military, political, legal and 
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ideological struggle against terrorist organisations and regimes that support 
terrorism, as designated by the United States.307 That said, many observers 
continue to frame the issue in terms of states, assuming that al-Qa’ida’s 
strength can only derive from state support rather than exist independently of 
the state system. For the United States, it resulted in the military invasions of 
Afghanistan and Iraq and was strategically justified under the Bush Doctrine of 
preventive war, which attempts to root out terrorists and stop ‘rogue states’ 
from acquiring weapons of mass destruction that could be used against the 
United States. 308  The goal in Afghanistan was to destroy al-Qa’ida and 
strengthen the country’s government to ensure that the terrorist organisation 
could never use its territory as a base again. This strategy assumes that al-
Qa’ida behaves like a twentieth-century national terrorist group, tied to a host 
state, rather than a twenty-first century transnational organisation, tied to no 
state. Meanwhile, al-Qa’ida left long ago in favour of Pakistan, northern Africa 
and the Arabian Peninsula for bases of operation, leaving the United States 
mired in Afghanistan. In Iraq there was never an obvious link between al-
Qa’ida and the Saddam Hussein regime, and the United States invasion there 
remains extremely controversial. Structuring al-Qa’ida as a state-centric 
predicament pre-ordains failure, since the problem is quintessentially non-state 
in nature. The cognitive dissonance has resulted in strategic failure. 
                                                
307 Bradley Graham and Josh White, “Abizaid Credited With Popularizing the Term ‘Long War,’” 
Washington Post, February 3, 2006. 
308 Bush, “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (2002),” 14. See also: Robert J. 
Delahunty and John Yoo, “The ‘Bush Doctrine’: Can Preventive War be Justified?,” Harvard Journal of 
Law and Public Policy 32 (Summer 2009): 843-865.  
  
144 
 Unlike terrorists of the past that were often contained to a specific 
region, al-Qa’ida is a distinctly globalised neomedieval phenomenon. Armed 
non-state actors that use violence to achieve political aims is hardly new, and 
they have many names: terrorists, insurgents, guerrillas, revolutionaries, and 
freedom fighters. But in the twentieth century, when the Westphalian system 
was at its zenith, revolutionary war theorists such as Mao Zedong, Ho Chi 
Minh and Che Guevara all understood the purpose of their struggles as 
establishing a counter-state. In On Protracted War, Mao explains that warfare 
secures a new state in three stages: guerrilla warfare, mobile warfare and 
positional warfare. The first two stages comprise classic ‘hit and run’ tactics 
common to irregular warfare, while the last stage, ‘positional warfare’, 
describes conventional, ‘regular’ or Clausewitzian military engagements by 
standing armies that seek to hold and control territory for the future state or 
counter-state.309 Owing to this perspective, Bull would likely dismiss armed 
non-state actors as threats to his state-centric view of international society 
because they seek to create new states; they may threaten individual states, but 
not the system itself. 
 However, post-Cold War terrorists are not interested in creating new 
states as much as abandoning the system entirely. Al-Qa’ida does not seek to 
establish a Wahhabi state with representation at the UN and formal diplomatic 
relations with other countries; it repudiates the international society of states 
altogether and seeks to establish an Islamic caliphate independent of the 
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current international order. On 11 March 2005, the pan-Arab daily newspaper 
Al-Quds Al-Arabi published extracts of document ‘Al-Qa’ida’s Strategy to the 
Year 2020’, by Muhammad Ibrahim Makkawi, also known as Sayf al-Adel. The 
newspaper’s editor-in-chief summarizes the strategy in five stages, which is 
evocative of Mao’s On Protracted War: first, to provoke the United States into 
invading a Muslim country; second, to incite local resistance against the non-
Muslim invaders; third, to expand and elongate the war into neighbouring 
countries; fourth, to transform al-Qa’ida’s Islamic ideas into operating 
principles that can be exported to other countries and inspire new militant 
cells; and fifth, after the United States economy collapses under the strain of 
protracted warfare, causing the United States to implode as did the Soviet 
Union shortly after the Soviet-Afghan war, to install the new caliphate among 
the ummah, or worldwide Muslim community, without interference from the 
world’s only remaining superpower.310  
Al-Qa’ida’s ambition to abandon the Westphalian order and establish a 
competing system in the caliphate represents a globalised neomedieval 
perspective, which simultaneously stems from and creates an environment of 
mixed authorities and allegiances on an international scale. Without a base in 
any single state, it mercurially moves around the planet, evading and striking its 
enemies at the same time, akin to guerrilla fighters in T.E. Lawrence’s Seven 
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Pillars of Wisdom: ‘We might be a vapour, blowing where we listed. Our 
kingdoms lay in each man’s mind, and as we wanted nothing material to live 
on, so we might offer nothing material to the killing’.311 Al-Qa’ida operates in a 
similar manner but on an international scale, thanks to the benefits of 
globalisation. They have established cells in the Maghreb, the Arabian 
Peninsula, Europe and other regions, and have launched coordinated attacks in 
Madrid, Bali, Casablanca, London and New York City. Globalisation has 
rendered al-Qa’ida’s war borderless.  
 Al-Qa’ida’s success will likely make it a template for other groups who 
wish to leave the international society of states, further reinforcing the world 
movement toward a globalised neomedieval order. That the organisation 
persists after ten years of war against the United States is significant, an 
inspiration for other groups that feel disenfranchised in a world order that 
imposes what some believe are ethnocentric and Western norms of justice in 
the form of international law and human rights. This is especially true in 
Africa, where the creation of the state was an artificial consequence of 
colonialism rather than an organic extension of a people and their nation. 
Boko Haram in Nigeria and al-Shabaab in Somalia are militant Islamist groups 
seeking to create their own caliphates under strict sharia law. The growing 
desire to leave the international society of states as Bull would have conceived 
it evidences the emergence of a neomedieval world order of multiple 
authorities and allegiances; a vision of a regional or global caliphate based on 
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religious identity rather than territorial nationalism harkens back to the Middle 
Ages, when the Church commanded authority on par with states.  
The Nefarious Side of Global Trade 
Outlaws and organised crime were a serious threat to states and citizens in the 
Middle Ages. During the reign of Edward III (1312-77), robber barons such as 
Thomas de Lisle, Bishop of Ely, and Sir John Molyns exploited their 
aristocratic power to run criminal organisations that openly engaged in 
robbery, extortion and murder in the face of state authorities. Gangs led by 
noble families such as the Folvilles and the Coterels had free reign over large 
swathes of England and committed crimes with impunity. In 1326 the Folvilles 
and their confederates murdered Sir Roger Bellers, a baron of the exchequer. 
A few years later, they abducted justice Sir Richard Willoughby, later chief 
justice of the king’s bench, and ransomed him back to the king for 1,300 
marks, an exorbitant sum at the time. 312  In the heterogeneous political 
environment of the Middle Ages, the king’s law often competed with the 
robber baron’s law rather than subdued it. 
A similar situation has developed since the end of the Cold War 
between transnational criminal organisations and legitimate authorities such as 
states and international organisations. Many criminal organisations are so 
strong they now openly challenge and even co-opt states. Just as globalisation 
has expanded the political power of MNCs in international relations, it has 
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benefitted their shadowy counter-parts and fostered an international black 
market historically unrivalled in scale and scope. Sophisticated criminal 
organisations around the world traffic drugs, small arms and light weapons; 
women and children for sexual exploitation; undocumented migrants; 
counterfeit goods and intellectual property; natural resources; stolen vehicles; 
and other contraband that are produced or stolen, moved and then sold in a 
global market. Dimitri Vlassis of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime estimates 
that the overall annual profits of organised crime are about $1 trillion, almost 
as much as the United States annual federal budget. 313  Making matters 
complicated for law enforcement, today’s criminal networks diversify their 
portfolios to reduce risk and detection. Integral to these activities are money 
laundering and corruption, which allow criminals to reap the benefits of their 
ill-gotten revenue and expand their range of activities and power. 
Transnational criminal organisations operate independently within the 
international system, a de facto indication of their political authority in the 
neomedieval order.  
Globalisation is not responsible for the rise of transnational crime but 
it facilitates it through the unifying effects of technology, allowing criminal 
organisations to transcend national borders. As Louise Shelley observes, 
‘significant technological advances most affecting the growth of transnational 
crime include the rise of commercial airline travel, telecommunications 
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(including telephone, fax and computer networks) and the use of computers in 
business’.314 The Latino gangs Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and the 18th Street 
Gang (M-18) evolved quickly from localised street gangs in Los Angeles into 
transnational gangs across the United States and Central America thanks to 
modern technology and transportation, allowing them to share information 
and even coordinate operations.315 A recent criminal case found that a MS-13 
group, or clique, in Maryland maintained contact with cliques across the 
United States and El Salvador. Another case revealed that cliques loan 
weapons to one another. Also, the porous United States-Mexico border makes 
it easy for MS-13 and MS-18 to recruit members in El Salvador and Mexico 
for United States operations, which is more lucrative for criminals than poorer 
countries in Central America.316 In response to this emerging transnational 
threat, the FBI created a transnational anti-gang initiative, which coordinates 
with law enforcement in other countries such as El Salvador.317  
The criminal organisations are also transnational in that they capitalize 
on the complex global financial system to launder their money, which is 
massive in quantity, by intermingling it with legitimate banking and other 
financial transactions, making it difficult for regulators to find and freeze 
criminal money without disrupting the entire global financial system. To 
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provide some scale of the challenge, North American cocaine sales alone are 
estimated at $38 billion in 2008.318 Similarly, modern international trade and 
technology has made the production and distribution of criminal goods 
feasible on a global scale. According to the UN World Drug Report 2010, opium 
production has increased by 78 per cent over the past ten years and heroin 
seized in Pakistan in 2008 was destined for every continent save Antarctica.319 
The technological unification of the world lowers the barriers for business, licit 
and illicit alike.  
Like al-Qa’ida, transnational criminals are truly globalised, and strong 
law enforcement in one country simply pushes the criminal organisation into a 
neighbouring state, making them impossible to eradicate with a state-centric 
strategy. A good example of the fusion between transnational criminal and 
terrorist organisations is D-Company, a 5,000-member criminal syndicate 
operating mostly in Pakistan, India and the United Arab Emirates. D-
Company is involved in several criminal activities including extortion, 
smuggling, narcotics trafficking and contract killing.320 The crime boss of D-
Company is Dawood Ibrahim, an Indian Muslim raised in a poor Muslim 
enclave of Mumbai. Like many Muslims, Ibrahim was outraged by the 1992 
destruction of the Babri Mosque in Uttar Pradesh, India, by Hindu rioters. In 
response, he shifted the focus of D-Company from pure profiteering to 
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protecting the Muslim population of India, and on March 12, 1993, D-
Company launched a series of bombing attacks, killing 257 people.321 To avoid 
the wrath of the Indian government, Ibrahim moved D-Company to Pakistan, 
beyond the reach of Indian law enforcement and with a tacit nod from the 
Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI).322  
Once in Pakistan, D-Company forged operational ties with al-Qa’ida 
and Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, another terrorist group, providing them with material 
support and allowing them to utilise D-Company’s smuggling routes. 323 
Ibrahim also allegedly provided a boat for the ten terrorists who killed 173 
people in the Mumbai attacks on November 26, 2008.324 The convergence of 
transnational crime and terror is indicative of neomedievalism, and a purely 
state-centric approach is insufficient to deal with the situation. As Vlassis 
explains, ‘it has become clear that only by tackling organised crime in a 
concerted manner inroads can be made into a problem that exceeds the 
capacity of national mechanisms operating alone’.325  
Some transnational criminal organisations are so strong that they take 
over states for their own purposes. Since the end of the Cold War, more and 
more countries are becoming narco-states, controlled and corrupted by drug 
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cartels, where rule of law is effectively non-existent.326 The narco-state is a 
neomedieval phenomenon, emerging as the Westphalian order declines and 
correlated with the rise of transnational criminal organisations and other 
neomedieval threats. Since the early 1990s, the trend of drug cartels co-opting 
states has grown, in the Tijuana and Gulf cartels in Mexico and Central 
America; warlords in Afghanistan, Tajikistan and the Golden Crescent area; 
mafia such as the Arkan gang or Rudaj Organisation in the Balkans; and South 
American cartels operating in West Africa.  
The small West African nation of Guinea-Bissau is an archetypal 
example of the narco-state. UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon describes the 
recent economic boom in the small West African nation as ‘fast becoming a 
major market place’.327 However, the commodity he is referring to is not 
clothes or cars but cocaine. Europe remains a primary market for South 
American cocaine, with approximately 4.5 to 5 million users, representing 
about one quarter of worldwide cocaine consumption. 328  Colombian drug 
cartels found the ideal transit hub in West Africa, given its location, abject 
poverty, thin rule of law and state weakness, and Guinea-Bissau is particularly 
ripe for exploitation: It is the fifth-poorest country in the world and rife with 
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corruption. Western officials estimate $150 million of cocaine flows into 
Guinea-Bissau per month from Latin America, equal to the country’s annual 
GDP, en route to Europe.329  
Nor is this a uniquely Guinea-Bissau problem. In the late 1990s and 
early 2000s, cocaine seizures in all of Africa rarely exceeded one metric ton a 
year.330 Now, estimates of annual cocaine trans-shipments in West Africa range 
between 60 and 250 tons, yielding wholesale revenues of $3 billion to $14 
billion. In November 2009, a Boeing 727 crash-landed on a dry lake bed in the 
desert of northern Mali. When UN investigators finally arrived at the site, the 
plane’s owners had already torched the aircraft to hide evidence of their 
identity and removed its cargo: about ten tons of cocaine fetching a wholesale 
value of $580 million. The yields from cocaine trans-shipment dwarf the 
subregion’s official resources. During an incident in January 2008, Malian 
security officials seized 750 kilograms of cocaine following a shoot- out. This 
one haul represented thirty-six percent of Mali’s entire 2007 military 
expenditures. Similarly, the 350 kilograms of cocaine seized on one occasion in 
August 2007 in Benin represented the annual per capita income of 31,000 
Beninois.331 
However, rather than viewing the drug trade as a problem, some 
Africans view it as a business opportunity in a parallel global economy 
                                                
329 Stephanie Hanson, “In West Africa, Threat of Narco-States,” Council on Foreign Relations Analysis Brief, 
July 10, 2007. 
330 Wyler and Cook, “Illegal Drug Trade in Africa,” i. 
331 Davin O’Regan, “Cocaine and Instability in West Africa: Lessons From Latin America and the 
Caribbean,” Africa Security Brief  (Washington, DC: African Center for Strategic Studies, 2010), 1-2. 
  
154 
compromised of contraband. As one African observer explains, ‘If Africa is 
not allowed to export legitimate produce, it will export drugs, prostitutes and 
illegal migrants’.332 This is worrisome to strong states such as the United States, 
which is concerned with the nexus among transnational organised criminals, 
terrorists and weak states.333 The linkages among transnational arms dealer 
Viktor Bout, al-Qa’ida and Liberian president Charles Taylor are now 
known.334 The spectre of similar future collaborations is a threat to strong 
states since connections are emerging between the Colombian cartels, al-
Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the drug transit corridor from 
Western Africa through the Sahel to Northern Africa, which is demarcated by 
weak states and armed conflict. As an official report to the United States 
Congress bluntly put it, ‘The growth of drug trafficking through Africa poses 
new challenges to international counternarcotics efforts, as well as a variety of 
emergent threats to the United States’.335 The lines of illicit supply and demand 
fuelling the criminal parallel economy can provide sources of financing for 
non-drug operations, increased international ties with other illicit actors and 
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access to barter deals involving drugs and other illicit goods, such as black 
market arms.336  
 The development of a sophisticated international shadow economy 
among transnational actors, who have the power to co-opt states, evidences 
the rise of globalised neomedievalism. Like al-Qa’ida, these transnational 
actors are self-governing, operate in a borderless manner, have the capacity to 
threaten strong states and are independent political actors in world affairs. 
Taken together, they have created a parallel international political economy 
that competes––and at times is at war with––the legitimate political economy 
of Bull’s society of states.  
The Disintegration of States 
Unconstrained political rivalries, the proliferation of warlords and mercenaries, 
weak states, weaker rulers, cowed populations and little or no rule of law 
created the maelstrom that was northern Italy in the high Middle Ages. In the 
absence of a competent civil authority, rulers became tyrants and people 
became prey. Florence and Ravenna developed into fortresses, villages grew 
walls (castelli) and the hilltops were adorned with castles to protect the 
powerful. Bloody vendettas between families such as the Montefeltri and the 
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Malatesti lasted centuries and claimed countless lives even though no one 
could recall why there was a vendetta in the first place. The ceaseless wars 
between states, cities, the church and anyone else who could rent or raise an 
army left the countryside destitute, hungry and frightened. While passing 
through hell, Dante is approached by a particularly infamous warlord called 
Mastin Vecchio who asks the travelling poet whether his homeland of 
Romagna is at peace or not. Dante replies: ‘Your Romagna is not and never 
has been without war in the hearts of its despots’.337  
 Like Dante’s Inferno or medieval Romagna, life in a modern failed 
state––Somalia or Liberia––can be hell, and incidences of state failure seem to 
be on the rise since the Cold War ended. Since Bull’s day, entire countries have 
disappeared, some quietly (Czechoslovakia) and some not (Yugoslavia). Today 
about 1 billion people live in a failing or fragile state, and trends indicate that 
this number will increase in the future.338 There has been an explosion of 
literature on the disintegration of states since the mid-1990s, yet precise 
definitions of state ‘weakness’ are lacking. It is easy to identify clear-cut cases 
of strong states, such as the United States or the United Kingdom, and also 
state failure, such as Somalia and Haiti. But there is less consensus on what 
comprises a weak or fragile state, other than the famous formulation that ‘I 
know it when I see it’.339 Definitions range widely and even the terminology is 
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unsettled, as there are myriad labels for these countries: ‘difficult partners’,340 
‘difficult environments’,341 ‘fragile states’,342 ‘low income countries under stress 
(LICUS)’, 343  ‘poor performers’, 344  ‘weak performers’, 345  ‘failing’ or ‘failed 
states’,346 and ‘countries at risk of instability’.347 At least twenty-five indices now 
identify fragile and failed states using a variety of indicators, from poverty to 
insecurity to lack of freedom. 348  Similarly, scholarship on the topic has 
burgeoned over the last two decades, ranging from Jeffrey Sachs’s sanguine 
The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for Our Time to William Easterly’s less 
sanguine The White Man’s Burden: Why the West’s Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done 
So Much Ill and So Little Good to something more in between with Paul Collier’s 
The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What Can Be Done 
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About It. These books are academic best sellers and widely read in popular 
culture.  
 During the Cold War, failing or failed states were seen only as a 
humanitarian tragedy, and strong states could opt for a policy of 
disengagement. This changed with the civil wars of the Balkans in the 1990s, 
which many feared could spread throughout Eastern Europe, and the events 
of 11 September 2001, which were prepared for and launched from the fragile 
state of Afghanistan. These challenges demonstrated that fragile and failed 
states could be security threats, pole-vaulting the issue of state disintegration to 
the forefront of national security thinking, especially as most state strength 
indices have ranked the majority of the world’s nearly 200 states as weak, 
failing or failed.349 The fear is that weak states can wittingly or unwittingly act 
as incubators for armed groups, such as insurgents, terrorists, militias and 
criminal organisations, who have transnational reach due to globalisation.350  
In a reversal of the Westphalian threat model, weak states now pose a 
greater danger to strong states than other strong states do; as the United States 
national security strategy of 2002 declared, ‘America is now threatened less by 
conquering states than we are by failing ones’.351 Nearly ten years later, United 
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States Secretary of Defence Robert Gates says ‘fractured or failing states’ are 
‘the main security challenge of our time’.352 He further explains this threat: 
The recent past vividly demonstrated the consequences of 
failing to address adequately the dangers posed by insurgencies 
and failing states. Terrorist networks can find sanctuary within 
the borders of a weak nation and strength within the chaos of 
social breakdown. The most likely catastrophic threats to the 
United States homeland, for example, that of a United States 
city being poisoned or reduced to rubble by a terrorist attack, 
are more likely to emanate from failing states than from 
aggressor states.353 
The significance of state disintegration for international security is magnified 
when considering that most of the world’s states are weak. The preponderance 
of state disintegration further evidences the emergence of globalised 
neomedievalism. 
Knowing It When You See It 
The diversity of opinions about state collapse, its causes and its effects––and 
the bonanza of attention on the topic since the end of the Cold War––
confirms a growing apprehension regarding the phenomenon. State strength is 
a relative concept that is difficult to measure, but features of a strong state 
typically include, as a minimum, the provision of security, essential civil 
freedoms and basic services. Fragile and failed states lack the will or capacity to 
provide these ‘political goods’ to citizens,354 resulting in what Gabriel Marcella 
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describes as ‘inadequate public security forces, dysfunctional judicial systems, 
inadequate jails which become training schools for criminals, and deficiencies 
in other dimensions of state structure such as maintenance of infrastructure’.355 
This vacuum is often filled by non-state actors creating what Marcella says is 
‘essentially two states within their boundaries: the formal and the informal’.356 
John Rapley makes similar observations when observing the slums of Jamaica, 
noting that where the state has failed to provide essential services, local area 
leaders or ‘dons’ step in to provide basic services, albeit under their 
independent rule. As he explains:  
The local gang maintains its own system of law and order, 
complete with a holding cell fashioned from an old chicken 
coop and a street-corner court. It ‘taxes’ local businesses in 
return for protecting them, punishing those who refuse to pay 
with attacks on property and people. It provides a rudimentary 
welfare safety net by helping locals with school fees, lunch 
money, and employment––a function that the Jamaican 
government used to perform. But over the last couple of 
decades, keen to reduce spending, it has scaled back many of 
its operations, leaving a vacuum. As one kind of authority has 
withdrawn, another has advanced.357 
 In short, new authorities fill in the void left by the retreating state. 
Often these new authorities resemble warlords with private armies, who 
enforce the warlord’s own rule of law. Examples of this phenomenon include 
the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) in Peru, where the state does not fully 
exist outside Lima. Similarly, in Afghanistan the United States military has 
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relied on warlords to provide security for United States convoys far away from 
Kabul.358 Although Marcella and Rapley focus primarily on Latin America and 
the Caribbean, their observations are equally valid for other parts of the world, 
especially Central Asia and Africa, and their conclusions indicate that state 
fragility is on the rise.  
 Scientific surveys confirm the trend of growing state weakness. The 
Economist Intelligence Unit’s 2010 index of state capability, based on an 
unweighted assessment of twelve indicators, measures the state’s ability to 
provide physical security, efficient institutions and capable administration. The 
survey found that of the 163 countries evaluated, only thirty-four are classified 
as ‘highly capable’ with the rest assessed as moderately weak (38), weak (33) or 
very weak (58) states.359 Similarly, according to the State Fragility Index and 
Matrix of 2008, conducted by the Centre for Systemic Peace and Centre for 
Global Policy at George Mason University, the majority of states in the world 
are weak (see 
Figure 3). The matrix lists all independent countries in the world in which the 
total country population is greater than 500,000 in 2008, totalling 162 
countries. The matrix then scores each country on both effectiveness and 
legitimacy at the end of 2008 in four performance areas: security, political, 
economic and social. From this, the matrix derives a ranking of state fragility 
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and finds that of the 162 countries, 119––73 per cent––are ‘fragile’. Of these 
60 have ‘low fragility’, 30 have ‘medium fragility’ and 29 have ‘high fragility’. 
The results of the matrix suggest that a country’s fragility is closely associated 
with its capacity for managing armed conflict, making and implementing public 
policy, delivering essential services to citizens and maintaining overall systemic 
resilience and coherence.360 
Figure 3: State Fragility Index and Matrix of 2008 
 
Another index of state weakness is the Peace and Conflict Instability Ledger, 
which concludes with similar findings. This biannual report is compiled by the 
University of Maryland’s Centre for International Development and Conflict 
Management, and uses five indices of instability: institutional consistency, 
economic openness, infant mortality rates, militarisation and neighbourhood 
security. The 2010 report concludes that thirty-six of the 162 reviewed 
                                                
360 Monty G. Marshall and Benjamin R. Cole, Global Report 2009: Conflict, Governance, and State Fragility 
(Virginia: Center for Systemic Peace, 2009), 25–30. 
Series1,(
Strong(
states,(43,(
27%(
Series1,(Low(
fragility,(60,(
37%(
Series1,(
Medium(
fragility,(30,(
18%(
Series1,(High(
fragility,(29,(
18%(
  
163 
countries are at ‘high’ or ‘highest’ risk of instability that leads to violence, and 
that the overall global risk of instability has been increasing. For 2008 the 
average score for ‘high risk’ countries is 14.1, whereas the average for 2010 is 
17.3, a statistically significant difference. Even countries assessed to have a 
‘moderate’ risk of instability are worsening, with the average score increasing 
from 5.3 in 2008 to 7.4 in 2010. Especially disturbing is that seventeen 
countries have increased their risk of instability by more than 30 percentage 
points from 2008 to 2010, while Angola, Djibouti, the Kyrgyz Republic and 
Mauritania all increased by more than 100 percentage points.361 Like the State 
Fragility Index and Matrix, the Peace and Conflict Instability Ledger finds that 
state fragility and disintegration are increasing within the international system.  
 Per Bull’s analytical framework, a sign of state disintegration is the 
presence of multiple loyalties for significant portions of the population. Like 
the Middle Ages, individuals in fragile states may have mixed and multiple 
allegiances to the state, religion, ethnicity, tribe and other identity groups. 
Liberia has fourteen to sixteen distinct tribes, and identifying oneself as a 
Liberian may take second place to identifying oneself as a member of the 
Krahn tribe. In such instances, the purpose of politics is to enter national 
government to benefit one’s own ethnic group at the expense of the country, 
as Liberian president Samuel Doe did for the Krahn tribe after his coup d’état 
in 1980. Graft is not new but the extent of it may be, as rulers of some failed 
states deliberately weaken it to better extract national resources for private 
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gain. As Reno writes of Sierra Leone, ‘The country’s rulers intentionally made 
life for their subjects less secure and more materially poor. They became 
personally wealthy as a consequence of this disorder, and then sold chances to 
profit from disorder to those who could pay for them by providing services––
as experts in violence, for example––and to those local and expatriate 
businessmen who traded their access to commercial networks’.362  
 The lack of loyalty to the state in fragmented political environments is 
a significant problem for the United States nation-building strategy in Iraq. In 
an independent report to the United States Congress, retired general James 
Jones, the former NATO commander and United States national security 
advisor, said that ‘allegiance of many personnel [within the Iraqi government] 
has been to individual ministries, parties, tribes, and clans rather than to the 
central government, and such division of loyalties undermines their ability to 
provide security’. 363  Likewise, in 1999 Timor-Leste––also known as East 
Timor––declared independence from Indonesia and in 2002 established a new 
Timor-Leste national police force (PNTL), with help from the UN. However, 
rather than safeguarding the public, the PNTL instead became sectarian 
marauders, preying on the public as much as protecting it. Numerous 
paramilitary units were created in the PNTL with unclear mandates and 
ambiguous chains of command, often serving specific political parties or 
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leaders. This created tensions between the PNTL and Timor Leste’s defence 
forces, leading to a mini-coup d’état in the eastern part of the country during 
early 2004 that required an international armed intervention to stabilize the 
situation.364 Individual competing loyalties to the government, ethnic group, 
political party, religious organisation, leader and other non-state entities 
harkens back to a medieval era. 
 Another signal of sovereignty’s retreat is the growing prevalence of 
legal pluralism. Legal pluralism arises when different legal ideas, principles and 
systems are applied to the same circumstance, and can be defined as ‘the 
existence, within a specific society, of different legal mechanisms applying to 
identical situations’.365 A primary advantage of parallel legal structures is that it 
accommodates the divergent justice norms of minority groups. In Kenya, kahdi 
courts are a discrete legal system for Muslims, applying sharia law where 
government courts use a legal system based on British law. Kenyan Muslims 
can choose between state or religious courts to resolve disputes. India and 
Tanzania have similar Islamic courts to address concerns in Muslim 
communities. In the Philippines, the government recognizes the customary 
ways of indigenous peoples in the Cordilleras region, especially in the province 
of Kalinga where people use the process of bodong, or peace pact, to settle 
disputes. Though successful, these states have essentially traded a traditional 
element of sovereignty for stability: If one of the precepts of state strength is 
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its ability to compel obedience and impose its law, then legal pluralism 
demonstrates state weakness and the presence of multiple authorities. 
  Fragmentation of allegiance taken to an extreme results in civil war and 
trans-border conflict between duelling identity groups, in what Rupert Smith 
terms ‘wars amongst the people’.366 These wars are fought by civilians against 
other civilians or the government, and often occur without respect for the 
territorial boundaries of the state, another indicator of state weakness. The 
Kurds in the Middle East are a distinct ethnic group who desire their own state 
and fight across eastern Turkey, northern Iraq and northern Iran. Similarly, the 
Hutu and Tutsi genocide occurred throughout the Great Lakes region of 
central Africa, and not just Rwanda, as is popularly conceived. Hutu and Tutsi 
populations exist throughout Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda and eastern 
Democratic Republic of the Congo. The boundaries of these states do not 
reflect an organic nationhood in physical space; they are the imposition of 
European colonial cartographers two centuries ago.  
Westphalian military-to-military engagements are exceedingly rare 
today and 90 per cent of casualties in contemporary conflict are civilian.367 
Conflict-affected countries have by definition lost their monopoly of force and 
are plagued by civil war, ethic conflict, insurgency, rampant violent crime, 
warlordism and general lawlessness. A review of conflict trends over the last 
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sixty years confirms this, showing a tripling of intrastate conflicts while the 
number of interstate wars has declined to zero in 2010 (see  
Figure 4).368 The top twenty-five ‘at risk’ countries all have at least one 
active ethnic insurgency or terrorist group within their borders. Armed non-
state actors are prevalent in states that are failing and where intrastate conflict 
is the most prone to reoccur, suggesting a mutually causal relationship. The 
report concludes that ‘the number of conflict recurrences has surged to 
unprecedented levels. Since the mid-1990s, recurrences outnumber new onsets 
by significant margins’.369 Today ‘irregular’ warfare is more regular than the 
‘regular’ warfare articulated by Clausewitz and the Westphalian way of war, 
fought between states through militaries.370  
Figure 4: Conflict Trends 1945–2005 
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State sovereignty is retreating on seemingly every front since the Cold 
War ended. Aside from a handful of strong states in Western Europe, North 
America and parts of Asia, an increasing majority of states in the world are 
fragile. Where state governments are weak, non-state entities have filled in the 
authority vacuum and imposed their own independent rule, complete with 
their own monopoly of force, from Jamaica to Somalia. Other states have 
deliberately diluted their authority by permitting legal pluralism to preserve 
stability. Like the Middle Ages, life in fragile states is marked by fragmented 
and overlapping loyalties to the ethnic group, religious order, political party, 
individual leaders and other political authorities that compete with the central 
government for fealty. The weakest states in the world are marred by civil war 
and insurgencies that do not recognize state territorial boundaries or the 
government in general. The increasing tendency toward state fragility, failure 
and disintegration remains a major unmet challenge for the contemporary 
system––a sign not only of the Westphalian order’s decline, but its possible 
demise. 
The Horn of Africa 
Globalised neomedievalism is not necessarily only cause for alarm, but its 
emergence as a new and competing world order is best illustrated by a tragic 
example: armed conflict in the Horn of Africa. The ongoing conflict in the 
region of southern Somalia, eastern Ethiopia and northeast Kenya clearly 
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demonstrates four of the five characteristics of globalised neomedievalism: the 
technological unification of the world, the regional integration of states, the 
importance of transnational organisations, and the disintegration of states. In 
the Horn of Africa, these elements are working in concert to create a 
globalised neomedieval environment.  
Somalia, the Disintegrated State 
At the centre of the armed conflict is Somalia, a quintessential failed state with 
the dubious distinction of topping the Foreign Policy and Fund for Peace Failed 
State Index three years in a row. The territory has been without a functional 
central government since 1991, making it the longest-running instance of 
complete state collapse in African postcolonial history. Several dozen national 
peace conferences have been launched to resuscitate Somalia, including many 
sponsored by the UN, but none has succeeded. While parts of the north have 
remained relatively peaceful, including much of the self-declared Republic of 
Somaliland, the region is rife with fighting, kidnapping, murder, crime and 
piracy. Since 1991 an estimated 350,000 to 1,000,000 Somalis have died due to 
armed conflict or its consequences.371 Abducting international humanitarian aid 
workers is practically an industry and piracy has burgeoned since the second 
phase of the Somali Civil War in 2005, threatening international shipping.372  
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According to realist theory, weak states should represent an 
opportunity for strong states, yet Somalia demonstrates the exact opposite: 
Strong states cringe at becoming entangled in weak states. In October 1993 
Somali clans armed only with small arms and technicals––often pickup trucks 
with a heavy machine gun or anti-aircraft gun mounted on the truck bed––
defeated the most elite United States military forces, consisting of the Army 
Delta Force, Ranger teams, the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, 
Navy SEAL Team Six, and Air Force Pararescue-Air Force Combat 
Controllers. The Battle of Mogadishu, also known as the Day of the Rangers 
to Somalis, was captured in the book and then the movie Black Hawk Down. 
Following this defeat, the United States left Somalia. The Battle of Mogadishu 
shows that the Westphalian way of war is not absolute and the hegemony of 
strong states no longer total.  
The defeat also led to a shift in United States foreign policy. The 
superpower became reluctant intervene in weak states, as illustrated by its 
inaction regarding the Rwandan genocide. In A Problem from Hell, Samantha 
Power explains that the ‘lesson of Somalia’ was that the Pentagon now feared 
‘a small engagement by foreign troops would end up as a large and costly one 
by Americans’.373 The experience also gave birth to the so-called Mogadishu 
Line, a foreign policy term denoting the point at which peacekeeping becomes 
war; it is sometimes used pejoratively to describe strong states’ aversion to 
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entering situations in weak states that might drag them into an armed conflict, 
as with United States president Bill Clinton’s refusal to mobilize United States 
ground troops to curb the conflict surrounding the Bosnian Serb Army in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995, as well as his decision to only use airpower in 
Kosovo during Operation Allied Force in 1999. The violent devolution of 
Yugoslavia after the end of the Cold War into semi-autonomous regions 
coined another term in international affairs, Balkanisation, referring to the 
neomedieval process of state disintegration and fragmentation into smaller 
stateless polities. 
During the 1990s, Somalia Balkanised into at least three semi-
autonomous areas: Somaliland in the north, Puntland in the northeast and 
Somalia in the south. The borders between these informal polities and their 
neighbours are porous and tensions remain high. Spillover violence and crime 
from Somalia threatens the stability of neighbouring Ethiopia and Kenya. In 
an attempt to quell this problem, Ethiopia invaded Somalia in 2006 with 
troops from Puntland. As Ethiopia’s prime minister, Meles Zenawi, explains, 
the invasion was necessary because Ethiopia faced a direct threat to its own 
borders and ‘Ethiopian defence forces were forced to enter into war to protect 
the sovereignty of the nation’.374 Two years of irregular warfare ensued and 
ended in 2009 when Ethiopian troops withdrew, marking another victory for 
the clans in southern Somalia.  
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Similarly, Somali clans clashed near the Kenya border, destabilizing the 
region. It is estimated that since the start of 2007, violence has killed at least 
21,000 people in Somalia and driven another 1.5 million from their homes, 
many into neighbouring countries, helping trigger one of the world’s worst 
humanitarian emergencies.375 Over the past twenty years, the Somali refugee 
camp at Dadaab in Kenya, about 100 kilometres south of the border, has 
swelled to nearly 300,000 people, making it one of the largest population 
centres in Kenya and one of the biggest refugee complexes in the world. The 
UN says Dadaab has 6,000 third-generation refugees, grandchildren of the 
original arrivals.376 Overcrowding, lack of shelters and insufficient food have 
made matters worse, and the camp is a frequent recruiting spot for Somali 
warlords and militants.377  
However, consistent with neomedievalism, Somalia’s lack of 
government does not imply a lack of governance. Like the dons of Jamaica, 
the lack of a formal central government has given rise to local ad hoc efforts of 
governance that provide communities limited public security, dispute 
mediation, social services and other political goods. These informal polities 
range widely in character and effectiveness. The most visible manifestations of 
these overlapping and competing authorities are Somaliland and Puntland, 
semi-formal and self-declared administrations. However, even these separatist 
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states have sovereignty in name only, for they compete with clan authorities 
within their territory for authority and allegiance.378 The Rahanweyn, Hawiye, 
Darod, Isaaq, Dir and their sub-clans all retain a measure of autonomy within 
Somalia’s political mosaic. This ‘radical localisation’ of politics transpired in the 
political vacuum left by the central government’s collapse in 1991 and failure 
of the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) in 1992–93. Africa observers 
Ken Menkhaus and John Prendergast describe these independent authorities as 
‘radically localized Somali polities [that] are fluid in structure and authority, 
overlapping, and situational in nature’.379 Recent research suggests that this 
process of political fragmentation is not unique to Somalia: The rise of 
informal, localized and ad hoc authorities that overlap and compete with one 
another is a growing phenomenon in areas of protracted state failure and an 
emblem of neomedievalism.380  
War Nexus: the UN, Transnational Actors, and Globalisation  
The most significant actors in the Horn of Africa are not states. During the 
Cold War, Somalia was merely a pawn to the great powers, but as the world 
changed after the fall of the Berlin Wall, so did the world’s interest in Somalia. 
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As the UN promoted its muscular vision of a ‘global transition’ to a new world 
order founded on humanitarian concern rather than the interests of individual 
states in An Agenda for Peace, televisions around the world were flooded with 
images of dying Somali children, the victims of drought, famine, brutal 
warlords and their civil war. Out of a population of 4.5 million people, 
approximately 300,000 died of malnutrition and at least 1.5 million lives were 
at immediate risk. Almost 1 million Somalis sought refuge in neighbouring 
countries and elsewhere, creating a massive refugee crisis for the region.381  
Somalia was an early test case for the UN’ new world order, and by 
spring of 1992 the Security Council adopted Resolution 751 establishing 
UNOSOM I to provide, facilitate and secure humanitarian relief in Somalia, as 
well as to monitor the first UN-brokered ceasefire of the Somali civil war. 
Although not a success––hence its sequel UNOSOM II, one year later––it was 
a ground-breaking Chapter VII peacekeeping mission that served as a 
prototype for future missions in the Balkans, Africa and elsewhere. Following 
its failure, President George H.W. Bush sent United States troops to protect 
relief workers as part of the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) led by the United 
States in the appropriately named Operation Restore Hope. This transitioned 
into UNOSOM II, which also ended in failure, and on 4 November 1994, the 
UN Security Council voted unanimously in Resolution 954 to withdraw all 
forces by 1995.  
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Since then, Somalia has persisted in a state of civil war and chaos 
despite additional international efforts to the contrary. The forces that defeated 
the UN were not state militaries but non-state actors: warlords and their 
militias. Mogadishu warlord Mohamed Farrah Aidid saw UNOSOM II as a 
threat to his power, and in June 1993 attacked the mission, killing over eighty 
peacekeepers. Other casualties followed and finally UNOSOM II left Somalia 
in 1995, whereupon Aidid claimed to be the president of Somalia. In 
neomedieval fashion, competing local warlords, such as Ali Mahdi 
Muhammad, challenged this claim and in 1996 Aidid died of a gunshot wound.  
Tending to the victims of the internecine fighting is not the society of 
states but a consortium of other transnational actors: NGOs, which make up 
the largest international presence inside Somalia. In 1999 they formed a 
consortium in Nairobi to coordinate their efforts, which now numbers 191 
members.382 It also makes them targets. In 2008 twenty-four aid workers were 
killed and another ten remain missing, causing many NGOs to suspend 
programs and withdrawn staff in country.383 An Amnesty International report 
found that at least forty Somali human rights defenders and humanitarian 
workers were killed between 1 January and 10 September 2008, and tersely 
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concludes: ‘The increasing attacks against humanitarian and civil society 
workers also testify to the international community’s failures in Somalia’.384  
The attacks are not limited to land. Piracy off the coast of Somalia 
threatens humanitarian work and international shipping and has reintroduced 
pirate into the lexicon of contemporary global politics. Since 2005 piracy off the 
coast of Somalia and especially Puntland has become big business, as they 
capture ships in the Gulf of Aden and ransom them and their crews back to 
the owners for millions of dollars. According to the International Maritime 
Bureau, in 2010 almost half of the world’s pirate attacks occurred off the coast 
of Somalia and 92 per cent of successful hijackings were Somali, resulting in 
948 people taken hostage, a notable increase from 2004 when there were only 
five recorded attacks in the region. 385  The pirates, armed only with light 
weapons and small boats, can seize large cargo ships, operate 200 nautical 
miles offshore thanks to mother ships that act as floating bases and can take 
over a ship within fifteen minutes of being sighted by the ship’s crew, making 
it difficult for international patrols to respond in time.386 This is significant 
because some 16,000 ships a year pass through the Gulf of Aden, carrying oil 
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from the Middle East and goods from Asia to Europe and North America, 
making it one of the most important trade routes in the world. Consequently 
piracy has menaced international trade and slowed humanitarian re-supply to 
the region. It could cause a major environmental disaster in the Gulf of Aden 
if a tanker is sunk, run aground or set on fire.  
But not all the violence in Somalia is for profit. One of the most 
powerful authorities in Somalia is the internationally notorious group al-
Shabaab (Movement of Warrior Youth), an Islamic armed group that has 
successfully waged war against the Somali transitional federal government and 
its Ethiopian and Ugandan supporters since 2006.387 In February 2009 the 
group killed eleven Burundian soldiers who were a part of the African Union 
peacekeeping mission.388 The organisation also can project force beyond its 
borders, launching a coordinated dual terrorist attack in Kampala, Uganda in 
July 2010 that killed more than seventy people. 389 Analogous to al-Qa’ida’s 
2004 Madrid bombings, the Kampala bombings by al-Shabaab sent a clear 
strategic message to withdraw troops from the AU peacekeeping mission.  
There is one reason the world knows about this non-state actor waging 
an intrastate war in the hinterlands of Somalia, and that reason is globalisation. 
NGOs have used globalised media to highlight the humanitarian crisis in the 
country, bolster their own legitimacy by enacting the human rights agenda and 
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nettle international organisations and states to do more. Following an 
especially fraught period of insecurity, drought and record-high food prices in 
2008, some 3.25 million Somalis were in need of emergency aid from outside 
Somalia. A coalition of fifty-two NGOs banded together to flood international 
media and world capitals with the message of to drum up the needed 
assistance. In their statement, they echo the prerogatives of R2P: ‘The 
international community has completely failed Somali civilians. We call on the 
international community to make the protection of Somali civilians a top 
priority now’.390 World news organisations such as CNN and the BBC even 
dedicate special watch pages on their websites to al-Shabaab.391 NGOs’ ability 
to galvanize the global media and mobilize popular support for the 
humanitarian cause of Somalia is an example of their de facto political power 
in the international system. 
The darker side of globalisation has also fostered a bond between al-
Shabaab and al-Qa’ida. The strongest tie between the two groups is ideological. 
Using the internet, a senior al-Shabaab leader released a video in September 
2008 praising Osama bin Laden and linking Somalia to al-Qa’ida’s global 
operations.392 A few months later Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qa’ida’s second-in-
command, reciprocated with a video praising al-Shabaab’s seizure of the 
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Somali town of Baidoa and assured followers that al-Qa’ida would ‘engage in 
jihad against the American-made government in the same way they engaged in 
jihad against the Ethiopians and the warlords before them’.393 The United 
States added al-Shabaab to its list of foreign terrorist organisations in February 
2008 and maintain that senior al-Shabaab leaders have trained and fought with 
al-Qa’ida in Afghanistan.394 
 In an example of the technological unification of the world, al-Shabaab 
uses the internet to successfully recruit foreign fighters from around the 
world––including from within the United States and United Kingdom. From 
2007 to 2009, twenty men left Minnesota, California and Alabama to join al-
Shabaab; all but one were of Somali heritage.395 In June 2010, two United 
States men from New Jersey were arrested at the airport en route to Somalia to 
join al-Shabaab. They were inspired by the Yemen-based United States cleric 
Anwar al-Awlaki,396 who has been described as the ‘bin Laden of the Internet’; 
he also inspired United States army major Nidal Malik Hasan to shoot fellow 
soldiers at Fort Hood, Texas, killing thirteen and wounding thirty people.397 
United States Attorney General Eric Holder calls this a ‘deadly pipeline that 
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has routed funding and fighters to al-Shabaab from cities across the United 
States’ and represents ‘a disturbing trend’.398 
However, all of the above does not mean that Somalia is lawless; a 
neomedieval durable disorder pervades much of the country as Somali 
warlords and armed groups impose order in their own, albeit brutal, manner. 
As of 2010, al-Shabaab controls most of south and central Somalia, including 
some of Mogadishu, and its influence extends across the Somali borders into 
neighbouring Ethiopia and Kenya. In this area, carved out of the ‘sovereign’ 
territory of existing states, al-Shabaab maintains the monopoly of force and 
provides some political goods to the people under its own extreme version of 
sharia. With the exception of Mogadishu, much of this area is peaceful. 
Al-Shabaab also provides governance. In 2008 it began to reach out to 
the public in a series of town visits that the International Crisis Group 
describes as ‘well choreographed, with clerics addressing public rallies and 
holding talks with local clan elders’.399 They also have handed out food and 
money to the poor, provided criminal justice through mobile sharia courts and 
attempted to settle local disputes. Even Human Rights Watch concedes that ‘in 
many areas, al-Shabaab rule has brought relative peace and order that contrasts 
dramatically with the chaos in Mogadishu’.400 Horn of Africa expert Andre Le 
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Sage has identified four separate systems of justice in Somalia following its 
descent into chaos in 1991: the centralized formal judiciary structures created 
through international peace processes; the traditional, clan-based system 
known as xeer; sharia courts in urban areas, particularly Mogadishu; and civil 
society and private-sector initiatives, including those established by warlords. 
What makes them essentially neomedieval is that they coexist as ‘multiple, 
overlapping and often contradictory sources of law’.401 
In Somalia’s continuing armed conflict, none of the major actors is a 
state. The primary actors are international organisations such as the UN, which 
justifies violence on humanitarian grounds in the guise of Chapter VII 
peacekeeping missions. Abetting its mandate are transnational NGOs, which 
provide the bulk of external assistance to the Somalis as well as highlight the 
problem in international politics. The actual battles are waged not between 
national military units but between UN blue-helmet peacekeepers and militants 
who serve warlords. Victory is determined as much in the realm of ideology as 
physical space.  
Al-Shabaab is also a globalised enemy, taking full advantage of the 
technological unification of the world to resource and recruit its ranks as well 
as strike alliances with simpatico groups like al-Qa’ida in Afghanistan. The 
most famous fight between a professional military and non-state actors was the 
Battle of Mogadishu, which ended in decisive victory for the low-tech clan 
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militias over the United States military’s most elite units. The formalized 
international relations between states as they govern world events have been 
completely absent from this twenty-year scenario. Somalia represents the 
antithesis of state-centric international relations theory and demonstrates the 
emergence of globalised neomedievalism in world affairs. 
Medieval Solutions to Modern Problems 
The neomedieval situation in Somalia reinforces the obvious but often 
overlooked observation that local communities are not passive in the face of 
state failure and insecurity, but establish political arrangements that minimise 
risk and maximise stability in the face of Hobbesian anarchy. 402  This 
governance without government creates a durable disorder that may hold 
valuable insights beyond the borders of Somalia. While state-building efforts in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as UN peacekeeping missions around the world, 
toil in Sisyphusian frustration to create Westphalian states where none existed 
before, an alternative development model based on the realities of 
neomedievalism might prove more apt. Such a model would recognize the 
various overlapping authorities and allegiances in a region, and work with them 
to achieve security, stability and development.  
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Somalia expert Ken Menkhaus recommends a more neomedieval 
approach to rebuilding the country. He suggests that the best hope for Somalia 
lies in establishing it as a ‘mediated state’ that harnesses the neomedieval 
nature of the situation. The notion of ‘mediated’ and ‘unmediated’ states 
originates with Michael Barnett and Christoph Zuercher. An unmediated state 
corresponds to the Westphalian model: strong state institutions govern central 
features of the economy and society. Mediated states exist when elites rule 
instead of institutions through alliances with local notables, akin to the feudal 
lords of medieval Europe.403 The latter are not ideal choices for governments 
since they are inherently disorganised, illiberal and chaotic, but they are often 
the best of bad options for failed states existing in a neomedieval condition 
where attempts to instill an unmediated state may prove impossible.  
The concept of the mediated state stems from the Middle Ages when, 
as Menkhaus explains, ‘ambitious monarchs with limited power were forced to 
manipulate, manoeuvre, and make deals with local rivals to extend their 
authority’. 404  Those rivals often ‘mediated’ authority as over-powerful 
purveyors of royal authority, as ‘private’ subjects exercising ‘public’ jurisdiction 
or as members of supranational bodies such as the Church.405 This created a 
situation in medieval France akin to neomedieval Somalia: ‘a nation 
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184 
characterized by parcellized and overlapping jurisdictions, multiple legal codes, 
and a plethora of internal tariffs and taxes’.406  
Given this reality, a state-building strategy based on neomedievalism 
may prove more effective than the Westphalian model. According to 
Menkhaus, establishing Somalia as a mediated state would involve creating a 
limited central government that relies on a diverse range of local authorities to 
execute core functions of government and mediate relations between local 
communities and the state. 407  This partnership between a weak central 
government and semi-autonomous local authorities might more successfully 
resuscitate the failed state than conventional Westphalian models of state 
building, since it harnesses pre-existing local authorities to deliver good 
governance rather than ignoring or disbanding them––the standard practice in 
contemporary peacekeeping missions.  
Historically, the international community dismisses ‘subnational’ 
polities as part of the problem of state failure, and is quick to abandon them 
the instant a national government is declared. However, in areas where 
neomedievalism is firmly rooted, establishing a Westphalian state may be 
unattainable, resulting in state building failure. Le Sage recommends that 
Somalia should not seek to adopt a single justice system to the detriment of 
the others and recognize that the ‘multiplicity of systems has afforded Somalis 
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options in responding to their predicament of state collapse, and each form of 
justice has its own advantages’.408 Too often well-intentioned peacekeeping 
missions attempt to create ‘unmediated’ Westphalian states in neomedieval 
environments that are doomed to fail since the two conditions are 
incompatible, as exemplified by the dismal state-building record in Somalia 
since 1991. Consequently, Menkhaus concludes, ‘the problem in Somalia is not 
that state building itself is doomed to fail; it is rather that the type of state that 
both external and local actors have sought to construct has been unattainable 
and has as a consequence repeatedly set up Somali political leaders and their 
external mediators for failure’.409 
Precisely how the centralized government can coexist with prevailing 
local authorities would be uniquely a matter for Somalis to determine, town by 
town and district by district. Such a process promises to be messy, but there is 
precedent for success. The lawless border region of Kenya, Ethiopia, Somalia, 
Sudan and Uganda has produced years of bloodshed rivalling civil war. Unable 
to fully police its borders, the Kenyan government in the late 1990s partnered 
with coalitions of local NGOs, traditional leaders and other civic groups to 
manage and prevent armed conflict through peace and development 
committees. Following this, public security and rule of law substantially 
improved, giving the Kenyan government the capacity to extend its authority 
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into its frontier zones with the help of mediated actors. 410  Similarly, 
governments and peacekeepers alike increasingly use community policing in 
fragile states to help provide governance in Afghanistan, the DRC and 
Liberia.411 In this way, neomedieval state building harnesses the overlapping 
authorities and allegiances of local actors to achieve good governance by 
working toward a common goal. Furthermore, a neomedieval approach 
reassures potential peace spoilers by reducing the threat of an overly ambitious 
and strong central government. Unlike attempts to build unmediated 
Westphalian states, a neomedieval approach co-opts spoilers by aligning the 
interests of the weak central government with local authorities and vice versa, 
ideally creating a symbiotic relationship to motivate stability. This approach 
may be the only way to rebuild failed states that almost always exist in highly 
neomedieval conditions.  
This chapter examined the evidence for globalised neomedievalism, 
and found some substantiation for its presence as an emerging world order 
since the Cold War; specifically this chapter surveyed four of the five 
characteristics of neomedievalism that, according to Bull, would indicate the 
presence of neomedievalism: the technological unification of the world, the 
regional integration of states, the importance of transnational organisations, 
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and the disintegration of states. These areas have been well covered in 
scholarship. Conspicuously absent from the literature, however, is a rigorous 
analysis of the last characteristic of neomedievalism: the restoration of private 
international violence. Since the end of the Cold War, private militaries have 
made a fierce comeback, and are now a multi-billion-dollar globalised industry. 
Despite the volumes of ink spilled on the topic in recent years, the industry 
remains murky because it is notoriously opaque to outside investigators. 
Consequently, little is known about how and why these private armies exist. 
We know why weak states use or are exploited by armed transnational actors, 
as epitomized by narco-states. But why have strong states such as the United 
States elected to use private armies in war? How has this changed warfare, and 
what are the implications for security in the twenty-first century? The next 
chapter explores the return of private armies after their multi-century hiatus 
since the Middle Ages, locating the missing piece of the puzzle regarding the 
emergence of a globalised neomedieval world order. 
  
  
188 
 
Chapter  3 
  
The Return of  Private  Armies  
 
 
The sinews of war are unlimited money 
–– Cicero 
 
 
On 27 April 1522, two armies faced each other at dawn across a soggy field 
ready for battle at a manor park of Bicocca, a small town six kilometres north 
of Milan. On one side stood the combined forces of France and Venice, 
numbering over 20,000 troops, including condottiero Giovanni de’ Medici’s 
Black Bands and 16,000 dreaded Swiss mercenaries. For two centuries, Swiss 
companies were the scourge of the European battlefield, overtaking superior 
forces with deadly twenty-one-foot steel-tipped pikes and precision formations 
that could run down heavily armoured knights––as the doomed Duke of 
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Burgundy could attest to––making them the most sought-after private armies 
on the market.412  
Opposing the combined army were the comparatively meagre Spanish-
Imperial, Milanese and papal forces, which numbered only 6,400 but included 
landsknechts or German mercenary pikemen. 413  The Swiss companies and 
landsknechts were more than mere business rivals and held special contempt for 
each other. The Holy Roman Emperor Maximilian I formed the first 
landsknechts regiments several decades earlier and patterned them after the 
Swiss companies, who regarded them as cheap copies purloining their brand. 
Consequently, no quarter was given when these mercenary rivals met on the 
battlefield. 
 The attack commenced at dawn. The French advanced on the 
outnumbered Spanish imperial forces with two columns of Swiss mercenaries, 
numbering a few thousand each, bearing down on the landsknechts and Spanish 
arquebusiers––soldiers using a predecessor of the musket––who stood behind a 
sunken road and an earthen rampart. As the Swiss advanced, their French 
masters ordered them to halt and wait for the French artillery to bombard the 
imperial defences first, but the Swiss did not. Perhaps the Swiss captains 
                                                
412 The Duke of Burgundy known as Charles the Bold, also called Charles the Rash, met his end at the 
Battle of Nancy on 5 January 1477, bringing to a conclusion the Burgundian Wars (1474–77) between the 
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and disfigured body was found frozen in a riverbed several days after the battle, only his physician was 
able to identify him. His head had been cleft in two by a halberd, multiple lances were lodged in his 
stomach and loins and his face was so badly mauled by wild animals that he was beyond recognition. 
413 Their ranks included many non-Germans too. 
  
190 
doubted the artillery would have any effect on the earthworks; perhaps the 
Swiss did not trust the French owing to an earlier pay dispute regarding their 
contract; perhaps it was the aggressive Swiss push-of-pike strategy that 
advanced without support of firearms; perhaps it was due to rivalry between 
the two Swiss columns, one from the rural cantons and the other from Bern 
and urban cantons; or perhaps it was because of their ‘blind pugnacity and self-
confidence’, as a French eyewitness later remarked.414 Either way, the Swiss 
moved swiftly across the open field without regard for consequence.  
As soon as the Swiss were in range of the enemy cannon they began to 
take massive casualties. With nowhere to go but forward, they moved toward 
the Spanish positions but came to a deadly halt when they reached the sunken 
road that acted as a ditch and the tall rampart behind it. Atop that rampart 
were the landsknechts who mercilessly attacked their trapped rivals while the 
arquebusiers fired downward into the sunken road, massacring the Swiss. 
Retreating back across the field they lost more men to cannon barrage. By the 
time they reached French lines they had suffered more than 3,000 casualties, 
including twenty-two captains and all but one of the French commanders who 
accompanied the Swiss assault. The battle was lost and three days later the 
Swiss abandoned the campaign altogether, marching home to their cantons 
and marking the end of Swiss dominance in the mercenary market. As 
Francesco Guicciardini, a contemporary historian, wrote, ‘they went back to 
their mountains diminished in numbers, but much more diminished in 
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audacity; for it is certain that the losses which they suffered at Bicocca so 
affected them that in the coming years they no longer displayed their wonted 
vigour’.415 From this battle comes the Spanish word bicoca, meaning a bargain or 
something acquired at little cost.416 
The return of private armies may seem absurd to those brought up to 
view war as fought only between states through their public armies. However, 
this reigning assumption is a modern idealisation that does not match historical 
reality. Throughout most of history military force was marketised and non-
state violence dominated the international system. Being a mercenary is often 
referred to as the second-oldest profession.417 Individuals and groups regularly 
employed private armies to pursue their objectives––political power, wealth, 
vendetta––creating an international market for force in which military might 
was traded as a commodity and the nationality of suppliers or purchasers 
meant little. As Jeffrey Herbst observes, ‘the private provision of violence was 
a routine aspect of international relations before the twentieth century’.418 This 
market came to an end with the rise of the Westphalian system as states 
consolidated the monopoly of violence in the marketplace by defeating or 
banning all armed competitors, especially mercenaries. Public armies replaced 
private ones and mercenaries were outlawed.  
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At the dawn of the twenty-first century, however, the international 
market for force is remerging after a four-century hiatus; as Christopher Coker 
noted in 1999, ‘the privatisation of violence represents a global trend’.419 Some 
weak states have lost their monopoly of force to non-state rivals, such as 
militants, mercenaries and insurgents. But strong states, the United States 
among them, have voluntarily reintroduced private violence into warfare by 
hiring private military companies (PMCs) such as Blackwater, DynCorp 
International and their many competitors. In doing so, the United States has 
inadvertently hatched a new private military industry with a future in 
international relations that is anything but certain, yet it will shape peace and 
security in the decades to come. This chapter briefly charts the transformation 
of private armies in the ‘West’ from honourable profession to black-market 
pariah to honourable profession once again, revealing the final piece of Bull’s 
formulation of neomedievalism: the restoration of private international 
violence.  
The Market for Force 
Mercenaries are as old as war itself. Today, the label connotes vileness, 
treachery and murder, but it was not always so. Being a mercenary was once 
considered an honest albeit bloody trade, and employing mercenaries to fight 
wars was the norm rather than the exception throughout early military history: 
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King Shulgi of Ur’s army (2094–47 BC); Xenophon’s army of Greek 
mercenaries known as the Ten Thousand (401–399 BC); and Carthage’s 
mercenary armies in the Punic Wars against Rome (264–146 BC), including 
Hannibal’s 60,000-strong army, which marched elephants over the Alps to 
attack Rome from the north.420 When Alexander invaded Asia in 334 BC his 
army included 5,000 foreign mercenaries and the Persian army that faced him 
contained 10,000 Greeks. 421  In fact, Greek mercenaries were core to his 
military campaign––on all sides of the conflict.422 Rome relied on mercenaries 
throughout its thousand-year reign, and Julius Caesar was repeatedly saved, 
even at Alesia, by mounted German mercenaries in his war against 
Vercingetorix in Gaul. Nearly half of William the Conqueror’s army in the 
eleventh century were mercenaries, as he could not afford a large standing 
army and there were not enough nobles and knights to accomplish the 
Norman conquest of England.423 In Egypt and Syria the Mamluk Sultanate 
(1250–1517) was a regime of mercenary slaves who had been converted to 
Islam. From the late tenth to the early fifteenth century Byzantine emperors 
surrounded themselves with Norse mercenaries known as the Varangian 
Guard, who were known for their fierce loyalty, prowess with the battle axe 
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and ability to swill copious amounts of alcohol.424 In Europe, the condottieri, 
Swiss companies, landsknechts, Bretons, Gascons, Picards and other mercenaries 
dominated warfare from the thirteenth to the sixteenth centuries. The list 
continues; as Tony Lynch and A.J. Walsh remark, it is clear that ‘for at least 
three thousand years mercenarism has been a feature, often the major feature, 
of institutions of organised violence’.425 
 The way of war began to change in the first half of the seventeenth 
century in Europe, particularly during the Thirty Years’ War (1618–48). In the 
hundred years leading up to 1650, warfare became increasingly violent as 
armies grew larger, weapons more destructive and consequences more severe. 
The damage to Germany in the Thirty Years’ War was, in some ways, more 
extensive than that of World War II. It lost up to a third of its population.426 
The reliance on mercenaries was ubiquitous and the overall cost of warfare 
was little more than the solde or pay due to mercenaries, from which the word 
soldier is derived. Battles were fought mostly between hired units, and ‘by and 
large, the military forces of every country consisted of mercenaries’.427 For 
example, some 40,000 Scotsmen––perhaps 15 per cent of the total males in 
Scotland––journeyed to central Europe to fight in the Thirty Years’ War.428 
The majority of Sweden’s military was mercenary, which is significant given 
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that it was a great power in the conflict and King Gustavus Adolphus was one 
of the great innovators of manoeuvre warfare. At the Battle of Breitenfeld, 
only 20 per cent of Sweden’s army consisted of Swedes, and at the Battle of 
Lutzen the figure was 18 per cent. European armies were an amalgamation of 
mercenaries, and the concept of patriotism was unconnected to military 
service.  
By the middle of the seventeenth century, the conduct of violence was 
a capitalist enterprise no different than any other industry. According to 
historian Michael Howard, ‘war became the biggest industry in Europe’.429 
Major engagements during this period typically involved 50,000 troops, as 
evidenced by the battles of White Mountain (1620), Breitenfeld (1631), Lützen 
(1632), Nördlingen (1634), Wittstock (1636) and Rocroi (1643). To meet the 
rising demand for troops, a new breed of conflict entrepreneur emerged who 
outfitted entire regiments and leased them to those in need of martial services. 
These ‘rental regiments’ allowed rulers to wage war on a grand scale without 
undue administrative or fiscal reform, effectively lowering the barrier to entry 
in war and encouraging ever larger battles. Examples of such entrepreneurs 
include Count Ernest Mansfeld, who raised an entire army for the Elector 
Palatine; Amsterdam businessman Louis de Geer, who sourced Sweden a 
complete operative navy; the Genovese Marquis of Spinola, who managed the 
king of Spain’s military affairs in the Netherlands; Bernard von Weimar, who 
produced armies for Sweden and then France; and most famously Count 
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Albrecht von Wallenstein, who offered his services plus an army to the Holy 
Roman Emperor Ferdinand II and eventually became the supreme 
commander of the Habsburg monarchy’s armies and the richest man in 
Europe.430  
The havoc was not limited to the battlefield, as the behemoth armies 
sustained themselves by pilfering the countryside, sometimes violently and 
often lawlessly, and the tyranny of plunder wore heavily on civilian 
populations. Rectifying the social damage caused by en masse larceny was 
expensive for employers, who consequently attempted to station troops away 
from population centers and ideally deploy them in offensive campaigns in 
foreign lands.431 However, this was not always possible. The populace of 
Brandenburg complained bitterly that the mercenaries guarding them were far 
more terrible than the enemy Swedes outside the city walls, and they begged 
their ruler Frederick William, the Great Elector, to disband the unruly 
companies. Assessing the situation, the Elector wrote in April 1641: 
We find that our military forces have cost the country a great 
deal and done much wanton damage. The enemy could not 
have done worse. We do not see that we have had, or are likely 
to have, the least benefit from their services. Therefore we 
have resolved to keep only what is necessary as a garrison for 
our fortresses.432 
 The Elector’s sentiments were not unique. The unrestrained actions of 
mercenaries caused widespread destruction and misery in the course of the 
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Thirty Years’ War. These mercenary companies were often intractable and 
could usurp their employers if left unchecked. Additionally, because they were 
recruited only during a military emergency and dismissed immediately at its 
conclusion, they frequently roamed the countryside as brigands while awaiting 
new contracts. These and other bitter experiences taught both rulers and ruled 
that they could not entrust the protection of their homeland to unreliable 
mercenaries. At the conclusion of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 leaders of 
all sides tacitly agreed that an open market for force was too destructive and 
expensive to continue, and that public armies should replace private ones; that 
is, the state should take over.  
The State Monopolises Force 
Shortly after the Peace of Westphalia, the Holy Roman Emperor, Ferdinand 
III, established the first peacetime field army in the history of the monarchy. 
He issued a decree in 1649 announcing that of the fifty-two regiments raised 
during the great war, nine infantry (including both pike and shot) and ten 
cavalry (one of dragoons and nine of cuirassiers) would not be demobilised 
with the rest, but remain as permanent units.433 Previously there had been small 
attempts to create standing public armies. The force of King Charles VII of 
France in 1445 consisted of 9,000 French soldiers. Rudolf II of Austria had 
three winter regiments in 1598 at key fortifications along his frontier. 
Hungarian king Matthias Corvinus’s Fekete Sereg, or Black Army, captured 
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parts of Austria and Bohemia in the fifteenth century. 434  However, these 
antecedents did not attempt to dislodge private armies and take over the 
market for force. The size, scale and scope of Ferdinand’s ambitions were 
unprecedented, as he sought to expunge the need for mercenaries and thus 
began the state’s monopoly on violence, the end of private armies and the 
beginning of modern public armies. 
The transition from private to public armies was gradual, spanning two 
centuries. By 1650 it was clear that on-demand military services were no longer 
economical to rulers, given the destruction mercenaries wrought upon the 
countryside and the threat they posed to their employers. What was needed 
was a public army of systematically trained and disciplined professionals, 
maintained in peace and war, winter and summer, with a regular means of 
obtaining supplies and replacements and paid by and loyal to the state, 
unequivocally. Following the Thirty Years’ War, the Great Elector of 
Brandenburg-Prussia retained 4,000 soldiers and increased that number to 
12,000 after the Northern War (1655–60). Wurttemberg, Hesse, Saxony and 
Bavaria undertook similar efforts. 435  France formed a standing army by 
absorbing most of Louis XIV’s officers into the gendarmerie and establishing six 
standing infantry units that endured after the Peace of the Pyrenees (1659). 
These regiments enabled the Sun King to mobilise his armies swiftly in the 
War of Devolution and overrun the Habsburg-controlled Spanish Netherlands 
                                                
434 Ibid, 124-126. 
435 F.L. Carsten, Princes and Parliaments in Germany (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959), 74-99, 182-83, 239-40, 
397-403, 409-10. 
  
199 
and the Franche-Comté, encouraging him to create an even larger standing 
army at the end of the war in 1668. 436  Concurrently in England, Oliver 
Cromwell’s New Model Army was a prototype standing army, and after the 
Restoration of 1660 Charles II was permitted to retain five regiments from this 
force, totaling about 3,000 men, to garrison his fortresses as royal guards.437 
These early efforts were the germ of the large national militaries centuries later. 
As military historian John Mears explains, ‘the nature of military conflict in the 
seventeenth century provided a further impetus for the creation of permanent 
armed forces…. giving them an appearance which men in the twentieth 
century can recognise as being distinctly modern’.438 
Technological improvements in weaponry helped make public armies 
possible. Previously, mercenaries provided not only on-demand military 
services but highly specialised ones too. The Swiss Guard delivered precision 
tactics that required extensive training and drill to employ effectively in the 
heat of battle. Similarly, the heavy crossbow known as the balestrieri––with 
armour-piercing bolts––required a significant investment of time and training 
to use with any skill in combat, especially against moving or ranged targets. 
The cost of developing similar in-house capabilities for states was simply too 
high, which is why they outsourced these needs in the Middle Ages. However, 
this became possible with the advent of the musket, which could punch holes 
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in knights’ armour; the declining price of gunpowder made training cheaper 
and less time consuming, giving rise to the possibility of the citizen-soldier.439 
Combining this with the practice of conscription, rulers discovered that they 
could muster large national armies without the risks associated with 
mercenaries. The armies that swept across Europe under Napoleon’s 
command were mostly made up of French citizens, and with their decisive 
victory over and occupation of Prussia following the twin battles of Jena and 
Auerstedt in 1806, Prussia quickly adopted a citizen-soldier model and rejoined 
the campaign later to help defeat the French forces. As the Napoleonic wars 
continued, the model eventually became the norm for all powers.440  
Administrative changes also helped put private armies out of business. 
Sustaining a large standing army is complicated and expensive, requiring a 
considerable bureaucracy to collect taxes and administer revenue. Over time, 
large centralised state bureaucracies replaced feudal lordships in the 
machinations of governance and especially military administration. Louis XIV 
established a sophisticated bureaucracy to manage state affairs at the expense 
of the estates and the great nobles. Influenced by Swedish ideas and the 
reforms of Gustavus Adolphus, Secretary of State for War Michel le Tellier 
and his son the Marquis de Louvois managed the intendants de l’armée that 
reorganised the French army into a pyramidal structure of responsibility and 
authority, led by generals and managed by bureaucrats, which grew to 400,000 
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soldiers. 441  Modeling this bureaucracy, the Great Elector created the 
Generalkriegskommissariat in 1655 with subordinate officials in each of his 
various territories that eventually supplanted the estates regarding all matters of 
finance and taxation connected with the army. 442  Paying for the new 
bureaucrats and soldiers mandated an ever-increasing tax base built upon 
productive citizens unfettered by marauding mercenaries, reinforcing the need 
to outlaw private armies.  
Enlightenment ideas and their accompanying political revolutions also 
spurred the demise of private armies by strengthening the bond between 
soldier and state. Previously, mercenary organisations were a conglomeration 
of nationalities bound by a command language, purpose for profit and perhaps 
even loyalty toward colleagues. Although some private armies, such as the 
Swiss companies, consisted of a single nationality, most were a multinational 
lot, such as the landsknechts. This began to change when ideas of rationalism, 
the social contract and natural rights emerged from the English, American and 
French Revolutions, ushering in a new era of political thinking that 
transformed the individual from royal subject to national citizen and 
proclaimed that kings no longer ruled by the divine right of God but by the 
consent of the ruled, on pain of death. However, with new privileges came 
new responsibilities. Just as the state was obliged to protect citizens’ rights, 
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citizens were duty-bound to defend the state, as demonstrated by the levée en 
masse that swelled Napoleon’s ranks. The revolutions cemented a bond 
between individual and state, giving rise to nationalism and linking military 
service to patriotic duty. 
The emerging Westphalian notion of sovereignty also demanded that 
states put private armies out of business. First, if states were to govern as the 
sole authority within a given territory, they needed a monopoly of force to 
uphold their rule of law; all threats to this enterprise, such as mercenaries, were 
proscribed. Second, the Westphalian system held that each state was 
responsible for trans-border violence that emanated from its territory, even if 
the regime did not support that violence. Owing to this, states prohibited 
private armies out of fear that they might start a war with a neighbour and drag 
both states into armed conflict with each other. The only serious exception to 
the new norm against private armies involved states employing the armies of 
other states. During the American Revolutionary War, Great Britain rented 
nearly 30,000 soldiers from German states, mostly from Hesse-Kassel, to quell 
the colonial revolt. The American rebels called these German soldiers Hessians. 
German states became factories of state-sponsored mercenarism, supplying 
tens of thousands of German soldiers to other national powers in the soldier 
trade (Soldatenhandel).443 In a sign of the times, what was once considered a 
legitimate practice became morally repugnant, attracting pejorative labels such 
                                                
443 M.S. Anderson, Europe in the Eighteenth Century, 1713-1783 (London: Longman, 1987), 220; M.S. 
Anderson, The War of the Austrian Succession, 1740-1748 (London: Longman, 1995), 32; Michael Hughes, 
Early Modern Germany, 1477-1806 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992), 153. 
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as Menschenhandel (trade in human beings), Menschenverkauf (sale of human 
beings), or Seelenverkauf (sale of souls).444  
Similarly, though pirates were strictly outlawed and typically faced the 
gallows if caught, it was considered legitimate for states to hire private 
warships, or privateers, by issuing a letter of marque to attack enemy ships. 
Privateers were even permitted pilfering as part of the prize. The key 
difference between a pirate and a privateer was normative, as acts of piracy 
were deemed illegal because they were ‘done under conditions which render it 
impossible or unfair to hold any state responsible for their commission’.445 
States also delegated military affairs to quasi-state-run trading companies such 
as the East India Company, which commanded its own armed forces and 
governed India for Great Britain for over two centuries. The last incident in 
which a state raised an army of foreigners was in 1854, when Great Britain 
hired 16,500 mercenaries for the Crimean War, although none saw battle 
because the war ended before they arrived in theater.446 By 1900 the practice of 
utilising private forces, even when state sponsored, was defunct. As Thomson 
writes, ‘states could no longer buy an army or navy from the international 
system’.447 European rulers first encouraged, then delegitimised and finally 
eliminated mercenarism.  
                                                
444 Peter H. Wilson, “The German ‘Soldier Trade’ of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries: A 
Reassessment,” The International History Review 18, no. 4 (1996): 758. 
445 William Edward Hall, A Treatise on International Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1917), 310; see also 
Thomson, Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns, 22-26. 
446 Charles C. Bayley, Mercenaries for the Crimea: The German, Swiss, and Italian Legions in British Service, 1854-
1856 (Quebec: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1977), 111. 
447 Thomson, Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns, 19. 
  
204 
The Black Market for Force 
In the twentieth century the Westphalian order was at its zenith and the free 
market for force was pushed underground. The privilege of legitimately waging 
war was arrogated exclusively to states and their militaries, and was the view 
commonly espoused by international relations theory, which emerged during 
this period. 448  As World War I, World War II and the Cold War were 
emblematic conflicts of the period, waged between ‘great power’ nations using 
huge public militaries as gladiators to settle political disputes, private armies 
were globally outlawed by the society of states and codified in the laws of 
armed conflict (LOAC), particularly in the Third and Fourth Geneva 
Conventions. The LOAC were created to regulate interstate warfare and 
proscribe all forms of non-state violence, such as mercenaries, that crossed 
national borders. According to the LOAC, the only ‘lawful’ combatants are 
members of regular––read state––armed forces and paramilitary groups that 
come under national military command and meet certain criteria, such as 
carrying their weapons openly, distinguishing themselves from civilians and 
generally obeying the laws of war.449 In this context, mercenaries are deemed 
illegal because they are warriors whose allegiance is based primarily on 
                                                
448 For example see: Robert J. Art, and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Use of Force: International Politics and Foreign 
Policy (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1983).; Brown, et al., Theories of War and Peace.; 
Midlarsky, Handbook of War Studies; Wayman and Diehl, Reconstructing Realpolitik. 
449 Third Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 
3316; Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516.  The LOAC that deal with mercenaries also sought to stem the rise of individual 
mercenaries operating in Sub-Sahara Africa in the 1960s. 
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monetary compensation rather than obedience and loyalty to a state.450 The 
most widely accepted definition of a mercenary in the laws of war is in Article 
47 of Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions, which states as 
follows: 
 
1. A mercenary shall not have the right to be a combatant or a 
prisoner of war.  
 
2. A mercenary is any person who:  
a. is especially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in 
an armed conflict;  
b. does, in fact, take a direct part in the hostilities;  
c. is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the 
desire for private gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on 
behalf of a Party to the conflict, material compensation 
substantially in excess of that promised or paid to 
combatants of similar ranks and functions in the armed 
forces of that Party;  
d. is neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a resident 
of territory controlled by a Party to the conflict;  
e. is not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the 
conflict; and  
f. has not been sent by a State which is not a Party to the 
conflict on official duty as a member of its armed forces.451 
 
However, this definition is so restrictive yet imprecise that almost no one falls 
into the category.452 One military historian remarked that ‘any mercenary who 
                                                
450 Gregory P. Noone, “The History and Evolution of the Law of War Prior to World War II,” Naval 
Law Review 47 (2000): 176-207.  
451 “Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12 1949, and Relating to the Protection 
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) June 8, 1977,” Office of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Human Rights, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/protocol1.htm.  
452 For further discussion of the many loopholes in Protocol 1, see: Montgomery Sapone, “Have Rifle 
with Scope,Will Travel: The Global Economy of Mercenary Violence,” California Western International Law 
Journal 30, no. 5 (1999): 36-43; Juan C. Zarate, “The Emergence of a New Dog of War: Private 
International Security Companies, International Law, and the New World Disorder,” Stanford Journal of 
International Law 34, no. 75 (1998); Sarah Percy, Mercenaries: The History of a Norm in International Relations 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
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cannot exclude himself from this definition deserves to be shot––and his 
lawyer with him!’453 
Despite the norm against mercenaries, there were some examples of 
state-sponsored mercenarism in the twentieth century.454 The Flying Tigers––
the popular name of the 1st American Volunteer Group of the Chinese Air 
Force in 1941–42––consisted of some sixty Curtiss P-40 shark-faced fighter 
planes based in Burma, and flew missions against Japanese forces occupying 
China. The unit was staffed by mostly former United States military personnel 
and pilots, and was little more than a way for the United States to combat 
Japan before war was formally declared. Monthly salaries varied but were all 
substantially higher than those of the United States public military: $250 for a 
skilled ground crewman, $600 for a pilot officer and $675 for a flight leader.455 
Squadron commanders received $750 a month or $11,486.65 in 2010 dollars. 
In many ways, the Flying Tigers were precursors of modern PMCs. 
For the most part, however, mercenaries led an illicit life, operating as 
private warriors in the shadows rather than for-profit companies in the open 
market. Individual soldiers of fortune bounced between geopolitical hotspots 
in China, Latin America and especially Africa. Their employers included rebel 
groups, weak governments, multinational firms operating in precarious regions 
and former colonial powers who desired clandestine influence in the affairs of 
                                                
453 Originally quoted in Geoffrey Best, Humanity in Warfare (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980),  
375. 
454 For more on the norm against mercenaries, see: Sarah Percy. Mercenaries: The History of a Norm in 
International Relations. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. 
455 Daniel Ford, Flying Tigers: Claire Chennault and His American Volunteers, 1941-1942 (New York: Harper 
Paperbacks, 2007), p. 45. 
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their past colonies. The decolonisation that followed World War II offered 
particularly rich opportunities for these private warriors. With unconstrained 
political rivalries, the proliferation of warlords and warriors, weak states, 
weaker rulers, cowed populations, little or no rule of law and access to 
resources, the conditions for a free market for force were improving. 
The Congo Crisis of 1960–68 began with national independence from 
Belgium and ended with the seizing of power by Joseph Mobutu, causing the 
deaths of tens of thousands of people.456 During this maelstrom of conflict, 
international mining companies such as Union Minière hired hundreds of 
mercenaries known as Les Affreux (The Frightfuls), including Irishman ‘Mad’ 
Mike Hoare and Frenchman Bob Denard, to support the Katanga secession. 
Later, Hoare attempted a coup d’etat of the Seychelles Islands and Denard 
fought in many African countries including Angola, Zimbabwe, Gabon and 
the Comoros Islands, where he participated in four coups, the last in 1995. 
Their exploits informed movies such as The Wild Geese (1978), for which Hoare 
was a technical advisor, and The Dogs of War (1980), based on a Frederick 
Forsyth novel inspired by the life of Denard. These and other treatments still 
shape mercenary stereotypes in today’s popular imagination, summed up by a 
scene in The Dogs of War when one mercenary makes a toast before their ad 
                                                
456The Twentieth Century Atlas––Death Tolls places the number of dead around 100,000 people. See: “Mid 
Range Wars and Atrocities of the Twentieth Century,” The Twentieth Century Atlas – Death Tolls, 
accessed January 14, 2011, http://users.erols.com/mwhite28/warstat4.htm#Crisis.  
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hoc team embarks on its mission: ‘Vive la mort! Vive la guerre! Vive le sacré 
mercenaire!’.457  
The Return of Private Armies 
Shortly after the Cold War the world witnessed the resurrection of private 
armies. Perhaps it is not surprising that the first real mercenary firm emerged 
in Africa. With the fall of the South African apartheid regime, Lieutenant-
Colonel Eeben Barlow left the South African Defence Force to establish the 
first PMC, the appropriately named Executive Outcomes (EO). Its ranks were 
populated by soldiers from South African special forces units, such as the 32nd 
Battalion and the Koevoet––crowbar in Afrikaans––a special counter-
insurgency police force. EO was a private army in the mould of the old 
condottieri: It was a fully functional, self-contained military organisation, 
complete with its own air force, that would conduct full-spectrum combat 
operations for the right price. In 1993 the Angolan government hired EO to 
defeat the rebel group National Union for the Total Independence of Angola 
(UNITA), retake oil facilities in the harbour town of Soyo and train 
government soldiers for $40 million a year. Two years later, Sierra Leone’s 
government hired EO to defeat the Liberian-backed Revolutionary United 
Front (RUF), retake the Kono diamond area and force a negotiated peace for 
$35 million.458  
                                                
457 Loosely translated, ‘Long live death! Long live war! Long live the sacred mercenary!’ 
458 David Shearer, “Outsourcing War,” Foreign Policy, no. 112 (1998): 73. See also: Coker, “Outsourcing 
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In the early days of the Rwandan genocide EO approached then-
UNDPKO chief Kofi Annan and offered to help contain the violence as the 
United Nations generated a competent peacekeeping force, which normally 
requires several months. Annan refused EO’s offer, claiming later that ‘the 
world may not be ready to privatise peace’.459 This view was costly, as over 
800,000 people died within 100 days––8,000 people a day, more that all United 
States casualties in the wars of Iraq and Afghanistan combined over the past 
decade.460 Later, Mozambique, Uganda and Kenya also turned to EO for 
help. 461 Some scholars suggest, with a fair degree of hyperbole, that EO 
represents the future of armed conflict, but this has not come to pass.462 EO 
remains a distinctly unique phenomenon. Taking a cue from its progenitors 
350 years earlier, the South Africa government outlawed mercenaries in 1998 
and EO was dissolved as mandated by the Regulation of Foreign Military 
Assistance Act. 
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However, EO’s legacy lives on. The firm was loosely linked to a 
London-based PMC known as Sandline International, managed by former 
British lieutenant colonel Tim Spicer, British Special Air Service (SAS) officer 
Simon Mann, and US Army Special Forces colonel Bernie McCabe. 
Connecting these two PMCs was Mann, who had worked for EO,463 and 
Anthony Buckingham, a British army officer turned oil executive who helped 
EO secure contracts in Angola. Fearing EO’s imminent demise in the late 
1990s, Buckingham turned to Sandline for services, although the exact 
relationship between EO, Sandline and Buckingham remains unclear. In 1997 
Papua New Guinea’s prime minister Julius Chan contracted the firm to 
recapture copper mines held by separatists on Bougainville Island for $36 
million.464 Sandline subcontracted most of its personnel from EO, only to be 
rebuffed by the Papua New Guinea army, who arrested and deported the 
contractors without shots fired. Chan was forced to resign and the entire 
spectacle made world news as the Sandline Affair. Around this time, ousted 
Sierra Leone president Ahmad Tejan Kabbah contracted the firm to train and 
equip 40,000 Kamajor militia and members of a regional peacekeeping force to 
overthrow the military junta and secure diamond areas. Sandline was also to 
provide logistical and air support to the operation, as well as launch a full 
counter-coup from neighbouring Guinea. This too ended in failure, resulting 
in the arms-to-Africa scandal in the United Kingdom. 
                                                
463 Adam Roberts, The Wonga Coup: Guns, Thugs, and a Ruthless Determination to Create Mayhem in an Oil-Rich 
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In a twist of mercenary fate, the private warriors later found 
themselves working for different sides. Simon Mann led a group of 
mercenaries with alleged financial backing from Mark Thatcher, son of the 
former United Kingdom prime minister, in an attempted coup d’état of oil-
rich Equatorial Guinea in 2004, known as the Wonga Coup. The coup failed 
and Mann was sentenced to thirty-four years in prison, but was released on 
compassionate grounds. McCabe left Sandline to become the head of global 
security for the Marathon Oil Corporation, which is deeply invested in 
Equatorial Guinea and would not wish to see the country change political 
hands.465 It would be interesting to imagine a reunion between these two 
brothers-in-arms on opposite sides of the cell door in Equatorial Guinea’s 
notorious Black Beach prison. As for Spicer, shortly after the United States 
invaded Iraq in 2003 he founded Aegis Defence Services and won a lucrative 
contract worth $293 million over three years providing armed protection, 
logistical support and intelligence services to the United States government.466 
EO’s progeny lives on in Iraq today. 
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Chapter  4 
  
The New Market for  Force   
 
 
Is it really true that political self-interest  
is nobler somehow than economic self-interest?  
 
 ––Milton Friedman 
 
 
Private armies have returned, but as a mirror image of their times. Today’s 
military companies are sophisticated MNCs with shareholders and corporate 
offices around the world.467  Their stocks are bought and sold on Wall Street 
and listed on the London and New York stock exchanges. As they are 
responsible for complex military operations, DynCorp International, 
Blackwater, MPRI, Triple Canopy, Erinys and ArmourGroup International 
have generals and ambassadors on their corporate boards and former military 
and law enforcement personnel on their payrolls, and the companies proffer 
                                                
467 Interestingly one could also argue that private armies have returned as a mirror of their times in 
broader way, representing not just the commodification of violence but also the commodification of the 
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their employees’ skills to governments, other MNCs, NGOs and international 
organisations. The industry even has its own trade associations: the 
International Stability Operations Association (ISOA) in Washington DC, the 
British Association of Private Security Companies in London, and the Private 
Security Company Association of Iraq. 468  Like their medieval forerunners, 
modern condottieri are generally considered legitimate yet controversial 
businesses that provide needed services in the global marketplace.  
 The market maker for modern force is the United States, as it turned 
to the private sector in unprecedented ways to support its wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. Contractors have been present on United States battlefields since 
the American Revolution, but never before has the country relied so heavily on 
their services to wage war. Consequently war has become big business again. 
In little over a decade, the industry has expanded from a multi-million to a 
multi-billion dollar affair. The market’s value remains unknown; expert 
estimates range wildly from $20 billion to $100 billion annually.469 What is 
known is that from 1999 to 2008, DOD contract obligations increased from 
$165 billion to $414 billion.470 In 2010 DOD obligated $366 billion to contracts 
(54 per cent of total DOD obligations), an amount seven times the United 
                                                
468 The International Stability Operations Association (ISOA) was formerly known as the International 
Peace Operations Association (IPOA), which rebranded to ISOA in late 2010. 
469 Respectively: “Interview with Doug Brooks,” Frontline, March 22, 2005, accessed May 13, 2009,  
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liquidated. See: Moshe Schwartz and Joyprada Swain, Department of Defense Trends in Overseas Contract 
Obligations (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2011), 1. 
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Kingdom’s entire defence budget.471 Moreover, this only entails DOD contract 
obligations and does not include contracts made by other government agencies 
like the State Department. The United States dominance of the new market for 
force does not make it entirely free, as was the case in the Middle Ages. It is 
more a monopsony, in which the United States wields market power as the 
consumer-in-chief to shape business practices and norms. 
The manifestations of the new market are stark. Not surprisingly, the 
number of contractors supporting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan has 
reached historic proportions compared to earlier United States wars (Figure 5). 
As of 31 March 2010, the United States deployed 175,000 troops and 207,000 
contractors in war zones. During World War II contractors accounted for only 
10 per cent of the military workforce compared to 50 per cent in Iraq today––a 
1:1 ratio of contractors to military personnel.472 As the number of troops in 
Iraq has decreased, so too has the number of contractors. Since June 2008 
troop levels have dropped by 57,400 (37 per cent) and the number of 
contractors by approximately 67,000 (41 per cent). However, this reduction is 
not uniform across the types of contracted personnel. Those providing base 
support and construction declined by approximately 27,400 (31 per cent) and 
                                                
471 “Defence Spending £32.9Bn or $51Bn in 2010”, UK Ministry of Defence, Accessed Aug 4, 2011,   
http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/Organisation/KeyFactsAboutDefence/Defences
pending.htm. 
472 Government Accounting Office, Defense Management: DOD Needs to Reexamine Its Extensive Reliance on 
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34,000 (94 per cent) respectively, whereas the number of armed contractors 
actually increased by 2,417 (26 per cent), which is significant.473 
Figure 5: Contractors as Percentage of United States Military Workforce 
in Theatres of War (as of March 2010)474 
 
Contractors are also paying the ultimate sacrifice, accounting, in a 
rising trend, for 25 per cent of all United States fatalities since the wars in Iraq 
and Afghanistan began. In 2003 contractor deaths represented only 4 per cent 
of all fatalities. That number rose to 27 per cent from 2004 to 2007, and from 
2008 to 2010, contractor fatalities accounted for 40 per cent of the combined 
death toll. In 2010 more contractors were killed than military personnel, 
marking the first time in history that corporate casualties have outweighed 
military losses on United States battlefields. In the first two quarters of 2010 
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alone, contractor deaths represented more than half––53 per cent––of all 
fatalities (see Figure 6 and Figure 7).475 The exact numbers are difficult to 
reach, as the United States government does not track such data and 
companies have a propensity to underreport their wounded and dead, as it is 
bad for business.476 But overall, this trend suggests a growing United States 
dependency on the private military industry in warfare, similar to the situation 
in the Middle Ages, and unless the United States decides to significantly 
expand its public armed forces or reduce military engagement abroad, this 
trend toward the privatisation of warfare will continue.  
Figure 6: Per cent Breakdown of Fatalities in Iraq477 
 
                                                
475 Steven L Schooner and Collin Swan, “Contractors and the Ultimate Sacrifice,” The George 
Washington University Law School, Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper no. 512 (September 
2010). 
476 Government Accountability Office, Contingency Contracting: DOD, State, and USAID Continue to Face 
Challenges in Tracking Contractor Personnel and Contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan (Washington, DC: 
Government Accountability Office, 2009); Christian Miller, “Civilian Contractor Toll in Iraq and 
Afghanistan Ignored By Defense Dept,” ProPublica, October 9, 2009.; Justin Elliott, “Hundreds of 
Afghanistan Contractor Deaths Go Unreported,” Salon.com, July 15, 2010. 
477 Schooner, “Contractors and the Ultimate Sacrifice.” 
0%!10%!
20%!30%!
40%!50%!
60%!70%!
80%!90%!
100%!
2003! 2004! 2005! 2006! 2007! 2008! 2009! 2010!
US!Troops!Contractors!
  
217 
 Figure 7: Per cent Breakdown of Fatalities in Afghanistan478 
 
To address this development, the United States army commissioned an 
independent internal study led by top military logisticians, who issued their 
report in 2007 titled Urgent Reform Required: Army Expeditionary Contracting, also 
known as the Gansler Report after its chairman, Dr. Jacques S. Gansler. As the 
title infers, the panel found that the ‘“Operational Army” is expeditionary and 
on a war footing, but does not yet fully recognise the impact of contractors in 
expeditionary operations and on mission success’. Furthermore, they 
unanimously agreed that ‘acquisition failures in expeditionary operations 
urgently require a systemic fix of army contracting’, and recommended 
sweeping changes in four broad areas: first, establishing effective laws, 
regulations and policies to govern contracting, especially for expeditionary 
operations; second, fundamentally restructuring and reorganising army 
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institutions to better manage and integrate contractors into operations; third, 
increasing the stature, quantity and career development of military and civilian 
contracting personnel (especially for expeditionary operations), including 
introducing contract management into all levels of military education; and 
fourth, providing the training and tools necessary for overall contracting 
activities in expeditionary operations.479  
To date, these recommendations have been ignored, as the military 
persists in viewing contractors as temporary augmentations to their campaigns, 
even as, for nearly a decade, contractors have constituted half the United 
States forces in war zones. As Christopher Kinsey explains, ‘the military still 
sees contractors as a bolt-on asset that it can utilise in an ad hoc fashion as 
required, when in fact the military needs to come to terms with the idea that 
contractors are now part of its force structure’. 480 The 2010 Quadrennial 
Defence Review finally acknowledged the military’s ‘dependence’ on 
contractors and its intention to reduce it though an ‘in-sourcing initiative’ 
however this program will not apply to contractors in conflict areas, like 
PMCs. 481  In a widely distributed memorandum, the Secretary of Defense 
confirms the number of contractors in warzones ‘well exceeded’ military 
                                                
479 Urgent Reform Required: Army Expeditionary Contracting: The Report of the Commission on Army Acquisition and 
Program Management in Expeditionary Operations: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Readiness and Management 
Support of the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, 110th Cong. December 6, 2007, 5. 
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personnel and ‘I do not expect this to change now or in future contingency 
operations’.482 
In addition to the increasing United States dependence on the private 
sector to wage war, the types of private actors are also expanding. The vast 
majority of contractors in Iraq and other places are unarmed and provide non-
lethal logistical support, such as construction, maintenance and administrative 
duties (Figure 8). Logistics is the traditional role of contractors on the 
battlefield, and today’s largest contracts remain logistical in nature, such as the 
US Army’s Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) worth up to 
$22 billion. What is new, and controversial, is the presence of armed 
contractors. To many, the decision to outsource lethality to armed civilians in 
foreign lands who are tasked to kill people when necessary smacks of 
mercenarism.  
Armed contractors account for 12 per cent, or 11,610, of the overall 
contracting force in Iraq in 2010 and 14,439 in Afghanistan, representing a 
minority of all contractors in theatre.483 But size does not matter when it comes 
to armed contractors. Even though they are fewer in number than their 
unarmed brethren, their actions resonate disproportionately louder, owing to 
the nature of their work: They kill people. When a handful of Blackwater 
personnel killed seventeen innocent civilians at Nisour Square in Baghdad on 
                                                
482 Secretary of Defense, ‘Strategic and Operational Planning for Operational Contract Support (OCS) 
and Workforce Mix’, memorandum, US Department of Defense, January 24, 2011. 
483 Warlord, Inc.: Extortion and Corruption Along the U.S. Supply Chain in Afghanistan, 15; Schwartz, Department 
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16 September 2007, it created a firestorm of anti-US sentiment that 
undermined the United States counter-insurgency strategy of ‘winning hearts 
and minds’ in Iraq and generated such international ill will that Secretary of 
State Condoleezza Rice had to publically address the shooting and launch an 
official investigation.484 Despite the pandemonium, the Blackwater contractors 
walked free because they are immune from Iraqi law, in accordance to Order 
17 of the Coalition Provisional Authority. 485  Like Machiavelli and other 
medieval leaders outraged with mercenaries harming the people they were 
hired to protect, Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki angrily declared: ‘It cannot 
be accepted by an American security company to carry out a killing. These are 
very serious challenges to the sovereignty of Iraq.’486  
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Figure 8: United States Military Contractors in Iraq by Type of Service 
Provided (as of March 2010)487  
 
 
Companies make their profit on ‘time and materials’, meaning that they 
charge the client a premium for every hour an employee works or for every 
item purchased, no matter how small. For example, a firm may bill the 
government $40 an hour for an employee’s time yet only pay that person $30 
an hour. The difference between the ‘billing rate’ and what a firm actually pays 
for the time or material covers the contractor’s indirect costs, overhead and 
profit. In the past, some critics claim private armies are more expensive than 
public ones. For example, Joseph Stiglitz and Linda Bilmes estimate that ‘In 
2007 [in Iraq], private security guards working for companies such as 
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Blackwater and DynCorp were earning up to $1,222 a day; this amounts to 
$445,000 a year. By contrast, an Army sergeant was earning $140 to $190 a day 
in pay and benefits, a total of $51,100 to $69,350 a year’. 488 However this 
analysis is flawed since they compare a company’s billing rate––what it charges 
the government––to the annual salary of a soldier, which does not include the 
government’s indirect costs and overhead, such as healthcare, the use of 
vehicles, housing, hazardous duty pay, pension and so forth. Fundamental 
confusions regarding how firms make their money has led to misleading 
conclusions about the private sector’s efficiency. 
Currently, most PMCs are headquartered in the United States and the 
senior management are United States citizens, but like all MNCs, the 
companies maintain offices in several countries. Should one government, such 
as the United States or United Kingdom, impose strict regulations on their 
trade, they could move offshore. Currently, Dubai is a favourite hub for the 
industry owing to its proximity to the markets (i.e., the Middle East and Africa) 
and its business-friendly laws. In personnel, these new military MNCs are 
comparable to the private armies of old: The personnel who fill their ranks are 
densely international. In Iraq only 26 per cent of contractors are United States 
citizens. In Afghanistan the number is only fourteen per cent.489  
                                                
488 Joseph E. Stiglitz and Linda Bilmes, The Three Trillion Dollar War: The True Cost of the Iraq Conflict (New 
York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2008), 12.  For more information on appropriate cost comparisons, 
see: Contractors Support of Us Operations in Iraq, 14. 
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Personnel that work for a United States private military firm fall into 
one of three categories. The first category is United States citizens, who 
comprise only 20 per cent of the contractor workforce, according to the 
Congressional Budget Office.490 They generally fill management positions and 
highly technical jobs, such as engineering or legal services, and receive the 
highest pay. A second category is local hires, or local nationals: citizens of the 
country in which the firm is working (e.g., Iraqis working in Iraq). Local hires 
usually account for the bulk of contractors overseas, and they perform a wide 
range of mundane tasks, such as driving, food preparation and interpreting. 
They are also the lowest-paid category. The last category is third-country 
nationals (TCNs), who are neither United States nor local citizens. TCNs hail 
from countries as diverse as India, Fiji, Ghana, Ecuador, Australia, Mexico and 
South Africa.491 They typically do not fill significant management positions and 
are almost always paid less than a United States counterpart, even if the job is 
identical and they are working side by side. What is significant for the future of 
the industry is that these TCNs and local hires are gaining valuable trade 
knowledge that they can use to found new PMCs that are less picky about who 
they work for and how they do it. This is already happening. 
                                                
490 Contractors Support of US Operations in Iraq, 8. 
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Markets Want to Be Free 
As the private military industry grows, it is beginning to move beyond United 
States monopoly control and morph into a true free market for force, akin to 
the Middle Ages. In a free market, supply and demand naturally seek each 
other until a balance or equilibrium is reached between the two, a 
phenomenon Adam Smith describes as the ‘invisible hand of the market’.492 In 
the context of private military services, this means force providers are pursuing 
new clients and vice versa in conflict zones around the world, widening the 
market for force. At least three different types of private military actors are 
driving this trend.  
The first are personnel from ‘blacklisted’ firms such as EO and 
Blackwater. After the Nisour Square shootings, Erik Prince, founder of 
Blackwater, left the United States for Abu Dhabi, where he has become a 
dealmaker within the industry, connecting companies with clients and vice 
versa. He helped the South African military company Saracen International 
win contracts from Somalia’s beleaguered government to protect its leaders, 
train Somali troops and battle pirates and Islamic militants. Saracen was 
formed from the remnants of EO and is managed by Lafras Luitingh, a former 
officer in South Africa’s Civil Cooperation Bureau, a covert government-
                                                
492 Adam Smith uses the metaphor of an ‘invisible hand’ to describe the self-regulating nature of a free 
market. This phenomenon is created by the convergence of market actors’ self-interest, free competition, 
and the nature of supply and demand. This confluence of factors act like an ‘invisible hand’ that guides 
market actors to trade in the most mutually beneficial manner possible, allowing markets to allocate 
scarce resources efficiently in society without the need of strong government market manipulation or 
regulation. This is a founding principle of the Austrian laissez-faire economic school, but is also invoked 
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sponsored hit squad that operated during the apartheid era and is now 
defunct.493  
Saracen operates independently of all international and multilateral 
frameworks in Somalia, and little is known about the firm’s intentions other 
than profit-motive. Between May 2010 and February 2011 it trained, equipped 
and deployed fighters in an attempt to create one of ‘the best-equipped 
indigenous military force anywhere in Somalia’, according to a UN report.494 
Using shell companies, some of which are linked to Prince, Saracen secretly 
shipped military equipment into northern Somalia on cargo planes, which the 
report declares ‘a significant violation of the general and complete arms 
embargo on Somalia’.495  Worse, the company’s presence has aggravated already 
tense relations in the region, and local authorities and the UN force 
commander asked the company to leave Mogadishu, which it did. Now it 
seems Puntland has ambiguous designs for the firm and its forces, which 
worries neighbours and many within Puntland itself that it might reignite 
war.496  
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 Saracen International is not the only PMC seeking business in Somalia. 
The US State Department has indirectly financed Bancroft Global 
Development to train African troops to fight al Shabab. The PMC offers the 
United States a convenient way to fight its war on terror in Africa without 
committing its own forces to the battle, or as Johnnie Carson, the State 
Department’s top official for Africa, explains: ‘We do not want an American 
footprint or boot on the ground’. 497  Bancroft’s advisers include a retired 
general from the British marines and an ex-French soldier who commanded a 
group of foreign fighters during Cote d’Ivoire’s civil war in 2003 and did a stint 
in the presidential guard of the Comoros Islands. Michael C. Stock, the 
American head of Bancroft, strongly objects to the term ‘mercenary’ and 
instead describes Bancroft as a NGO, although it is unclear whether traditional 
NGOs would recognize Bancroft as such.498 
 Another firm, with backing from Prince, is raising a small army for the 
United Arab Emirates city of Abu Dhabi. Reflex Responses (R2) is based in 
the Middle East and boasts it can provide anything from static armed guards to 
nuclear security with ‘the right people for the right solution at a fair price’.499 
Reminiscent of Florence’s hiring of Hawkwood, the city paid the firm $529 
million to raise an 800-member battalion of foreign troops to conduct special 
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operations missions inside and outside the country (e.g., Iran), defend oil 
pipelines and skyscrapers from terrorist attacks and put down internal revolts. 
The firm’s labour pool is international, with former soldiers from the United 
States, Europe, Latin America and South African, but no Muslims since they 
might not be willing to kill fellow Muslims.500 Prince is the first major private 
military mogul to part ways with the United States, but other individuals and 
companies will inevitably follow as United States markets dry up, and when 
they do, they too will seek new clients or face bankruptcy. 
Another type of private military actor driving this trend is the growing 
number of indigenous PMCs that, unsurprisingly, germinated in Afghanistan 
and Iraq and is now considered normal. Warlords and other local conflict 
entrepreneurs are adopting the PMC model as a legitimate means of providing 
security and making a living in dangerous places, and as a result, Iraq and 
Afghanistan are now awash in home-grown PMCs. In 2010 the United States 
Senate concluded a comprehensive investigation into private security 
contractors operating in Afghanistan. It revealed squandered resources, 
dangerous failures in contractor performance and serious gaps in government 
oversight that allowed such failures to persist. It also found the industry was 
going native, or as one observer explained: ‘What used to be called warlord 
militias are now Private Security Companies’.501 For example, an international 
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PMC called ArmorGroup hired two local PMCs that the company called ‘Mr. 
White’ and ‘Mr. Pink’ to provide a guard force. The Senate investigation found 
evidence that these local PMCs were linked to murder, kidnapping, bribery, 
and anti-Coalition activities, and concluded ‘The proliferation of private 
security personnel in Afghanistan is inconsistent with the counterinsurgency 
strategy’.502 Other examples of Afghan PMCs include Watan Risk Management, 
NCL Holdings, Elite Security Services and Asia Security Group.503 
Problematically, the only local organisations in fragile states capable of 
fielding private armies are warlords, militias and insurgents, whom comprise 
much of the local market for force. Moreover, the number of local PMCs is 
rising. In Iraq, fifty-six of the eighty-two private security firms registered and 
licensed with the Ministry of Interior are Iraqi, and they work for a variety of 
government and private-sector clients. In Afghanistan, fifty-two private-
security companies are licensed to operate, arming about 25,000 civilians 
contractors. These indigenous PMCs are less finicky than their United States 
and European counterparts about whom they work for and what they do. 
A third type of private military actor driving this trend is former sub-
contractor PMCs that have spun off from larger international PMCs. Global 
PMCs like ArmourGroup or DynCorp International typically create or retain 
local companies to assist them in executing their security contracts however 
this has inadvertently facilitated the nativisation of the private military industry 
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in conflict-affected countries. In industry parlance, these sub-contractors are 
called ‘subs’ while big firms that are directly contracted by the United States 
government are called ‘primes’. In the private military context, Blackwater, 
DynCorp International and Triple Canopy are primes; subs can be local 
security guards, fortification builders or local administrative support. 
Regardless of their task, subs’ exposure to the industry allows them to become 
independent market players in their own right. Little is known about these 
local PMCs because the United States generally only monitors the performance 
of prime contractors and there is little––if any––vetting or oversight of subs.504  
The subs-turned-PMCs are now instituting a free market for force in 
conflict centres like Afghanistan, which can work against United States 
strategic objectives in the country. A United States Congressional investigation 
into a $2.16 billion contract called Host Nation Trucking (HNT), which 
protects overland supply lines in Afghanistan, found that most of the prime 
contractors hire local Afghan PMCs for armed protection of the trucking 
convoys. In some ways this arrangement works well: it effectively supplies 
most United States combat outposts across difficult and hostile terrain while 
only rarely needing the assistance of US troops. However, the investigators 
also discovered that 
the principal private security subcontractors on the HNT 
contract are warlords, strongmen, commanders and militia 
leaders who compete with the Afghan central government for 
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power and authority. Providing ‘protection’ services for the 
United States supply chain empowers these warlords with 
money, legitimacy, and a raison d’etre for their private armies.505 
Like the medieval market for force, the report concluded these indigenous 
‘private armies’ fuel warlordism, extortion, corruption, and likely collaborate 
with the enemy. It determined that ‘the logistics contract has an outsized 
strategic impact on U.S. objectives in Afghanistan’.506 The nativization and 
proliferation of PMCs is consistent with Adam Smith’s ‘invisible hand’; 
markets want to be free as self-interest, competition and supply and demand 
encourage new market actors where none existed before, and this is liberalizing 
the marketplace for force.  
The current size and scope of the embryonic free market for force 
remains unknown. Even the approximate number of private military personnel 
and where they are operating is undetermined because the firms are 
notoriously secretive and no independent organisation credibly tracks this 
information. What is known is meagre and generally limited to United States 
employment in Iraq and Afghanistan. According to the Congressional 
Research Service, a non-partisan watchdog agency of the United States 
Congress, of the 30,000 armed contractors operating in Iraq, only about a third 
work directly for the United States government while the rest served other 
clients: foreign governments, NGOs, MNCs and international organisations.507 
Many of the security contracts are buried within larger contracts, such as 
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reconstruction projects or aid programs that require security. Reconstruction 
contractors working for USAID have in turn subcontracted with PMCs for 
protection.  
In Afghanistan the situation is more pronounced. Experts estimate the 
true number of armed contractors is approximately 70,000. Most of these 
armed civilians work for non-US firms and non-US clients, evidence that the 
market for force in Afghanistan is expanding beyond the ambit of United 
States security operations.508 The growing number of armed contractors has 
traumatised the Afghan population, causing needless civilian casualties, 
corruption and general insecurity. As Hanif Atmar, the Afghan interior 
minister, explains, ‘There are thousands of people that have been paid by both 
civilian and military organisations to escort their convoys, and they all pose a 
problem. The Afghan people are not ready to accept the private companies’ 
providing public security’.509 Afghan president Hamid Karzai has called to ban 
all private military contractors in the country, which is evocative of Frederick 
William the Great Elector’s call to disband his mercenaries in 1641.510 The new 
market for force may have a fresh face but the effects of mercenaries are 
generally timeless. 
The rise of a free market for force should be expected, along with its 
origins in conflict-affected countries, since they share the same market 
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dynamics as medieval northern Italy, where the condottieri flourished for 
centuries. Such places are marked by unconstrained political rivalries; the 
proliferation of warlords and mercenaries; weak states, weaker rulers and 
cowed populations; little or no rule of law; and resources. Unless the 
international community can substantially oppose these factors, which seems 
unlikely, the trend toward a free market for force will continue. 
Microeconomics theory explains that free markets always try to bring 
themselves to equilibrium between supply and demand. In the case of conflict-
affected countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan there is significantly more 
demand for security than suppliers, encouraging the proliferation of PMCs as 
the state fails to monopolise force and provide security. This naturally induces 
an open marketplace for security rather than a monopoly, as the Westphalian 
model requires; a market for war will grow until supply meets demand, but 
achieving equilibrium might prove elusive, as war naturally escalates unless 
constrained. In a free market context, it is unclear what that constraint might 
be, other than competing market actors, resulting in a situation similar to the 
Middle Ages of ceaseless war.  
Why So Little Is Still Known 
The private military industry has become a fashionable subject for study over 
the past decade, but knowledge about the industry remains murky. The 
principal obstacle to research is the lack of data on the industry. The firms 
themselves can be more opaque than the United States military or intelligence 
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agencies because they are not subject to the Freedom of Information Act or 
similar legislative tools that impose transparency. Even members of Congress 
do not have direct access to the contracts that employ these firms, even 
though Congress is writing the checks. Journalists’ and academics’ analyses of 
PMCs are anaemic because the industry is media-phobic, owing to its roots in 
the military, which traditionally eschews public scrutiny. Reporters, who are 
typically not even allowed to interview much less embed in PMCs, can only 
record the events surrounding the industry. Academics depend almost entirely 
on the work of journalists for their analyses of these firms. Consequently, their 
mutual conclusions can be speculative and even factually erroneous. This has 
stultified understanding concerning this important topic. 
Government inquiry into the industry is limited and, at times, 
convoluted. Currently there is little, if any, meaningful regulation of or 
reporting requirements from this industry, which is remarkable when the firms 
are authorised to use lethal force abroad under the United States flag. Reports 
produced by government watchdog agencies such as the Congressional 
Research Service, Congressional Budget Office, the Special Inspector General 
for Iraq Reconstruction, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan 
Reconstruction and the Government Accountability Office offer excellent 
snap-shots of discrete problems with the market but lack in-depth analysis. 
Additionally, government investigators are often given limited access to the 
industry’s interior, owing to issues over propriety knowledge. What genuine 
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investigation has occurred is narrow and limited to three areas: the legal status 
of armed contractors on the battlefield; monetary fraud, waste and abuse; and 
experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan. Wider ramifications of this industry are 
left unexamined, such as how the commodification of conflict might 
undermine long-term foreign policy objectives. Congressional hearings on 
PMCs, such as those held by Congressman Henry Waxman, spotlight 
problems with these firms but do little to tangibly resolve them, and are often 
little more than political theatre. 
Much of the media discourse on the industry is usually framed in 
acrimonious and demonizing terms, owing in part to the sensationalistic lure of 
labelling PMCs as mercenaries and the promise of an audience. A sample of 
headlines from mainstream news outlets reveals some of this: ‘Dogs of War: 
From Mercenary to Security Contractor and Back Again’, ‘Making a Killing: 
The Business of War’, ‘Modern Mercenaries On the Iraqi Frontier’. 511 
Reporters turned authors fan the fire of conspiracy theorists by insinuating 
that PMCs represent a shadow government manipulating or coercing the 
national security establishment, with provocative books such as Jeremy 
Scahill’s best-selling Blackwater: The Rise of the World’s Most Powerful Mercenary 
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Army, Stephen Armstrong’s War Plc: The Rise of the New Corporate Mercenary and 
Robert Young Pelton’s Licensed to Kill: Privatizing the War on Terror.512 
The greatest purveyor of information in the popular imagination––
Hollywood––often displays mercenaries as heartless villains who only care for 
money regardless of honour or ethics. From Boba Fett of the Star Wars 
universe to Brock Pike from the film remake of The A-Team, mercenaries are 
classic ‘bad guys’ driving the movie’s heroes to eventual victory. Other movies 
portray mercenaries in a more ambiguous light. 513  Stock characters aside, 
Hollywood tends to portray the contemporary private military industry as a 
massive conspiracy to ransom national security for a profit margin. The 2009 
blockbuster film State of Play, adapted from a British Broadcasting Corporation 
mini-series, portrays the fictitious PMC PointCorp International, a thinly veiled 
play on the real PMC DynCorp International, as orchestrating an intricate web 
of lies that stretches to the highest levels of power in Washington DC to 
secure $40 billion worth of contracts and ultimately the total privatisation of 
the United States military. Fortunately the day is saved by the excellent 
investigative reporting skills of the Washington Globe, a barely disguised version 
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of the Washington Post. Such distortions of the industry are more inflammatory 
than informative.  
Industry defenders are equally problematic, as they tend to treat it as 
just another services industry, overlooking the moral, strategic and policy 
complexities of the issue. They maintain that the private sector is more 
efficient and effective than the public sector at finding solutions to difficult 
security challenges, but offer little evidence to outside researchers to 
corroborate these claims. They even inoculate the language used to describe 
the industry with euphemism. ISOA is disparaging of the term ‘private military 
company’ and ‘private security company’ and promotes the softer phrase 
‘contingency contractors’. Perhaps Erik Prince best articulates the industry’s 
self-image: ‘Our corporate goal is to do for the national security apparatus 
what FedEx did to the Postal Service’.514 Following the storm of negative 
publicity after the Nisour Square shootings, his company rebranded itself from 
the militaristic Blackwater, a term used by Navy SEALS to describe covert 
night time underwater operations, to Xe, which stands for xenon an inert, non-
combustible gas. Some might view this as disingenuous and even cynical.   
Amid the public debate, a broad range of literature has emerged on the 
private military industry within international relations, law, political science and 
economics, mainly dwelling on a few aspects of the issue: vague regulatory 
options for the industry at national, regional and international levels; normative 
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challenges to the state’s monopoly on force; and typologies that clarify the 
industry’s organisational structure. 515  The conclusions drawn are generally 
theoretical and speculative, however, pointing out not only the lack of data 
needed for rigorous analysis, but disagreement about how to define a PMC. 
Academia offers a surfeit of terminology to describe the private military 
industry, among them private military contractors, private security companies, 
private military companies, private security/military companies, private military 
firms, private security contractors, private military corporations and military 
service providers. Some analysts and organisations, such as the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), use terms interchangeably––say, private 
military company, private security company, and private military/security 
company––sowing further conceptual disorder. 516  The lack of a common 
lexicon handicaps meaningful discourse on a topic already shrouded in secrecy. 
Definitions of PMCs range from the very narrow to the very broad, 
and both ends of the spectrum are unsuccessful from an analytical or 
theoretical perspective. Not surprisingly, the industry defines private security 
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pertinent international legal obligations and good practices for States related to operations of private 
military and security companies during armed conflict,” September 17, 2008. 
http://www.eda.admin.ch/etc/medialib/downloads/edazen/topics/intla/humlaw.Par.0057.File.tmp/M
ontreux%20Document%20(e).pdf.; International Committee of the Red Cross, “Privatisation of War: 
The outsourcing of military tasks,” May 23, 2006, accessed April 9, 2009, 
http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/privatisation-war-230506?opendocument.  
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too narrowly: the commercial act of physically protecting a person, place or 
thing––or, in the words of Doug Brooks, president of the ISOA, private 
security is any activity directly related to protecting a ‘noun’.517 Similarly, the 
National Defence Authorisation Act for fiscal year 2008 defines private 
security functions as the guarding of personnel, facilities or properties, and any 
other activity with armed personnel.518 These definitions may sound fairly 
comprehensive, but they fail to account for the many activities the industry’s 
firms are involved in, such as intelligence analysis, military operational 
coordination, security force training and logistical support in non-permissive 
and hostile environments. Moreover, they ignore the moral aspects of 
conducting business when it comes to the application of lethal force.  
Overly broad definitions also exist, and tend to emanate from the 
academic community. A seminal definition advanced in the book Corporate 
Warriors by Peter W. Singer defines private military firms (PMFs) as ‘private 
business entities that deliver to consumers a wide spectrum of military and 
security services, once generally assumed to be exclusively inside the public 
context’. 519  This definition provides a good starting point for study but 
ultimately depends on the subjective assessment of what military services are 
inherently governmental or ‘assumed to be exclusively inside the public 
context’. This will vary greatly from observer to observer, weakening the 
definition’s analytical utility. Singer breaks down his definition into a typology 
                                                
517 Elsea, Private Security Contractors in Iraq, 2.  
518 P.L.110-181 Sec. 864. 
519 Singer, Corporate Warriors, 8.  
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consisting of three categories of private military actor: ‘military providers’ that 
conduct lethal military operations, ‘military consulting firms’ that provide 
military training and ‘military support firms’ that provide supplementary 
military services ranging from logistics to intelligence.520 Another widely utilised 
typology is by David Shearer and contains five categories: direct support to 
military operations; military advice and training; logistical support; security 
services, including political analysis; and crime prevention.521  
Both Singer’s and Shearer’s typologies served analysts admirably in the 
early days of the industry, but they are now outmoded. Formulated before the 
United States invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, they lack explanatory power 
for the contemporary marketplace for military services. They are also overly 
inclusive in encompassing almost any company supporting a military or police 
effort in a conflict-affected area. Both typologies would consider Federal 
Express (FedEx), an international letter courier firm, a member of the private 
military industry because it provides logistical support to the military in Iraq, a 
conflict zone (category 3 for both typologies); obviously, few people would 
consider FedEx a member of the private military industry by any metric.522 
Further, most PMCs perform a wide range––if not all––of the functions 
outlined in the typologies, which does not help clarify what is or is not a PMC. 
MPRI and DynCorp International include law enforcement, logistics planning 
                                                
520 Ibid, 93. 
521 Shearer, Private Armies and Military Intervention, 25-26.  
522 Although perhaps they will be. John Updike’s 1998 novel Towards the End of Time is set in an America 
of the near future when the police have been replaced by protection rackets that are later ousted by 
Federal Express. 
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and operations, strategic communications, and security forces training and 
capacity building in their services. This qualifies these PMCs in nearly every 
category of both typologies, negating the purpose of a typology.  
Both typologies also ignore PMCs’ expeditionary nature, and as a 
result, would technically consider domestic security firms that provide security 
guards and ‘rent-a-cops’ to protect United States malls, banks and stores from 
criminals as PMCs. Clearly, PMCs are set apart from their peers in providing 
military force in foreign lands. Additionally, Singer’s self-described ‘tip of the 
spear’ typology defines a ‘military provider firm’ based partly on its proximity 
to the ‘front line’ within the battle-space. However, the last time the United 
States fought a war with a front line was the Korean War; irregular warfare 
knows no battle lines, making the ‘tip of the spear’ approach atavistic in an era 
dominated by unconventional warfare. In short, existing academic typologies 
are too blunt an instrument to parse this complex private military industry. A 
new taxonomy is needed, one that provides analytical and theoretical 
coherence to modern private military actors. 
Typology of Modern Private Armies 
A more appropriate typology for the private military industry is based on that 
which the United States army itself utilises, for two reasons. First, these new 
private military organisations are fundamentally private armies, as there are no 
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private navies or air forces.523 Like their medieval ancestors, the firms focus on 
land warfare. Second, because the United States is the market maker for the 
new private military industry, firms have patterned themselves largely on the 
United States military. Former US Army and Marine Corps personnel staff the 
ranks of management within these companies, and they have adopted the 
doctrine, terminology and informal soldierly language of the United States 
military. The boards of directors for these corporations are stocked with 
retired generals to help win contracts from the United States government, 
anticipate future government needs and lend credibility to the firm for its chief 
customer. At present, the market is US-centric as the United States is the chief 
employer of private military services and consequently has shaped the industry 
during its formative transformation from a multi-million to multi-billion dollar 
market. 
 The categorisation of activities required to support land warfare is 
similar regardless of private versus public providers, although different armies 
have slightly different approaches. Because combat can occur anywhere, the 
typology is based on function rather than location in the battlespace. For the 
US Army, military units fall into one of three general categories based on their 
primary mission: combat arms, combat support and combat service support. 
The function of combat arms units is to kill or train others to kill the enemy in 
foreign lands, unless a foreign enemy is invading the homeland. Combat arms 
                                                
523 However this might be changing. Insurance companies have recently considered creating a private 
navy to ward off pirates in the Gulf of Aden. See: Cahal Milmo, “Insurance Firms Plan Private Navy to 
Take on Somali Pirates,” Independent.co.uk, September 28, 2010. 
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units include infantry, special forces, armed aviation and armour (e.g., tanks). 
Combat service units provide operational support to the combat arms units, 
allowing them to engage the enemy more effectively, but they do not directly 
engage the enemy themselves unless in self-defence. These units include the 
military police and military intelligence. Combat service support units provide 
logistical and administrative support to combat arms and combat service units, 
thereby supplying and sustaining the force. Like combat service units, combat 
service support components are not expected to engage the enemy unless in 
self-defence. This category of unit includes quartermaster, ordnance, 
transportation, adjutant general, finance and medical services corps. The chief 
distinction between combat service and combat service support is that the 
former offers operational support while the latter offers logistical and 
administrative support to combat arms units.  
Similarly, the private army sector consists of three categories of units 
or types of firms analogous to combat arms, combat service and combat 
service support. The Private Military Company (PMC) is the private sector 
equivalent of combat arms: conflict entrepreneurs structured as multinational 
corporations that kill or train others to kill, usually in foreign lands. There are 
strong and weak PMCs. Strong PMCs include condottieri like Hawkwood and 
his White Company or modern force providers such as Executive Outcomes, 
which can both conduct autonomous military campaigns, offensive operations 
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and force projection. Examples include Hawkwood’s campaigns in Northern 
Italy and Executive Outcomes’s operations in Angola. 
Weak PMCs include Blackwater, Triple Canopy, DynCorp 
International and other contemporary firms since they cannot wage 
independent military campaigns; at present they can only augment large 
national militaries like the United States’ armed forces.  Additionally, they 
employ force (mostly) defensively and can project little power beyond their 
area of operation, as they employ armed personnel, convoys and helicopters to 
protect people and things for the United States government. In 2005 the State 
Department’s Worldwide Personal Protective Services II (WPPS) contract 
awarded up to $1.2 billion to these three PMCs, which collectively provided 
some 1,500 ‘shooters’, or armed civilians authorised to kill in Iraq alone. 
According to a DynCorp International memorandum, armed employees are 
allowed to use deadly force in Iraq when ‘it becomes reasonably necessary’ and 
‘reasonableness and necessity are not to be viewed from the calm vantage 
point of hindsight’.524 Iraqi survivors and the families of the slain––including a 
nine year old boy, a three month old infant, and other children––sued 
Blackwater over what they called the ‘senseless slaughter’ of innocent Iraqi 
civilians. In other theatres of war, two Blackwater personnel were charged with 
killing two Afghan civilians after a traffic incident.525 In most cases the PMC 
                                                
524 Government Services Unit of DynCorp International, ‘DI Rules for the Use of Force (RUF) for DI 
Programs in Iraq’, Internal memo number DI-3001, (approved by CEO Bob Rosenkranz and effective 
August 13, 2007): section V, A, 4 and 5. 
525 David Zucchino, “Iraqis Settle Lawsuits Over Blackwater Shootings,” Los Angeles Times, January 28, 
2010. 
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personnel go free because they are authorised (and expected) to kill as part of 
their contract. If mistakes are made, as was the case at Nisour Square, then as 
Erik Prince said during congressional testimony, ‘they have one decision to 
make: window or aisle’ on their return flight home.526 Other than being fired, 
PMC personnel face little if any punishment for mistakenly killing civilians 
whereas members of the United States armed forces or Iraq security forces 
could be court marshalled and imprisoned.  
PMCs are force providers in another way too: training. The ability to 
raise additional military forces through training is a combat arms function 
because only these units can transfer their unique skill sets to another. Only an 
infantry unit or special forces unit can train another country’s infantry units, 
which is standard practice in military training. The reason is self-evident: 
Military professional training is derived from the knowledge and credibility of 
field experience that cannot be duplicated by a textbook or imitated by a 
pretender. A quartermaster unit cannot train platoon patrol tactics nor can an 
infantry platoon train brigade resupply operations. When the United States 
employs a PMC to create combat arms units in the Iraq or Afghanistan army–
–or even raise an entire military in Liberia (as will be examined in the next 
chapter) akin to Wallenstein during the Thirty Years War––the PMC typically 
hires ex-soldiers with the requisite background, experience, credibility and 
expertise to plan and deliver the training. Training others to kill occupies the 
                                                
526 ‘Blackwater USA’, Hearing Before The Committee On Oversight And Government Reform, United States House Of 
Representatives, 110th Cong., October 2, 2007 (statement of Eric Prince).  
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same moral universe as killing itself, and must be considered within the ambit 
of PMCs.  
Perhaps the greatest proof that PMCs are not ordinary security guards 
is that enemies target PMC personnel as they would United States’ soldiers. 
PMC personnel often look, dress and act like soldiers to casual observers: they 
utilize similar equipment, also wear battle fatigues, speak the same operational 
language as the US military, and are typically ex-US military. Not surprisingly, 
this has made them targets just like ordinary soldiers. On 28 January 2011 the 
Taliban claimed responsibility for a suicide bomb attack at a supermarket in 
Kabul frequented by foreigners. According to the Taliban spokesman, 
Zabiullah Mujahid, their target was the head of Blackwater’s local operations 
because ‘they are invaders and, secondly, they are protecting the invaders’.527 
To date there are approximately 2,200 contractor casualties in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.528 To label these companies ‘private security companies (PSCs)’, 
‘contingency contractors’ or anything other than ‘military’ would be 
disingenuous.  
The private security company (PSC) is the private sector version of 
combat services. Examples of PSCs range from Science Applications 
International Corporation (SAIC), which provides intelligence analysis, to the 
Lincoln Group, which conducts strategic communication in Iraq, to CACI and 
Titan, which provide interpreters to the United States military, to Total 
                                                
527 Ray Rivera, Alissa J. Rubin, and Sharifullah Sahak, “Deadly Attack By Taliban in Kabul Sought to Kill 
Head of Blackwater,” The New York Times, January 28, 2011. 
528 President ISOA Doug Brooks, 2011. 
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Intelligence Solutions, which runs spy rings for the United States government 
overseas. PSCs are as controversial as PMCs even though they typically are 
unarmed and do not employ lethal force. CACI and Titan contractors were 
implicated in the Abu Ghraib prison scandal and Lincoln Group instigated 
uproar when journalists discovered that the United States government hired 
the company to propagandise the United States cause in the Iraqi free press. 
Private spy rings are always controversial.529  
General contractors (GCs) provide logistical support through supply, 
maintenance, transportation, medical and other services combat units require. 
GCs are not members of the private military or security industry, as they 
perform non-lethal tasks that are not uniquely military or security related in 
nature. However they are an important inclusion within this typology to 
acknowledge their presence and complicity in conflict-affected areas. Typical 
GC tasks include equipping soldiers, maintaining vehicles, constructing 
buildings, driving trucks with supplies, cooking meals, janitorial services, 
building bases and administrative duties. The bulk of contractors in conflict-
affected areas fall into this category. 
Focusing on function in relation to combat operations and recognising 
the influence of the US Army’s organisational and operational influence on the 
                                                
529 Renae Merle and Ellen McCarthy, “The Civilian Contractors: 6 Employees From CACI International, 
Titan Referred for Prosecution,” The Washington Post, August 26, 2004; Borzou Daragahi and Mark 
Mazzetti, “U.S. Military Covertly Pays to Run Stories in Iraqi Press; Troops Write Articles Presented as 
News Reports. Some Officers Object to the Practice,” Los Angeles Times, August 30, 2005; Dexter Filkins 
and Mark Mazzetti, “Contractors Tied to Effort to Track and Kill Militants,” The New York Times, March 
24, 2010; Mark Mazzetti, “Former Spy With Agenda Operates a Private C.I.A,” The New York Times, 
January 22, 2011. 
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emerging private military industry produces a more logically coherent typology 
than earlier attempts, especially for typologies created before the wars in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, which shaped the industry in substantial ways. Table 1 
depicts this new typology. A few of the larger companies, such as DynCorp 
International, operate in all three categories, but this is exceptional; most 
companies specialise in only one category.  
United States military officers frequently discuss tooth-to-tail ratios in 
campaigns. Tooth refers to combat arms units while tail refers to combat service 
and combat service support. How the private sector’s tooth-to-tail ratio 
compares to the United States military’s is unknown and worthy of further 
study. Based on preliminary numbers of armed contacts and trainers, such as 
the WPPS or security force assistance contracts, one would expect the private 
sector ratio is overwhelmingly tail compared to the United States national 
army. But as the Nisour Square and Abu Ghraib scandals demonstrate, 
numbers may not be the best measure of campaign significance, as the 
mistakes of a few contractors had a strongly negative strategic effect for their 
employer. Owing to these and other incidents, PMCs remain the most 
controversial aspect of private armies: They represent for-profit killing and the 
commodification of conflict.  
 248 
Table 1: Typology of the Private Military Industry 
Functional  Area Public Sector  
Military Unit Type 
Private Sector Equivalents Typical Tasks and Missions 
Combat Arms/ 
Private Military Companies 
(PMCs) 
 
Organisations whose primarily 
function is to kill or train 
others to kill the enemy in 
foreign lands 
 
 
 
Infantry 
 
Special Forces 
 
Armed aviation 
 
Armour 
 
Artillery 
 
Engineers (sapper) 
 
Spying 
 
Company of the Star 
White Company 
Executive Outcomes 
Sandline International 
Blackwater 
DynCorp International 
Triple Canopy 
Aegis Defence Services 
• Military campaigning, offensive operations, force projection 
• Static defence: protecting fixed or static sites, such as 
housing areas, reconstruction work sites, or government 
buildings 
• Convoy security: protecting convoys traveling in unsecured 
areas  
• Security escorts: protecting individuals traveling in 
unsecured areas  
• Personal Security Details (PSD): providing protective 
security to high-ranking individuals 
• Lethal force training: training foreign security forces to 
employ lethal force 
• Military training: training uniquely military tasks, techniques, 
tactics, or strategy that improves a foreign security force’s 
ability to destroy the enemy 
Combat Service/ 
Private Security Companies 
(PSCs) 
 
Organisations that provide 
operational assistance to 
combat arms units 
  
Engineers (non-sapper) 
 
Intelligence 
 
Communications 
 
Information Operations & 
Psychological Operations 
 
Civil Affairs 
Titan Corporation 
 
SAIC 
 
Lincoln Group 
 
Total Intelligence Solutions  
 
DynCorp International 
 
MPRI 
• Operational coordination: establishing and managing 
command, control, and communications operations centers 
in hostile environments 
• Intelligence analysis: gathering information and developing 
threat analysis 
• Psychological warfare: planning and disseminating 
propaganda and other psychological actions to influence the 
opinions, emotions, attitudes, and behavior of hostile 
foreign groups  
• Demining  
Combat Service Support/ 
General Contractors (GCs) 
 
Organisations that provide 
logistical assistance to combat 
arms units 
 
 
Quartermaster  
 
Ordnance  
 
Transportation  
 
Adjutant General  
 
Finance  
Medical services 
KBR 
  
DynCorp International 
 
Swift Global Logistics 
 
Parsons 
 
SOS International 
ITT Corporation 
• Equipping and supplying soldiers and civilians in the field 
with food, water, ammunition, equipment, etc. 
• Providing services that promote, improve, conserve, or 
restore the mental or physical well-being of personnel 
• Maintaining equipment such as vehicles, generators, 
buildings, etc. 
• Transporting units, personnel, equipment, and supplies   
• Managing human resources 
• Constructing military bases and infrastructure 
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Why Private Armies Have Returned 
Observers of history should not be surprised by the return of private armies, 
as they are ubiquitous throughout the history of warfare. Yet important 
questions remain regarding exactly how and why this occurred. We know that 
weak states lose their monopoly of force when they lack the military muscle to 
dominate armed threats. But why would the United States, a military 
superpower, voluntarily choose to relinquish its monopoly of force and share 
this power with the private sector? What does this imply for the future of 
warfare and international relations? 
In Search of Efficiency 
The move toward private solutions to public problems began during the Cold 
War as a way to use business know-how to streamline government operations. 
The intellectual roots for the logic of privatisation originate with economists 
Friedrich Hayek, Milton Friedman, Ronald Coase, George Stigler and others 
from the Chicago, or freshwater, school of economics, which advocates 
unfettered free markets and minimal government intervention. It stands in 
stark contrast to the saltwater school of economics based in coastal United 
States universities––notably Harvard, MIT and Berkeley––which espouse the 
macroeconomic theory of John Maynard Keynes and others who believe 
government intervention in markets is necessary to prevent market failure. The 
Chicago school ideas found an enthusiastic champion in the British 
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Conservative Party leader Margaret Thatcher. During the economically bleak 
summer of 1975, a Conservative Party strategist proposed that the party 
should take a pragmatic ‘middle way’ between the liberal Keynesian policies of 
their rival Labour Party and the free-market ideas of the Chicago school that 
many Conservatives backed. Interrupting him, Thatcher reached into her 
briefcase and pulled out a copy of Hayek’s The Constitution of Liberty, held it up 
for all to see and in her characteristically iron manner asserted: ‘This is what we 
believe’. With this she banged the book down on the table.530 When Thatcher 
was elected prime minister in 1979 she had the opportunity to test Hayek’s 
ideas and initiated a comprehensive and controversial program to denationalise 
and privatise many state industries. Despite enormous public resistance, her 
efforts helped achieve the unthinkable by turning around the British 
economy.531 The privatisation revolution was under way. 
 Over the next three decades, fervour for free markets swept across the 
world. The Soviet Union and communism collapsed. State-managed 
economies from India to Latin America liberalised and globalisation led to an 
economic boom. At the core of this transformation was privatisation, as states 
retreated from what Lenin called the ‘commanding heights’ of the economy: 
large industrial plants, banking, foreign trade and other key sectors of a 
                                                
530 Quoted from: John Ranelagh, Thatcher’s People: An Insider’s Account of the Politics, the Power and the 
Personalities (New York: HarperCollins, 1991), ix; see also Richard Cockett, Thinking the Unthinkable: Think 
Tanks and the Economic Counter Revolution, 1931-1983 (New York: Harper Collins, 1995), 174-176. 
531 Roderick Floud and Paul Johnson, The Cambridge Economic History of Modern Britain (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004), 392. 
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national economy.532 International financial institutions such as the World Bank 
and IMF helped turn the ideology into a normative reality by encouraging 
rulers to turn their backs on patrimonialism and liberalise not only their 
economies but also their political systems by embracing democracy. They 
found willing partners in nascent post-communist countries that were eager to 
join the rising globalised economy. Western ideologues and especially 
neoconservatives, such as Fukuyama, interpreted this as proof of a causal 
relationship between free markets, democracy and freedom, a link Hayek had 
posited in his popular book The Road to Serfdom, written at the apex of 
totalitarianism in World War II. 
 US President Ronald Reagan joined Thatcher in her faith in free 
markets, and was fond of saying ‘the best minds are not in government. If any 
were, business would hire them away’. He meant it. Like Thatcher, he 
introduced sweeping economic policies, christened Reaganomics, that opposed 
government regulations, tariffs and other infringements on the marketplace.533 
He pushed for massive tax cuts that favoured business growth at the expense 
of government budgets to help stimulate the private sector and recover from 
the economic malaise of the 1970s.534 Faced with ballooning federal deficits, he 
                                                
532 Daniel Yergin and Joseph Stanislaw, The Commanding Heights: The Battle for the World Economy (New 
York: Simon & Schuster, 2002), 7. 
533 The term Reaganomics is attributed to journalist Paul Harvey. Reagan outlined his economic policy in a 
July 1981 televised address from the Oval Office that consisted of four elements: reducing government 
spending, reducing income and capital gains marginal tax rates, reducing government regulation and 
controlling the money supply to reduce inflation. His approach was a clear departure from his immediate 
predecessors. 
534 The Economic Recovery Tax Act (ERTA) of 1981, also known as the ‘Kemp-Roth Tax Cut’ or 
‘Reagan Tax Cut’, was a federal law ‘to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to encourage 
economic growth through reductions in individual income tax rates, the expensing of depreciable 
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established the Private Sector Survey on Cost Control to eradicate waste and 
inefficiency in the federal government. Its chairman, J. Peter Grace, 
unsurprisingly concluded that ‘government-run enterprises lack the driving 
forces of marketplace competition, which promote tight, efficient operations’. 
The solution was privatisation: ‘Turn government operations over to the 
private sector and you get innovation, efficiency, flexibility’.535 Consequently, 
an increasing number of areas previously considered inherently governmental 
were privatised, from the postal system to prisons, rationalised by the belief 
that businesses could find more efficient and effective solutions to public 
functions than the government. This faith in free market forces cleared the 
road for the eventual privatisation of security.  
Reagan’s successors continued his privatisation policy, as hundreds of 
billions of dollars’ worth of government activities were outsourced to 
businesses. In 1993, President Bill Clinton announced the creation of the 
National Performance Review, an inter-agency task force led by Vice President 
Al Gore to identify problems and offer solutions and ideas for government 
savings, including privatisation. Across the aisle, the Republican-majority 
                                                                                                                       
property, incentives for small businesses, and incentives for savings, and for other purposes’ (Pub. L. 97-
34, 95 Stat. 172, enacted August 13, 1981). It included an across-the-board decrease in the marginal 
income tax rates in the United States by 23 per cent over three years, with the top rate falling from 70 per 
cent to 50 per cent and the bottom rate dropping from 14 per cent to 11 per cent. It also cut estate taxes 
and reduced corporate business taxes by $150 billion over a five-year period. Additionally the tax rates 
were indexed for inflation, though the indexing was delayed until 1985. By 1986 the annual revenue of 
the federal government was reduced by $200 billion, prompting Reagan to raise taxes eleven times during 
his presidency. 
535 Thomas Frank, “Government By Contractor is a Disgrace: Many Jobs Are Best Left to Federal 
Workers,” The Wall Street Journal, November 26, 2008. 
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congress was equally dedicated to the cause.536 The result was ‘cost savings in a 
range of 20 to 50 percent when federal and private sector service providers 
compete to perform these functions’, according to the Office of Management 
and Budget. 537  By the time George W. Bush entered the White House, 
privatisation was a well-established norm. During his tenure he sought to 
privatise parts of the gigantic social security program that paid out $675 billion 
in benefits in 2009, and nominated devout followers of Ayn Rand, the high 
priestess of unrestrained capitalism, to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, which polices Wall Street.538 It should not be so shocking that the 
United States military also acceded to privatisation.  
The Post-Cold War Security Vacuum 
The Cold War’s end produced a perfect storm of market conditions that 
forged the private military industry. As the world became unstable and 
neomedieval, the United States was simultaneously downsizing its massive 
                                                
536 “Privatization 98,” (paper presented at the 12th Annual Report on Privatization and Government 
Reform, 1998). 
537 Office of Management and Budget, “The President’s Management Agenda: Fiscal Year 2002,”  
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/omb/budget/fy2002/mgmt.pdf, 17. 
538 “Actuarial Publications,” U.S. Social Security Administration, 
http://www.ssa.gov/oact/STATS/table4a3.html. In May 2001, Bush announced establishment of a 
sixteen-member bipartisan commission ‘to study and report specific recommendations to preserve Social 
Security for seniors while building wealth for younger Americans’, with the specific directive that it 
consider only how to incorporate ‘individually controlled, voluntary personal retirement accounts’. See: 
President’s Commission to Strengthen Social Security, “Strengthening Social Security and Creating 
Personal Wealth for All Americans,” December 2001. In 2005, Bush nominated Charles Cox as 
Chairman of the United States Securities and Exchange Commission, whose strong beliefs in 
deregulation attracted the ire of many during the 2008 recession. He resigned in early 2009. Stephen 
Labaton, “Bush S.E.C. Pick is Seen as Friend to Corporations,” The New York Times, June 3, 2005.; Amit 
R. Paley and David S. Hilzenrath, “SEC Chief Defends His Restraint,” The Washington Post, December 24, 
2008. 
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military by 40 per cent in order to reap a ‘peace dividend’. 539  Almost 
immediately upon taking office in 1993, the Clinton administration 
implemented a 40 per cent drop in the defence budget and reduced forces 
from 2.2 million to 1.4 million active-duty soldiers, sailors, airmen and 
Marines.540 The cuts affected the entire military. Army divisions were reduced 
from eighteen to ten, navy ships decreased from 547 to 346 and air force 
fighter wings dropped from thirty-six to nineteen.541 Overseas troop strength 
was especially targeted for reduction, as the United States no longer required a 
massive army standing watch over the Iron Curtain to guard against Soviet 
invasion. Troops stationed overseas shrank by more than 50 per cent, from 
approximately 600,000 in 1990 to 250,000 in 1999. These dramatic reductions 
in force structure generated the labour pool of experienced ex-military 
personnel that the new private military industry needed to grow. 
Just as military supply was shrinking, demand for military operations 
was on the rise. From 1960 to 1991 the United States army conducted ten 
operational events outside of normal training and alliance commitments; by 
comparison, from 1991 to 1998 the army conducted twenty-six operational 
events. The United States Marine Corps undertook fifteen contingency 
operations between 1982 and 1989, but conducted sixty-two such operations 
                                                
539 Thomas K. Adams, “Private Military Companies: Mercenaries for the 21st Century,” Small Wars & 
Insurgencies 13, no. 2 (2002): 54-67. 
540 Volker Franke and Marc Von Boemcken, “Private Guns: The Social Identity of Security Contractors,” 
Journal of Conflict Studies (2009), 10. 
541 Government Accountability Office, Military Readiness: Management Focus Needed on Airfields for Overseas 
Deployments (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2001), 10. 
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after the fall of the Berlin Wall.542 The dwindling military force structure 
combined with the mission creep of stability operations created a post–Cold 
War security vacuum that the budding private military industry was eager to 
fill. The United States hired MPRI to train and equip Croatian, Bosnian and 
Macedonian forces for over $150 million.543 The State Department contracted 
DynCorp International to provide ‘peace verifiers’ in Kosovo, train Haitian 
police and eradicate coco plants as a part of Plan Colombia, during which 
three of its American crop-duster pilots were shot down and killed.544 Lacking 
its own full complement of forces, the United States permitted the private 
military industry to perform tasks traditionally associated exclusively with the 
national armed forces. As Tim Spicer of Sandline International explains: 
The end of the Cold War has allowed conflicts long suppressed 
or manipulated by the superpowers to re-emerge. At the same 
time, most armies have got smaller and live footage on CNN 
of United States troops being killed in Somalia has had 
staggering effects on the willingness of governments to commit 
to foreign conflicts. We fill the gap.545 
Humanising War 
Another factor in the new market for force is what Christopher Coker calls 
‘humane warfare’. Following the Cold War the Western way of war changed: It 
sought to humanise war by converting it into a humane endeavour that seeks 
to minimise casualties on all sides, even among enemy combatants. Perhaps 
                                                
542 Flloyd Spence and Eugene J. Carroll, “Q: Is the Military Drawdown Endangering U.S. National 
Security?,” Insight on the News 14 (1998). 
543 Singer, Corporate Warriors, 128. 
544 “On the Ground: DynCorp and other U.S. firms provide U.S. peace verifiers to Kosovo,” Newsweek, 
February 15, 1999. 
545 Andrew Gilligan, “Inside Lt Col Spicer’s New Model Army,” Sunday Telegraph, November 22, 1998. 
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the decades of living under the threat of mutually assured nuclear destruction 
had curdled the West’s appetite for bloodshed; perhaps the rise of the human 
rights regime had a hand, as it required UN commanders on Balkan battlefields 
and elsewhere to fight with human rights lawyers by their sides to parse the 
excessively complex and convoluted rules of engagement on the use of force.546 
Possibly the effort to sanitise war of cruelty resulted from a collective amnesia 
regarding war’s fundamental nature in the modern memory, or conceivably it 
was the sight, captured on CNN, of four dead and mutilated United States 
soldiers being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu by gloating mobs of 
AK-47-wielding Somalis in 1993. Maybe it was all of this and more.547  
In the almost twenty years after Somalia the United States has 
introduced two significant innovations to realise ‘humane’ warfare: armed 
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and the private military industry to do the 
dying for America. Technology such as precision-guided munitions launched 
from drone aircraft reduces the risk of civilian casualties and collateral damage, 
and it avoids the sticky situation of a United States pilot being shot down and 
captured or killed by the enemy. Contractors, meanwhile, are disposable 
human beings. The United States reveres its fallen soldiers: the media pay 
tribute to the dead daily; politicians running for office reflexively invoke their 
sacrifices; and the public demonstrates their wide support––even if they do not 
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support the wars––with bumper stickers, yellow ribbons and lapel pins (an old 
US Army tradition), and billboards.548 In stark contrast, no one even tallies the 
numbers of dead contractors, much less reveres them. Through technology 
and contractors, the United States need not spill much of its own blood, and 
thereby gives the appearance of humanising warfare, making it seem more 
virtuous and even a virtue in a type of humanitarian imperialism.549 Such 
anodyne endeavours to humanise war are delusional, as Clausewitz cautions:  
Kind-hearted people might of course think there was some 
ingenious way to disarm or defeat an enemy without too much 
bloodshed, and might imagine this is the true goal of the art of 
war. Pleasant as it sounds, it is a fallacy that must be exposed: 
war is such a dangerous business that the mistakes which come 
from kindness are the very worst.550 
Nonetheless, private armies became an attractive option for the United States 
well before the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, which themselves have been 
literal boom times for the private military industry.  
The Utility of Private Force 
The appeal of private force is understandable regardless of century. Even Sir 
Thomas More advocated using mercenaries.551 Despite the protestations of 
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Catherine of Siena in the Middle Ages or NGOs such as Human Rights First 
today, private armies are big business for a reason: They work. The military 
advantages that mercenaries provide employers are significant and timeless.  
First, mercenaries offer on-demand military services to execute 
whatever plans the employers please, from buttressing national security, 
furthering a commercial interest, settling a dispute, self-glorification or self-
preservation. In an insecure world, there will always be a demand for security 
services. The condottieri made their livelihoods surfing the maelstrom of armed 
politics that pervaded northern Italy during the high Middle Ages, so much so 
that some mercenary captains became political actors in their own right, such 
as Braccio da Montone and Sigismondo Malatesta, who ruled lands in addition 
to private armies.552 Others, such as Francesco Sforza of Milan, became so 
strong that they took over the states they served, becoming Olson’s stationary 
bandits as warlord became lord. 
 On-demand soldiers also allow rulers to swell their armies’ ranks with 
mercenaries when volunteers or conscripts are lacking. Examples are 
numerous: William the Conqueror in the eleventh century; England, France 
and Prussia in the eighteenth century; and the United States in Iraq and 
Afghanistan today. In each of these cases, for-hire soldiers comprised one-
third to one-half of the overall military strength. On-demand force also allows 
                                                
552 Michael Mallett, Mercenaries and Their Masters: Warfare in Renaissance Italy (London; The Bodley Head Ltd, 
1974).; F.C. Lane, “Economic Consequences of Organized Violence,” Journal of Economic History 18, no. 4 
(1958): 401-417.; William P. Caferro, “Warfare and Economy in Renaissance Italy,” Journal of 
Interdisciplinary History 39, no. 2 (2008), 170. 
 259 
a surge capacity to serve the immediate strategic needs of rulers who fail to 
plan. When England found that it did not possess enough ground troops to 
suppress its rebellious colonies during the American War of Independence 
(1776–81), England doubled its army by hiring 30,000 German soldiers. Two 
hundred years later the United States is in a similar position to its former foe: 
Half of its military force structure is made up of contractors and the United 
States cannot fight without them.  
Second, if handled properly private armies are cheaper than public 
ones, as maintaining a year-round professional standing army is expensive 
regardless of era. The tax revenue required to field, maintain and manage such 
a force is sizable, involving capital costs such as barracks and siege engines and 
sustaining costs such as salaries and upkeep. 553  Removing citizens from 
economically productive jobs such as farming or factories to stand in the ranks 
of an army is a significant opportunity cost to the country’s economy, as the 
military does not produce a commodity that can be sold for profit and taxed. 
Some economists view military expenditure as essentially inflationary.554 Finally, 
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governments tend not to be as innovative or efficient as business in 
operations, as companies keep costs down out of existential necessity.555  
The cost savings of private armies is confirmed in modern times. 
Examining the cost effectiveness of PMCs in Iraq, the United States 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO), an official government agency charged 
with reviewing congressional budget issues, found private military contractors 
to be cheaper than the US Army. According to CBO estimates, the army’s 
total cost of operating an infantry unit in Iraq was $110 million, while hiring 
the same size unit from Blackwater to perform the same tasks during the same 
time period was only $99 million. In peacetime the cost differential jumps even 
more. The cost of maintaining an army infantry unit at home is $60 million, 
whereas the cost of Blackwater is nothing, since the PMC’s contract would be 
terminated.556 As Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld explained,  
It is clearly cost effective to have contractors for a variety of 
things that military people need not do, and that for whatever 
reason other civilians, government people, cannot be deployed 
to do. There are a lot of contractors, a growing number. They 
come from our country but they come from all countries, and 
indeed sometimes the contracts are from our country or 
another country and they employ people from totally different 
countries including Iraqis and people from neighbouring 
nations. And there are a lot of them. It’s a growing number.557 
Mercenaries are also cost-effective for long-term engagements; 
historically, some employers used the same private military organisation for 
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over a century to wage war on the cheap. Mercantile firms such as the East 
India companies were licensed to raise armed forces and war in service of their 
countries’ economic interests while sparing their governments the headache of 
managing global military and trade operations. By the turn of the nineteenth 
century, the British East India Company boasted an army of 150,000 soldiers 
and 122 ships of the line, the larger ones mounting up to forty guns, a match 
for all but the most powerful enemy warships.  
 Third, mercenaries can also prove safer than public armies, as they 
reduce the risk of praetorianism, a term deriving from the infamous Praetorian 
Guard, the imperial bodyguard of the Roman emperors established by 
Augustus Caesar. During its 300-year existence, it assassinated fourteen 
emperors, appointed five and even sold the office to the highest bidder on one 
occasion. Rulers may feel safer with transient mercenaries, such as the 
Varangian Guard in Byzantium, than with an institutionalised security force 
that serves only its own interests. Furthermore, mercenaries’ bought loyalties 
may prove more reliable than public armies in the case of internal conflict and 
civil war. King Henry II of England engaged mercenaries to suppress the great 
rebellion of 1171–74 because their devotion lay with their paymaster rather 
than with the ideals of the revolt. In 2011 Libyan president Moammar Qaddafi 
adopted the same approach and hired mercenaries to violently quash national 
protests and fight rebellious army units.558 
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 Mercenaries may be appealing when a ruler does not want to arm an 
aggrieved populace that could potentially mutiny or menace other members of 
society.559 As the medieval Venetian poetess Christine de Pizan makes clear, 
‘there is if I may dare so no greater folly for a prince, who wishes to hold his 
lordship freely and in peace, than to give the common people permission to 
arm themselves’. 560  Likewise, there was rich debate among the American 
founding fathers in the discussions over the United States Constitution in the 
1780s over the wisdom of standing armies. Anti-federalists feared an 
unemployed army could become a public menace by preying on the populace 
it was tasked to protect, and even federalists such as Alexander Hamilton 
acknowledged the danger.561 The relative security of mercenaries, of course, 
relies on the ruler and mercenaries both honouring their contracts. Princes 
who do not pay their bills may become victims of their own mercenaries, and 
greedy mercenaries may wish to treacherously renegotiate their contracts with 
violence. Although praetorianism by PMCs is not a real risk for the United 
States today, despite the frenzied forebodings of Pulitzer Prize-winning 
journalists and Hollywood, it remains a threat for fragile states that dabble in 
the market for force.562 
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 Fourth, mercenaries provide specialised military skills and services that 
are too expensive for ordinary public militaries to sustain. Like all market 
actors, private military organisations seek out gaps between supply and 
demand and attempt to fill them, taking advantage of economies of scale to 
develop capabilities such as armour-piercing crossbow soldiers known as 
balestrieri in the fourteenth century and Mi-24 heavy attack helicopters flown by 
EO in the late twentieth century. The costs associated with equipping, training 
and sustaining these specialised military units are too great for all but the 
wealthiest public armies, making it more efficient to outsource these 
capabilities when needed. In addition to exotic military units, private military 
organisations also provide rare skill sets: the ninja and shinobi of feudal Japan 
were uniquely trained in unorthodox warfare, and MPRI has specific expertise 
in restructuring modern armed forces in developing countries. As T.X. 
Hammes, a retired United States Marine Corps officer, affirms, ‘contractors 
can execute tasks the United States military and civilian workforce simply 
cannot’.563  
 It is important to dispel some myths about mercenaries. Probably the 
most pernicious perception, made famous by Machiavelli’s bitter 
pronouncements, is that they are faithless.564 While there are certainly examples 
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of faithless mercenaries, perfidiousness is hardly unique to the private military 
industry, though the consequences are more lethal than other sectors. But in 
an open market for force mercenaries are incentivised to honour their 
contracts in order to build a positive professional reputation and attract future 
business. Many mercenaries have enjoyed long and esteemed relations with 
their employers: Hawkwood was faithful to Florence for decades and the city 
honoured him with a funerary monument at the Basilica di Santa Maria del 
Fiore; the Varangian Guard was fiercely loyal to the Byzantine emperors for 
centuries; and the Dutch and British East India companies served their 
respective nations’ interests admirably for well over a hundred years. Private 
military actors tend to meet their contractual obligations, as long as they are 
accountable to customers.  
 Another myth is that mercenaries are lone-wolf adventure seekers. 
Although there are individual mercenaries or small bands of private warriors, 
most of the successful private armies are sizable and sophisticated 
organisations: Xenophon’s Ten Thousand, the companies of the condottieri and 
PMCs such as Blackwater. These private militaries are well organised with clear 
chains of command, in-house codes of conduct and discipline and internal 
machinations to handle administrative tasks such as personnel, logistics and 
accounting. The condottieri formed expeditionary corporate military units 
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comprised of international personnel with itemised budgets for battle gear, 
compensation for loss of horse, ransom-based revenue detailed, and other 
costs of war. They also had company policies regarding the democratic 
distribution of loot, bonuses for victories and a standardised war feast should 
victory be won.565 They even formed their own trade association, much like 
today’s ISOA, of ‘confederated condottieri’.566  
 Finally, the stereotype that mercenaries are little more than murderous 
thugs is unfair. The marketplace tends to discipline bad mercenaries, as it did 
in the Middle Ages. When the famed Hawkwood switched sides one too many 
times during the War of Eight Saints, Bernabo Visconti of Milan passed a 
decree promising thirty florins to anyone who ‘took or killed’ a member of 
Hawkwood’s company. 567  Similarly, Blackwater saw its business with the 
United States plummet after the Nisour Square incident, and in 2009 the State 
Department did not renew the PMC’s contract.568  
 Those who cavil too much about ethical issues surrounding 
mercenaries ought not avert their eyes from the obvious: There is plenty of 
evidence that private armies are more disciplined and effective than public 
forces in Sudan, Somalia, Myanmar, Belarus, Chad, Zimbabwe, the DRC, Iraq, 
Afghanistan, Guinea, Kirgizstan, the Central African Republic, Tajikistan or 
Côte d’Ivoire, to name a few. Some even await the day when the United 
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Nations hires qualified PMCs as peacekeepers, a rational choice given that 
peacekeeping needs rise each year while national troops available for such 
missions dwindle.569 Private military force is a high-utility commodity, which is 
why the market for force has thrived for most of human history.  
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The Dark Side of Private Force 
The problems of private force are as timeless as the benefits. Although today’s 
nascent market for force is tame compared with the medieval market, the 
condottieri have much to teach us about how private violence alters strategic 
outcomes. Already parallels between the Middle Ages and today are apparent. 
Like the mercenary companies of old, PMCs are corporate organisations that 
provide private military services for profit, constitute their ranks with ex-
military personnel drawn from around the world and gravitate toward conflict 
markets. In the Middle Ages the largest conflict market was Northern Italy; 
today it is Iraq and Afghanistan. The United States’ experience with private 
force is also distorting international outcomes in ways consistent with the 
Middle Ages because privatizing war changes warfare. 
For-Profit Killing 
Linking armed conflict with profit motive incentivises private armies to 
prolong war for financial gain, which many will find morally repugnant.570 In 
Afghanistan today, Matiullah Khan leads an indigenous private army employed 
by NATO and earns millions of dollars guarding supply convoys and fighting 
Taliban insurgents alongside United States special forces. Like the condottieri of 
old, his monopoly of force is so great that he eclipses the authority of the 
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provincial government, appointing public officials and doling out government 
largesse to further his business interests. Nor is Matiullah Khan alone. 
According to Hanif Atmar, the Afghan interior minister, Matiullah is one of at 
least twenty-three native PMCs working in the area without any government 
license or oversight. Major General Nick Carter, commander of British forces 
in Marja and of NATO forces in southern Afghanistan, suspects that these 
Afghan PMCs are deliberately prolonging the fighting for profit. Both Hanif 
Atmar and General Carter said they would like to disband Matiullah’s private 
army but cannot control him, making a volatile situation worse.571 
Also, markets fail, and in the market for force, failure means impunity 
for mercenaries––violence without constraint––because no credible police 
force exists to control them. Under these conditions, mercenaries devolve into 
marauders and prey on the weak for survival. Moreover, the market for force 
does not behave like other markets. A surplus of military supply does not 
necessarily correspond to lower private military prices or insolvent weaker 
mercenary companies. Instead, unemployed mercenaries can weather tough 
economic times by plundering local lands to feed themselves. This makes 
security a commodity that is not strictly demand-driven but also self-directed, 
generating bloody market distortions. Pope Urban V described marauding 
mercenaries in the fourteenth century as a ‘multitude of villains of various 
nations associated in arms by the greed to appropriate the fruits of labour of 
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innocent and unarmed people, let loose to every cruelty, to extort money, 
methodically devastating the countryside’.572 When mercenaries fight in times 
of war and pillage in times of peace, for civilians, the line between war and 
peace may disappear. 
Even when the market for force is functional, security is a commodity 
for which supply can artificially create demand through extortion. Like a mafia, 
a private military organisation can arrive at a community and demand payment 
in exchange for not attacking it. The condottieri made a lucrative living this way, 
as the most common response for communities was to purchase reprieve. In 
1342, Werner of Urslingen and the Great Company made a tour of Italy and 
successfully extorted payment from Cesena, Perugia, Arezzo, Siena and several 
Lombard communes. Eleven years later the Great Company––by then 
numbering some 10,000––returned under the leadership of Montreal 
d’Albarno, whom the Italians called Fra Moriale, and extracted tribute from 
Pisa, Arezzo, Florence, Siena and the Malatesta of Rimini. True to their name, 
condottieri entered into a no-sack contract with local cities. The October 1381 
agreement between the city of Siena and John Hawkwood stipulated that his 
company would not attack the city and its local lands for eighteen months in 
exchange for 4,000 florins.573 Often it was cheaper for both mercenary and 
mark to negotiate a price for peace rather than face the expenditure of a siege 
and sacking.  
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However, such payments only encouraged more mercenaries, either as 
racketeers or hired defenders of cities, revealing the true nature of the market 
for force: expansion. Consistent with Clausewitz’s nature of war, competition 
in the market for force escalates until one market actor emerges victorious 
with the monopoly of force. This produces constant war since monopolies are 
difficult to attain. In the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries Florence 
and its mercenaries were continuously at war with someone: Pisa (1362–64), 
the pope (1374–75) and Milan (1389–90, 1399–1400, 1423–24, 1430). Luckless 
Siena was obliged to buy its freedom from enterprising condottieri thirty-seven 
times between 1342 and 1399. 574  This endless fighting attracted more 
mercenaries from every corner of Europe, compounding the problem.575  
The dynamic of the market for force presents a counter-intuitive 
conundrum for modern observers: Private warfare actually swells rather than 
depletes the ranks of private armies. To those steeped in the Westphalian way 
of war, great conflicts such as World War I and II were conflicts of attrition 
that terminated in part when one side ran out of troops.576 As the Allies 
marched on Berlin in 1945 the German army had insufficient soldiers left to 
defend the city and had to rely on old men and young boys. Japan went even 
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further. Low on soldiers, the government extended the logic of its kamikaze 
program to the entire populace, arming people with bamboo spears to repel 
the expected United States’ land invasion, in what critics called ‘collective 
suicide’.577 Conversely, battle in private wars enlarges the soldier labour pool as 
the lure of well-paying contracts, rich booty, knightly honor and other 
opportunities attract private warriors from around the world. Medieval 
mercenaries in northern Italy hailed from all over Europe just as PMCs in Iraq 
and Afghanistan are packed with foreigners and intrastate conflicts in Libya 
and Côte d’Ivoire have attracted mercenaries from all over Africa.578 Like all 
markets, supply seeks demand and supply in this case is private warriors and 
demand is armed conflict.  
Unconstrained by nationality in their recruitment, private armies can 
endure wars of attrition as long as there is a paying client and enough willing 
men-at-arms on the planet. Such conditions only propagate private warfare: 
More war means more mercenaries, which gives private armies more resources 
to ply their trade, fostering more war. This self-feeding and ever-escalating 
cycle of violence generates the perpetual war that is the market for force.  
Enticing War 
On-demand military services make it easier and subsequently more tempting to 
go to war in several ways. The option of private warriors lowers war’s barrier 
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to entry for consumers. For the United States, using contractors saves the 
government from more painful political solutions, such as a national draft, 
courting unwilling or unsavory coalition partners or a premature withdrawal 
from Iraq and Afghanistan. Proponents and opponents of the wars admit that 
without contractors the United States would require a total force of 320,000 in 
Iraq and a force of over 210,000 in Afghanistan.579 Hiring contractors in 
domestically unpopular wars also allows the government to dodge national 
political debate over whether the wars should end, since few Americans care 
about contractor causalities.  
Similarly, when a policy is politically too risky, outsourcing it to the 
private sector offers employers a layer of plausible deniability in the event of 
failure. Not surprisingly, the origins of plausible deniability are tightly bound to 
non-state violence. State rulers invented the concept at the turn of the 
seventeenth century to give themselves political cover for dubious ventures. If 
a private undertaking authorised by the ruler met with success, he or she could 
claim a share of the profits, but if it met with failure, the ruler could claim he 
or she was not responsible.580 Plausible deniability was especially useful when 
using private forces could accidently draw the state into war with another state. 
Since the end of the Cold War governments have relied on the industry for 
clandestine and covert operations. Clandestine operations are those that the 
United States hopes will remain secret, but if exposed, will either admit to or 
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simply remain silent on; covert operations the United States will always 
disavow. Typically the United States only uses PMCs for clandestine 
operations, which is a legal gray area, whereas only the CIA and Department 
of Defence are authorised under federal law to conduct covert operations.581 
The United States employs private spy firms for intelligence collection. These 
firms are typically founded by ex-CIA personnel, such as Cofer Black, the 
chairman of Total Intelligence Solutions, a subsidiary of Blackwater. 582 
Similarly, former CIA spy Duane Clarridge runs a network of contracted spies 
in Pakistan and Afghanistan to collect information on militant fighters, Taliban 
leaders and the inner workings of Kabul’s ruling class.583 Michael D. Furlong 
created a private spy ring to track militants in Afghanistan and Pakistan for $22 
million, although senior Pentagon officials claim Furlong ‘deliberately misled’ 
senior generals when journalists questioned the contract584––a safe claim for 
the United States to make if a politically embarrassing operation fails or is 
exposed. 
Plausible deniability also allows the government to hide secrets from 
itself, especially official oversight mechanisms. The United States use of 
contractors allows the executive branch a method of circumventing 
congressional oversight because there is (at present) little requirement to report 
on the activities of contractors. The State Department, DOD and intelligence 
                                                
581 Based on author’s experience as a program manager for DynCorp International. 
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agencies all have dedicated congressional oversight committees. Members of 
Congress are continually concerned with the deliberate lack of executive 
branch transparency regarding contractors; according to a 2008 Congressional 
Research Service investigation, ‘as oversight hearings have demonstrated, the 
executive branch either has not kept sufficient records to produce or has been 
unwilling to present basic, accurate information on the companies employed 
under United States government contracts and subcontracts in Iraq’.585 This 
impedes oversight and quality control, evidenced by the repeated reports of 
substandard construction, fraud and theft in Afghanistan and Iraq.586 More 
generally, the White House can exploit the oversight loopholes to prosecute 
war while politically insulating itself with plausible deniability. In this way the 
private military industry fosters moral hazard among decision makers to enter 
and remain at war. 
Dilemmas with Contract Warfare 
Doug Brooks, president of ISOA, once made a case for the privatisation of 
warfare this way: ‘write a check, end a war’.587 While appealing, it is obviously 
simplistic, even if there are some examples of it, such as EO’s involvement in 
Sierra Leone. Generally, contract warfare is fraught with difficulties, especially 
in contract enforcement. According to Jurgen Brauer and Hubert van Tuyll, 
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the challenge of holding parties to contractual promises eventually put the 
condottieri out of business.588 There was not––nor is there today, at present––an 
effective judicial system to enforce contracts in the market for force. This 
allows both the client and mercenary to double-cross one another, which led 
to all manner of deceitfulness in the Middle Ages. For contracts to work 
without law enforcement, there must be trust between the consumer and the 
agent contracted to perform military services that the terms of the contract will 
be honoured. But trust is a rare commodity in the market for force; as the 
fourteenth-century Italian novelist Franco Sacchetti put it, in mercenaries 
‘there is neither love nor faith’.589 The consumer-agent problems that plague 
contract warfare can result in treachery and tragedy for consumers, providers 
and bystanders alike in the market for force.  
The moral hazards in the market for force extend beyond plausible 
deniability. Moral hazard occurs when shielding a party from risk causes it to 
behave differently than it would if it were exposed to the risk.590 In contract 
warfare it is difficult for the principal to observe what a private military 
organisation does during a campaign, and mercenaries can exploit this 
asymmetry of information for profit. To alleviate this problem, medieval 
customers would have representatives called provveditori travel with and monitor 
the hired mercenary companies during the campaign and even goad them into 
battle to ensure they did not shirk their obligations. However, this was a 
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589 Quoted in Caferro, “Italy and the Companies of Adventure in the Fourteenth Century,” 801. 
590 Bengt Holmstrom, “Moral Hazard in Teams,” The Bell Journal of Economics 13, no. 2 (1982): 324. 
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defective system, as condottieri could manipulate key information, such as 
intelligence on the enemy that only the condottieri knew, to unduly influence the 
provveditori to make business decisions in favour of the condottiero’s interests 
rather than the client’s. Or condottieri could simply ignore the provveditori and 
allow themselves to be outbid on the field of battle, turning against their 
original employers. This is precisely what happened to the Milanese at 
Canturino in 1363, when its entire Hungarian contingent went over to the 
enemy. During their war with Pisa in 1364, the Florentines successfully bought 
off Pisa’s mercenaries amassed before its walls.591 Who was managing whom?  
Similar asymmetries of information exist between the United States 
and the private military industry that the industry can exploit for profit. The 
bureaucracy needed to competently oversee contractors did not grow 
commensurately with the industry during the Iraq and Afghanistan boom 
years, and as a result, the government lacks the capacity to manage the 
industry, as the Gansler report and other government studies repeatedly 
show.592 A 2010 United States inspector general’s investigation found that the 
State Department completely failed to supervise DynCorp International and 
other firms that were paid $1.6 billion to build the Afghan National Police.593 
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To avoid this problem, the United States deploys modern provveditori, called 
contracting officer’s technical representatives (COTRs), into the field to 
oversee the government’s interests, but like the Middle Ages this system is 
deficient. There are insufficient numbers of COTRs, those that exist receive 
inadequate training and they lack the needed tools and authority to manage 
multi-million dollar contracts in conflict zones.594 Owing to this, COTRs are 
vulnerable to manipulation in the same manner as provveditori because they are 
often too reliant on contractors’ specialised knowledge and access to key 
information to make important decisions regarding the contract. This 
represents a clear conflict of interest: Contractors, like the condottieri, are 
incentivised to share only expert opinion or information that lengthens or 
expands their contract for profit.  
That the mercenaries can themselves be cheated is another type of 
moral hazard; if a manager cannot be fired because they are protected by 
nepotism or cronyism, then that manager can treat his or her employees 
unprofessionally with impunity. Strong principals in the market for force can 
renege on paying their mercenaries without fear of consequence. In the Middle 
Ages, a scammed mercenary company could attempt to attack their unfaithful 
employer, but may have been too weak to do so after a long military campaign. 
Furthermore, the employer could hire a fresh company at a fraction of the 
price to chase off the remnants of the war-weary company. Some principals 
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were also relatively untouchable. Pope Gregory XI was infamous for lack of 
payment during the War of Eight Saints and drove Hawkwood and half of the 
Breton companies to defect to his enemies. As in the Middle Ages, there are at 
present few options for PMCs whose customers have backed out of their 
contracts. The market for force is inherently a distrustful environment that 
encourages both principal and agent to behave in treacherous ways, which is 
dangerous in the context of war. 
Neomedieval Warfare 
As the world has become more neomedieval since the end of the Cold War, so 
has warfare. Westphalian war, as elucidated by Clausewitz and exemplified by 
World War I and II, is fought between powerful states via national militaries 
with a clear beginning (declarations of war), middle (decisive battlefield victory 
or defeat), and end (official surrenders). By contrast, today’s wars, like the 
Middle Ages, are fought between myriad actors, both state and non-state, and 
though less intense than World War II they tend to persist in nebulous 
perpetuity without a clear beginning, middle or end. Examples of this ‘new’ 
warfare include Chechnya, the Balkans, Iraq, Afghanistan, Darfur, the DRC 
and West Africa.595 Unlike Westphalian warfare, neomedieval armed conflict is 
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often fought by armed non-state actors for non-state objectives using irregular 
warfare tactics and strategies with scant regard for the laws or war or human 
rights norms. Van Creveld predicts this transformation of war as early as 1991, 
and warns the future of war ‘will be protracted, bloody, and horrible’.596  
General Sir Rupert Smith goes even further and argues that 
Westphalian warfare is dead. Smith wrote The Utility of Force after forty years in 
the British army that included integrating the Zimbabwe African National 
Union-Popular Front (ZANU-PF) and the Zimbabwe African People’s Union 
(ZAPU), commanding the UK Armoured Division in the (first) Gulf War, 
leading UN forces in Bosnia in 1995, and commanding UK forces in Northern 
Ireland from 1996 to 1999. He finished his career as the deputy commander of 
NATO during the Kosovo War. After this long career, his conclusion about 
the future of warfare is stark: ‘War as cognitively known to most non-
combatants, war as battle in a field between men and machinery, war as a 
massive deciding event in a dispute in international affairs: such war no longer 
exists’. 597  Interstate war waged between what he calls ‘industrial’ national 
militaries have been replaced by low-tech yet enduring ‘war amongst the 
people’ such as ethnic conflicts in the Rwanda, Iraq, Bosnia, Kosovo, 
Afghanistan and so on. These wars are waged by armed non-state groups, blur 
the lines between civilian and combatant, can span several generations, and are 
                                                                                                                       
character of warfare as transforming from Westphalian to neomedieval. This does not suggest that 
‘conventional’ interstate wars are an ‘anachronism’; only that they will become more rare. 
596 Van Creveld, The Transformation of War, 212. 
597 Smith, The Utility of Force, 1. 
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fought for malleable non-state ends rather than the hard objective of defeating 
other states.598  
This formulation of warfare is essentially neomedieval as it describes 
armed competition between non-state actors with overlapping authorities and 
loyalties. The objective of war amongst the people is to ‘influence the 
opponent, to change or form an intention, to establish a condition and, above 
all, to win the clash of will’ rather than seizing territory, concessions from 
another state, or some other Westphalian calculation of gain.599 To be clear, 
Smith does not claim that conventional warfare is dead but the risk of nuclear 
annihilation makes them too risky. Instead, polities at odds with one another 
alternate between periods of ‘conflict’ and ‘confrontation’. Neomedieval 
warfare endures in a lower-intensity yet unending armed conflict that 
epitomizes ‘durable disorder’.  
Private armies are among the new actors waging neomedieval war, 
further blurring the distinction between combatant and civilian as well as war 
and peace. The over-utilisation of private military organisations can produce 
strategic surprises and failures in war. In the Middle Ages war was so 
specialised and monopolised by private actors that city-states and other 
political entities were absolutely dependent on them in war, nor could the 
condottieri survive without the patronage of warring clients. Today half of the 
United States military structure is comprised of contractors and the 
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superpower cannot wage war without them. This creates an existential co-
dependency between political authorities and the private military industry that 
warps warfare and strategic outcomes in unexpected ways.  
One unintended consequence of contract warfare is the growing 
United States dependence on the private military industry to deliver victory in 
modern warfare. United States military campaigns proceed in five phases. 
Phase 0 is conflict prevention; phase 1 is the decision to deter or engage the 
enemy; phase 2 is seizing the initiative to outmanoeuvre the enemy; phase 3 is 
decisive operations to defeat the enemy on the field of battle; and phase 4 is 
post-conflict transition and stability operations. 600  In Westphalian warfare, 
decisive victory was seen as an outcome of great battles in phase 3––akin to 
Napoleon’s defeat at Waterloo or the World War II naval battle at Midway 
between the United States and Japan601––that determined the course of the war 
and world politics. As Clausewitz explains, ‘combat is the only effective force 
in war; its aim is to destroy the enemy’s forces as a means to a further end’.602 
However, victory is different in neomedieval warfare. According to 
Smith, the limited effectiveness of Western militaries since the end of the Cold 
War, as in the Balkans and elsewhere, reflects their continued focus on 
Westphalian war despite the emergence of a new paradigm of armed conflict, 
and concludes that in modern war the utility of force is diminished. 
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Contrasting Clausewitz, he concludes that ‘the strategic object cannot now be 
achieved through the singular use of massive military force alone; in most 
cases military force can only achieve tactical results’.603 Recent experiences in 
Iraq and Afghanistan confirm this, as success in phase 3 is no longer the 
decisive variable in a military campaign when determining victory. There is no 
greater metaphor of this than the image of President George W. Bush standing 
on the deck of the United States aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln and declaring 
‘victory’ with a large ‘Mission Accomplished’ banner behind him after phase 3 
combat operations ended in Iraq, just a few weeks after the invasion began. 
Few observers today would claim the United States accomplished its mission 
on that brisk day in 2003, and the United States remains embroiled in Iraqi 
internal warfare well after Bush’s departure from the White House.604  
Today there is broad consensus that phase 4 operations are now as 
important––if not more so––than phase 3 when assessing victory. This 
strategic paradigm shift is evidenced by the advent of National Security 
Presidential Directive 44605 and the Defence Science Board Task Force on 
stability operations, all of which decree post-conflict and stability operations a 
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strategic imperative on par with combat operations. 606  Similarly, the 2006 
Quadrennial Defence Review recognises that a core DOD mission should be 
conflict prevention, or phase 0, to ‘prevent problems from becoming crises 
and crises from becoming conflicts’. 607 Because decisive victory may require 
years of low-intensity conflict, the costs of sustaining a modern military 
campaign are prohibitively high, which is why Defence Secretary Robert Gates 
recommended the military focus on capabilities that ‘prevent festering 
problems from growing into full-blown crises which require costly––and 
controversial––large-scale American military intervention’.608  
Like the Middle Ages, the private military industry is responding to 
market demand and quickly monopolising skills pertaining to phase 0 and 4 
operations, making the United States increasingly dependent on the private 
sector for victory in neomedieval warfare. Private military companies’ support 
of phase 0 and 4 operations include KBR repairing Iraq’s infrastructure and 
managing complex logistical operations country-wide; Blackwater, DynCorp 
International and Triple Canopy protecting critical Iraqi infrastructure and 
leadership; MPRI training and equipping Afghanistan police; PAE building 
new military bases for indigenous security forces; and Lincoln Group 
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conducting strategic communications in Iraq. Many of the lessons that 
informed the army’s recent field manual 3-07 on stability operations were 
drawn from private-sector experiences.609 Moreover, many of the specialised 
skills developed by these firms are considered proprietary knowledge, and 
government must hire the company to benefit from that capability. Just as the 
United States is dependent on the private sector to provide its military 
manpower (see Figure 5, p. 215), it is also reliant on companies to furnish 
specialized skills sets necessary to win the peace. 
The United States is correspondingly vulnerable to strategic defeat 
when contractors fail. In 2010, the NATO-led International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan determined that DynCorp had 
failed in its contract to train and mentor the Afghan police.610 General Stanley 
McChrystal, then-commander of ISAF, stated that the police were one of the 
most crucial elements of his campaign plan, and a United States government 
investigation into the matter concluded that DynCorp’s failure ‘hampers the 
ability of DOD to fulfill its role in the emerging national strategy’.611 The 
ramifications are far worse when PMCs fail. On 16 September 2007, personnel 
from the Blackwater opened fire on innocent Iraqi citizens while escorting a 
United States diplomatic convoy at a Baghdad traffic circle in Nisour Square. 
The attack was unprovoked, according to eyewitnesses, and resulted in the 
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deaths of seventeen Iraqi civilians.612 Because PMCs are immune from Iraqi 
law, the killers literally walked away from the scene of the crime free and clear 
of wrongdoing. Order 17 from the Coalition Provisional Authority states that 
‘contractors shall be immune from Iraqi legal process with respect to acts 
performed by them pursuant to the terms and conditions of a Contract or any 
sub-contract thereto’.613 Neither Blackwater nor its employees who killed the 
civilians faced criminal proceedings. 
Indignation over the immunity and impunity of PMCs was fast and 
unequivocal by both anti-American insurgents and pro-American Iraqis alike, 
dealing a serious setback to the United States counter-insurgency strategy of 
‘winning hearts and minds’ among the Iraqi population. Radical Shi’ite cleric 
Muqtada al-Sadr, leader of the Mahdi Army that spearheaded the first major 
armed confrontation against the United States-led occupation forces, 
demanded the expulsion of these ‘criminals’ from Iraq. Baghdad resident 
Halim Mashkoor seemed to encapsulate Iraqi anger at large when he decried, 
‘We see the security firms, or the so-called American security firms, doing 
whatever they want in the streets. They beat citizens and scorn them. If they 
face a traffic jam, they start hitting cars with bottles and sometimes fire at 
them. I ask one question. If such a thing takes place in America or Britain, 
does the American president or the American citizen accept that?’614 Even Iraqi 
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prime minister Nuri al-Maliki bluntly declared that ‘it cannot be accepted by an 
American security company to carry out a killing. These are very serious 
challenges to the sovereignty of Iraq’. 615  The Iraqi government banned 
Blackwater from operating in Iraqi, demanded that the United States 
government end its contract with the company and called on Blackwater to 
pay the families $8 million in compensation. It also sparked an intractable 
diplomatic dispute between the United States and Iraqi governments over the 
Status of Forces Agreement, lasting over a year, regarding the legal immunity 
of contractors and soldiers who commit crimes under Iraqi law.616  
The adverse effect of the PMC’s failure was not limited to Iraq, as the 
entire region was incensed with the impunity of Blackwater, largely seen as 
representative of the PMC industry and the new United States way of war. The 
negative public diplomacy and subsequent fallout was enough to demand 
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s personal involvement; she quickly issued 
new guidelines to manage PMCs.617 Many in the United States also were 
shocked by the incident and apparent lack of government oversight of PMCs. 
Five separate federal investigations were launched, led by the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation (FBI). Congress also investigated the incident, and the House 
of Representatives passed legislation on a 389–30 vote to make private 
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contractors working in Iraq and other combat zones subject to prosecution by 
United States courts.618  
If United States or Iraqi soldiers killed seventeen innocent Iraqis, they 
would nominally be court-martialled and sentenced to years in military prison 
for homicide. Nothing happened to the contractors involved in the Nisour 
Square incident. In over seven years of activity in Iraq, no contractor has been 
convicted in a United States court of a crime against Iraqi citizens. 
Congressman Henry Waxman, the chair of the House Committee on 
Oversight and Government Reform, held hearings ‘to understand what has 
happened and the extent of the damage to United States security interests’ and 
concluded that ‘the controversy over Blackwater is an unfortunate 
demonstration of the perils of excessive reliance on private security 
contractors’.619  
Part of the ‘perils’ of armed contractors stems from the United States 
military’s narrow conception of strategy and failure to grasp the inherent 
complexity of neomedieval warfare. The military conceives strategy as an 
interaction between ends, means and ways.620 ‘Ends’ are the objectives or 
desired outcomes of a given strategy; literally the desired ‘end-state’. ‘Means’ 
are the resources, capabilities, and weapons platforms available to the 
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commander to achieve the ends; examples of means include an infantry 
battalion, F-22 fighter jet, or allies. ‘Ways’ are the methods or concepts that 
apply the means to achieve the ends, bridging the two. This framework is used 
at every level of military activity, from tactical to operational to strategic.  
As warfare became more neomedieval in Africa, the Balkans and 
elsewhere in the 1990s, the military responded with a new doctrine called 
‘Effects-Based Operations (EBO)’: operations aimed at producing specific 
outcomes or effects as opposed to merely damaging or destroying targets. The 
intent of EBO is to simplify complex warfare by employing sufficient force to 
paralyze the enemy with minimum bloodshed yet compromise the enemy’s 
ability to engage friendly forces or allies in close combat. Unlike Westphalian 
warfare, EBO is not about seizing territory, capturing a capital, or destroying a 
rival army, as Clausewitz advocates. Instead EBO views modern armed 
conflict as risk management rather than war.  
Anticipating risks is not new to strategists, but what is new is the type 
of risk: external versus internal. In Westphalian warfare, risk comes from 
outside the state, such as the threat that another state might ally with one’s 
enemy. However, in a neomedieval era these risks emanate from within or 
across states: insurgents, terrorists, militias, trans-national criminal 
organisations and other armed non-state actors. Owing to this, states now 
wage war as a consequence management exercise in an attempt to mitigate the 
effects of non-state threats. As Coker clarifies, ‘Today we internalize risks in 
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the form of consequence management. And assessing the implications is made 
more difficult still by the multiplicity of actors we have to take into account. 
For the ones that count most are no longer states’.621 
EBO soon grew from a theory to a mind-set during the late 1990s, 
leading to conceptual incoherence and confusion within the military. The EBO 
approach treats war as a formulaic and process driven event that can be won 
with predictive precision when balancing ends, ways, means for desired effects. 
In other words, EBO generally treats warfare as a math problem. Finally in 
2008 Marine General James Mattis, commander of the US Joint Forces 
Command (USJFCOM), which is responsible for crafting military doctrine, 
directed the termination of EBO: ‘Effective immediately, USJFCOM will no 
longer use, sponsor or export the terms and concepts related to EBO...in our 
training, doctrine development and support of JPME [Joint Professional 
Military Education]’. Mattis went on to say, ‘...we must recognize that the term 
“effects-based” is fundamentally flawed, has far too many interpretations and 
is at odds with the very nature of war to the point it expands confusion and 
inflates a sense of predictability far beyond that which it can be expected to 
deliver’.622 Treating complex warfare simply does not make it simple. 
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Despite this moratorium on EBO, the idea still lingers in military 
minds and this has contributed to strategic setbacks involving PMCs. EBO 
inhabits a constrained conceptual universe that, in the words of Mattis, 
‘assumes a level of unachievable predictability’ and ‘is too prescriptive and 
overengineered’ and ‘discounts the human dimensions of war (for example, 
passion, imagination, willpower, and unpredictability)’.623 Given this lack of 
sophistication, it is understandable how EBO planners might assume PMCs 
are merely a new type of ‘means’ that behave identically to their public sector 
equivalents when plugged into an ‘ends, means, ways’ formula. Unfortunately 
this ignores the reality that PMCs are fundamentally different than their public 
sector counterparts, as outlined above. Also, contract warfare rewards 
companies for accomplishing discrete jobs only, making them extremely task 
focused. Blackwater was successfully conducting its mission at Nisour square–
–the physical protection of their clients from real or perceived threats––even 
to the detriment of their client’s purpose for being in Iraq. As Coker observes, 
‘PSCs are rarely required to think about the consequences of their acts’.624 
Ultimately, the very act of employing PMCs as a means changes the ways and 
ultimately the ends, as demonstrated at Nisour Square and elsewhere. 
 
 Conspicuously absent from the list of concerns surrounding the 
market for force is the question of legitimacy, which presupposes that only 
                                                
623 Ibid, 20. 
624 Coker, Ethics and War in the 21st Century, 143. 
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states or multinational organisations such as the United Nations can rightfully 
sanction force. This is a purely Westphalian bias that demands exposure. For 
example, when a group of US Marines killed twenty-four Iraqi men, women 
and children at the city of Haditha in 2005 and then not found guilty of any 
crimes, there was slight international protest compared to the Nisour Square 
incident despite the overt similarities. 625 Unlike the multiple inquiries into 
Blackwater, the US government conducted an internal investigation into the 
event, led by General Eldon Bargewell, which did not fully address the core 
issue––the killing of civilians. Instead it focused on procedural and 
bureaucratic processes. It recommended the rules of engagement for combat 
be ‘reset’ to competently engage ‘an unscrupulous enemy’ that uses 
unconventional warfare tactics, and dismissed the incident as a ‘case study’ that 
illustrates ‘how simple failures can lead to disastrous results’.626 Given the 
stigma against private military violence, it should be expected that the Marines’ 
actions did not incur the same level of international outrage as Nisour Square, 
even though the Marines killed more Iraqi civilians than their private sector 
counterparts. 
However today’s bias against PMCs does not invalidate the serious 
problems regarding the reintroduction of an industry that takes life for profit. 
Westphalian militaries are highly normative institutions with a cultivated sense 
                                                
625 Of the seven Marines accused in this incident, six had all charges dropped. Charges against the 
seventh have been reduced from unpremeditated murder in eighteen deaths to voluntary manslaughter in 
nine of the twenty-four deaths, dereliction of duty and other crimes. As of March 25, 2011, these charges 
are still pending. Tony Perry, “Court Upholds Dismissal of Charges in Haditha Case,” The Los Angeles 
Times, March 18, 2009. 
626 “Excerpts from Army Maj. Gen. Eldon A. Bargewell’s report,” Washington Post, April 21, 2007. 
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of patriotism and self-sacrifice. Soldiers are supposed to fight for an idea––the 
nation––rather than for personal gain, and they are not allowed to negotiate 
salaries, working conditions, unionize or go on strike. The profession 
maintains an unspoken covenant with the state, which provides them with 
food, housing, clothing, education, healthcare, subsidised goods aliberiand 
status. In exchange they are expected to protect the state with their lives. This 
‘calling’ creates a warrior ethos that internalises concepts like ‘service’, ‘duty’, 
‘honour’, ‘sacrifice’ and ‘country’ into a code of conduct that seeks to 
distinguish soldiers from every other segment of society, which it terms 
‘civilian’.627  
Private warriors are an affront to this code because they reject it. 
Unlike their Westphalian counterparts, PMCs salute something far more 
palpable and base than the state: profit. As Coker explains, ‘private security 
companies embrace the norms of the marketplace, with its attachment to the 
law of supply and demand….Performance is measured against the standards of 
the marketplace, such as efficiency and cost. Their relationship with society is 
highly contractual’.628 A growing challenge of neomedieval warfare will be 
reconciling these duelling models of the warrior ethos: the business-oriented 
view of private armies with the Westphalian idealism of public ones, especially 
when the former is contracted to the latter. 
                                                
627 A good example of this is the United States Military Academy at West Point, whose motto is ‘Duty, 
Honor, Country’. For more on this theme, see: Charles Moskos (ed.), The Post-Modern Military: Armed 
Forces after the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).  
628 Coker, Barbarous Philosophers, 150. 
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One response to this conundrum is curtailing or outlawing private 
military actors, like 1648. However efforts to regulate the industry so far are 
largely seen as insufficient: the ICRC’s and Swiss government’s Montreux 
Document recommending best practices; United States laws such as the 
Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA) of 2000; the ISOA’s proposed 
solution of self-regulation through a voluntary code of conduct.629 Missing and 
urgently needed is an international code of practise for private military actors 
that moves beyond the outmoded Westphalian norms inherent in international 
law and recognises the neomedieval nature of the early twenty-first century. 
The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) in 
Switzerland has proposed such a code but it has yet to impact market practises 
in tangible ways.630 An international code embraced by all relevant actors could 
harness the power of private force for good rather than letting it devolve into 
the chaos of medieval Italy.  
The next chapter examines in detail how the private military industry 
functions within the emerging neomedieval order through the tragic case of 
Liberia, where the United States hired DynCorp International to demobilise 
and then rebuild Liberia’s military––the first time in two centuries that one 
sovereign nation hired a private company to raise another sovereign state’s 
armed forces. A close examination of this process sheds light on the inner 
                                                
629 For critiques of this, see: Avant, The Market for Force, 174; J. Spear, “Market Forces: The Political 
Economy of Private Military Companies. New Security Programme,” Fafo Report 531 (2006): 46; James 
Cockayne, “Regulating Private Military and Security Companies: The Content, Negotiation, Weaknesses 
and Promise of the Montreux Document,” Journal of Conflict and Security Law 13, no. 3 (2008): 401-428. 
630 Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), Code of Conduct for Private 
Military and Security Companies (PMSCs), November 2010. 
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workings of the private military industry, how these companies function in a 
neomedieval environment, and how they can alter international outcomes.  
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Chapter  5 
  
Liberia:  a Neomedieval  Tale  
 
 
He killed my Ma, he killed my Pa, I’ll vote for him! 
––Charles Taylor’s presidential campaign slogan631 
 
 
Monrovia is the capital of Liberia, a small West African country that, by the 
summer of 2003, had suffered fourteen years of civil war epitomised by 
torture, rape, child soldiers, blood diamonds and fratricide. The city is situated 
on the Atlantic Ocean and inhabits a peninsula parallel to the mainland with 
                                                
631 Incidentally, he won. An alternate slogan was ‘he killed your ma, he killed your pa; vote for him or 
he’ll kill you too!’ He meant it and took the 1997 Liberian presidential election by a landslide 75.3 per 
cent of the vote. International observers declared the elections to be fair, and UN Security Council 
President Peter Osvald read a statement noting the joint certification statement by the secretary-general 
along with the chairman of the Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS), which found 
the elections to be ‘free, fair and credible’ and reflecting the will of Liberian voters. See: UN, “Security 
Council Welcomes Successful Presidential, Legislative Elections in Liberia,” press release SC/6402, July 30, 
1997. However, some human rights groups and scholars observe that the elections took place in a general 
climate of intimidation, hence Taylor’s ‘victory’. See: Binaifer Nowrojee, “Liberia: Emerging From the 
Destruction: Human Rights Challenges Facing the New Liberian Government,” Human Rights 
Watch/Africa (Washington, DC: Human Rights Watch, 1997); Terrence Lyons, “Liberia’s Path From 
Anarchy to Elections,” Current History 97, no. 619 (1998): 229-233. 
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only three entrances: one road and two bridges. On 18 July 2003, the city was 
sealed off by rebels, from the east by Liberians United for Reconciliation and 
Democracy (LURD) and from the south by the Movement for Democracy in 
Liberia (MODEL). Ferociously defending the gateways to Monrovia were 
remnants of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) still loyal to President Charles 
Taylor, a notorious warlord accused of war crimes and crimes against 
humanity.632 At the time, Liberia was more of a kingdom than a state. As one 
Liberian put it, ‘Ghankay [Charles Taylor] is our law. He understands that the 
man with the gun is a strongman’.633  
Taylor has been accused of murdering and mutilating civilians during 
his reign from 1989 to 2003, illegally trafficking diamonds and timber to enrich 
himself at the expense of the state, abducting women and girls as sex slaves 
and forcing children and adults into pressed labour and fighting during the war 
in Sierra Leone.634 His militias chased down civilians and asked them if they 
wanted a long-sleeve or a short-sleeve shirt. For people who said long sleeves, 
the fighters hacked off their hands at the wrist with a machete. People who 
said short sleeves had their arms hacked off closer to the shoulder. To this day, 
people missing one, two and even four limbs lie on the streets on Monrovia 
                                                
632 Many members of the AFL remained in their barracks and did not partake in the fighting. Not 
everyone in the AFL supported Taylor. 
633 Quoted in: William Reno, “Reinvention of an African Patrimonial State: Charles Taylor’s Liberia,” 
Third World Quarterly 16, no. 1 (1995): 109. 
634 Sixth Annual Report of the President of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (Freetown, Sierra Leone: Special 
Court For Sierra Leone, 2009).  
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begging for money.635 Taylor also supported rebel groups in the adjacent 
countries of Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire to agitate ongoing conflicts there and 
destabilise his neighbours. In July 2003 those same countries returned the 
favour, helping unseat Taylor by aiding LURD and MODEL. In late 2002, The 
Economist predicted that Liberia would be ‘the world’s worst place to live’ that 
year.636 They were right. 
The fighting was fierce and all sides committed atrocities. Child 
soldiers were commonplace, the line between combatants and civilians blurred 
and the laws of war were utterly ignored. The battles over the bridges into 
Monrovia were so intense that the road was paved in blood and brass shells; 
lampposts, road signs and nearby buildings were riddled with bullet holes. As 
John W. Blaney, the US ambassador to Liberia, later recalled in an interview: 
‘It was really like a 14th-century siege. The two rebel armies had surrounded 
Monrovia with the government’s troops inside of Monrovia and the two rebel 
armies pressing hard outside’.637 Frustrated by the AFL’s resistance, rebels 
started indiscriminately shelling the overcrowded inner city with mortars, 
killing more than 1,000 civilians.638 Liberians described the situation as ‘World 
                                                
635 Interview with Ex-Combatant Monrovia, Liberia 12 May 2004. Other accounts of gruesome acts from 
eyewitnesses include: human heads on chairs and tables in the middle of the road as a warning to others; 
stringing human entrails across concertina wire to make an ad hoc road block at which cars would be 
stopped and robbed, and perhaps passengers raped or killed; combatants would capture a pregnant 
woman, bet on the gender of her baby and then find out. 
636 “The World’s Worst: Liberia,” The Economist (2002). 
637 John Blaney, interview by Ky Luu, Disaster Resilience Leadership Academy, YouTube Upload, September 
11, 2009, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cdGGs6QGaCU.  
638 “U.S. Military Experts Confront Carnage in Liberia,” Associated Press, July 9, 2003. 
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War III’ and began piling their dead at the gates of the US Embassy in a 
macabre plea for help.639  
Monrovia was already a humanitarian disaster, as hundreds of 
thousands of internally displaced Liberians had fled the fighting in the 
hinterlands for the capital, which could not accommodate them all. With no 
electricity, water, sewage, police, food or any other accoutrement of modern 
life, the city became a massive slum of tin shacks, garbage, human waste, 
disease and lawlessness. Liberia was once the jewel of West Africa and a 
popular international vacation destination: Pam Am airlines had flown directly 
from New York City to Monrovia three times a week.640 Now the country was 
apocalyptic.  
 International pressure mounted as the siege went on, stretching from 
days into weeks. US President George W. Bush twice demanded on 
international television that Taylor ‘leave Liberia’ and stationed 2,300 marines 
in three US Navy ships off the country’s shore.641 Nigeria offered Taylor 
asylum if he left, shielding him from the machinations of international law.642 
The UN Security Council authorised a multinational peacekeeping force in 
                                                
639 Ibid. 
640 According to a 1963 Pan American (Pan Am) airlines brochure describing Liberia, ‘tourists are 
welcome here and are treated with great friendliness and courtesy. The coastal area on the Atlantic Ocean 
has beautiful beaches and good fishing’. See: Matt Jones, “Moved2Monrovia,” accessed April 14, 2011,  
http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_nAWhnWKWr-w/THZicXetaMI/AAAAAAAAAoc/qqZrx-
kxqY0/s1600/PANAM+LIBERIA.jpg. 
641 Scott Lindlaw, “Bush Approves Small Peacekeeping Contingent for Liberia,” Associated Press, July 6, 
2003. 
642 “Transcript: U.S. Debating Sending Troops to Help Liberian Civil War,” CNN, July 2, 2003. However, 
in March 2006 Nigeria handed Taylor over to Liberian authorities for trial, who in turn handed him over 
to the Special Court for Sierra Leone. This court was set up jointly by the government of Sierra Leone 
and the United Nations to try those most responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian 
law during the civil war there (1991–2002). See: Stephen Faris, “War Returns to Monrovia,” Time 
Magazine, July 20, 2003.; Sixth Annual Report of the President of the Special Court for Sierra Leone.  
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Liberia, citing its deep concern over ‘the humanitarian situation, including the 
tragic loss of countless innocent lives … and its destabilising effect on the 
region’. 643  Meanwhile, the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS), a regional international organisation, hastily assembled a force to 
relieve the city.  
With global pressure intensifying and rebels at the gates, Taylor finally 
yielded on 11 August and fled to Nigeria. He blamed Liberia’s problems on 
foreign meddling and cast himself the martyr: ‘Because Jesus died, we are 
saved today. I want to be the sacrificial lamb. I am the whipping boy. It’s easy 
to say “It’s because of Taylor”. After today, there will be no more Taylor to 
blame’.644 A few days later the rebels lifted their siege, and 1,000 ECOWAS 
peacekeepers and 200 US marines entered the city to provide emergency 
humanitarian assistance and prevent a relapse of violence. ‘God bless you, 
Oga’, women cried to convoys of Nigerians, using the Nigerian Yoruba word 
for ‘boss’. ‘God bless you, marine’, they sang to other vehicles filled with 
American troops.645 On 18 August, the two rebel groups and what was left of 
Taylor’s government signed a comprehensive peace agreement (CPA) at Accra, 
Ghana, ending Liberia’s bloody civil war.646  
                                                
643 U.N. Security Council, Resolution 1497, S/RES/1497, “Adopted by the Security Council at Its 4803rd 
Meeting, on 1 August 2003,” August 1, 2003, http://unmil.org/documents/resolutions/reso1497.pdf. 
644 Stephan Faris, “Charles Taylor Leaves Liberia,” Time Magazine, August 11, 2003. 
645 Glenn Mckenzie, “Rebels Lift Siege of Liberia’s Starving Capital, U.S. Marines Land,” The Associated 
Press, August 14, 2003.; “Rebels Lift Siege of Starving Monrovia,” RedOrbit.com, August 14, 2003, 
accessed April 11, 2011, 
http://www.redorbit.com/news/general/14811/rebels_lift_siege_of_starving_monrovia/. 
646 “Comprehensive Peace Agreement Between the Government of Liberia and the Liberians United for 
Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) and 
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However, a tragic legacy remained: After 150 years of troubled history, 
fourteen years of civil war and horrific abuses of power, Liberia was shattered. 
Its infrastructure was beyond destroyed, any semblance of civil governance 
had been long since abandoned and much of its population was either 
displaced or dead. To this day Liberia is plagued by intense hunger and 
poverty, no central running water or sewage, no telephone landlines and no 
electrical grid. Small generators power most of the country.  
The human cost is even greater. As a US Agency for International 
Development (USAID) report describes, in a country of only three million,  
over 250,000 people, most of them civilian non-combatants, 
have lost their lives in the civil war. More than 1.3 million have 
been displaced, including hundreds of thousands who fled the 
country. Abductions, torture, rape and other human rights 
abuses have taken place on a massive scale. It is estimated that 
at least one in ten children may have been recruited into 
militias at one time or another. A similar percentage has been 
traumatised by seeing their families and friends murdered and 
raped.647 
Almost everyone in Liberia was affected by the war. Post-conflict polls show 
that 96 per cent of respondents had some direct experience of the conflict and, 
of these, an astonishing 90 per cent were at one point or another displaced 
from their homes.648 
                                                                                                                       
Political Parties,” August 18, 2003, accessed April 11, 2011, 
http://www.usip.org/files/file/resources/collections/peace_agreements/liberia_08182003.pdf. 
647 “Overview of Activities in Liberia,” United States Agency for International Development, May 4, 
2004.  
648 International Monetary Fund, “Liberia: Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper,” (Washington, DC: 
IMF, 2007), x; IDP Advisory Team Policy Development and Evaluation Service, “Real-Time Evaluation 
of UNHCR’s IDP Operation in Liberia,” (Geneva: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR), 2007), 7; UNHCR, “Liberia: Regional Operations Profile - West Africa,” 
http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e484936#; ICRC, “Liberia: Opinion Survey and 
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Optic into a New Order 
Liberia’s tragic history and hopeful recovery shed light on the mechanics of the 
emerging neomedieval world order. To be clear, neomedievalism is not 
necessarily a negative phenomenon nor is contemporary Africa analogous to 
Medieval Europe. In fact, Africa is home to five of the world’s fastest growing 
economies.649 However, extreme examples are often the most illustrative, and 
Liberia’s violent fall and fragile resurgence demonstrate all five characteristics 
of neomedievalism: the disintegration of states, the regional integration of 
states, transnational organisations, the technological unification of the world, 
and the restoration of private international violence.  
Liberia is a stark example of state disintegration; as Africa expert Peter 
Pham observes, ‘tragically, the recent history of Liberia has been a case study 
par excellence of a failed state’.650 In 1975 Liberia’s per capita GDP was greater 
than those of Egypt, Indonesia or the Philippines and double that of India.651 
By 2003 it was one of the poorest countries in the world and has remained at 
the bottom of most international health and development indexes.652 From 
                                                                                                                       
in-Depth Research,” (Geneva: International Committe of Red Cross, 2009), 1. For more on the 
significance of data, especially in post-conflict Liberia, see: Josef Teboho Ansorge, “The Technics of 
Politics: Information Technology in International Relations” (doctoral thesis, University of Cambridge, 
2011), 205-225. 
649 The five fastest growing African economies by real GDP in early 2011 were also ranked among the 
fastest in the world:  the DRC (10th in world), Zimbabwe (11th), Botswana (13th), Nigeria (16th) and 
Ethiopia (20th). Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database (Washington, DC: 
IMF, 2011). 
650 J. Peter Pham, Liberia: Portrait of a Failed State (Georgia: Reed Press, 2004), 191. 
651 In 1975 the per capita GDP for Liberia’s was $386.17, for Egypt $291.08, Indonesia $242.46, 
Philippines: $354.47 and India $156.33. Source: “Indicators: Data,” World Bank, 2010, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator. 
652 In 2008 the UNDP’s Human Development Index ranked Liberia 176 of 179 states and did not rank 
Liberia at all in 2003 for lack of data. A Liberian’s life expectancy at birth was 56 years in 2003 and 59 
years in 2010. In 2010, Liberia’s adult literacy rate remains at 46 per cent, one of the lowest in the world, 
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2000 to 2008, 83 per cent of the population subsisted on less than $1.25 per 
day, and in 2008, Liberia had the second-lowest gross national income in the 
world.653 By the time Taylor fled the country, Liberia’s economic collapse was 
complete and replaced by an illicit economy dominated by warlords trafficking 
diamonds, timber and other natural resources for personal gain at the country’s 
expense.654 Liberia today depends totally on global largesse for its survival: 
foreign aid accounts for a stunning 771 per cent of government expenditure––
the highest percentage of foreign aid to government spending in the world, 
with Guinea-Bissau a distant second at 221 per cent.655 After the war foreign 
aid jumped from $106 million in 2004 to $1.25 billion in 2008. Liberia’s GDP 
that year was only $843 million.656 Not surprisingly, corruption is a big problem 
and is so institutionalised that Liberians even have a verb for it––chopping––as 
                                                                                                                       
and the combined gross enrolment in school was only 57.6 per cent. The unemployment rate stood at 85 
per cent. The 2010 Gallup Global Wellbeing Survey puts the country at 141st out of 155 (Gallup, 
“Global Wellbeing Surveys Find Nations Worlds Apart,” Gallup.com, 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/126977/global-wellbeing-surveys-find-nations-worlds-apart.aspx). The 
2010 Global Hunger Index ranks Liberia as 69th out of 84, which makes it the 15th most food insecure 
country in the world (Klaus von Grebmer et al., “Global Hunger Index, the Challenge of Hunger: Focus 
on the Crisis of Child Undernutrition,” (Bonn, Washington D.C., Dublin: Welthungerhilfe, International 
Food Policy Research Institute, Concern Worldwide, 2010), 17.). The UN and World Bank continue to 
place Liberia in the lowest category of state strength. Other failed-state indices have ranked Liberia in 
various versions of ‘the worst of the worst’ category from 2008 to 2010 (no data were available on 
Liberia during or immediately after the war): the Fund for Peace’s Failed State Index; Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perceptions Index; Brookings’s Index of State Weakness in the Developing 
World; the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) and International 
Development Association (IDA) Resource Allocation Index; and Freedom House’s World’s Most 
Repressive Societies list. See: UNDP, National Human Development Report 2006: Liberia (New York City: 
United Nations, 2006); James Heintz, “A Rapid Impact Assessment of the Global Economic Crisis on 
Liberia,” Political Economy Research Institute (December 12, 2009); Soniya Carvalho, Engaging With Fragile 
States (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2006), 5; “Indicators: Data,” World Bank.  
653 “Indicators: Data,” World Bank. 
654 Pham, Liberia: Portrait of a Failed State, 191-192. 
655 Foreign aid here refers to net official development assistance (ODA): “Net Official Development 
Assistance and Official Aid Received (Current US$),” World Bank, accessed April 16, 2011, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ALLD.CD?cid=GPD_54. ; Calculation of percentage of 
foreign aid to government spending: “Percentage of Foreign Aid to Government Spending,” Financial 
Times, http://media.ft.com/cms/7398f192-6d99-11df-b5c9-00144feabdc0.swf (accessed April 16, 2011). 
656 “Indicators: Data,” World Bank. 
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ministers and executives are expected to chop money off budgets to feed their 
families and patronise their tribes.657  
However, Liberia’s economic woes are only a fragment of its statehood 
challenges. There are no functioning public utilities and most Liberians have 
no access to electricity, water, sanitation facilities or health care. Basic 
infrastructure such as roads and bridges––which aid workers, entrepreneurs, 
peacekeepers and Liberians themselves all need, especially in rural areas––are 
in dire need of repairs. Fourteen years of civil war has left a generation of 
Liberians without a formal education and with a brain drain of those that do. 
Liberia has no effectively functioning judicial system, leaving it with a culture 
of impunity: most courts have been destroyed and trial by ordeal is not 
unheard of outside the capital.  
Beginning with the first coup d’etat in 1980, national authority––if it 
even existed––rarely extended beyond Monrovia. Institutions were anaemic 
and those who possessed the means of violence served warlords such as 
Taylor rather than the state. Like most post–Cold War armed conflicts, the war 
in Liberia was not Westphalian or interstate, but neomedieval or intrastate in 
nature: it was fought between warlords rather than states. Consistent with 
Rupert Smith’s ‘war amongst the people’, civilians were both the principal 
actors and targets of armed conflict, displacing nearly half the population and 
destabilising the region. By the war’s end, the United Nations registered 
                                                
657 Interview with member, Liberian Ministry of Defence , Monrovia, Liberia April 23, 2005. 
 304 
314,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) and the challenge of resettlement 
continues as returnees struggle to rebuild their lives and communities.658  
In another sign of the move toward neomedievalism, states did not 
manage the situation in Liberia; international organisations did. Liberia’s 
rescuers were not other states, as the Westphalian order demands, but the 
United Nations, ECOWAS and others. Notwithstanding Blaney’s efforts to 
secure a battlefield ceasefire, the role of the United States was minimal. Its 
three warships and 2,300 Marines sat off the coast of Liberia and did nothing 
to stop the fighting; a mere 200 troops intervened only after Taylor departed. 
No other state military came to Liberia’s aid. By contrast, the ECOWAS 
peacekeeping mission provided security and humanitarian assistance in the 
immediate aftermath of the war and was replaced by a larger UN force a few 
weeks later. On 19 September 2003, the UN Security Council established a 
Chapter VII peacekeeping mission called the United Nations Mission in 
Liberia (UNMIL), authorised to use ‘all necessary means’ to support the 
implementation of the ceasefire agreement and the peace process. Led by 
Ambassador Jacques Paul Klein, UNMIL was the largest peacekeeping mission 
in the world at the time, with an authorised strength of 15,000 blue-helmet 
peacekeepers.659 For the next several years, UNMIL essentially administered 
the country. Taylor was eventually handed over to a joint UN and Sierra Leone 
                                                
658 “Liberia: Development Challenges Top Agenda as the Nation Recovers From Years of Civil Strife,” 
United Nations, 2006, accessed April 23, 2011, 
http://www.un.org/events/tenstories/06/story.asp?storyID=2100#. 
659 “UNMIL Background,” United Nations, accessed April 16, 2011, 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmil/background.shtml. 
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court of international law to be tried for war crimes and human rights 
violations. At the time of publication, he remains at The Hague and awaits a 
verdict.  
As international organisations rescued Liberia, transnational actors 
keep it alive on life support. Hundreds of NGOs, ranging from large 
international actors such as Médecins Sans Frontièrs to small indigenous 
organisations, provide the bulk of services normally associated with good 
government: healthcare, food, shelter, education, security, water, sanitation, 
sewage, infrastructure, job creation and general administration. Save the 
Children, an international NGO, provides free healthcare for 102,399 people, 
has vaccinated 40,670 children against deadly diseases, has sheltered 15,182 
children from violence and abuse and has helped 56,094 children receive an 
education. 660  Overwhelmed with NGO support, the government issued a 
national policy to help coordinate their efforts, and by early 2007 more than 
400 NGOs registered with the Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs.661 
As NGOs provide substantially more public services than Liberia’s own 
government, many on the ground at the time quipped it was a ‘republic of 
NGOs’. 
MNCs also contributed to Liberia’s recovery. After the war ended, 
Firestone Natural Rubber Company returned to Liberia, where it had operated 
                                                
660 “Home Page,” Save the Children Liberia, accessed April 17, 2011, 
http://www.savethechildren.org.uk/en/liberia.htm. 
661 “National Policy on Non-Governmental Organisations in Liberia,” Republic of Liberia, 
http://www.emansion.gov.lr/doc/NGOPolicguidelines.pdf. On some of the pitfall regarding too many 
NGOs in Liberia, see: Veronika Fuest, “Contested Inclusions: Pitfalls of NGO Peace-Building Activities 
in Liberia,” Africa Spectrum 45, no. 2 (2010): 3-33. 
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from 1926 until 1989. According to the company, since 2005 it has invested 
more than $101.75 million to improve conditions in Liberia and ‘intends to 
invest tens of millions more’. As of 2011, the company had built or renovated 
2,200 homes, with an additional 321 under construction. By then, the MNC 
was operating twenty-six schools teaching nearly 16,000 children and was 
running nine health care facilities, including a hospital. It distributed more than 
2.21 million free rubber tree saplings to Liberian farmers to help rebuild the 
industry and ensure a future for thousands of families in the country.662 In the 
long run, Firestone’s actions could prove to be trend-setting: in addition to 
rubber, Liberia holds promise for MNCs investing in mineral ore, timber, 
diamonds, and agricultural commodities. Long-time Africa observer Greg Mills 
notes low-income countries can prosper when their leaders promote private 
sector–led development in a ‘trade not aid’ policy. After considering a similar 
agricultural program in Mozambique, Mills concludes that ‘commercial 
projects did what aid could never achieve. By placing extension services on a 
commercial footing, it granted a different logic to sustainability: one based not 
on pity, but on performance’.663  
Underlying and enabling the efforts of both NGOs and MNCs is the 
technological unification of the world, which was involved even in catalysing 
the international response. Globalised media streamed arresting images of the 
war’s carnage directly into living rooms across the world twenty-four hours a 
                                                
662 “Liberia Statistics,” Firestone, 
http://www.firestonenaturalrubber.com/documents/StatSheetNarrative.pdf. 
663 Greg Mills, Why Africa is Poor (New York: Penguin Global, 2010), 372. 
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day, inciting international outrage and demand for humanitarian intervention. 
This outcry was answered when President Bush declared that ‘Charles Taylor 
needs to step down’ on CNN and Kofi Annan, the UN secretary-general, said 
Taylor’s departure ‘mark[s] the beginning of the end of the long nightmare of 
the Liberian people’.664 This sequence of globalised media igniting international 
uproar and prompting world leaders to take action is a self-feeding cycle 
sometimes referred to as the ‘CNN effect’.665 Polling data show that American 
support for a US peacekeeping mission in Liberia initially increased during 
media coverage of the war but remained mixed until President Bush 
announced on CNN that US marines would be stationed off the coast of 
Liberia. This galvanised popular support for the policy.666 Without globalisation 
the world may have ignored Liberia’s plight. 
                                                
664 “Transcript: U.S. Debating Sending Troops to Help Liberian Civil War.”; UNIS, “Secretary-General 
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665 The concept of the CNN effect holds that globalised media have the power to shape popular opinion 
in representative governments, which in turn influence a state’s foreign policy, such as whether to stage a 
humanitarian intervention. It is named after the popular 24-hour international television news channel 
known as Cable News Network, or CNN. For more information on the CNN effect, see: Steven 
Livingston, “Clarifying the CNN Effect: An Examination of Media Effects According to Type of 
Military Intervention,” Research Paper R-18 (Cambridge, MA: The Joan Shorenstein Center on Press and 
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International Relations,” Political Communication 22, no. 1 (2005): 27-44.; Hamid Mowlana, Global 
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666 American popular support for a humanitarian intervention in Liberia was mixed before President 
Bush announced he would station troops off Liberia’s shore on July 25, 2003. A 16–17 July poll by 
Time/CNN/Harris Interactive asked half the respondents whether they would favour or oppose 
‘sending about 100 troops into Liberia for a few months or less’ and asked the other half if they favoured 
or opposed ‘sending about 1,000 troops into Liberia for a year or more’. Half (50 per cent) opposed the 
lesser troop number being sent for the shorter period of time. Opposition was even higher (57 per cent) 
to sending more troops for the longer time period. Support for the operation was significantly higher 
after Bush announced his decision to send troops to the region. A July 2003 CNN/USA Today/Gallup 
poll that began the day Bush announced that marines were being sent to the region asked, ‘Would you 
favour or oppose the presence of US ground troops, along with troops from other countries in an 
international peacekeeping force in Liberia?’ 63 per cent said they would favour that, while 30 per cent 
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Globalisation also facilitated Liberia’s recovery. Once peacekeepers 
were on the ground, information technology and the globalised supply chain 
nourished the large peacekeeping mission. Satellite telephones, mobile 
telephone networks and the internet enabled instant coordination between aid 
workers in the field and headquarters in New York City, London, Paris, 
Geneva, Washington, DC and elsewhere. The global supply chain made it 
possible to deliver humanitarian aid from around the world to Liberia in a 
timely manner. Such aid has accounted for an average of 50 per cent of 
Liberia’s total aid, one of the highest shares in all recipient countries in 2004 
and only behind Iraq, Sudan and Somalia. In the months that followed 
Taylor’s departure, $109 million in humanitarian aid was flown, floated or 
driven into Liberia; that number jumped to $177 million in 2004. 667 
Globalisation also spurred the Liberian diaspora community’s return and 
reinvestment in the country: remittances rose from $0 during the war to 
$1,008,166 in 2009.668  
                                                                                                                       
opposed it. In a Gallup poll, 57 per cent of respondents said they favoured the presence of US ground 
troops ‘along with troops from other countries, in an international peacekeeping force in Liberia’. A 
slightly smaller majority, 51 per cent, said in the Princeton Survey Research Associations/Newsweek poll 
conducted the same week that they supported sending US troops to Liberia ‘to participate in a 
peacekeeping operation there’. The lower result in the Princeton survey may be due to the lack of 
mention of sharing the peacekeeping duty with other nations. Another poll by NBC/Wall Street Journal 
that began the day after Bush made the announcement showed majority support (58 per cent) for 
sending US troops to Liberia. A CNN/USA Today/Gallup poll taken a month after Bush’s 
announcement, and after US troops had deployed onto Liberian soil, found 61 per cent in favour of US 
troops’ presence in Liberia for peacekeeping. See:  “Humanitarian Military Intervention in Africa,” 
WorldPublicOpinion.org, accessed April 16, 2011, http://www.americans-
world.org/digest/regional_issues/africa/africa4.cfm. 
667 Based on OECD DAC (constant 2008 prices) and UN OCHA FTS data for 2009–10. See: “Liberia 
Overview,” accessed April 16, 2011, 
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Lastly, the new private military industry was essential to Liberia’s 
recovery and future. Liberia’s stability and success is guaranteed by thousands 
of UNMIL peacekeepers who enforce the peace deal and rule of law, but 
serious questions remain regarding the country’s future once the United 
Nations leaves. Liberia’s prospects are uncertain given the government’s 
limited capacity, the dangerous geopolitical neighbourhood it inhabits and the 
many spoilers waiting in the wings. To survive as a state, a government needs a 
monopoly of force to uphold its rule of law and fend off armed threats to its 
existence. In Liberia, however, the United States outsourced this critical task to 
a PMC called DynCorp International––the first time since the era of the 
British East India Company that a sovereign nation hired a private company to 
raise another sovereign nation’s armed forces. 
DynCorp International is an exceptional representative of the new 
private military industry. Founded in 1946 as an aviation support firm, the 
company evolved into a MNC that is traded on the NASDAQ stock exchange 
(ticker symbol: DCP), is bought and sold by large MNCs and small New York 
private equity firms alike and has Wall Street magnates and retired US military 
generals on its board of directors.669 It describes itself as a ‘leading provider of 
specialised, mission-critical professional and support services outsourced by 
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Management. 
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the US military, non-military US governmental agencies and foreign 
governments’.670 
DynCorp International is also massive. With $3.6 billion in revenue for 
2010 and tens of thousands of employees working on every continent save 
Antarctica, DynCorp International dwarfs its nearest PMC competitors, 
Blackwater and Triple Canopy.671 The company is so large that its contracts 
comfortably span and even dominate all three categories of the private military 
industry––private military company, private security company and general 
contractor––with the bulk of its work in the non-violent last category. The 
United States is DynCorp’s best client and accounts for 98 per cent of its 
earnings. The firm claims it has 23,000 employees, but that does not count 
individuals on annual contracts, which comprise the majority of personnel.672 
According to Forbes, a business magazine, the company has some 240,000 
contracted employees in Iraq and Afghanistan alone, outnumbering the troops 
they serve, and has collected approximately $100 billion from the United States 
government on the wars.673 In Liberia, the United States contracted DynCorp 
to demobilise the AFL without causing a coup d’etat and raise a completely 
new military and Ministry of Defence (MOD), which it did.  
                                                
670 DynCorp International, “Form 10-K for DynCorp International Inc,” Annual Report for the period 
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671 Ibid. 
672 Ibid, 14.  
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DynCorp in Liberia is an ideal case to examine the inner workings of 
the modern private military industry, how it alters global outcomes, and how it 
contributes to the emerging neomedieval order. First, as is already mentioned, 
Liberia is a microcosm of neomedievalism, and DynCorp an excellent 
representative of the private military industry; its actions there may portend 
how the industry will behave in a larger neomedieval setting. Second, unlike in 
Iraq or Afghanistan, DynCorp’s operations in Liberia span all three categories 
of the private military industry, allowing an examination of how these firms 
operate at the strategic as well as the tactical level. If a company can raise an 
army in a challenging place like Liberia, then it can undoubtedly deploy that 
army too, as Wallenstein did during the Thirty Years’ War.674 Force generation 
and utilisation will become core services in the future should the private 
military industry expand into a truly free market for force, and the case of 
DynCorp in Liberia illustrates how a PMC might accomplish this. 
Third and more generally, DynCorp International’s involvement in 
Liberia is more telling of the industry’s future than its experiences in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. The effort in Liberia was embedded within a neomedieval 
campaign comprised of many actors––the United Nations, ECOWAS, NGOs, 
MNCs––rather than a massive bilateral effort commanded by a single country. 
Also, Liberia was also a relatively inexpensive program compared to the 
profligate sums of money the United States paid PMCs in Iraq and 
                                                
674 During the Thirty Years’ War, Count Albrecht von Wallenstein raised an army for the Holy Roman 
Emperor Ferdinand II and eventually became the supreme commander of the Habsburg monarchy’s 
armies and the richest man in Europe. 
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Afghanistan, and the US government has grown increasingly wary of granting 
multimillion dollar contracts to military companies with limited oversight 
mechanisms, as evidenced by the creation of SIGIR, SIGAR and the 
Commission on Wartime Contracting.675 Future contracts, whether issued by 
the United States or others, will probably approach the modest budget range 
of Liberia rather than the exorbitant sums of Iraq and Afghanistan.676  
Fourth, Africa is the best venue to examine the future of the private 
military industry. While DynCorp’s role in Liberia does not represent the 
muscular offensive operations of Hawkwood’s White Company or Executive 
Outcomes, it does suggest the next step in the maturation of the modern 
market for force. Additionally it shows what a modern PMC can do––raise an 
army relatively independently––and suggests that is could likely deploy that 
army too, since the skillsets are closely entwined.677 Moreover, with the bubbles 
bursting on the markets in Iraq and Afghanistan, PMCs will seek new 
opportunities to survive and expand, and most of the world’s armed conflicts 
are in Africa. Over the past few years, DynCorp, Triple Canopy, ArmorGroup 
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International, Blackwater, Erinys International, AECOM and others have 
established offices in Africa, and Erik Prince’s post-Blackwater career is 
allegedly as a power broker for firms seeking business opportunities on the 
continent.678 As in the market for force in the Middle Ages, today supply of 
armed force seeks––and potentially creates––demand. 
Lastly, in the spirit of transparency, the author was a program manager 
for DynCorp International in Africa and played a primary role in the design 
and implementation of the company’s Liberia program from its inception in 
2004 until the end of 2006. The private military industry is notoriously opaque, 
and academics, journalists and others are reflexively denied access to data.679 
This lack of information has led to serious misunderstandings regarding the 
private military industry and a sizable gap in the literature on the restoration of 
private international violence compared to the other four components of 
neomedievalism. Only a former industry insider who is not beholden to the 
industry’s interests can reveal its inner machinations. This thesis aspires to help 
fill the gaps in the literature and shed light on the secretive topic of modern 
private armies.  
Historical Roots of the Conflict 
Like Ethiopia, Liberia never knew colonialisation. Freed African-American 
slaves and abolitionists founded it in 1822 with the help of the United States as 
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an outpost for other freed slaves returning from the Americas. The country’s 
name is derived from the Latin word liber, meaning free, and its capital 
Monrovia was named in honour of US president James Monroe, who held 
office at the country’s founding and supported its creation. Liberia’s red, white 
and blue flag is modelled on the US flag and its currency is the Liberian dollar. 
The country was an eager and willing US ally during World War II and the 
Cold War. 
 Growing from an outpost to a commonwealth, Liberia achieved 
statehood in 1847 with the ratification of a constitution drafted at Harvard 
University. However, problems loomed. Few of the freed slaves who found 
new beginnings in Liberia were from that region of Africa, and they proceeded 
to treat local tribes in ways comparable to their own treatment in the Americas. 
Soon a rift developed between descendants of the freed slaves, known as 
Americo-Liberians, and the fourteen or so indigenous tribes. This evolved into 
a hierarchical caste system with four distinct classes. At the top were the elites: 
Americo-Liberian officials of mixed black and white ancestry with light skin 
(also known as mulattos). Second were darker-skinned Americo-Liberians, 
consisting mostly of labourers and small farmers. Third were the ‘recaptives’ or 
‘Congos’, African captives on US-bound slave ships who were rescued by the 
US Navy and brought to Liberia. At the bottom of the hierarchy were the 
indigenous Liberians.680 The first three classes––comprising less than 3 per cent 
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of the population––retained absolute political control, enjoyed a monopoly of 
social privilege and benefitted substantially from the unequal distribution of 
power and wealth within the country. This tyranny of the elites went unabated 
until 1980, when a coup d’etat irrevocably altered the national landscape.  
End of Americo-Liberian Rule 
The 1970s marked the beginning of the end for the elites’ 125-year rule. In 
1971, William Tubman, Liberia’s president for twenty-seven years, died while 
in office. His Open Door economic policy had proven a boon for Liberia, 
giving it the largest mercantile fleet and rubber industry in the world. The 
country also became the third-largest exporter of iron ore globally and received 
over $1 billion in foreign investment. Few, however, enjoyed the benefits, as 
the prospering Americo-Liberians tended not to share the wealth. This further 
widened the rift between the elites and the rest of the population, setting the 
conditions for revolt.  
 Tubman’s vice president and successor, William Tolbert, attempted to 
ward off the crash course the country was on, but his own Americo-Liberian 
roots combined with the ensconced system of political and social elitism 
hindered his efforts. Adversaries almost immediately accused him of nepotism 
and cronyism. However, he also began to liberalise Liberia by introducing 
reforms to allow more indigenous Liberians in government and creating the 
first opposition party in the nation’s history, the Progressive Alliance of 
Liberia, to run against the Americo-Liberians’ old True Whig Party. Though 
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re-elected in 1975, his government was criticised sharply for failing to address 
the deep economic disparities between the Americo-Liberians and the rest of 
the population. Social unrest began to swell as the majority felt change was 
occurring too slowly while power-wielding Americo-Liberians felt it was too 
rapid. 
 Tensions came to a head in 1979. In April of that year, Tolbert’s 
administration proposed to raise the price of government-subsidised rice by 50 
per cent, claiming it would promote more local farming, slow the rate of urban 
migration and reduce dependence on imported rice. Opposition leaders 
claimed the measure was meant only to benefit the Tolbert family, which 
controlled the rice monopoly in Liberia. Hundreds of people marched through 
Monrovia, protesting the sharp rise in the price of rice. Tolbert ordered troops 
to fire on the demonstrators, killing some seventy people. So-called rice riots 
soon spread throughout Liberia and government attempts to quash them by 
arresting the opposition leaders failed. Tolbert’s credibility was dealt a mortal 
blow and the situation within Liberia continued to decay.  
 On 12 April 1980, AFL Master Sergeant Samuel Doe, an ethnic Krahn, 
led a coup d’etat, ending the 133-year monopoly of power that the Americo-
Liberians’ True Whig Party had enjoyed. The coup gained immediate popular 
acceptance and Doe adopted the revolutionary slogan that ‘in the cause of the 
people, the struggle continues’. Doe personally disembowelled Tolbert in his 
bed and then ordered the public execution of thirteen top-ranking ministers 
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and members of the Tolbert family. They were tied to poles on South Beach in 
Monrovia and shot to death. Many ranking government ministers who 
survived were tried, tortured and paraded naked through downtown Monrovia. 
African countries, allies and trading partners widely condemned the coup; a 
flight of capital and the elites soon ensued, including future president Ellen 
Johnson-Sirleaf.  
1980–89: The Reign of Samuel Doe 
Following the coup, Doe suspended the constitution and established the 
People’s Redemption Council (PRC) with full powers, consisting of seventeen 
enlisted men headed by Doe. The PRC imposed a price freeze on all 
commodities, including imported foods, and doubled the salaries of civil 
servants and military personnel. Doe lacked formal education and by many 
accounts he was illiterate when he assumed the presidency. After only one 
year, he executed five PRC members, including his vice head of state and coup 
comrade Thomas Weh-Syen, claiming they had plotted against him. As he 
grew increasingly paranoid regarding threats to his leadership, he placed 
members of his own Krahn ethnic group in key positions. Soon the Krahn 
dominated the government, and as Africa expert Peter Pham notes, ‘the new 
regime turned increasingly brutal and proved even less popular than its 
predecessors’.681 Doe’s inner circle became as disillusioned with the autocratic 
regime as the general population did. In November 1983, three prominent 
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members of the PRC left Liberia: Thomas Quiwonkpa, who was the AFL’s 
commanding general; Prince Yormie Johnson, Quiwonkpa’s aide; and Charles 
Taylor, the head of the General Service Agency. All would eventually challenge 
Doe.  
 Doe further solidified control by holding elections in 1985, which were 
characterised by widespread fraud. Before the election, more than fifty of 
Doe’s opponents were murdered and most of the elected opposition 
candidates refused to take their seats. Liberia’s political situation continued to 
erode with increased human rights abuses, corruption and ethnic tensions. On 
12 November 1985, Quiwonkpa staged a coup with an estimated 500 to 600 
people from neighbouring Sierra Leone; the AFL killed them all and 
Quiwonkpa’s body was dragged through Monrovia’s streets. The Krahn-
dominated AFL then retaliated against the ethnic groups in Quiwonkpa’s 
native Nimba County, causing widespread loss of life within the Gio and 
Mano communities.  
 Despite Doe’s poor human rights record and dubious democratic 
credentials, his regime enjoyed considerable US financial and political support. 
Washington considered Monrovia an important strategic ally during the Cold 
War, and from 1981 to 1985 the United States gave Liberia $402 million in aid, 
more than Liberia had ever received before and more financial aid per capita 
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than any other sub-Saharan country received during the 1980s.682 Doe even 
met with President Ronald Reagan twice, and some have speculated that the 
US endorsement of the 1985 election results––despite international and 
domestic observers’ reports that it was compromised––may have led Doe to 
declare an unchallenged victory over his closest rival, Jackson F. Doe, whom 
many believed, and still maintain, was the true winner.683  
1989–2003: The Reign of Charles Taylor  
On Christmas Eve 1989, Charles Taylor and approximately 100 fighters, some 
trained in Libya, invaded Liberia from neighbouring Côte d’Ivoire. Named the 
National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), this rebel incursion initially 
enjoyed popular support within Nimba County, which had endured the 
majority of Samuel Doe’s wrath after the 1985 attempted coup. Within six 
months, Taylor’s forces reached the outskirts of Monrovia, but were stopped 
by AFL counter-attacks. 
A bloody civil war ensued, claiming hundreds of thousands of lives and 
displacing a million people in a country of only four million. The human toll of 
the fourteen-year war (1989–2003) is estimated at 270,000 dead, 320,000 long-
term internally displaced people and 75,000 refugees in neighbouring 
countries. Almost everybody in Liberia was touched by the war: a recent poll 
shows that 96 per cent of respondents had some direct experience of the 
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conflict, and of these, a shocking 90 per cent were at one point or another 
displaced from their homes.684 The situation was so dire that ECOWAS, a 
regional international organisation, intervened in 1990 under the premise of a 
cease-fire and peace deal, albeit without the NPFL. ECOWAS’s peacekeeping 
force, the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group 
(ECOMOG), prevented the NPFL from entering Monrovia. However, the 
NPFL also ravaged the Krahn and Mandingo areas of Liberia, with widespread 
atrocities reported. Although reports vary, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf was 
apparently affiliated with Charles Taylor’s movement.685 
 In July 1990, the NPLF splintered. Prince Johnson formed the 
Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL), which captured and 
killed Doe on 9 September 1990, torturing him on Monrovia’s beach. AFL 
soldiers fled to Sierra Leone and founded the new insurgent United Liberation 
Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO). Soon after, an Interim 
Government of National Unity (IGNU), with Amos C. Sawyer as its president, 
was formed in Gambia with ECOWAS support. However, Taylor did not 
recognise the IGNU and the fighting continued. By 1995, Liberia’s civil war 
had grown to involve seven major factions, including the AFL, which acted as 
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an armed political organ rather than a professional military. These seven 
factions joined to form the Liberian Council of State, in accordance with the 
1995 Abuja Peace Accords. However, fighting still continued and 1996 saw 
some of the war’s deadliest battles.  
 Taylor finally agreed to a peace deal after more than a dozen peace 
accords and the exhaustion of his military power. A five-man transitional 
government was established and warring factions were hastily disarmed and 
demobilised in advance of special elections, held on 19 July 1997. Taylor and 
his National Patriotic Party emerged victorious. Taylor himself won the 
election by a large majority, gaining 75 per cent of the vote primarily because 
Liberians feared a return to war if Taylor lost. However, peace in Liberia did 
not last long. Taylor’s government did nothing to improve the lives of 
Liberians: unemployment and illiteracy stood above 75 per cent, little 
investment was made in the country’s infrastructure, reconciliation between 
factions was largely ignored and rule of law was eclipsed by a patronage system 
that recognised Taylor as its supreme authority.  
Taylor’s actions not only exacerbated Liberia’s intractable civil war; 
they helped foment civil war in Sierra Leone. Taylor backed the Revolutionary 
United Front (RUF), a Sierra Leonean rebel group, and reportedly directed 
RUF operations from Liberia. He is accused of selling them weapons in 
exchange for diamonds, which they typically extracted with slave labour and 
under threat of maiming or death; hence the term blood diamonds. Owing to the 
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UN embargo against arms sales to Liberia at the time, the weapons were 
purchased largely on the black market through arms smugglers such as Viktor 
Bout.686 Taylor is also charged with aiding and abetting RUF atrocities against 
civilians and assisting in the recruitment of child soldiers. Like Liberia’s war, 
Sierra Leone’s civil war was total. More than 200,000 of the country’s 2.6 
million people were killed. Approximately 800,000 were internally displaced 
and another 700,000 sought refuge in neighbouring countries. The fighting 
destroyed much of the country’s infrastructure, including water and electricity. 
Sierra Leone’s war also left it a ward of the international community under the 
protection of the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), which had a 
Chapter VII mandate. The United Nations declared UNAMSIL’s mission 
complete in 2005, although the country remains precariously fragile. 
 Taylor’s misrule at home led to the resumption of armed rebellion 
among his former adversaries. LURD formed in 1999 and engaged in sporadic 
fighting with the AFL in northern Lofa County, which borders Guinea; it was 
headed by Sekou Conneh, a businessman married to the daughter of Guinean 
president Lansana Conté. By 2000, it was believed that LURD controlled 
nearly 80 per cent of the countryside. Throughout the fighting both the AFL 
and LURD were accused of widespread human rights violations as well as 
child soldier recruitment. In 2003, MODEL formed as an offshoot of LURD 
in Côte d’Ivoire and enjoyed support in the southeastern counties of Grand 
Gedeh, Sinoe and Grand Kru. By the spring of 2003, LURD and MODEL 
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had advanced to the outskirts of Monrovia, and intense fighting took place in 
and around the city. Thus began the siege of Monrovia. 
 With fighting escalating, Taylor agreed to participate in an ECOWAS-
sponsored peace summit in Ghana between the government of Liberia, civil 
society and the LURD and MODEL rebel groups. In the hope that Taylor’s 
Ghanaian hosts would arrest him, the chief prosecutor of the UN-supported 
Special Court for Sierra Leone issued a press statement announcing the 
opening of a sealed March 7, 2003 indictment of Taylor for ‘bearing the 
greatest responsibility’ for atrocities in Sierra Leone since November 1996.687 
Reportedly caught by surprise and unwilling to arrest Taylor, Ghana refused to 
detain him. Within hours Taylor returned to Monrovia, where the fighting 
continued and intensified, creating a massive humanitarian disaster. Rebels 
indiscriminately fired mortars into downtown Monrovia and the bodies of the 
innocent began to pile up.   
Blaney requested military assistance, and in response, the US military 
established the Joint Task Force Liberia, comprised of three Navy ships and 
2,300 troops of the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit. This force positioned 
itself off the West African coast and sent a small number of Marines to protect 
the embassy, which had come under attack. At this point, the rebels were on 
the mainland trying to cross the bridges to inner-city Monrovia, which Taylor’s 
forces heavily defended. During one of these firefights Blaney walked onto the 
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Leone - The Office of the Prosecutor, March 8, 2003. 
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middle of a bridge and demanded both sides stop fighting. Amazingly they 
did.688  
 Finally on 11 August 2003, under intense international pressure, Taylor 
accepted an ECOWAS-brokered peace deal that offered him asylum in 
Nigeria. LURD, MODEL and the Government of Liberia signed a 
comprehensive peace agreement in Accra, Ghana, on 18 August 2003, known 
as the Accra Accords. This paved the way for the deployment of what became 
a 3,600-strong ECOWAS peacekeeping mission in Liberia––ECOMIL––and 
also established a two-year National Transitional Government of Liberia 
(NTGL), headed by Liberian businessman Gyude Bryant.  
The UN Takes Charge 
The United Nations took over security duties in October 2003, subsuming 
ECOMIL into UNMIL, which was authorised 15,000 UN blue-helmet military 
personnel and 1,115 police officers, making it the world’s largest UN 
peacekeeping mission at the time. UNMIL’s mission as established by Security 
Council Resolution 1509 and led by Jacques Paul Klein was to monitor the 
ceasefire agreement, but it rapidly evolved into rebuilding the country. In 
terms of priorities, everything was urgent in Liberia: security, humanitarian 
relief, good governance, economic stabilisation, democratisation and 
development. The NTGL nominally led Liberia as the United Nations 
                                                
688 “U.S. Ambassador to Liberia Urges Rebels to Leave Capital,” The New York Times, July 28, 2003. 
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prepared the country for elections in 2005, though many regarded the NTGL 
as a kleptocracy.689 
The 2005 elections are considered the most free, fair and peaceful 
elections in Liberia’s history. The 11 October 2005 presidential and legislative 
elections and subsequent 8 November 2005 presidential run-off saw the 
victory of Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, former World Bank official and human rights 
advocate, over George Weah, an international football star and former United 
Nations Children’s Fund goodwill ambassador. Inaugurated in January 2006, 
President Johnson-Sirleaf, nicknamed the Iron Lady, is Africa’s first 
democratically elected female president. Her government of technocrats draws 
from Liberia’s many ethnic groups and also includes members of the Liberian 
diaspora––that is, those who had fled the country earlier. In March 2006, her 
reversal of an earlier position led to Charles Taylor being turned over to the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone.  
 The country has remained remarkably stable since the 2005 elections and 
may even serve as a model of post-conflict stability in a neomedieval world. As 
Blaney and Klein observed in 2010, ‘the country’s future may not yet be 
secure, and much progress has yet to be made, but most of those present in 
the immediate aftermath of the war in 2003 would agree that today’s Liberia is 
                                                
689 On February 27, 2007, Bryant was charged with embezzlement. His government is alleged to have 
stolen at least $1 million at a time when the annual gross national income per capita was $116 (2011 
US$). See: Winter, “Africa - New Front in Drugs War.” Data from: “Liberia,” United Nations Statistics 
Division, accessed April 2, 2011, http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crName=Liberia. 
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a comparative miracle’. 690  Johnson-Sirleaf has pursued an ambitious 
reconstruction agenda aimed at political stability and economic recovery, 
emphasising job creation, education, attracting investment and infrastructure 
repair, as well as restoration of public services, security sector reform and a 
‘government of inclusion’. She has bolstered public trust by taking a strong 
stand against corruption, which is endemic in Liberia’s political system. She has 
dismissed several government officials, including much of the Ministry of 
Finance, and supported experienced and technically competent senior officials. 
Her World Bank background has allowed her to forge strong relations with the 
international community and donor nations, which is crucial given Liberia’s 
dependence on foreign aid.  
 Yet political conditions in Liberia are still perilous, as the roots of 
conflict have not been fully addressed, institutions are weak, development is 
still taking hold, the region of West Africa is unstable and violence as a 
political solution is a precedent that cannot be ignored. To date the United 
Nations ultimately guarantees Liberia’s security, and grave concerns remain 
about the country’s future once it departs.  
Establishing a State’s Monopoly of Force 
Before we examine DynCorp International’s role in Liberia, we must first 
understand what it was hired to do: safely demobilise the old army and raise a 
                                                
690 John Blaney, et al., “Wider Lessons for Peacebuilding: Security Sector Reform in Liberia,” Policy 
Analysis Brief (Iowa: The Stanley Foundation, 2010). 
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new one. The challenges of this are daunting because armed groups are the de 
facto institutions of power in conflict-affected countries. Any attempt to alter 
the balance of this power is deeply political. It is also dangerous. Convincing a 
general or warlord to put down his weapons and become a farmer may not be 
welcomed and may even provoke violence. In 2002, the government of 
neighbouring Côte d’Ivoire attempted to demobilise 750 soldiers, who, in 
response, staged a coup leading to a civil war that lasted for several years, 
despite a French and UN armed intervention to maintain peace. 
Technically, whether one is raising an army of 2,000 or 200,000, the 
methods and processes are essentially the same, differing only in scale and 
scope. The two tools needed to acquire the monopoly of force are 
disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) and security sector 
reform (SSR). DDR consolidates the state’s monopoly of force by disbanding 
the competition, such as militias and insurgents, who threaten the country’s 
ability to impose its governance. SSR professionalises and strengthens the 
state’s armed actors so that they can responsibly enforce the law of the land 
and defend it from armed threats. In theory, DDR and SSR work together in 
tandem to help uphold the state’s rule of law and are also gateway capacities, 
since security, law and order are prerequisites of sustainable development. 
However, in practice, DDR and SSR are often difficult and dangerous. In 
Liberia, state forces themselves were complicit in wide-scale atrocities and 
human rights abuses. How exactly does one transform the military from a 
 328 
symbol of terror into an instrument of democracy? How can one make a 
soldier someone a child would run toward for safety rather than away from in 
fear?  
DDR: Outlawing the Competition 
The first step in establishing a state’s monopoly of force is disbanding the 
competition. This means disarming, demobilising and reintegrating combatants 
safely into civil society and enabling them to earn livelihoods through peaceful 
means. DDR is the fulcrum between war and peace. In the short term, those 
who do not find peaceful ways to make a living are likely to return to conflict 
or join gangs; in the long term, disaffected ex-combatants can challenge public 
order and polarise political debate, since they are often easy targets of populist, 
reactionary and extremist movements. To date, the United Nations is the 
leader in developing and implementing DDR, with programs in Burundi, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Sudan, 
Uganda, Afghanistan, Nepal, Solomon Islands and Haiti.691  
As the term implies, DDR is a three-stage process. The first stage 
involves disarming combatants, who report to a safe and secure cantonment 
site within the conflict zone to turn in their small arms, munitions and light 
and heavy weapons. This is usually linked to a broader small arms and light 
weapons counter-proliferation program that documents and destroys the 
                                                
691 The United Nations defines DDR as a process that ‘deals with the post-conflict security problem that 
arises when combatants are left without livelihoods and support networks during the vital period 
stretching from conflict to peace, recovery and development’. See: “UN Integrated DDR Standards 
(IDDRS),” 24, http://www.unddr.org/iddrs/iddrs_guide.php. 
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weapons and munitions. The second stage demobilises and disbands the armed 
non-state groups, formally breaking up command structures and marking their 
official entry into civilian life. Lastly, ex-combatants are reintegrated into civil 
society to prevent another escalation of conflict. This typically is divided into 
two parts: initial rehabilitation and long-term reintegration. Initial rehabilitation 
entails giving ex-combatants short-term support packages and transporting 
them back to their homes to begin their new lives. Long-term reintegration 
involves job training and placement programs, working with communities to 
accept ex-combatants and monitoring progress in the difficult transition to 
civilian life. The overall goal of DDR is to ensure permanent demobilisation 
and sustainable peace.  
DDR is fraught with operational challenges that can quickly backfire, 
possibly fomenting armed conflict. First, combatants often do not relinquish 
their weapons if they do not believe the peacekeeping force can ensure their 
safety. Owing to this, the peacekeeping force must be large enough to 
monopolise force and perceived as credibly neutral by all parties, which is 
tricky in a post-conflict country where distrust is ubiquitous. Second, armed 
groups generally hold back their best fighters and weapons as a hedge against 
others who renege on the peace agreement. This creates a prisoner’s dilemma 
that encourages pre-emptive defections from the peace process, as rebel 
groups fear that rivals will defect first and gain the advantage of surprise in a 
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renewed war.692 Mismanagement of a DDR process––which is easy to do––
creates a classic race to the bottom. 
Third, a combatant group typically disarms only if all combatants 
disarm; otherwise the disarmed are vulnerable to the armed, who may seek 
reprisal or gain against their defenceless enemies. Although simple in theory, 
simultaneously disarming tens of thousands of combatants in a highly chaotic 
and dangerous failed state with little logistical infrastructure and much 
unresolved bad blood is thorny in practice. Fourth, the victims of violence may 
not welcome DDR, as they may question why the worst actors in the war are 
rewarded with money and jobs while the innocent get little or nothing––even 
if failing to transition combatants to civilian life almost guarantees more 
violence and victims.  
Lastly, a DDR process requires a reliable funding source. A program 
that runs out of money halfway through can be worse than no program at all, 
since a temporary or premature shut-down may provoke an attack by the 
armed on the unarmed or encourage ex-combatants to take up the gun again 
to make a living. Also, ex-combatants who are denied benefits might seek 
reprisals against DDR staff. Unfortunately, it is difficult to forecast DDR 
funding needs in conflicts like that in Liberia, where nearly everyone is a 
perpetrator of violence, a victim, or both. Owing to this, many DDR programs 
                                                
692 The prisoner’s dilemma is a fundamental problem in game theory that demonstrates why two people 
might not cooperate even though it is in both their best interests to do so. 
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prioritise the DD to get the guns and gangs off the streets but leave the R to 
wither.  
The problem of the forgotten R––that is, not fully reintegrating ex-
combatants into society––involves them turning rogue again, perpetuating the 
cycle of violence as they earn a living or gain status through violent crime. This 
manifests itself most visibly in criminal gangs, which often form from 
demobilised groups and can terrorise the population, hinder peace efforts, and 
challenge the new police and army’s legitimacy. Worse, unlike combatant 
groups, gangs cannot undergo DDR because they are a law enforcement 
problem and must be arrested, tried and incarcerated within the criminal 
justice system.693 In a failed state this adds a layer of complexity to an already 
complex situation. 
In Liberia, the United Nations and United States shared DDR 
responsibilities. The United Nations conducted the bulk of DDR as it 
disarmed the entire country and demobilised and reintegrated non-state armed 
actors, such as LURD and MODEL, as well as Liberian law enforcement. The 
United States, through DynCorp International, demobilised and reintegrated 
the AFL, which will be discussed below. According to the United Nations, it 
disarmed and demobilised 101,495 combatants and received 28,314 weapons 
and 6,486,136 rounds of small arms. Despite these numbers, the United 
Nations suffered setbacks, which is not surprising given the plethora of 
                                                
693 For more information on this problem, see: Michael J. Dziedzic, et al., Haiti: Confronting the Gangs of 
Port-Au-Prince (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2008). 
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problems associated with DDR in failed states. There was a great deal of 
corruption and fraud regarding qualification for DDR benefits, resulting in 
incredibly high numbers of ex-combatants; many observers believe the number 
of actual combatants was closer to 38,000.694  
Detractors also argue that UNMIL began its program prematurely, in 
December 2003, before sufficient peacekeepers were on the ground to 
guarantee security. Serious riots erupted at the start of the program at Camp 
Schefflin, a DDR site just outside of Monrovia, and it was shut down. The 
riots were a planned attempt to disrupt UN efforts and create instability, 
largely to increase monetary profits for warring factions, and would have 
happened whenever the DDR program began.695 Four months later, however, 
the program resumed without incident, and remains one of the most 
comprehensive programs of its kind.   
SSR: Acquiring the Monopoly of Force 
Working in tandem with DDR, SSR institutes the monopoly of force within a 
territory and enables the authority––government or otherwise––to enforce its 
rule of law.696 Like DDR, it is deeply political and does not easily move from 
                                                
694 The number of demobilized fighters (101,495) is debatably high. During the 2003 CPA talks with 
LURD and MODEL faction leaders, the number of combatants, including the AFL, had been put at 
approximately 38,000. Furthermore, less than 30,000 weapons were submitted and the majority of DDR 
recipients qualified through the submission of ammunitions. Lastly, Liberians reported widespread fraud 
was committed during the DDR process. Source for numbers: UNMIL, Disarmament, Demobilisation, 
Reintegration And Rehabilitation. For discussion of Liberia DDR, see: Josef Teboho Ansorge and Nana 
Akua Antwi-Ansorge, “Monopoly, Legitimacy, Force: DDR-SSR Liberia,” in The Monopoly of Force, ed. 
Melanne Civic and Michael Miklaucic (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 2011), 265-284. 
695 Blaney, et al., “Wider Lessons for Peacebuilding,” 5. 
696 ‘Security sector reform’ has many names: security and justice reform, security sector governance, 
security sector development, security force assistance, foreign internal defence, security sector [or system] 
transformation, etc. While recognizing that these terms may connote subtle differences in 
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theory to practice. Program failure risks coup d’etat, war or worse. Security in 
this context means protecting citizens and the state from threats that endanger 
normal life, public safety and survival. The security sector is generally 
comprised of public organisations and government agencies with the primary 
mission of providing security. SSR seeks to transform these organisations and 
institutions into professional, effective, legitimate, apolitical and accountable 
actors that support the rule of law.697   
SSR involves more than train-and-equip programs, which, though 
necessary, only create better-dressed soldiers who shoot straighter. More 
comprehensively, SSR should encompass creating new institutions, facilitating 
force structure698 decisions, formulating national security strategy and doctrine, 
recruiting and vetting new forces, constructing military bases and road 
infrastructure, selecting leadership, establishing oversight mechanisms within 
ministries and parliament and many other complex tasks that go well beyond 
simply training and equipping troops.  
                                                                                                                       
conceptualization and the word ‘reform’ is problematic for some, this thesis will assume the term security 
sector reform is generic and all-encompassing. Furthermore, it is the term adopted by the US State 
Department and DynCorp International in Liberia. 
697 Although SSR seeks to uphold the rule of law, it should not be confused with justice sector reform 
(JSR). The programs are interdependent but entail distinctly separate tasks. A SSR program should not 
attempt to rewrite a country’s constitution or laws, address past human rights abuses and crimes against 
humanity or attempt to integrate indigenous systems of justice with international norms. Nor should a 
JSR program attempt to recruit and train military and police forces, determine weaponry and 
organisational structure of security forces or draft the national security strategy. Such attempts would 
likely result in failure owing to a mismatch of expertise and functions. 
That said, an SSR program operating without a corresponding JSR program will likely be unsuccessful. 
Without legitimate laws to enforce, police legitimacy suffers; officers can end up being stooges for a 
corrupt legal system. Similarly, JSR program operating without a commensurate SSR effort will probably 
fail because criminal justice systems require professional police, prisons, customs and other instruments 
of law enforcement. SSR and JSR rise and fall together: though operationally distinct, they should be 
conceptually integrated.  
698 In military parlance, a ‘force structure’ is the organisation and hierarchy of units within an army, from 
the general staff down to the basic infantry squad. It is similar to a massive organisational chart for an 
army, and it outlines how military personnel, weapons and equipment are organised for the operations. 
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There are three types of actors in the security sector. Operational 
actors interact directly with the public on security matters and may include law 
enforcement, military and paramilitary forces, border control, customs, 
immigration, coast guard and intelligence services. Institutional actors manage 
the policy, programs, resources and general administration of operational 
actors and may include ministries of defence, interior and justice. Oversight 
bodies monitor and supervise the security sector; they are ideally civilian led, 
democratically accountable to citizens and able to ensure that the security 
sector serves the people and not vice versa. Oversight bodies may include the 
executive, legislative and judicial branches of government as well as municipal 
and district authorities. One may conceptualise the security sector as a pyramid 
of actors (seeFigure 9. Not included in the security sector are non-statutory 
security forces––that is, liberation armies, armed criminal gangs, guerrilla 
forces, PMCs, insurgents and political party militias.  
Figure 9: Taxonomy of the Security Sector  
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 The three types of actors can, in turn, be grouped into security sub-
sectors, distinguished from one another by unique objectives, technical 
knowledge, capabilities, best practices, institutional culture and professional 
ethos. Sub-sectors can overlap and vary widely among countries and regimes. 
But the idea is useful for understanding the security sector in any given country 
or governed area. Taken together, the hierarchy of actors and security sub-
sectors form a matrix of the security sector (see Table 2). 
Table 2: Conceptual Framework of the Security Sector699 
Security Sub-
Sector 
Operational Actors Institutional 
Actors 
Oversight 
Actors 
Military 
Military, civil defence 
forces, national 
guards, militias, 
paramilitary 
Ministry of Defence Executive, Legislative, Parliament 
Law 
Enforcement 
Police, gendarmerie, 
prison, criminal 
justice, presidential 
guard 
Ministry of Interior, 
Ministry of Justice Executive, Legislative, 
Parliament, Judiciary, 
Municipal and District 
Governments and 
Councils Border 
Management 
Border control, 
immigration, coast 
guard, customs 
authorities 
Ministry of Interior, 
Ministry of Defence 
Foreign 
Relations 
Embassies, attachés 
and security liaison 
officers 
Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Ministry of 
Defence Executive, Legislative, 
Parliament  
Intelligence Collection assets Intelligence agencies 
As the matrix suggests, building sub-sector capacity and 
professionalising actors make SSR a fundamentally complex effort, and 
creating a truly successful program remains a major unmet challenge for the 
                                                
699 This table serves only as an example, as every security sector is unique, although most have a military, 
police and other elements. 
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international community, despite the growing prevalence of peacekeeping 
missions and nation building around the world.700 There is no practicable 
doctrine, best practice or even common terminology.701 The concept itself has 
no commonly accepted definition and has many names: security and justice 
reform, security sector governance, security sector development, security force 
assistance, foreign internal defence, security system transformation. 702  As 
efforts to re-establish the security sectors in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere 
                                                
700 This is largely due to a gap between theory and practice. SSR theory is generally conceived by 
academics, human rights lawyers and international development specialists who produce normative SSR 
frameworks espousing human rights, democracy and sometimes a near-utopian endstate for the world’s 
most dangerous places. To achieve this SSR vision, the United Nations, donor states and a pantheon of 
global actors involved in SSR must work together in a holistic and seamless manner, and will require, as 
Mark Sedra explains, ‘a radical change in the modus operandi of donor states in how they provide 
assistance’ (17). For examples of this SSR approach, see: Mark Sedra, ed. The Future of Security Sector 
Reform (Waterloo, Canada: The Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2010), and its authors; 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and Development Assistance Committee, et 
al., The OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice (OECD, 2007).. Such 
a vision is impracticable. Absent from this idealisation are the voices of practitioners, such as military 
professionals, who are often too busy in the field to attend academic conferences on SSR. Unfortunately, 
they tend to treat SSR as a train-and-equip exercise and ignore its other vital roles, which is equally 
untenable, as demonstrated by US efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. See: “Joint Publication (JP) 3-07.1: 
Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID),” April 30, 2004, 
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA434396&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf.; U.S. 
Army and U.S. Marine Corps, FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5: Counterinsurgency, chapter 6.; U.S. Army, FM 3-
07.1: Security Force Assistance (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2009). Owing to 
this, some theorists have challenged the orthodox theory of SSR and advocate for pragmatic SSR that 
deals with discrete elements of the security sector, occupying a middle ground between the sweeping all-
or-nothing approach of academic idealists and the narrow train-and-equip thinking of practitioners. See: 
Eric Scheye, “Realism and Pragmatism in Security Sector Development,” (Paris: OECD, 2010). 
701 Attempts have been made to formalise and operationalize SSR best practices but serious problems 
persist. For one, SSR is a complex process that requires the close integration of security and development 
organisations, yet most attempts to conceive SSR are conducted by either security or development 
agencies but not both. The result is conceptual incoherence. Security organisations tend to fold SSR into 
combat doctrine under the nebulous rubric of stability operations. For example, the US Army devotes 
but a single chapter to this complex topic in both Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency, and Field Manual 
3-07, Stability Operations, and only discusses abstract principles of SSR rather than operationalising the idea, 
which is the singular purpose of military field manuals. See: U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps, FM 3-24: 
Counterinsurgency.; FM 3-07: Stability Operations. Similarly, development agencies tend to propagate legalistic 
and donor-oriented methods, focusing on standards and norms rather than advancing concrete methods 
or strategies for conducting SSR on the ground. See, e.g.: OECD, et al. The OECD DAC Handbook on 
Security System Reform. To date, neither the United Nations nor any other international organisation, NGO 
or country has developed a comprehensive approach to SSR capable of being operationalised. 
702 There are many reasons for this theoretical dissonance, including: SSR’s recent development as a post-
Cold War concept; difficulty in safely implementing SSR programs; and coordination challenges between 
security and development implementing organizations––which typically do not integrate well––since SSR 
straddles the security-development nexus. 
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illustrate, few practical models for SSR have been developed, perpetuating 
cycles of violence in fragile states and prolonging costly peacekeeping 
missions.   
 In Liberia, the Accra Accords specifically mandate SSR (see Part 4 of 
the accords in Annex A).703 In sharing responsibilities for the process, UNMIL 
assumed the restructuring of civilian elements of the security sector and the 
United States the transformation of the military sub-sector, owing to its 
historical ties to Liberia and especially its defence. The US Navy guaranteed 
security during the nineteenth century; the United States oversaw the creation 
of the Liberian Frontier Force in 1908, used Liberia as a strategic logistical 
supply node for the North Africa campaign of World War II, and gave 
substantial military aid to Liberia during the Cold War. Also, as an internal 
State Department document explained, the ‘international community expects 
the US to take the lead in this endeavour. No other country will do so’.704 The 
crucial task of rebuilding Liberia’s military was outsourced to DynCorp 
International, which worked in parallel with the United Nations but not under 
it. Contracting the wholesale reconstitution of a nation’s armed forces to a 
private firm had not been attempted since the early nineteenth century, and 
remains one of the most controversial facets of Liberia’s recovery. 
                                                
703 “Part Four: Security Sector Reform, Article VII Disbandment of Irregular Forces, Reforming And 
Restructuring of the Liberian Armed Forces,” in “Comprehensive Peace Agreement Between the 
Government of Liberia and the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and the 
Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) and Political Parties.”  
704 “USG Pre-Assessment Trip to Liberia on Security Sector Reform,” US State Department, January 
2004. 
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Decision to Outsource 
The US government did not originally intend to outsource the making of 
Liberia’s military; necessity drove the decision. The client was the US 
Department of State (State Department) since it was responsible for managing 
the US commitments to Liberia as agreed to at Accra, including SSR for the 
AFL. To this end, State Department organised a five-person SSR pre-
assessment trip, made from 21 to 29 January 2004, with members from the 
State Department and DOD. The purpose was to better understand the 
general requirements for Liberia’s military SSR in advance of a fuller 
assessment. After meeting with UN Chief Klein, US Ambassador Blaney, 
Liberian Chairman Bryant (the title ‘President’ was deemed inappropriate for a 
interim head of government) and leaders of the AFL, LURD, MODEL and 
others concluded that Liberia needed ‘a small, mobile defence force to provide 
border, coastal and internal security to support their mission’ and estimated the 
size of the military should be from 3,000 to 6,500 personnel.  
The pre-assessment team also observed UK efforts to rebuild the 
military of neighbouring Sierra Leone and determined not to use the British 
model of SSR, concluding that ‘while IMATT [UK’s International Military 
Assistance Training Team] was initially viewed as a success story in Sierra 
Leone, the UK now admit to many problems that they have yet to resolve’. 
One of the primary challenges was in incorporating all units into the new 
security forces regardless of experience, capability and the country’s security 
 339 
needs. This created significant problems in the quality control of troops and 
the sheer number of forces, which the government of Sierra Leone could not 
sustain. Lastly, the team considered four options for who should conduct 
implementation: the US military alone, the US military with light contractor 
involvement, a contractor with light US military involvement or a contractor 
alone.705 They would let the upcoming SSR assessment trip combined with 
budget considerations decide the matter. 
 The Liberia SSR assessment trip followed on 19 to 26 May and 
included some twenty experts drawn from the State Department, the DOD’s 
European Command (EUCOM, the unified command responsible for West 
Africa at the time) and three companies: DynCorp, Pacific Architects and 
Engineers (PAE) and MPRI.706 The purpose of this evaluation mission––
during which one of the DOD civilian staff members was murdered––was to 
determine the operational requirements for SSR of the AFL and Ministry of 
Defence.707 At the conclusion of the trip the team proposed to the US embassy 
a restructured AFL, which it called the New Armed Forces of Liberia (NAFL). 
The NAFL’s mission would be ‘to defend and protect the people of Liberia 
and the sovereignty of the nation against external and internal threats and to 
effectively respond to humanitarian crisis’. To achieve this it would require an 
                                                
705 Offering no US support for Liberia SSR was also considered, but dismissed. “USG Pre-Assessment 
Trip to Liberia on Security Sector Reform,” US State Department, January 2004.  
706 DynCorp International and MRPI are PMCs while PAE is a GC firm; it does primarily construction 
work, specializing in conflict zone operations. PAE personnel do not carry weapons or train others how 
to use them. 
707 Robbers killed John Auffrey, a DOD civilian, in his room at the Mamba Point Hotel, Monrovia, on 
May 23, 2004. At the time, he was the security assistance program administrator at the US Embassy in 
Namibia. 
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armed force of 4,020 personnel, consisting of one light infantry brigade (three 
infantry battalions, one engineer battalion, one base support battalion), one 
maritime patrol battalion, one aerial reconnaissance company, one military 
police company, an AFL headquarters company and a military band.708  
However, other than the NAFL’s mission and force structure the team 
completely overlooked many thorny yet essential components of SSR, among 
them DDR for the legacy armed forces, a recruitment plan in a state with 
destroyed infrastructure and low literacy, a vetting plan for personnel in a 
country where war crimes were rampant and background checks nearly 
impossible, the restructuring of the Ministry of Defence, leadership selection, a 
national military strategy, fostering local ownership and the domestic political 
ramifications of making a new military. There was no consideration for how 
Liberia’s population would receive the re-creation of the military; many would 
not welcome it, given the AFL’s troubled past, and the Accra Accords 
mandated that this be addressed. On 10 June DynCorp submitted its own 
seventy-eight page assessment of SSR for the AFL to the State Department 
that addressed most of these concerns. 
Following the assessment mission, the DOD quickly concluded it 
could not conduct the SSR program due to resource constraints and ongoing 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.709 Consequently the State Department was 
                                                
708 “New Armed Forces of Liberia Force Opt Working Brief” (paper presented at the SSR Assessment 
Mission, Monrovia, 2004). 
709 It may also have something to do with the DOD’s general aversion to all things African following the 
1993 Somalia disaster. 
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left with a Hobson’s choice: either outsource the entire SSR program to the 
private sector or have no SSR for the AFL. The State Department chose the 
former and made history without meaning to.  
The Contracting Process 
During the summer of 2004 the State Department tendered a request for 
proposal (RFP) to the private sector to rebuild Liberia’s armed forces. In the 
US government’s contracting system, a RFP is an invitation to bid on a 
contract, and bids generally consist of two parts: a technical proposal and a 
cost proposal. The technical proposal explains the company’s plan to achieve 
the objectives outlined in the RFP and the cost proposal estimates in detail––
from airplanes to pencils––the estimated cost in time, material and labour 
needed to fulfill the contract. Typically firms dedicate considerable, non-
reimbursable resources to crafting detailed proposals and submitting them on 
time, as the government does not accept late proposals.  
Only two companies, DynCorp and PAE, were allowed to submit bids 
on the RFP for the Liberia SSR contract, as only they had earlier won a five-
year indefinite delivery–indefinite quantity (IDIQ) contract from the State 
Department to support peacekeeping and security efforts in Africa. As the 
name suggests, IDIQ contracts provide for an indefinite quantity of services 
during a fixed period of time; the government uses them when it cannot 
predetermine the precise amount of supplies or services it will need for 
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complex operations, such as peacekeeping. 710  Such a contract does not 
represent a firm order for services, but pre-qualifies companies to bid on 
future contracts that might arise under the scope of the IDIQ contract.711 This 
helps streamline the contract process and speed service delivery, as 
negotiations can be made only with the pre-qualified companies and such 
contracts are exempt from protest.712 Because IDIQs act as large umbrella 
contracts between the United States and the private sector, they are usually 
awarded to multiple firms. For Liberia, those firms were DynCorp and PAE. 
IDIQ contracts work in a relatively uncomplicated way. They stipulate 
a needed range of services over a period of time, starting with a base year 
followed by a number of option years. They also guarantee a minimum and 
maximum amount of money spent on contracts overall. The government 
makes no guarantee regarding the number of sub-contracts it will issue under 
the IDIQ or the actual amount of expenditure above the guaranteed minimum 
value, but companies compete vigorously to obtain an IDIQ because it gives 
them exclusive access to lucrative agreements as a prime contractor to the 
                                                
710 The legal origin of IDIQ contracts comes from the US Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR), 
section 16.501(a). 
711 There are typically three types of contracts that an IDIQ contract authorizes: fixed-price type 
contracts, time-and-materials type contracts and cost-reimbursement type contracts. In a fixed-price 
contract, the price is not subject to adjustment based on costs incurred, which can favourably or 
adversely affect the firm’s profitability depending on its execution in performing the contracted service. 
Fixed-price contracts include firm fixed-price, fixed-price with economic adjustment and fixed-price 
incentive. Time-and-materials type contracts provide for acquiring supplies or services on the basis of 
direct labor hours at fixed hourly/daily rates plus materials at cost. Cost-reimbursement type contracts 
provide for payment of allowable incurred costs, to the extent prescribed in the contract, plus a fixed fee, 
award fee or incentive fee. Award fees or incentive fees are generally based on various objective and 
subjective criteria, such as aircraft mission capability rates and meeting cost targets. 
712 As per Federal Acquisition Regulation’s subpart 33. 
 343 
government rather than as a sub-contractor to another firm acting as the 
prime.  
When the government needs services or supplies that fall under the 
IDIQ it tenders a RFP and a statement of work (SOW), which explains what 
the contract entails, to the pool of pre-selected companies on the IDIQ. 
Orders placed for supplies are called delivery orders; those for services are 
called task orders. Once the RFP is issued for either a delivery or task order, 
the companies on the IDIQ contract bid for the work. Contracts are typically 
awarded under a best-value approach and large orders are usually awarded to 
multiple firms while smaller ones are not. Once the government selects its 
contractors, it issues them a notice to proceed (NTP), which authorises them 
to commence work in exchange for payment. The delivery or task order 
normally requires deliverables from the contractor to the government, such as 
a delivery schedule and reporting requirements, to ensure accountability. 
The IDIQ for Liberia had a five-year period of service, from 1 January 
2003 to 26 May 2008, consisting of one base year and four option years, and 
draws funding from the State Department peacekeeping operations (PKO) 
account (see Annex B for more details). It had a minimum guaranteed 
expenditure of $5 million and a maximum of $100 million, which was later 
expanded to $500 million (see Annex B and C). Although only DynCorp and 
PAE could bid on the contract, MPRI joined PAE on the Liberia assessment 
mission as a sub to PAE, given MPRI’s strong background in raising military 
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forces and PAE’s lack of it. All in all, the costs of training the AFL by 2009 
were an estimated $240.56 million.713  
Purchasing a New Army 
On 17 September 2004, the State Department issued its SOW for rebuilding 
the Liberian military. It was only seven pages long. The objective and scope 
were deceptively simple: assist the government of Liberia in recruiting, training 
and equipping a new military beginning with 2,000 personnel. Consultations 
over the summer among the State Department, DOD, DynCorp and others 
concluded that the AFL should be a 2,000-person, all-volunteer force that 
could be scaled upward over time. It was acknowledged that 2,000 soldiers 
could not defend the entire country should a full-scale war erupt, but the size 
was constrained by the government’s ability to regularly pay soldiers’ salaries, 
as precedent suggested unpaid soldiers were a greater threat to Liberia’s 
security than an invading army was. Klein even suggested that Liberia abolish 
its military altogether, quipping that African armies ‘sit around playing cards 
and plotting coups’.714 
After reviewing both proposals, the State Department decided to 
divide the duties between the two contractors, giving them different roles 
                                                
713 This US government money was mostly drawn from a mix of fiscal years 2004 through 2007 
international disaster and famine assistance, regional peacekeeping and foreign military assistance funds. 
Cook, Liberia’s Post-War Recovery, 6, 18.; Cook, Liberia’s Post-War Development, 22. 
714 Klein suggested that Liberia could make do with a decent police force and a well-trained border 
security force of 600 to 700 men. Actual statement made November 5, 2003. “Liberia: US Hires Private 
Company to Train 4,000-Man Army,” IRIN Africa, February 15, 2005. His opinion may have also been 
informed by UNMIL’s civilian police (CIVPOL) commissioner, Mark Kroeker, who told US State 
Department personnel that Liberia needed a robust police force and not a military. USG Pre-Assessment 
Trip to Liberia on Security Sector Reform,” US State Department, January 2004. 
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based on their expertise. DynCorp would perform the bulk of the SSR at both 
the operational and institutional levels. At the operational level, it would 
rebuild the AFL from the ground up, which entailed the designing, recruiting, 
vetting, training, equipping and fielding of the new force. At the institutional 
level it would also create a new Ministry of Defence and establish systems for 
personnel management, intelligence, force integration and planning, resource 
management, communications, information management, public affairs, 
procurement and acquisition, internal audit and other ministerial functions. 
PAE would build the logistical infrastructure, such as roads and military bases, 
necessary to support the AFL once the SSR was well under way, and also 
provide limited mentorship when the units were in place. Both firms were 
required to construct military bases and other facilities as needed, with State 
Department approval. Absent from the initial plan was the DDR of the legacy 
AFL, which was originally to be conducted by the Liberian government but 
later fell to DynCorp owing to the government’s lack of capacity.  
In short, DynCorp was contracted to raise an army. The company was 
not contracted to perform SSR of the entire Liberian security sector, since 
UNMIL was transforming civilian actors, such as the police, and other entities 
were responsible for security sector governance, the legislature and the 
national security strategy. DynCorp’s work was limited to transforming the 
institutional and operational actors of the military sub-sector.715 The envisioned 
                                                
715 Amazingly, academic treatments of the AFL SSR program tend to overlook this essential fact. For 
example, see: Nicole Ball, “The Evolution of the Security Sector Reform Agenda,” in The Future Of 
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end was as an ethnically balanced, properly vetted, professionally trained, 
civilian led and apolitical military capable of ‘defending the national 
sovereignty and in extremis, respond to natural disasters’, as called for by the 
Accra Accords.716  
DynCorp Goes to Liberia 
Three individuals spearheaded DynCorp’s effort, including the author. Most of 
the first year was dedicated to designing the program, identifying implicit tasks 
and engaging key stakeholders, with the assistance of the US defence attaché 
to Liberia. Stakeholders included the legacy force, former rebels, the host 
government, the international community (those who were in Liberia) and civil 
society. Recent scholarship suggests that DynCorp did little or no outreach to 
Liberians to establish local ownership. This is untrue: DynCorp’s chief 
interlocutor with Liberian civil society was the NTGL itself, primarily through 
the interim minister of defence, Daniel Chea.717  
By July 2005 a vision for the new AFL and Ministry of Defence 
emerged along with guiding principles for its reconstitution. Because the 
program was designed by a MNC and not the US military, DynCorp resisted 
                                                                                                                       
Security Sector Reform, ed. Mark Sedra (Waterloo, Canada: The Centre for International Governance 
Innovation, 2010), 37. 
716 AFL mission statement taken from the CPA: “Comprehensive Peace Agreement Between the 
Government of Liberia and the Liberians United for Reconcilation and Democracy (LURD) and the 
Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) and Political Parties.”, Part Four, Article VII, Para. 2.c. 
717 For example see: Morten Bøås and Karianne Stig, “Security Sector Reform in Liberia: An Uneven 
Partnership Without Local Ownership,” Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 4, no. 3 (2010): 285-303.; 
Adedeji Ebo, “Liberia Case Study: Outsourcing SSR to Foreign Companies,” in No Ownership, No 
Commitment. A Guide to Local Ownership of Security Sector Reform, ed. Laurie Nathan (Birmingham, UK: 
University of Birmingham, 2007).; Mark Malan, “Security Sector Reform in Liberia: Mixed Results From 
Humble Beginnings,” (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2008). 
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the temptation to build a large army in the United States’ own image, as has 
occurred in Afghanistan and Iraq, with mixed results. Instead, the firm sought 
to craft––in partnership with the United States and Liberia––an armed force 
tailored to Liberia’s unique regional needs.   
Owing to the AFL’s troubled legacy during the civil war, it was agreed 
that the old AFL should be completely demobilised and rebuilt to ensure 
systematic human rights vetting of new recruits and also assure the population 
that this really was a new AFL. The new force would by open to all Liberians 
regardless of sex, tribe or religion, and selection and promotion would be 
based on merit rather than cronyism or nepotism. Recruitment would maintain 
a twelfth-grade functional literacy standard and work to achieve a balanced 
ethnic and gender mix within the ranks. All candidates would be vigorously 
vetted for past human rights abuses on an individual basis. Training would 
foster an apolitical professional ethos, especially in the leadership, that 
respected the rule of law, cultivated an ethos of public service and accepted 
civilian control of the military.718 Throughout the DDR and SSR process, 
DynCorp would manage a public sensitisation program crafted mostly by local 
Liberians rather than international media consultants. The concept of human 
security would inform the design and strategy of the AFL, marking one of the 
earliest attempts to operationalise the idea.  
                                                
718 National Transitional Government of Liberia, Executive Order No. 5: Demobilisation and Retirement of 
Soldiers, 2005.; National Transitional Government of Liberia, AFL Restructuring Policy, 2005.; Government 
of Liberia, Liberian National Defense Strategy (Draft), 2006. 
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The force structure of the new AFL and Ministry of Defence was 
designed to be strong enough to repel limited cross-border attacks but not so 
strong as to threaten Liberia’s neighbours. This entailed a small, basic, well-
trained motorised light infantry regiment without heavy or expensive 
weaponry, such as artillery, armour or fighter planes. The plan also proscribed 
the creation of special forces and other secretive, elite units that could easily 
become politicised killing machines, as the former Anti Terrorist Unit, the 
Special Anti Terrorist Unit, the Black Berets, the Special Security Service and 
the Special Operations Division became during the civil war. 
On 17 July 2005, DynCorp proposed an initial force structure and 
table of organisation and equipment (TO&E)––the blueprint for the new 
AFL––to the State Department. A TO&E is a master inventory of all 
personnel and equipment within the military, delineating for each unit the 
exact number, rank, title and military occupational specialty of every individual 
and the name and quantity of each piece of equipment. Several models of the 
AFL and MOD were considered, including ones with agricultural battalions so 
the AFL could source its own food (rejected because it could lead to 
corruption within the ranks) and a robust engineer battalion to help rebuild the 
country and strengthen bonds with the local populace (rejected because it was 
too expensive). 
The initial blueprint presented to and approved by the State 
Department in 2005 called for an AFL of just under 2,000 soldiers, comprising 
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a brigade headquarters company, two light infantry battalions, an engineer 
company, a military police company, a training company, a military band and 
three military personnel. The Ministry of Defence was a lean 100 people and 
all but three were civilians. This blueprint has changed over time, but the 
original concept for the AFL remains. 
Program Progression 
It is impossible to truncate a multi-year, highly complex program––with more 
than a few surprises––into a thesis, and a brief timeline is included in Annex D 
to provide coherence. The original plan anticipated training beginning a few 
months after the NTP, but pre-program consultations and start-up operations 
took longer than expected. Working in a country as sacked and pillaged as 
Liberia is problematic; accomplishing even a straightforward task in a place 
without infrastructure, institutions or social trust is gruelling, like war itself. As 
Clausewitz reminds us, ‘everything in war is simple, but the simplest thing is 
difficult’.719  
Significant surprises beyond DynCorp’s control slowed the program, 
costing the client money, the company time and Liberia its defence. 
Construction was expensive and delayed as many materials had to be 
imported, theft was rampant and concrete did not dry well in the monsoon-
like rainy season from April to September. Building the new training base––
                                                
719 The original State Department plan specifies that training begin within three months of the contract 
award, meaning that basic training would commence in January 2005. In reality, the first basic training 
class started July 2006. Clausewitz, et al., On War, 119. 
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and all training––was suspended for eight months as Liberia, the United States 
and UNMIL debated the base’s location. Finally in July 2006 the former Voice 
of America transmitter site was selected at Careysburg and rechristened the 
Sandee S. Ware Military Barracks.720 DynCorp started construction once the 
occupying UNMIL units moved off site. Another major surprise was the 
NTGL’s inability to safely demobilise the legacy AFL, a duty that fell to 
DynCorp in early 2005.  
The SSR program was originally envisaged as proceeding in several 
steps. In reality the program’s progression was ambiguous and fluid due to 
intervening challenges, though in retrospect, it had three relatively distinct 
phases. During this time, security was provided by UNMIL’s large 
peacekeeping force. Phase I began when the State Department decided to 
outsource the SSR program to the private sector and involved a small team of 
contractors to design the program and meet with stakeholders. Phase II 
commenced on 15 May 2005, when Chairman Bryant signed Executive Order 
Number Five authorising the full demobilisation of the legacy AFL on 30 June 
2005.721 After this, the State Department issued DynCorp an NTP for the 
program in full, and the company began to recruit and train staff (both local 
and international), acquire compounds and equipment for operations, 
construct a customised DDR site outside of Monrovia, demobilise 13,770 
                                                
720 Voice of America (VOA) is the official external broadcast institution of the United States federal 
government. During the Cold War, VOA maintained a large facility in Liberia but was sacked during the 
Liberian Civil War. 
721 National Transitional Government of Liberia, Executive Order No. 5. 
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members of the legacy AFL, plan the public sensitisation campaign regarding 
the AFL’ reconstitution and formulate a systematic recruiting and vetting plan.  
Chief among the challenges of Phase II was demobilising Liberia’s 
standing army peacefully while continuing to maintain security. This included 
determining who was eligible for demobilisation benefits, finding donor 
money to pay for those benefits, trying to prevent fraud and anticipating 
unwelcome public response amid fears that disgruntled demobilised soldiers 
would incite political violence. Building the site on the outskirts of Monrovia 
involved its own challenges: finding competent construction companies, theft 
of materials and significant delays caused by the rainy season.  
Phase III began in January 2006 with the completion of the old force’s 
demobilisation and the start of recruiting the new force. This phase involved a 
national public sensitisation and recruiting campaign, rigorous vetting, creation 
of a basic training or initial entry training (IET) course, and Ministry of 
Defence training. It also required equipping the new force, legally purchasing 
and shipping arms to Liberia from eastern Europe, and building the necessary 
bases. Determining entry standards for recruitment––in the hopes of instilling 
a professional, apolitical ethos that placed service to the country above tribe or 
individual––was problematic. Many Liberians were not sufficiently literate. 
Attracting women to the AFL was difficult because men historically filled the 
ranks. Vetting candidates and selecting leadership was complicated by a lack of 
public records. All AFL policies had to be created while simultaneously 
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transforming the Ministry of Defence, hiring and training all its civilian 
personnel and synchronising its development with that of the larger 
government.  
Phase IV entailed fielding the new force and program termination. 
PAE was responsible for constructing all non-training military facilities, 
settling individual soldiers into units once they left training and providing unit 
mentors. In 2009 Liberia’s two infantry battalions underwent a certification 
exercise modelled on the US Army Readiness Training Evaluation Program 
(ARTEP). The contract ended in 2010 and a team of sixty US Marines begin a 
five-year mentorship program with the AFL called Operation Onward 
Liberty.722 Today the AFL continues its development, transformed from an 
instrument of terror into one of stability. The International Crisis Group, a 
watchdog NGO, assessed that ‘the SSR program, in particular army reform, is 
a provisional success’.723  
Razing an Army: Que Sera Sera  
Eliminating armed competition is important for any mercenary career. In the 
Middle Ages, the condottieri frequently discharged other armies by destroying 
them, so perhaps it is a sign of the times that DynCorp demobilised one 
                                                
722 Although DynCorp was not quite out of Liberia yet. In a new task order (worth $20 million if all 
options were exercised), DynCorp was selected to provide the AFL with operations and maintenance 
services. This task order was awarded under the new five-year State Department IDIQ contract called the 
Africa Peacekeeping Program (AFRICAP), contract solicitation number SAQMMA08R0237. Awardees 
under AFRICAP include DynCorp International, PAE Government Services, AECOM, and Protection 
Strategies Incorporated. 
723 International Crisis Group, Liberia: Uneven Progress in Security Sector Reform, Africa Report no. 148 
(International Crisis Group, 2009), 9.  
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without bloodshed. True, no army stood against DynCorp on the plain of 
battle, but this does not mitigate the fact that few––if any––modern African 
armies have faded away peacefully, as demonstrated by Liberia’s neighbour 
Côte d’Ivoire. Attempts by the US military to retire forces in Iraq and 
Afghanistan have only led to greater insurgency and violence. In Liberia there 
was no such resistance. By the time the United Nations intervened, there 
seemed to be genuine war fatigue in the country, but the lack of violence is 
also due to the manner in which DynCorp demobilised the old AFL. 
 On 18 May 2005, Chairman Bryant publicly proclaimed Executive 
Order Number Five at a national press conference in the presidential palace; as 
his entourage departed the AFL band played ‘Que Sera Sera’. The order, which 
had the force of law, declared the entire AFL officially decommissioned on 30 
June 2005. Afterwards, Minster of Defence Chea told reporters that the 
demobilisation exercise would take place in the months ahead and would be 
done by DynCorp, expressing confidence in the company. At the time there 
was a real fear that members of the AFL would dig up cached weapons and 
challenge the authority of the state or demand greater remuneration in 
exchange for cooperation. Luckily, no such violence occurred, but it was a 
constant worry: in April 2006, 400 to 500 ex-soldiers threatened there would 
be ‘no Christmas’ if they did not receive salary arrears for their service.724 
                                                
724 In late April 2006, 400 to 500 former AFL soldiers conducted a violent protest outside the ministry 
and clashed with UNMIL peacekeepers sent to contain the unrest. They claimed nonpayment of salary 
arrears and retirement benefits and demanded back pay, which some reportedly received while others did 
not. See: Ansorge and Antwi-Ansorge, “Monopoly, Legitimacy, Force.”; “President Authorizes Defense 
Ministry to Pay Salary Arrears to Former Soldiers,” UNMIL (media summary citing ELBS Radio and Star 
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Immediately following the chairman’s announcement, DynCorp got to 
work. First, it coordinated with UNMIL to provide security during the 
demobilisation in case violence erupted––though the company’s small armed 
presence would have been insufficient to put down a large armed riot. Next, 
the company sub-contracted a local architecture and engineering firm to 
custom-build a demobilisation site on the outskirts of Monrovia, which was 
close enough to the city to be accessible for the majority of the population yet 
far enough to contain a violent outbreak before it spread to the capital. 
DynCorp also began refurbishing the Barclay Training Centre, a former AFL 
base in downtown Monrovia, and would later build the larger training base in 
Careysburg.  
DynCorp’s ability to rapidly demobilise the legacy AFL was aided by 
circumstance since it did not have to disarm combatants or determine who was 
eligible for benefits, both dangerous and time-consuming issues. UNMIL’s 
DDRR program had already disarmed but not demobilised ex-AFL soldiers, 
who were confined to their barracks. However, as with LURD and MODEL, 
it was widely believed that the AFL’s best weapons remained hidden rather 
than surrendered to UNMIL as a hedge against future hostilities. UNMIL 
collected few heavy or crew-served weapons despite their prevalence during 
the civil war, casting a shadow of anxiety over the entire process. 
                                                                                                                       
Radio), June 14, 2006; Brownie J. Samukai, Jr., “A Discussion with Liberia’s Defense Minister, Brownie J. 
Samukai, Jr.” (discussion, United States Institute of Peace, Washington, DC, May 11, 2007).; “Leadership 
of Demobilized AFL Soldiers Assure President Sirleaf of Unwavering Support,” Executive Mansion, 
Press Release, February 24, 2010.; Cook, Liberia’s Post-War Development, footnote 75. 
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Figure 10: One of fifteen demobilisation stations with biometric capture at 
DynCorp’s custom-built demobilisation site 
 
 The NTGL rather than DynCorp decided who was eligible for 
demobilisation benefits. Based on available funding, DynCorp derived a points 
system to distribute payment to ex-AFL fighters based on time in service and 
rank, which the NTGL approved and adopted. The minimum payment to help 
soldiers reintegrate into civil society was $540 (about a year’s salary) and the 
maximum over $2,000, substantially more than the flat $300 UNMIL offered 
non-government combatants in its DDRR program. Like so many other DDR 
programs, little was done to ensure long-term reintegration. Once individuals 
received their payments, they usually were offered transport to their home 
town and then forgotten. There was little if any serious job training, counseling 
or similar assistance to prevent them from relying on violence to make a living. 
Also, there was no separate assistance for dependents of former soldiers, aside 
from the 270 widows who received compensation only after vociferous and 
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persistent political protests to the Liberian government. But to be fair to 
DynCorp, it was not contracted to provide long-term assistance for former 
soldiers, only to demobilise them safely. 
Not surprisingly many Liberians fraudulently claimed they were in the 
AFL and demanded payment; determining who was actually in the AFL was 
difficult. First, nearly all the AFL personnel records were destroyed in the war. 
Second, many combatants took a nom de guerre during the war: memorable 
warlords include General Cobra, General Mosquito, General Mosquito Spray, 
General Peanut-Butter (currently a senator) and General Butt Naked (currently 
a preacher), whose warriors fought au naturel. Lastly, there was widespread 
fraud and abuse during UNMIL’s DDRR process, as later vetting 
investigations revealed, giving precedent to cheating the system.725  
 Owing to the above, a large re-documentation exercise was launched to 
ascertain who was truly in the AFL, which the NTGL led and DynCorp 
operationalised. The executive order established a joint Demobilisation 
Advisory Monitoring Committee (DAMC) to oversee the process, which did 
not include the firm.726 Initially well over 15,000 individuals claimed to be 
former AFL, but this list was painstakingly whittled down. UNMIL identified 
several hundred double dippers––Liberians who had already received benefits 
from UNMIL’s DDRR program posing as members of LURD or MODEL. 
                                                
725 Ansorge and Antwi-Ansorge, “Monopoly, Legitimacy, Force.” 
726 The DAMC included representatives from the Executive Mansion, Ministry of National Defence, 
Ministry of Finance, Central Bank of Liberia, Ministry of Information, Ministry of Planning, United 
States Embassy, United Nations, Economic Community of West African States, the African Union and 
the International Contact Group on Liberia. See: National Transitional Government of Liberia, Executive 
Order No. 5, clause 3. 
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These individuals were disqualified from receiving additional pay-outs. The 
AFL leadership also reconstructed former unit rosters drawn from fragments 
of surviving records and considered every claim individually, using eight 
criteria to validate a veteran’s identity.727 Suspicious candidates were quizzed on 
life in the AFL: which unit they were in, where they served, who their 
commanding officers and first sergeants were. By the end of July, the NTGL 
produced a list of 13,500 ex-AFL members eligible for benefits, and added 270 
widows later for a total of 13,770.  
Concurrent to these events, DynCorp and a senior member of the 
Ministry of Defence co-led a planning team of eight AFL officers that reported 
directly to the defence minister.728 The team issued a military operations order 
that provided a demobilisation schedule for all twenty-seven units, a three-
stage plan of action for the process (identity verification, registration, payment) 
and logistical requirements and taskings. 729  Though successful, this hybrid 
team, led by a Liberian and a contractor, raises questions over where the 
                                                
727 The criteria used to screen applicants were personal data (some fields in the database have no 
information); date of birth (DOB) versus date of entry (DOE) into the AFL (those with DOBs after 
1973 were disqualified from joining the service, since AFL standards required rigid application of a 
minimum entry age of seventeen); DOE versus training base (the AFL had fixed official training bases 
and some of them were not operational at certain times); whether the re-documentation form was 
personally filled in, as required by the process (questions were raised if another person did the writing for 
a lettered personnel); a cross-check with DDRR list from UNMIL resulting in ‘double dipping’ (no 
double benefit, AFL personnel processed through UNMIL DDRR program are excluded from AFL 
demobolisation process); a cross-check with the MOD insurance benefit list (no impersonation of dead 
service personnel); commander certification (each unit commander was required to review and certify the 
accuracy and completeness of the respective unit rosters under penalty of perjury and possible loss of all 
benefits and exclusion from possible re-entry consideration in the new AFL); and a photo check (all re-
documented personnel had photo forms; there was a facial check at time of payment). 
728 Each senior officer was chief of the following military staff offices: G1 (personnel), G3 (operations), 
G4 (logistics), adjutant general, engineers, chief information officer, signal, assistant G1, and brigade 
element. 
729 National Transitional Government of Liberia - Ministry of Defense, Operation Order 001-Operation 
Demobilization, 2005. 
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NTGL’s influence ends and DynCorp’s begins. The company had to manage 
significant portions of the process owing to the NTGL’s lack of capacity, 
which flags concerns over who truly controlled the process (discussed below). 
The NTGL and DynCorp imbued the process with dignity, which 
encouraged participation. After years of war rife with human rights violations, 
it was tempting to treat the AFL as criminals rather than soldiers. This would 
have been a mistake. First, not everyone in the AFL committed war crimes. 
Second, criminalising the process only would have alienated former AFL and 
deterred their cooperation, which was essential to the program. DynCorp 
consciously framed the demobilisation as a retirement, modelled on the US 
Army’s own protocol, rather than a DDR pay-out to ‘thugs’. Every day a unit 
mustered at the demobilisation site to be honoured with a formal ceremony 
replete with protocol, the AFL band and a congratulatory speech by the 
Minister of Defence or similar dignitary. Individuals then began the 
demobilisation process, which verified and logged their identity, took an 
identification picture and electronically fingerprinted them (see Figure 10). 
Following this, ex-soldiers received a voucher for payment at a Monrovian 
bank as well as a demobilisation certificate and a card indicating that they were 
either ‘demobilized’ or ‘honourably retired’, for those whose service began 
before Taylor’s take-over. These documents were intended to provide a 
measure of closure and status to ex-combatants, but also, as official 
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government papers, they represented the state’s reconstitution after a long 
absence.  
Cynics might argue this was merely political theatre yet, to date, it was 
successful: the legacy military remains peacefully demobilized. Moreover, it 
was done safely and efficiently. By treating ex-combatants as soldiers rather 
than criminals, in four months and at a cost of only $15 million, one of the 
more notorious armies in Africa was completely and safely demobilised, a rare 
event in African history.730 DynCorp’s ability to demobilise an army exemplifies 
what the private military industry can do and perhaps where it is heading 
within the new neomedieval order. In the new market for force, like the old, 
dismantling armed challengers is the first step to gaining a monopoly of force, 
whether it is for a client like Liberia––or the PMC’s own interests.  
Raising an Army in Five Steps 
In the medieval era, the condottieri were only as good as the army they could 
muster and future PMCs will be judged no differently. DynCorp’s experience 
raising a small army for Liberia shows how PMCs today can build a military, 
and because DynCorp accomplished this with minimal external assistance––
other than payment from the United States––it stands to reason that the 
company could do so again for another client, including itself.731 Other PMCs 
possess the same capacity to generate armed forces. Raising an army is 
                                                
730 The $15 million cost number comes from: Cook, Liberia’s Post-War Development, footnote 75. 
731 This thesis in no way implies that DynCorp International desired to raise an army for its own uses. 
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obviously complex, and a full analysis of how it is done is beyond the scope of 
this thesis. Instead, below is an overview of five key elements of army building, 
all managed by DynCorp in Liberia: public sensitisation, recruiting, vetting, 
training and equipping, and formulating strategy.    
Step 1: Alert the Public 
The first step in creating a new force––unless it is clandestine––is to alert the 
public. In Liberia this was challenging owing to the grim legacy of the former 
AFL in the war. Many Liberians and even UNMIL’s Jacques Klein did not 
welcome this development and thought the country ought to adopt the Costa 
Rican model of a robust national police force in lieu of a military. However, 
ultimately it was decided during the Accra peace accords that Liberia needed a 
military owing to the dangerous geopolitics of West Africa. To help prepare 
the populace for this, DynCorp began planning a public sensitisation program 
in early 2005.  
 The major obstacle of any foreign-led messaging campaign are cultural 
and language barriers, and Liberia has sixteen different tribes with their own 
customs and even languages. The widely spoken Liberian English is not easily 
recognisable to international English speakers, as it is a creole of Kru pidgin 
English and nineteenth-century African American vernacular English. 732 
Moreover, the fourteen-year dearth of education due to the civil war and 
resultant 75 per cent illiteracy rate limited much communications to oral or 
                                                
732 For example, instead of saying ‘he bothers me’, one would say ‘he vexes me’, delivered in heavy patois. 
M. Paul Lewis, ed., Ethnologue: Languages of the World, 16th ed. (Dallas, TX: SIL International, 2009). 
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pictorial transmission. Owing to these challenges, DynCorp sought to partner 
with a local communications firm and employed Liberians to craft effective 
messages that would resonate with indigenous audiences. DynCorp’s role was 
confined mostly to logistical support and coordination with international 
community representatives in Liberia.  
The communications strategy was a combined sensitisation and 
recruitment campaign targeting opinion leaders, civil society and the AFL 
recruitment pool. It consisted of several parallel efforts. The first was a series 
of workshops for senior AFL officers, cabinet members, soldiers to be 
demobilised, the media and civil society groups. The second was a broader 
outreach campaign to the public as a whole and involved members of the 
government and AFL SSR program giving interviews to the media, debating 
on radio talk shows, staging rallies featuring other senior members of the 
government (see Figure 11), producing radio dramas featuring the AFL, 
placing ads in newspapers, displaying large AFL billboards and murals (see 
Figure 12) and doing recruiting tours in Liberia’s hinterlands (see Figure 13). 
DynCorp even commissioned AFL comic books titled Jackie’s Adventure and 
Liberia’s New Armed Forces for free distribution (see Figure 14). The company 
also set up two information booths in downtown Monrovia staffed by 
Liberians to answer any questions passers-by had regarding the AFL SSR 
process or how to enlist.  
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Figure 11: The Liberian Minister of National Defence Brownie Samukai at a 
rally for the AFL, coordinated by DynCorp, in Monrovia, 2006 
 
 
Figure 12: The author standing in front of an AFL billboard alerting the 
public to the new Armed Forces of Liberia 
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Figure 13: Part of a DynCorp recruiting convoy into the hinterlands of Liberia 
 
Figure 14: DynCorp commissioned comic books to reach low-literacy 
audiences aimed at sharing information regarding the new AFL as well as 
encourage recruitment, especially among women in this case 
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Step 2: Recruiting 
Recruitment for the new AFL began on 18 January 2006 at the Barclay 
Training Center (BTC) in downtown Monrovia and attracted a great deal of 
attention, with a line wrapping nearly around the block (see Figure 15). Large 
groups of applicants even camped in front of the BTC for several nights 
before the opening day, and individuals travelled from outlying counties to 
stand for the chance to apply. In the first two months alone DynCorp 
processed 4,000 applications.  
Most of the recruiting took place at the BTC because a third of the 
population was encamped at Monrovia, making it fertile enlisting ground, and 
BTC also had the infrastructure to support the operation. Neither the Liberian 
government nor the State Department desired an all-Monrovian military, but 
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access to Liberia’s interior was very limited. The few roads and bridges that 
existed were in poor shape and some were impassable during the rainy season. 
To overcome this, DynCorp conducted large recruiting expeditions with the 
precision and robustness of a military operation. Each so-called forward 
recruiting convoy consisted of some dozen or so trucks, fifty staff and all 
necessary equipment, including spare vehicles. They would deploy days and 
even weeks at a time to all fourteen counties in Liberia and could process 
about 120 applicants a day. Like a military column, these forward recruitment 
operations consisted of several parts. Ahead of the main convoy, a 
reconnaissance team scouted the routes, conducted liaisons with relevant UN 
and Liberian authorities and identified recruitment sites. Next, a public affairs 
team made radio announcements and distributed posters and comic books. 
Then the forward recruiting team’s main body arrived, making announcements 
over truck-mounted speakers while driving through population centres. In the 
first six months of 2006 DynCorp launched twenty-eight recruiting 
expeditions.  
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Figure 15: The first day of recruiting attracted a long line of volunteers 
 
The final phase of the recruitment campaign was, of course, the 
recruitment itself. DynCorp devised a four-stage recruitment process––
enlistment, a literacy aptitude test, a physical fitness test and a medical exam––
to select the best candidates from the recruitment pool. The stages were 
sequential: applicants had to pass minimum acceptability standards before 
advancing to the next stage. To save money, DynCorp conducted less 
expensive tests first, when the applicant pool was large, and more costly tests 
last, when the applicant pool was smallest.  
 The first stage of recruitment was enlistment. Applicants had to be 
Liberian citizens between the age of eighteen and thirty-five, functionally 
literate at a twelfth grade level for enlisted soldiers and at a college graduate 
level for officers, physically fit and healthy, without a criminal record and free 
of allegations of human rights violations, crimes against humanity or war 
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crimes. Applicants showed up at a recruitment station and were searched for 
weapons, then asked to read a few simple sentences to ensure basic literacy (a 
fuller literacy exam ensued later); 11.5 per cent failed this and were escorted off 
the premises. Applicants who could read were briefed on the AFL and the 
recruitment process. If the individual wished to volunteer to serve, they filed 
an enlistment application, received an AFL recruitment identity card with their 
picture and unique tracking number and were given a report date for the 
second stage.  
The second stage was assessing functional literacy. Soldiers had to be 
able to read and write orders, reports, maps and other communications, a 
significant recruiting challenge in a country with 75 per cent illiteracy. On 
account of this DynCorp suggested a minimum sixth-grade reading level but 
the Liberian government insisted on a twelfth-grade level. Instead of relying on 
disparate and potentially fraudulent diplomas, DynCorp asked the West 
African Examinations Council (WAEC), a regional organisation, to create an 
aptitude test that the company could administer. WAEC is a not-for-profit 
examination board that has administered standardised tests for sixth and 
twelfth graders throughout the region since 1952. WAEC created a ninety-
minute aptitude test consisting of thirty multiple-choice questions and one 
essay to test for educational equivalency. If the applicant passed the aptitude 
test they were invited to return the next day for a physical fitness test and 
medical exam; if the applicant failed the aptitude test they were given one more 
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chance to retake the test in twenty-eight days’ time. Female candidates tended 
to score higher than males, and unlike in a developed country, younger 
Liberians on average did worse than older applicants, owing to the lack of 
schooling during the fourteen-year civil war. Fifty-eight per cent of applicants 
passed this stage. 
The third stage assessed physical aptitude. Obviously strong physical 
prowess is a prerequisite for soldiering and DynCorp modified the US Army’s 
physical fitness test to assess it, because the test required no special equipment 
or venue. To pass the test, applicants had to complete a minimum number of 
push-ups and sit-ups in a two-minute time frame and run 1.5 miles in less than 
a specified time, depending on age and gender. Only 7.6 per cent of applicants 
failed the fitness test and could retest in twenty-eight days. Of those who 
failed, 58 per cent failed to do the minimum required push-ups, 36 per cent 
failed to complete the minimum required sit-ups, and 6 per cent did not finish 
the 1.5 mile run in the maximum time allotted. Not surprisingly, applicants 
older than thirty-four had a higher failure rate than younger candidates, 
although the rate never exceeded 20 per cent for any age group. Forty-eight 
per cent of applicants passed this stage. 
Next, applicants underwent a basic medical examination consisting of a 
general check-up, a drugs screen, a tuberculosis test, and a HIV-AIDS test. 
Unlike the other tests, applicants who failed this exam were denied entry into 
the AFL unless it was for a temporary illness or the need of corrective lenses, 
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in which case the applicant could return for a reexamination. Surprisingly, only 
11.9 per cent failed the medical examination during the first six months, 
mostly due to illegal drug use. Liberia has a relatively high HIV-AIDS rate, but 
the recruitment campaign’s active dissemination of minimum entry standards 
may have deterred those afflicted from volunteering. Forty-six per cent of 
applicants passed this stage, meaning that only 40 per cent of the original 
applicant pool remained. 
Step 3: Vetting 
Vetting is perhaps the most important yet inexplicably overlooked element of 
raising security forces. Recruiting soldiers or policemen without proper 
background checks would be unthinkable in the United States and the United 
Kingdom, yet it has happened routinely in Iraq, Afghanistan and other conflict 
affected states, which arguably need professional security services the most. 
The lack of rigorous vetting allows terrorists and criminals to easily infiltrate 
security forces and commit crimes in uniform, discrediting and corrupting the 
force while terrorizing the populace. On 22 February 2006, insurgents posing 
as Iraqi police destroyed the Golden Mosque in Samarra, one of Iraq’s holiest 
Shiite shrines, re-igniting longstanding violence between Sunni and Shia in 
Iraq. This problem became so widespread in the Iraqi national police that in 
2007 the US Congress appointed a high-level independent commission headed 
by retired general James Jones, the former NATO commander, to assess the 
situation. The commission’s recommendation was grim: ‘We should start over’, 
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meaning the SSR of the Iraqi police. But as an earlier inspector general report 
on the same topic observed, a corrupt security force that has lost public trust 
and legitimacy is ‘a problem not easily undone’.733  
One reason vetting is ignored is because it is hard. How does one 
conduct background checks in a failed state where there are few if any records 
kept? Background investigations normally rely on a plethora of records: 
criminal, commercial, financial, educational and public. In a post-conflict failed 
state, such records may not have survived the war, if they existed in the first 
place; they also may be incomplete or not credible. In Liberia, what records 
remained were scant, incomplete and generally untrustworthy, since forgery 
and identity theft was common. The AFL’s personnel or G-1 Section of the 
Ministry of Defence had lost most of its filing systems, including the 201 files 
of its Military Personnel Record Jacket, which had documents on each soldier. 
Compounding the issue was the sheer number of problematic candidates, 
where many people were perpetrators, victims or both of violence during the 
war. The lack of tools plus large volume of troubled backgrounds made human 
rights vetting a daunting challenge. 
Vetting was also dangerous. Many did not welcome unearthing the 
bloody past, especially violent individuals under investigation with something 
to hide. If the vetting process failed to safeguard the identities of victims and 
witnesses who helped identify perpetrators, then those victims or SSR staff 
                                                
733 U.S. Department of State and Department of Defense, Interagency Assessment of Iraq Police Training: Joint 
Inspector General Report (Washington, DC, 2005), 22. 
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could be intimidated, coerced and even killed in reprisal. If the vetting process 
accidentally admitted a war criminal, it would discredit all vetted individuals 
and perhaps even provoke a violent backlash. Wrongful denunciations made 
against innocent individuals could generate antagonism in the community and 
discredit the SSR program as a whole, deterring people from enlisting in the 
new army and defeating the purpose of the SSR effort. 
DynCorp thus created an entirely novel approach to human rights 
vetting in post-conflict countries that combined investigative techniques, 
international best practices and human rights norms to judge a candidate’s 
character and capacity for a position of trust and to identify potential risks for 
security reasons. The process utilised three methods: background checks, 
records checks and public vetting.   
Once an applicant’s file was passed to the vetting office, it was 
assigned to a background investigator, who worked closely with Liberian 
colleagues. The purpose was to establish the overall truthfulness of the 
applicants’ claims about themselves and uncover evidence of past wrongdoing 
that would disqualify them from serving. During enlistment, applicants fill out 
a detailed questionnaire about their backgrounds, which includes their age, 
schooling, work history, claimed special skills, a strip-map to their home (there 
are few street signs in war-ravaged Liberia) and any supporting evidence, such 
as certificates or diplomas. An investigator then verified the accuracy of this 
information; fraudulent claims and documents filed in the applications account 
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for the majority of candidate disqualifications during the vetting process.  
The investigator also interviewed people on conditions of anonymity 
who know the candidate well for character references, which included the 
candidate’s references, neighbours, employers, co-workers, relatives, municipal 
authorities, teachers, community leaders and local religious leaders (see Figure 
16). To ensure interviews were controlled, confidential and conducive to 
maximum disclosure, investigators tried to conduct them in private locations 
and use open-ended questions (e.g., ‘tell me about this man’). Owing to the 
sensitive nature of investigating the past, local Liberian staff were vital as 
cultural interpreters and almost always accompanied the investigator. Without 
their support, competent investigation would not have been possible. 
Simultaneously, the vetting team ran a records check on the applicant, 
pooling what records were available and prioritising them by reliability and 
completeness. In its records search, DynCorp reached out to the full pantheon 
of neomedieval actors in Liberia: the government of Liberia, UNMIL and 
other international organisations as well as international and local NGOs.734 
WEAC maintained some of the best identity records in the country, with 
                                                
734 DynCorp approached several organisations for vetting purposes. The government of Liberia, such 
that it was, provided limited information through its Ministry of Justice and Liberian National Police (for 
criminal records); Ministry of Education (for verification of education level and identity); Ministry of 
Health (for verification of date and place of birth, citizenship and identity); Ministry of Defence (for 
prior record of service in the AFL, re-documentation exercise, surviving records and demobilisation 
exercise); and Ministry of Gender (for rape and other gender-related allegations). The United Nations 
and UNMIL’s various agencies provided records regarding identity, human rights violation allegations, 
war crimes, child soldiers, witness testimony from IDP camps, criminal activity and combatant 
demobilization lists. NGOs proved an excellent source on human rights violation allegations, and 
included international organisations such as the ICRC, ICG, IRC and WEAC. Local NGOs also 
provided excellent information on human rights violation allegations and include the National Human 
Rights Centre of Liberia, National Human Rights Commission, National Association of Female Lawyers, 
Liberia National Law Enforcement Association, Methodists Human Rights Commission and Catholic 
Justice and Peace Commission. 
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thousands of Liberians’ identities plus photographs on file. Despite the 
records’ incompleteness, they helped investigators verify facts and spot forged 
documents and falsehoods.  
Figure 16: A DynCorp vetting team comprising one international and one 
Liberian expert conducting background checks on an AFL applicant in the 
field 
 
DynCorp also used public vetting, a direct appeal to the population to 
solicit local knowledge of candidates’ past wrongdoings. The candidates’ 
pictures, names and hometowns were publicised nationally to afford witnesses 
and victims an opportunity to identify undesirable candidates. Candidates were 
briefed of this procedure during enlistment and signed a release form 
authorising DynCorp to broadcast their information. The company used 
posters, newspaper inserts, radio and facebooks to disseminate the information 
and invited the public to anonymously provide feedback via telephone 
hotlines, an email address or simply walking into an enlistment centre. 
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Additionally, some members of the public with special knowledge of past 
crimes, such as solicitors, academic researchers, civil society groups and 
journalists, were at times asked to submit relevant information concerning the 
human rights records of persons named on the list. Not surprisingly, public 
vetting in Liberia attracted many false leads and fraudulent claims aimed at 
defaming candidates for unrelated reasons, but in a country with few public 
records, tapping the collective memory of the populace was an important 
vetting method.  
Applicants could be disqualified on substantial or procedural grounds. 
Substantial reasons include credible evidence of wrongdoing, such as past 
human rights violations, whereas procedural grounds referred to candidates’ 
deleterious behaviour during the process itself. Since the vetting was to 
determine an applicant’s suitability for military service rather than establishing 
guilt or innocence of crimes, the process used a lower standard of proof than 
would courts of law, disqualifying candidates based on a preponderance of 
evidence or even a balance of probability suggesting that a candidate was more 
likely than not culpable in a crime. 
To help standardise the evaluation procedure for public vetting, 
DynCorp created a matrix that explained and ranked the trustworthiness of 
witnesses in four categories: identity, character, education and professional 
experience. For each of these categories the company gave guidelines regarding 
the type of person who was most and least trustworthy. Strongly credible 
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sources included people who knew the candidate well, such as a close relative 
or a friend who knew the candidate for fifteen years or more (e.g., spouse, 
parent, old friend) or people in positions of authority over the individual (e.g., 
high school principal, church pastor, boss). Weak witnesses only vaguely knew 
the candidate; in such cases the investigator needed to substantiate the charge 
with at least two or three unrelated witnesses. Allegations with few credible 
witnesses were generally deemed not probable and did not disqualify the 
applicant.  
In addition to allegations of war crimes or human rights violations, 
histories of criminal behaviour, poor reputations in the community, mental 
instability and family violence, candidates could be rejected for procedural 
reasons that cast negative light on their suitability for soldiering. The top 
reasons for procedural disqualification included failure to reveal pertinent 
information during the procedure; evidence of threats, intimidation or 
coercion of victims, references or witnesses; lack of cooperation with or 
support for the vetting process; or aggressive, violent, insulting or disrespectful 
behaviour toward staff. In the first six months of recruiting and vetting, 1,080 
candidates were investigated; of these 335 were accepted and 205 were 
rejected, almost all for procedural rather than substantive reasons. This may be 
because the recruiting campaign stressed the need for candidates free of 
criminal or human rights violations in their background and thus the applicant 
pool was self-selecting. It may also be because procedural problems were easier 
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to unearth than substantive ones. 
Once a candidate passed all recruiting and vetting requirements, 
DynCorp scored their merit based on how well they did in each category and 
then passed the candidate’s file to a joint personnel board (JPB) for final 
approval. The JPB reviewed the applicant’s file, test results, vetting findings 
and then voted on whether to admit the candidate into the new AFL as a 
recruit. Recruits spent the first year of their service on probation, during which 
their performances were evaluated. At the end of this first year, the JPB 
convened to decide whether to retain or dismiss the soldier. A simple majority 
won; among those voting were a member of the Liberian government, 
Liberian civil society (appointed by the Minister of Defence) and a United 
States embassy official. DynCorp had no vote in who was admitted into the 
new AFL it was tasked to train.  
Step 4: Training and Equipping 
Training and equipping the force is the simplest part of building an army. 
Although military training varies from place to place, the principles involved in 
transforming civilians into soldiers are so timeless that they are practically 
clichés: intense physical conditioning and psychological hardening; breaking 
down individuals’ egos and building them back up as a unit; bonding through 
mutual suffering; the more the recruits sweat in peace the less they bleed in 
war; repetitive drills until soldiers can literally accomplish military tasks in their 
sleep. The foundational document of US Army training––and now AFL 
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training––is US Army Regulation 350–1: Army Training and Leader 
Development, otherwise known as AR 350-1.735 DynCorp adopted the US 
Army’s initial entry training (IET) program for the AFL’s basic training, 
modifying it for the needs of Liberia, and hired only ex-US Army and Marine 
drill sergeants (see Figure 17) to transform the recruits into soldiers. 
Grounded in AR 350-1, DynCorp planned four training courses for 
the AFL. Basic training––that is, IET––initially lasted fifteen weeks but later 
was reduced due to lack of funding. Following this recruits would undergo 
advanced individual training (AIT), which usually lasted six weeks and 
provided specialised training to soldiers based on their military occupation 
speciality (MOS), such as infantry, medic or cook. Every member of the AFL 
undertook IET and AIT, but soldiers selected for leadership underwent 
additional training. Those selected as non-commissioned officers (NCOs, also 
known as sergeants) attended a basic non-commissioned officer’s course 
(BNCOC, pronounced bee-knock) for four weeks, and those selected as officers 
attended an officer basic course (OBC) for six weeks. Rather than examine 
each of these courses in depth, it may prove more useful to analyse one course, 
basic training, because it was the most widely attended and illustrates how 
DynCorp adapted US military training to the AFL’s unique needs. 
                                                
735 U.S. Army, Regulation 350-1: Army Training and Leader Development, 2007. 
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Figure 17: AFL Basic Training with a DynCorp Drill Sergeant 
 
 The recruiting campaign was fairly effective, given the high enlistment 
rate in the first six months of recruiting. DynCorp received 4,170 applicants in 
the first six months of recruiting. The average age was 29 years and there was a 
fairly even dispersion of tribal group; no single group accounted for more than 
12 per cent of the applicant pool, although some groups represented less than 
1 per cent, such as Sarpo, Bella and Dei.736 No one identified as Americo-
Liberian or Congo, though .8 per cent did not select a group on the application 
form: the enlistment application asks individuals to identify their tribe rather 
than ethnic group, and neither Americo-Liberians nor Congo regard 
themselves as a tribe. 
Two-thirds of all applicants resided in the county of Montserrado, 
where Monrovia is located, though because the war drove most of Liberia’s 
                                                
736 The tribal or ethnic groups are: Kpelleh, Bassa, Gio, Kru, Grebo, Mano, Krahn, Gola, Gbandi, Loma, 
Kissi, Vai, Dei, Bella, Mandingo, Mende and Sarpo. 
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population to its capital, this should not be interpreted as reflecting applicants’ 
counties of origin. Most candidates were born in Montserrado (22 per cent), 
Lofa (16 per cent) or Nimba (14 per cent), while the fewest came from River 
Gee (2 per cent), Gbarpolu (1 per cent) and Rivercess (1 per cent). In general, 
the applicants were representative of the population, consistent with the State 
Department’s and Liberian government’s desire for an ethnically balanced 
military.  
Curiously, only 772 applicants, or 18.5 per cent of the applicant pool, 
claimed former military experience, either in the AFL or a rebel group. No 
doubt some withheld this information when applying, especially during the 
early days of recruitment when the SSR program’s reputation was still 
inchoate. Over half of these applicants claimed they served in the AFL, with 
the remainder more or less evenly divided among former LURD, MODEL, 
militia and the National Patriotic Front of Liberia, a rebel group led by Taylor 
during the First Liberian Civil War from 1989 to 1996. A small number of 
candidates claimed they served in special units created by Taylor towards the 
end of the war that terrorised the population and enemy alike, such as the 
Special Operations Division and Special Secret Service. No applicant was 
denied entry into the new AFL because they were part of a notorious unit; 
candidates were only rejected when background checks revealed participation 
in human rights violations or crimes. Applicants with former military 
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experience scored substantially lower on vetting benchmarks than applicants 
without former military experience. 
Both the Liberian government and the State Department had asked 
DynCorp to emphasise female recruitment, and in 2006 Sirleaf-Johnson 
astonishingly declared that 20 per cent of all soldiers in the AFL should be 
women, perhaps the highest percentage of women in any military.737 DynCorp 
correspondingly held women-only recruitment days, featured women soldiers 
in comics and billboards and hired female veterans of the old AFL’s Women 
Auxiliary Corps to staff the AFL information booth in downtown Monrovia. 
Despite these efforts, only 130 of the 4,170 applicants were female, 
constituting 3.2 per cent of the applicant pool. When asked, one woman said 
she did not want to join the military because it would make her ‘muscly’ and 
‘no man wants a woman muscly’. When it was pointed out to her that she––
and many women in Liberia––walked several miles a day with a few gallons of 
water or a sack of rice balanced on their head yet remained ‘unmuscly’, she 
simply grinned and left.738 
In terms of equipping the recruits, conflict-zone logistics is the private 
military industry’s forte, as contractors manage the majority of DOD’s logistics 
                                                
737 However, this directive probably served political rather than operational purposes. By comparison, 
women comprise 14.5 per cent of the US military, 13 per cent of the Australian Defence Force, and 9.6 
per cent of the United Kingdom’s armed forces. See: “Statistics on Women in the [US] Military, Women 
In Military Service For America Memorial Foundation, September 30, 2010, accessed July 1, 2011, 
http://www.womensmemorial.org/Press/stats.html.; Australian Defence Force, 2005–06 Defence Annual 
Report (Canberra, 2006), 281.; U.K. Ministry of Defence, “Table 3a - Strength of UK Regular Forces By 
Sex,” accessed July 1, 2011, 
http://www.dasa.mod.uk/applications/newWeb/www/apps/publications/pubViewFile.php?content=1
70.131&date=2011-05-12&type=html&PublishTime=09:30:00. 
738 Author interview, Monrovia, Liberia, June 5, 2006. 
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requirements around the world. DynCorp’s team of ex-military and civilian 
logisticians at the company’s offices in Dallas equipped the AFL through the 
global supply chain. Since Liberia was under a strict UN arms embargo at the 
time, the State Department and DynCorp worked together closely in 2006 to 
purchase small arms in Eastern Europe and fly the weapons to Liberia via 
chartered cargo plane, landing unannounced in the dead of night to minimise 
ambush by clandestine rebel groups. The State Department arranged an 
exemption to the UN arms embargo, over-flight permissions, end user 
certificates and money for the operation. DynCorp found the supplier, 
transacted the deal and moved the weapons from Eastern Europe to Liberia. 
The deal was the first legal arms transaction to Liberia in nearly two decades.  
Step 5: Strategy and Administration 
As all good condottieri know, it takes more than soldiers and weapons to make 
an army. Owing to this DynCorp was also contracted to demobilise and 
rebuild the Ministry of Defence to develop defence strategy and manage the 
AFL’s human resources, public affairs, resource management, ombudsman, 
coordination with other ministries and other vital functions. Because ministries 
of defence in fragile states are often bloated affairs, the State Department 
directed the company to create a lean organisation of about 100 people, almost 
all civilians and led by a civilian minister. Once AFL recruiting and training was 
underway, DynCorp undertook the creation of a small military civil service. 
 Rebuilding a ministry is far from a facile affair. Public sector militaries 
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like the US Army generally do not conduct institutional reform, as it is not 
seen as a core military function. Instead, development agencies such as USAID 
or the World Bank typically assist host nations in the work. However, 
development organisations are often prohibited from working with military 
institutions or shun it, and consequently transforming a ministry of defence in 
particular remains largely unmapped territory.739 This did not deter DynCorp, 
which sought out relevant experts and lured them to Liberia though 
competitive pay packages in a manner no state bureaucracy can afford or has 
the flexibility to accommodate. Because practice was ahead of theory in 2005, 
many of the experts were retired US military officers and defence attachés with 
substantial experience working with African ministries of defence. Within 
months the firm formed a twenty-person team that devised a seventeen-week 
civil servant training course divided into ten functional areas, followed by 
sixteen weeks of on-the-job mentorship.740 The team also would help the 
fledgling Liberian ministry draft all plans, policies and procedures for the 
AFL––a major task––as well as assist in formulating military strategy. 
Unfortunately, this plan never came to fruition due to contractual pay 
problems (discussed below) so it is impossible to assess its effectiveness, 
although it could serve as a useful model for future efforts. Today the Ministry 
                                                
739 For more on the challenges of ministerial transformation in SSR, see: Elizabeth Panarelli, The Role of 
the Ministerial Advisor in Security Sector Reform: Navigating Institutional Terrains (Washington, DC: United States 
Institute of Peace, 2009).; Robert M. Perito, The Interior Ministry’s Role in Security Sector Reform (Washington, 
DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2009).; Susanna Bearne, National Security Decision-Making Structures 
and Security Sector Reform (Cambridge: Rand Europe, 2006). 
740  DynCorp identified ten functional areas for the Liberian MOD: operations; policy and plans; 
personnel and administration; resource management, fiscal acquisition/logistic, facilities; legal counsel; 
comptroller and budget planning; inspector general; and protocol and office administration. 
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of Defence has mostly learned by doing, a less than ideal approach to 
ministerial development. 
 By 2010 Liberia had a small fledgling army. It remains a qualified 
success compared to efforts in Afghanistan, Iraq, East Timor, Côte d’Ivoire 
and elsewhere where new security forces degenerated into sectarian killing 
machines or coup d’etat makers. What makes Liberia unique is a corporation 
raised its army, revealing some of the good, bad and ugly implications of 
today’s private military industry. 
The Good 
The Liberia program is unique even from the programs in Iraq and 
Afghanistan in that it was entirely outsourced to the private sector. This was 
not an entirely a bad thing, contrary to some of the dire warnings from 
sceptics that outsourcing any military function is undesirable. DynCorp’s profit 
motive drove it to find innovative, efficient and effective solutions to thorny 
security problems, like the condottieri before them, and this accounts for some 
of Liberia’s success today. 
Innovation: an Engine for Success 
Just as the Swiss Companies perfected pike warfare and Wallenstein developed 
unique methods to rapidly generate regiments, PMCs today also innovate in 
the realm of war. Such ingenuity was all the more important in Liberia because 
when DynCorp was hired to rebuild the AFL in 2004, there were no books, 
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theory, best practices, compendia of lessons learned or practitioners with 
significant experience on how to demobilise and rebuild an army. Scholarship 
was equally unhelpful, as it has always lagged behind practice in DDR and SSR. 
Owing to this, DynCorp’s team invented new solutions to its specific DDR 
and SSR problems, resulting in a sui generis program that could serve as an 
imperfect yet necessary model for future DDR and SSR programs, and it did 
so in a post-conflict setting, one of the most difficult operating environments 
in the world.741  
One example of innovation is DynCorp’s novel approach to human 
rights vetting in post-conflict countries, which the International Crisis Group 
says is ‘a notable success––the best, several experts said, they had witnessed 
anywhere in the world’.742 To date, no public military or government has 
developed a systematic method for vetting in fragile states, which accounts for 
difficulties in Iraq and Afghanistan, for instance, where insurgents easily 
infiltrate the security forces and commit crimes in uniform. To avoid spoilers 
subverting the AFL, DynCorp invested in developing a new vetting model and 
did so more efficiently than the United States’ own military, taking just a few 
                                                
741 Failed states and conflict-affected areas are settings of extreme poverty, lacking infrastructure, law and 
security. Simply moving across the country can become a daunting expedition involving robust security 
convoys, careful route reconnaissance, resupply points, spare vehicles, air medical evacuation support, 
river-crossing capabilities, disciplined staff and significant contingency planning. Other factors that affect 
operations include institutionalized corruption, exotic diseases, prevalent traffic accidents, lack of 
logistical resupply, wild animals and high rates of crime. Even amenities such as potable water, electricity 
and shelter cannot be assumed. Staff must be prepared for possible lack of cooperation from authorities, 
novelty of the procedure for the population, absence of precedents and cultural misunderstandings that 
could be disastrous. In light of this backdrop, DynCorp’s achievements are all the more notable. 
742 International Crisis Group, Liberia: Uneven Progress in Security Sector Reform. For more 
information on this vetting technique, see: Sean McFate, “The Art and Aggravation of Vetting in Post-
Conflict Environments,” Military Review (July/August 2007): 79-97. 
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months with a handful of experts. By contrast, the US military typically 
requires years to develop new doctrine, involving scores of individuals and 
institutions.743 The US military still does not rigorously vet individuals who 
wish to serve in the Afghan, Iraq or similar security forces, despite its centrality 
to effective SSR. Contrary to industry cynics, this also implies that DynCorp 
more scrupulously obeyed United States law––which forbids military 
assistance to foreign armies that violate human rights with impunity––than the 
United States’ own military since the firm investigated and culled candidates 
with potential human rights violations in their past.744  
Key to the success of the vetting program was guaranteeing the 
anonymity of people who gave information about applicants. Failure to protect 
the identities of witnesses and victims of crimes invited reprisals and even 
death: with a feeble judiciary and scant law enforcement, violence was never 
far beneath the surface. However, this was controversial because it meant that 
vetting must remain absolutely unconnected to instruments of post-conflict 
justice, such as a truth commission or a war crimes tribunal.  
                                                
743 For example, each United States military service has its own center for doctrine creation: the US Army 
Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; US Marine Corps Combat Development 
Command at Quantico, Virginia; US Air Force LeMay Center for Doctrine Development & Education at 
Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama; the US Navy Warfare Development Command at Naval Station 
Norfolk, Virginia; plus multi-service centers for joint doctrine creation and federally funded research and 
development centers, funded by DOD, to research doctrine and other topics. Owing to this large 
bureaucracy and various concerns, doctrinal development in the United States military is a sedate affair. 
744 U.S. law restricts the provision of funds to units of foreign security forces when the State Department 
has credible evidence that the unit has committed gross violations of human rights. Commonly referred 
to as the Leahy Law, after its principal sponsor Senator Patrick Leahy, this restriction first appeared in 
the 1997 Foreign Operations Export Financing and related appropriations act (P.L. 104-208) and only 
applied to funds appropriated to the State Department’s international narcotics control program. In 1998, 
Congress broadened the law to apply to all funds appropriated under the 1998 Foreign Operations 
Export Financing and related appropriations act (P.L. 105-118). In 1999, a similar provision appeared in 
the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) appropriations act (P.L. 105-262), which applied to funds 
appropriated under that act. the two provisions have appeared each year since in the annual Foreign 
Operations appropriations act and the DOD appropriations act, respectively. 
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This became an issue in the summer of 2006 when Liberia’s nascent 
truth and reconciliation commission (TRC) demanded all of DynCorp’s vetting 
records for transitional justice purposes. By this time, DynCorp had amassed 
one of the most complete sets of records on individuals in the country, 
especially regarding ex-combatants. Causing controversy within UNMIL, 
DynCorp refused to hand over its records, since it would reveal the identities 
of witnesses as well as vetting sources and methods. If the TRC were to use 
the vetting records as evidence, making them public in the process or leaking 
them by accident, it would invite reprisals against the witnesses and also 
compromise the AFL SSR program, since no one would volunteer to join if 
they thought it would land them in front of the TRC.  
Clearly, it is desirable that potential perpetrators of violence are 
brought before the TRC but sometimes in volatile situations like post-conflict 
Liberia the needs of transitional justice and security are at odds with each other 
and leaders must choose between the two. The real tragedy is that the choice 
must be made at all, as Liberians deserve both. At the time the immediate 
needs of security outweighed the need for transitional justice, and as a PMC it 
was easier for DynCorp to refuse the TRC than the United States government, 
which does not wish to be publically portrayed as retarding post-conflict 
justice, even when it is at times necessary. This is an instance when plausible 
deniability afforded by private companies serves the employer’s interests.   
Now that the SSR program is complete, the Liberian government 
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could choose to release the vetting records. Such an action could prove an 
important confidence building measure for the public and the AFL’s final step 
in become a fully fledged transparent army governed by civilian authorities and 
accountable to the rule of law. It would help dispel mistrust that the records 
are being concealed to protect the guilty and that this AFL was truly ‘new’, 
removing the taint of the civil war once and for all.  
A second example of innovation is DynCorp’s early embrace of human 
security in its approach to SSR, and it is fitting that a PMC should reject the 
Westphalian state-centric ‘national security’ model. After its initial assessment 
of Liberia’s defence sector in May 2004, the company had judged that the 
greatest risks to Liberian security were not strong neighbouring states with 
powerful armies threatening invasions, but rather violent street crime, criminal 
militias, disease and poverty, armed insurrection, food insecurity, lack of access 
to justice and political representation, terrorism and a dearth of the basic 
necessities of life––all internally driven conditions arising from failures of 
development. Based on this assessment, DynCorp believed Liberians (and the 
State Department) would judge the AFL’s success by its ability to secure 
development rather than repel invaders. 
 In a sign of the neomedieval times, DynCorp thus de-emphasised the 
idea of defending national borders with a massive military and prioritised 
securing development as the unifying concept behind the new AFL. The State 
Department and the Liberian government agreed with the company’s 
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conceptualisation of the AFL, and in 2006 DynCorp staff assisted the minister 
of defence in drafting a national defence strategy (NDS) white paper based on 
human security, making Liberia one of the first countries to try to 
operationalise human security in its military. The first sentence of the draft 
reads: ‘There can be no development without adequate security, nor can 
security be maintained without development and the benefits it promises for 
our population’.745 From there, the strategy explained the relationship between 
security and development in the context of Liberia, identified Liberia’s core 
security interests in light of development and outlined the principles that 
informed AFL SSR. Beyond this the strategy remains vague and not fully 
operational, perhaps serving best as an inchoate model for future 
endeavours.746 However, this does not diminish the fact that a PMC advanced 
new military strategic thought and also expressed concern for the welfare of 
civilians, indicating that the privatization of the military does not necessarily 
infer immoral mercenaries. 
 A third example of innovation is basic training. Early planners at 
DynCorp believed that after fourteen years of civil war most Liberians knew 
                                                
745 Government Of Liberia, Liberian National Defense Strategy (Draft). 
746 The draft 2006 Liberian National Defence Strategy (NDS) did not fully explain how the AFL would 
secure development beyond conventional military strategy and natural disaster response. Tasks that might 
aid development are left vague, such as the military’s role in domestic law enforcement, public works, 
medical treatment for the population and other exercises of soft power. Moreover, it remains unclear 
how operational humans security truly is. How exactly should a military guarantee ‘freedom from fear’ 
and ‘freedom from want’, a twin mandate of human security? (See the 1994 UNDP report that 
popularised the human security concept, and borrows these phrases from US President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt’s famous Four Freedoms speech of 1941, in which freedom from want is characterised as the 
third and freedom from fear the fourth fundamental and universal freedom. United Nations 
Development Program, Human Development Report 1994, 3. 
Ultimately, the NDS transformed into a more conventional and Westphalian approach to meet the 
political demands of the Liberian government and satisfy large state-centric donors likes the UN and US.  
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how to fire an AK-47 but did not know when or at what. Thus, the original 
basic training curriculum and first iteration reduced the number of hours AFL 
recruits spent on the range and added three weeks’ worth of civics classes, 
which taught the laws of war, ethics and the like. The curriculum was designed 
in partnership with Liberian lawyers, historians and educators, as well as 
DynCorp staff with backgrounds in international public law and military 
training. The 120 hours of civics instruction dwarfed all other training, with 
basic rifle marksmanship (BRM) coming in a distant second at under fifty 
hours. The firm also partnered with international NGOs such as the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to deliver eight hours of 
instruction on international humanitarian law and human rights. At the time, 
the volume of civics instruction was unprecedented in modern militaries, but 
few modern militaries face the challenges of the AFL. 
Additionally, the civics instruction addressed vital concerns of the AFL 
such as federalism. As in most neomedieval areas, people in Liberia often 
identified first with their tribe and second with their state, which had corrupted 
the national military. As mentioned above, Doe had replaced much of the AFL 
leadership with members of his Krahn tribe, turning the military into a 
sectarian war machine in the 1980s. To avoid this in the future, the Liberian 
government and State Department demanded DynCorp create an AFL with 
balanced ethnic representation in the ranks and also a strong national identity 
that superseded tribal loyalty. To answer its client’s demands, DynCorp 
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dedicated significant time in the civics section to Liberian history, loyalty to the 
constitution, organisation of the Liberian government, the civil-military 
relationship, the rule of law and other topics that imbued a national 
consciousness and duty to state above all else.747 Designed and often delivered 
by Liberian professional educators, this curriculum aspired to engender respect 
for federalism within the ranks. 
Another key challenge facing the AFL was literacy. Military leaders and 
ideally the entire force would be literate. But Liberia’s high illiteracy rate, 
combined with Taylor’s denial of education to his tribal enemies during the 
war, meant that some ethnic groups were less literate than others. This created 
a conundrum, since the State Department gave DynCorp the dual mandate of 
a literate and ethnically balanced military. To overcome this, DynCorp 
accepted some candidates from minority groups with lower literacy rates and 
embedded a literacy program into basic training for any recruit wanting or 
needing it.  
 Infusing civics, federalism and literacy instruction into the overall basic 
training framework is an excellent example of private sector innovation not 
found in similar public sector efforts. United States efforts at raising security 
forces in Afghanistan and Iraq faced similar hurdles as were seen in Liberia, yet 
lacked any sort of systematic approach to instilling federalism, literacy or 
respect for the rule of law. This failure stems, in part, from the US military’s 
reluctance to abandon its doctrine when restructuring security forces, often to 
                                                
747 Some topics, such as civil disobedience, were omitted from the civics curriculum for obvious reasons. 
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the detriment of those foreign forces––and unfortunately, like the market for 
force in the Middle Ages, the contractor is only as good as the client. After the 
first iteration of basic training, the State Department asked DynCorp to 
remove the three weeks of civics courses on advice from DOD and to save 
money. Owing to this, it is difficult to assess the efficacy of DynCorp’s civics 
program. 
To save money, the State Department chose to shorten basic training 
by three weeks, which it did by removing all civics, human rights, and laws of 
war classes––perhaps the most important training for the new AFL, since 
most recruits already knew how to shoot an AK-47 from the war. Industry 
critics might find this surprising, assuming the State Department would want 
the civics curriculum and the PMC would have no interest in implementing it, 
in a classic case of the profit motive overriding policy concerns. But PMCs are 
creatures of the market, and successful private sector actors anticipate future 
demand and innovate to distinguish themselves from competitors in order to 
attract potential employers, such as integrating civics into basic training 
consistent with the idea of human security.  
In many ways this situation is a microcosm of the transformation from 
the Westphalian to neomedieval order. It is expected that the State 
Department, a quintessentially state-centric and Westphalian organisation, 
would cleave to a strong Clausewitizian military model, adept at using violence 
to secure the state and advance its political interests. Nor is it surprising that a 
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PMC, a fundamentally neomedieval actor, would choose a human security 
model that prioritised civics over violence to secure the country in a region 
characterised by state weakness. DynCorp’s adoption of this un-Westphalian 
approach to securing a state demonstrates new military thinking and 
approaches emanating from the private sector––a herald of neomedievalism. 
Surge Capacity 
In industry parlance, a PMC’s ability to rapidly marshal personnel and material 
resources to a needed location is called ‘surge capacity’, and it is a significant 
private-sector advantage over bureaucratically bulky public sector militaries. 
After the contract was awarded, the DynCorp team went from a skeleton staff 
to demobilising an army in three months––fast, compared to the public sector. 
It can take the US Army up to six months or a year to deploy an existing unit, 
and generating a new unit would take far longer.748 Smaller and more agile than 
the United States’ government, DynCorp established a working staff of 
seventy-three contractors within three weeks of the order.  
Further aiding the velocity of hires is the private military sector’s ability 
to hire types of individuals its public sector counter-parts cannot: foreigners. 
Unconstrained by the US government’s requirement to hire predominantly 
Americans, DynCorp recruited experts from around the planet––Canada, 
Mexico, Australia, Ghana, Germany, the United States and of course Liberia––
                                                
748 The US military does maintain rapid reaction forces such as the 82nd Airborne Division, which can 
deploy anywhere in the world in eighteen hours. However such units are rare, expensive to maintain and 
probably not rapidly deployed for a SSR mission. 
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to create a bespoke staff customised for AFL SSR. Several members had in-
depth expertise in African affairs, having lived, worked and studied on the 
continent. This stands in stark contrast to a military unit deployed from Fort 
Bragg, North Carolina, with a one-size-fits-all mission and approach.749  
Keeping rapid pace with these hires, logistics experts at DynCorp’s 
headquarters in (then) Texas ordered equipment for the program––from pens 
to trucks to compounds for staff housing and offices––inexpensively by 
relying on economies of scale, the global supply chain and technical expertise 
in conflict zone logistics rivalling anything in the DOD. In fact, contractors 
currently handle much if not most of DOD’s logistical requirements, 
indicating that the United States’ military supply chain is already highly 
privatised.  
Free Agent for Effectiveness 
In the Middle Ages the mercenary Varangian Guard was fiercely loyal to the 
Byzantine Emperor and devoted to protecting him. Such fidelity was crucial in 
a court so insidiously convoluted and treacherous that the word Byzantine is 
used today to describe intractable bureaucratic politics. The secret of the 
Guard’s success was its relative isolation from the intrigues of the court. All its 
warriors were drawn from the rugged Norse tribes of the north, which most 
courtiers and officials perceived as barbarians. As such, Guard members were 
outsiders rather than stakeholders in the schemes of the court, making them 
                                                
749 US military units are not trained in DDR despite its importance for stability operations. 
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ideal bodyguards. Additionally, as outsiders they were not beholden to the 
vested interested of factions within the court and were free to perform their 
one task with single-minded efficiency and effectiveness. 
Like the Varangian Guard, DynCorp was only a stakeholder in its 
contract and was immune from the bureaucratic factionalism within the 
unwieldy US government, enabling it to conduct SSR with concentrated 
effectiveness and avoid becoming entangled in bureaucratic turf wars and 
budget battles that can sabotage operational efficacy. Some inside the 
Washington beltway quip that the State Department and USAID are from 
Venus while the DOD is from Mars, referring to their inherently different 
cultures, priorities and perspectives.750 Interagency friction can pose problems 
for whole-of-government tasks like SSR that require the healthy integration of 
all government departments to success.751 In a program requiring close State 
Department, USAID and DOD cooperation, officials from each organisation 
must make decisions that support their institutions’ abiding goals––even if 
those decisions have little to do with the task at hand––or risk not being 
promoted within their organisation. This can retard program progress. By 
contrast, contractors have no long-term interests in their client’s organisation 
and can freely make choices that support the program rather than equities back 
home. This does not suggest that DynCorp could act autonomously in 
                                                
750 See, e.g.: Rickey L. Rife, Defense Is from Mars, State Is from Venus: Improving Communications and Promoting 
National Security (white paper) (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1998). 
751 For more information on the whole-of-government nature of SSR, see: Organisation for Economic 
Co-Operation and Development –Development Assistance Committee, The OECD-DAC Handbook on 
SSR.  
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Washington or Monrovia: it could not. But DynCorp managers did enjoy 
significantly more bureaucratic latitude than their US government counter-
parts, especially along interagency fault lines of defence, development and 
diplomacy. As an institutional outsider, DynCorp could be a free agent for 
effectiveness in a seemingly Byzantine bureaucracy. 
As a private sector actor, DynCorp was not beholden to any country’s 
military doctrine or textbook solutions and could freely mould existing 
protocols without fear of institutional reprisal. Substantially modifying doctrine 
to fit the needs of a host nation is a departure from the United States’ own 
practice, which, as recent experience suggests, tends to transpose––wholesale–
–its own military models onto foreign forces without consideration as to 
whether they are appropriate or not.752 Not surprisingly, these efforts meet 
limited success: US solutions to Iraqi or Afghani problems have made for a 
poor fit. By contrast, in Liberia, DynCorp used US Army training doctrine as a 
baseline for innovation rather than as an outright solution.753   
                                                
752 Until recently, the US military treated the formation of foreign forces primarily as a foreign internal 
defence (FID) mission. FID is an ill-fitting model for SSR; it is a Cold War concept informed by Maoist 
irregular warfare strategy rather than SSR principles. FID employed US Army special forces to covertly 
train and equip pro-American guerrillas in communist countries (e.g., the Montagnards in Vietnam) and 
help friendly governments defeat communist insurgents (e.g., El Salvador) in proxy wars between the 
United States and Soviet Union. This accounts for the US military’s train-and-equip mentality when it 
comes to SSR, which yields only improved tactical units rather than a transformed security sector. This 
limited approach is promulgated in “Joint Publication (JP) 3-07.1: Joint Tactics, Techniques, and 
Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID).”; U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps, FM 3-24/MCWP3-
33.5: Counterinsurgency, chapter 6.; U.S. Army, FM 3-07: Stability Operations, chapter 6. After several years of 
FID failure in Iraq and Afghanistan, the US military finally drafted more comprehensive doctrine on SSR 
called security force assistance: U.S. Army, FM 3-07/1: Security Force Assistance. Though a significant 
improvement, this model does not address the full spectrum of SSR needs, such as vetting, and creates 
foreign militaries in the image of the US Army, which is inappropriate. 
753 DynCorp’s AFL basic training program was informed by the following US Army training doctrine and 
best practices: the US Army model of basic combat training (BCT), influenced by the US Army’s 1983 
and 1985 study and subsequent reviews of the BCT program; U.S. Army Training and Doctrine 
Command, TRADOC Regulation 350-6: Enlisted Initial Entry Training (IET) Policies and Administration 
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Additionally, DynCorp’s outsider status allowed it to support Liberia’s 
interests in the back offices of the Pentagon and State Department in 
Washington, DC, where Liberians could seldom venture. It became evident 
during the consultations that Liberians strongly advocated gender equality in 
the ranks while the US government did not. Before the civil war the AFL had 
an all-female unit called the Women’s Auxiliary Corps, which was well 
respected even in 2005, and during the civil war some of the most feared 
warlords, such as Black Diamond, were women. Liberians understood that 
women could be effective warriors. However, the US military holds that 
women are not fit for combat and therefore should not serve in front-line 
units, and it initially opposed including women in AFL infantry units.  
DynCorp thus became an unwitting arbitrator in a debate between the 
defence establishments in Washington DC and Monrovia. As a nominal 
outsider in the process, DynCorp could credibly present ideas and 
recommendations to entrenched bureaucracies on both sides of the Atlantic 
without the burdens of institutional loyalty or prejudice. This helped drive the 
argument for gender parity, since key managers in DynCorp were persuaded 
                                                                                                                       
(Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2003).; and the US Army’s program of 
instruction for basic training at Fort Jackson, South Carolina. US Army and AFL basic training relies on a 
three-phase ‘soldierization’ process. Phase I plunges recruits into regimented army life and organises 
them into thirty-man platoons. Phase II continues the enforcement of standards and begins combat 
training, such as basic rifle marksmanship (BRM) and physical training, and creates a company mind set, 
whereby all rise or fall together. Phase III concentrates on individual tactical training, movement 
techniques, small unit tactics, map reading, land navigation, first aid and other soldier skills. Transitioning 
from one phase to another was treated as a rite of passage as the training cadre evaluated and counseled 
each recruit regarding his or her performance and determined whether they should ‘recycle’ the phase or 
advance to the next one. Basic training culminated with a tough field training exercise (FTX) that, like a 
final exam, amalgamated all previous tactical training, plus a twenty-kilometre forced march. If recruits 
passed, they graduated to AIT training. 
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by the Liberians’ case. Because the State Department managed the SSR 
contract, it had the final vote on the matter and opted for gender parity, 
overruling the DOD’s desire to use US military templates and its bias against 
women in infantry units. Consequently, Liberian women now enjoy greater 
equality in their military than do American women.  
The Bad 
For all the success of the program, few things went as planned. This was partly 
due to the complexity of the task and difficulty of the environment, but also to 
the unique nature of the private military industry. Using private means to 
achieve public ends can sometimes pit profit motive against policy goals, and 
this created problems in the public-private partnership between the United 
States, DynCorp and Liberia. 
Competition for the Worse 
In the Middle Ages, Free Companies hired by the same employer did not 
always work well together, and the same is true today. The State Department 
awarded the remaking of the AFL to two companies, DynCorp and PAE, and 
despite the importance of their collective task they rarely coordinated. The idea 
of integrated operations is so critical to success in warfare that the US military 
even has a word for it––jointness––which refers to the ability of separate 
services, such as the US Army and Marines, to work closely together. The US 
government has devoted considerable energy to this challenge since the failure 
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of Operation Eagle Claw in 1980 to save American hostages in Iran and the 
subsequent Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 to remedy interoperability issues 
among services in the military. It is assumed in public sector militaries that 
different services ought to work well together.  
No such assumption exists in the private military sector; PMCs are 
incentivised not to work closely together for a single yet powerful reason: 
proprietary knowledge. Companies do not wish to share trade secrets about 
how they operate or other sensitive information with their competitors, even 
when they jointly win a contract, as occurred in rebuilding the AFL. Instead, 
both firms focused on their discrete tasks and assume the other was 
competent. DynCorp’s job was demobilising the old force and building a new 
one; PAE’s assignment was providing newly formed units with logistical and 
technical life support until they were functionally autonomous (or until the 
contract expired). This was a flawed solution.  
However, this approach became a problem where their mutual roles 
and competing interests intersected, to the detriment of the AFL. At the end 
of the contract the quality of the new AFL was tested using the US Army 
Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP), a gruelling multi-day field training 
exercise (FTX) that certifies a unit’s competency and declares it operational. 
Not surprisingly, the client also used the ARTEP to evaluate DynCorp and 
PAE, since the AFL’s performance reflected on the companies and would 
affect future contract opportunities with the State Department. This was a 
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frustrating situation for both firms. PAE had almost no input in the training or 
force structure of the AFL, yet it was expected to finish what DynCorp started. 
From DynCorp’s perspective, PAE modified and administered the ARTEP, 
which allowed its competitor to act as a peer reviewer of DynCorp’s work.754 
This created a dysfunctional working relationship that probably detracted from 
overall contract achievement. Worse, each was likely to blame the other if the 
State Department complained about the quality of training.  
Another deleterious effect of free market competition between firms is 
leadership selection and training: today the AFL remains a mostly leaderless 
army comprised of two thousand privates. This is partly because neither firm 
had full responsibility for leadership selection and training, and it was 
ultimately neglected in a ‘tragedy of the commons’ dilemma.755 DynCorp was 
responsible for the initial training officers and NCOs while PAE would 
mentor them once they arrived at their home unit. To be fair, developing 
‘instant’ senior leadership is extremely difficult and a fundamental challenge of 
SSR.756 In most modern militaries it takes twenty years to create a colonel and 
much longer to generate a general. Liberia cannot wait that long.    
                                                
754 “Diggin’ in: AFL Soldiers Complete FTX,” Military.com, March 6, 2009. 
755 The ‘tragedy of the commons’ describes a situation in which multiple individuals, acting in their own 
rational self-interest, deplete a shared limited resource even though it is not in anyone’s interest to do so. 
Garrett Hardin, “The Tragedy of the Commons,” in Nature’s Web: Rethinking Our Place on Earth, 
Peter Marshall (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1993), 173. 
756 Creating ‘instant’ senior leaders is a fundamental challenge of making a military from the ground up 
and one that SSR planners must weigh against the perils of lustration. Lustration culls undesirable 
members of a security force and then builds a new force around the ‘desirable’ individuals who remain. 
The challenge with lustration is that international actors seldom know who is ‘desirable’ and domestic 
ones use it to purge political adversaries in the ranks. For more information see: McFate, “The Art and 
Aggravation of Vetting in Post-Conflict Environments,” 79. 
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DynCorp’s initial plan called for the Liberian government to select 
leadership through a quarterly or monthly promotion board from recruits who 
demonstrated leadership potential in basic training or from applicants with 
relevant experience, such as Liberians serving in the US Army or UN 
peacekeeping missions. Then it was assumed PAE would mentor those leaders 
in the next phase of SSR. However, this process yielded few qualified leaders. 
An alternative was to have a foreigner lead the AFL, which is what the 
Liberian government chose: the AFL chief of staff is a Nigerian general. 
However, there was also third option, not considered by DynCorp, that was 
very neomedieval: the PMC would lead the army and train Liberian 
counterparts until they could take control. This might seem outrageous to 
some, but there is already precedent for it, as EO led client forces into battle 
during the 1990s.757 More likely than not, we shall see this again in the future.  
Who Is Managing Whom?  
Just as clients in the Middle Ages sent provveditori to watch over condottieri in the 
field, the United States sends contracting officer’s technical representatives 
(COTRs) to oversee contractors, and like the provveditori before them, the 
COTR system is plagued with problems. In Liberia, the State Department 
officials responsible for the AFL SSR program resided in Washington, DC, 
and not Africa. Their acting COTR was a lone military officer who worked in 
the US Embassy’s Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC). This individual was 
                                                
757 Human Rights Watch Arms Project. Angola: Arms Trade and Violations of the Laws of War Since the 1992 
Elections (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1994), 31. 
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responsible for overseeing the entire program and its hundreds of contractors, 
in addition to other embassy duties. Several ODC chiefs rotated through the 
embassy but few if any had significant experience managing multi-million 
dollar contracts, handling multi-billion dollar companies or building militaries 
wholesale in conflict-affected countries. One ODC chief was a navy officer 
with no real experience serving in armies, much less raising them. The lack of 
qualification was not the fault of the ODC chiefs, but their government: the 
United States routinely deploys COTRs without adequate training and 
resources to do their job, as the Gansler report confirms.758 
The COTR’s lack of expertise created asymmetries of information that 
DynCorp exploited for profit, just as the condottieri did with the provveditori. 
Because the COTRs were unfamiliar with rebuilding armed forces from the 
ground up, they relied too much on the company’s expert opinion and access 
to information to make important business decisions on behalf of the 
government, creating a classic situation of moral hazard. Contractors are 
incentivised to stall, elongate or expand their contracts for profit, and do so by 
finding additional, billable tasks to accomplish. Accordingly, they are 
motivated to steer government officials’ decisions towards this goal, but 
swaying COTRs potentially changes foreign policy implementation.  
The situation in Liberia created the conditions for exploitation by 
DynCorp. The situation festered until finally the State Department inspector 
                                                
758 Urgent Reform Required: Army Expeditionary Contracting: The Report of the Commission on Army Acquisition and 
Program Management in Expeditionary Operations: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Readiness and Management 
Support of the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, 110th Cong. December 6, 2007. 
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general conducted an internal audit of the SSR program and found oversight 
weak. They observed that embassy personnel who were involved in SSR 
‘received no training in managing or evaluating’ such programs. Worse, they 
discovered that the COTR occasionally ‘received invoices with vague 
descriptions, which covered work prior to his arrival in Liberia, or with 
questionable work descriptions’. They also found that the State Department 
staff responsible for the program in Washington, DC rarely visited Liberia. 
The inspector general’s report concluded that it ‘does not believe that such 
irregular visits assure adequate project oversight for this substantial program 
which spent $127 million through FY 2007’.759 
Outside observers agree. The International Crisis Group found that in 
Liberia ‘oversight structures employed by the US State Department have been 
shoddy’ and recommended that ‘the State Department, therefore, should 
radically revamp its oversight system’.760 This is representative of a larger 
problem echoed by many industry critics: the United States has limited 
regulation of and oversight over PMCs despite employing them widely, creates 
conditions for abuse by the contractor. The objectives of profit and public 
policy often diverge, and this can alter policy outcomes as firms subtly steer 
client decisions in favour of profit over policy goals.  
                                                
759 U.S. Department of State, Report of Inspection Embassy Monrovia, Liberia Report Number ISP-I-08-20a 
(Washington, DC: US Government, 2008), 16. 
760 International Crisis Group, Liberia: Uneven Progress in Security Sector Reform, i, 19, 34. 
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Who Owns What? 
Like the condottieri, contemporary contractors serve only their paymasters at the 
expense of other relevant considerations, such as process ownership. 
Ownership has become a mantra of the international community vested in 
developing fragile and failed states; it refers to local political and popular 
support for foreign assistance programs like SSR, and there is a growing 
consensus among scholars that early local ownership is crucial to program 
sustainability and legitimacy.761 The concept is simple enough: a foreign power 
that wields a heavy hand in transforming another country will likely alienate 
the very people it aspires to benefit, negating the purpose of the program. Or 
as Laurie Nathan explains, ‘Experience shows that reform processes will not 
succeed in the absence of commitment and ownership on the part of those 
undertaking reforms’.762  
                                                
761 Despite this growing consensus, ownership remains a contested concept, and how one translates this 
principle into practice is challenging. Even the definition of local ownership is disputed. Who gets to 
decide who the key stakeholders are when determining local ownership? Deciding which local leaders 
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international ones? Local ownership is sound in theory but ambiguous in practice. For more information 
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Because the AFL SSR process relied heavily on US support, some 
scholars assert it lacks ownership, sustainability and legitimacy.763 Morten Bøas 
and Karianne Stig sum up this collective critique when they claim that the lack 
of transparency, accountability and participation of local Liberians in the SSR 
process led to a paucity of ownership of the program. 764  Even the US 
Congressional Research Service questions the balance between foreign support 
for and national ownership of security in Liberia, and worries that lack of 
adequate public input has created an AFL where ‘political legitimacy might be 
called into question’.765 
Contractors compound the quandary of ownership because, as Adedeji 
Ebo reasons, ‘there is no direct contractual obligation between the security 
contractor and the institutions and people of the reforming state’.766 Not even 
the Liberian minister of defence had a copy of DynCorp’s contract to 
transform the AFL he was to lead, demonstrating a lack of transparency in the 
process (see annexes for copies of the contract). This created a problematic 
situation. Liberians were neither an employer nor a signatory to the contract, 
even though they were the intended beneficiaries of the program. 
Consequently, the Liberian government had only limited ability to direct 
DynCorp; the company, in essence, was not accountable to the state, even as it 
                                                
763 Ebo, “Liberia Case Study.”; Bøås and Stig, “Security Sector Reform in Liberia.”; Louise Andersen, 
Post-Conflict Security Sector Reform and the Challenge of Ownership: The Case of Liberia (Copenhagen: Danish 
Institute for International Studies, 2006). 
764 Bøås and Stig, “Security Sector Reform in Liberia,” 286. 
765 Cook, Liberia’s Post-War Development, 26. 
766 Ebo, “Liberia Case Study,” 154-155. 
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was rebuilding its military forces. For Bøas and Stig, ‘this clearly represents a 
democratic deficit in the SSR’.767 
Critics’ conclusions may be somewhat overstated. Few Liberians 
seemed concerned about the US role in the AFL SSR process, especially given 
the urgent need for military reform and the strong historical ties between the 
two countries. Nor were Liberians troubled by the presence of contractors: 
there were no riots, protests, violence or other evidence of widespread PMC 
rejection. DynCorp’s frequent overtures to civil society––almost always 
through the government of Liberia––were met with general disinterest. The 
Liberian minister of defence had multiple occasions to join DynCorp on its 
recruitment trips starting in 2006, but chose not to accompany the firm until 
2008.768 Additionally, the NTGL––and not DynCorp––determined who was 
eligible for demobilisation benefits and who would be admitted into the new 
AFL. This suggests a lack of worry on the Liberian government’s part rather 
than a failure of transparency on DynCorp’s, as more recent scholarship 
confirms:  
The Liberian Ministry of Defence, the legislature and civil 
society have had opportunities to involve themselves more in 
the reform than they have done, thus suggesting that the 
reform is not proceeding as such a closed process as previous 
research on the SSR has argued (Ebo 2005, 2007, Loden 
2007).769 
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Other problems undermine academic critiques over ownership. Can 
foreign scholars really speak for Liberians on the question of local ownership? 
Can outside observers claim Liberia had no ownership of AFL SSR if its 
government had approved and accepted a gratis program that the United 
States provided through its contractors?770 Can simultaneous assertions that 
there was no local ownership and that ownership is necessary for success be 
made if Liberians have not rejected the AFL and it is a success compared to 
the Liberian National Police and other elements of the security sector? The 
International Crisis Group describes progress in Liberia’s security sector 
reform as ‘uneven’: while ‘the police are still widely considered ineffective and 
corrupt’, ‘Army reform appears to be a provisional success’.771 
Other researchers are more acerbic about the use of a PMC in Liberia. 
As Mark Malan writes in a monograph for the US Army War College, ‘In a 
country and region where recent history has been shaped by warlords and 
mercenaries, the US Department of State has shown remarkable insensitivity 
by sending in contractors to shape the new army’.772 Comparing DynCorp to 
Liberian warlords and mercenaries without supporting evidence is absurd and 
reveals how ingrained the Westphalian taboo against private military functions 
remains in academic and policy thinking. Even the International Crisis Group–
                                                                                                                       
and Security Sector Reform in Post-Conflict Liberia: Painting a Moving Train Without Brushes,” 
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–no apologist for the private military industry––agrees that such 
interpretations are extreme and declares itself ‘agnostic’ on the issue.773  
However, despite exaggerations over ownership and the pro-
Westphalian zeal of some observers, the concern remains valid. An example of 
this lack of ownership is the sensitisation and recruiting efforts. Despite 
DynCorp’s efforts to localize the campaign by hiring locals to help design it, 
many Liberians found it bumbling and even insulting. The use of well-dressed 
and healthy-looking children on some of the AFL recruiting posters was not 
well received by a population traumatised by child soldiers. Many asked 
whether the children on the posters were American, given their health. This 
demonstrated a lack of cultural sensitivity on the part of the campaign 
designers, partly because the messages were not thoroughly tested on Liberian 
focus groups before they went public. Similarly, the comic books received 
mixed reactions; they were an effective tool for illiterate audiences but repelled 
some educated Liberians, who found them infantilising.  
  Worse, DynCorp’s attempt to combine sensitisation and recruiting into 
a single campaign to conserve resources and time muddled messages and 
hampered the efficacy of both. In many ways, these two information efforts 
are incompatible. The objective of the sensitisation program is to alert the 
public to the new military’s formation in the most transparent and neutral 
manner possible, whereas the purpose of recruitment is advocacy by framing 
information in a highly positive way to encourage enlistment. DynCorp chose 
                                                
773 International Crisis Group, Liberia: Uneven Progress in Security Sector Reform, 31. 
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to prioritise recruitment over sensitisation, which should not be a surprise. 
After all, it was hired to raise an army, not facilitate a civil society discourse on 
role of the new AFL: Too much indigenous criticism of what it was doing 
could have resulted in the State Department cancelling its contract. But this 
lack of transparency and civil society engagement is an important component 
of SSR as it inculcates ownership and acceptance of the new AFL. 
Like the condottieri, DynCorp sought primarily to please its client––the 
United States––and not Liberia, whose military it was rebuilding. This created 
incentive structures that explain some of the PMC’s behaviour in country, such 
as the weak sensitisation campaign. That SSR was contracted to a private 
military rather than assigned to a public one fundamentally altered the 
relationship between the three main actors: the United States, Liberia and 
DynCorp. This distorted the strategic outcome of the program. Akin to the 
medieval market for force, conducting this operation as a business transaction 
fundamentally changed it by shifting control to the entity with the power of 
the purse, the United States. The United States demanded the PMC brief it 
first on all major program decisions, often without the Liberian government’s 
knowledge, allowing it to make important decisions and influence plans before 
the Liberian government was even consulted. The State Department finalised 
and approved DynCorp’s plans for demobilisation, training, force structure, 
recruiting and vetting before they were formally presented to the Liberian 
Minister of Defence, often as a fait de compli. This gave the United States a 
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significant––and perhaps undue––advantage in shaping the future of Liberia’s 
military for its own strategic interests. 
Changing the Tool Changes the Outcome 
Modern PMCs alter international outcomes by their very presence, just as the 
condottieri did in the Middle Ages. Contemporary military strategists may be 
tempted to think of PMCs as a second-rate substitute for national army units 
and deploy them accordingly, but such idealisations are dangerously wrong. 
PMCs are not a swappable standby for public armies because they are 
fundamentally different in their composition, nature and purpose, and this can 
change strategic outcomes in unexpected ways. Blackwater’s killing of 
seventeen civilians at Nisour Square in Baghdad caused global outrage, 
galvanised anti-American sentiment during the US military’s ‘winning hearts 
and minds’ counter-insurgency campaign, and necessitated the secretary of 
state’s direct involvement to appease the region. By contrast, few remember 
when US Marines killed twenty-four Iraqis at Haditha, Iraq, under similar 
circumstances. The key difference between these two events is that the former 
involved private warriors and the latter did not, resulting in wholly different 
consequences for the war and the world. 
 Contractors change outcomes in more subtle yet pervasive ways too. 
In Liberia, principal-agent challenges unique to contracting infused every 
aspect of the AFL SSR program. The initial meetings with stakeholders were 
crucial to the SSR process, since early decisions shaped the program as a 
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whole; achieving some modicum of consensus was vital, and ideally this task 
would have fallen to the US Embassy. However, embassy staffing was thin and 
over-burdened, as noted in the inspector general’s report.774 Owing to this, the 
job of engaging stakeholders unofficially fell to DynCorp, allowing the firm to 
influence outcomes in its favour. The US defence attaché or ODC chief often 
accompanied DynCorp staff on these meetings but, as explained above, their 
role as overseer was limited due to inadequate contract management training, 
available resources to do their job and asymmetries of information and 
expertise. 
Although DynCorp had no real vote in any stakeholder meeting, it was 
the de facto representative of the US government when it met with Liberians. 
This afforded the company a certain modicum of convening authority and 
agenda setting power that allowed it to influence decisions and ultimately 
outcomes. It could identify stakeholder groups by choosing whom to invite 
and partially select leadership by deciding which individuals to engage 
regardless of whether that person’s opinion represented the group as a whole. 
DynCorp also could select and sequence issues for discussion, shaping 
outcomes by strategically proposing solutions for stakeholders to adopt. The 
company even had some power to veto or simply ignore concerns that it 
deemed unrealistic, not operationally possible or unprofitable. If he was 
present, the US representative often supported DynCorp’s veto.  
                                                
774 U.S. Department of State, Report of Inspection Embassy Monrovia. 
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Pay Problems 
As with the medieval paymasters of the condottieri, sporadic payments by the 
client jeopardised the campaign. The United States paid for the SSR program, 
save the soldiers’ salaries, making progress vulnerable to the ebb and flow of 
State Department funding.775 Money for the DDR of 13,770 legacy soldiers 
was scarce, delaying their demobilisation and placing the entire SSR effort––
and arguably the country––in peril. In late April 2006, 400 to 500 former AFL 
soldiers conducted a violent protest outside the Ministry of Defence, claiming 
non-payment of salary arrears and retirement benefits, and clashed with 
UNMIL peacekeepers sent to quell the unrest.776   
Erratic funding to other parts of the program resulted in inchoate 
outcomes. The Ministry of Defence reform program was prematurely 
terminated after the completion of a seventeen-week civil servant training 
course but before the implementation of a planned five-month mentoring and 
on-the-job training phase. Consequently, new civil servants had no source of 
advice or assistance as they assumed their official duties in the new ministry, 
rendering it severely incapacitated.777  
Lapses in client funding and Liberian capacity also created dangerous 
situations. Training was stopped for months due to lack of payment by the 
State Department, leaving new soldiers to sit idle while they waited for follow 
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776 Total demobilisation costs totalled approximately $15 million. Cook, Liberia’s Post-War Development, 22. 
777 Thomas Dempsey, Security Sector Reform in Liberia Part I: An Assessment of Defense Reform’, Issue Paper no. 
2008 (Carlisle, PA: Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2008), 3. 
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on recruits to fill out their unit. Making matters worse, the Ministry of Finance 
still did not have the capacity to pay soldiers in 2006, demonstrating that in 
recovering failed states all institutions must rise together. This created the 
dangerous situation of unpaid and disgruntled soldiers that the SSR program 
sought to avoid from the outset.   
Meanwhile those ready to report to basic training were literally told, 
‘don’t call us, we’ll call you’ by frustrated SSR program staff. The program then 
consisted of nearly one hundred international (US and third-country national 
personnel combined) and several hundred local national staff. Sending the 
international staff home and furloughing the local staff to save money would 
cause resentment among the locals, given Liberia’s 75 per cent unemployment 
rate, and many of the international staff were specialists who were difficult to 
replace.  
Frustrated and fearing that it might have to leave Liberia for lack of 
payment––an option few public armies would consider––DynCorp urged its 
client to stabilise the funding stream. The high cost of paying expensive 
employees to sit idle in a country where the average person subsisted on $1.25 
a day sent a cynical message to the population, already somewhat dubious over 
the new AFL. Also, it created a dangerous situation in an unstable state, as 
DynCorp was unable to store weapons and ammunition safely without an 
armoury, which PAE was scheduled to build but could not because of lack of 
money. Worse, soldiers who completed training would have no military base to 
 413 
report to, as PAE had yet to complete bases, which could prove a perilous 
situation for Liberian society and discredit the entire SSR program. As Mark 
Malan notes, ‘Weak and erratic funding from the US Department of State is 
the main cause of the slow pace of AFL development’.778 
The Ugly 
The most significant fact of DynCorp’s work in Liberia is that the private 
sector can raise an army at all. Like Hawkwood, Wallenstein, the British East 
India Company and other predecessors, DynCorp made a military for a client 
and did so without external assistance other than payment. The Liberia 
program was not a public and private partnership involving a hybrid of US 
soldiers and PMC personnel working together to transform the military, as has 
happened in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Balkans and elsewhere. Liberia’s armed 
forces are unique in that they were generated entirely by the private sector. 
DynCorp would even have had an easier time with its undertaking if it had a 
less finicky and legally constrained client than the State Department and a 
more laissez-faire context than a UN peacekeeping mission. 
If a company can create a military then it also has the expertise to 
deploy it, since the skill sets are intertwined and PMCs enlist most of their 
leadership from those with significant experience in other militaries, 
                                                
778 Malan, Security Sector Reform in Liberia, x. See also: Cook, Liberia’s Post-War Development, 23. 
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intelligence or law-enforcement organisations.779 For instance, DynCorp could 
have easily provided former military officers to lead the AFL, on a temporary 
or permanent basis, as EO did in Angola and elsewhere. Also, it was well 
within the PMC’s grasp to purchase and move small arms illegally and without 
state support, since the State Department role, beyond financier, was managing 
the legal requirements of the transfer while the machinations of the deal itself 
were left to the firm. Although DynCorp had no intention of building its own 
army, taking over the AFL or illegally supplying weapons to regional actors, 
the PMC––and others like it––currently possesses the ability to do so. 
The implications of this for international relations are substantial. The 
erosion of the taboo against private violence, coupled with the decline of state 
authority and ascendency of non-state global actors, augurs a neomedieval 
world where the means of war are available to anyone who can afford it. Like 
the condottieri of old, this holds the power to change warfare, why we fight and 
the future of war. The age of the PMC is upon us and perhaps never left in 
places like Africa. 
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the requisite expertise to do so. 
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Chapter  6 
  
Back to the Future  
 
 
I’ll get paid for killing and this town is full of men who deserve to die 
––Sanjuro, masterless samurai, from Akira Kurosawa’s Yojimbo (1961) 
 
  
Liberia is just the beginning of the new market for force. To date, the market 
has remained highly US-centric, since the country is the main consumer of 
private military force, but there is no reason to assume it will always be this 
way. Already more combat-capable private armies are emerging akin to their 
medieval ancestors, and the commodification of conflict is expanding beyond 
the grasp of the United States and its coalition partners in Iraq or Afghanistan. 
In 2011 alone, private warriors of all stripes have come out of the shadows to 
engage in for-profit warfare. In Afghanistan warlords act as free-market 
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modern condottieri: they offer for-hire fighters capable of dispersing Taliban and 
other armed threats, and the United States employs many of them, as 
demonstrated by its host nation trucking contract.780 Libyan president Gaddafi 
hired mercenaries from across Africa to brutally suppress the popular revolt 
against him, just as England’s King Henry II did in the twelfth century. Both 
sides in Côte d’Ivoire’s war of succession used mercenaries, mostly from 
Liberia, who have committed atrocities reminiscent of Hawkwood’s 
destruction of Cesena in 1377.781 PMCs Saracen International and Bancroft 
Global Development independently train Somalis to battle pirates and Islamic 
militants. Abu Dhabi, the capital of the United Arab Emirates, paid the PMC 
Reflex Responses $529 million to build a small army of 800 foreign troops to 
conduct special operations missions inside and outside the country, defend oil 
pipelines and other infrastructure from terrorist attacks and put down internal 
rebellions.782 Moreover, this phenomenon is not restricted simply to unstable 
places but affects rich and poor countries alike, both in times of crisis as well 
as everyday functioning. The US military is highly privatised, with contractors 
comprising half of its force structure, and the country can no longer fight a 
sustained war without the private sector.    
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Private armies are back and not likely to go away, and this is a 
harbinger of a wider trend in international relations: the emergence of 
neomedievalism. The return of private armies is symptomatic of the general 
decline of state authority in world politics and suggests a fundamental shift in 
the organisation and distribution of power within the international system. In 
the state-centric Westphalian world order, states are the only actors in 
international politics, the only subjects of international law and the only 
entities that can legitimately use force to impose their authority. Mercenaries 
are strictly outlawed because they can threaten a state’s monopoly of force to 
assert this authority and contest its existence. The reappearance of private 
armies signals a return to the pre-Westphalian norm of the Middle Ages, when 
states did not enjoy the monopoly of force or special authority in world 
politics. Instead, the medieval world was polycentric in nature, with authority 
diluted and shared among state and non-state actors alike.  
States will not disappear, but will matter less than they did a century 
ago. They already increasingly compete with IOs, NGOs, MNCs, politicised 
ethnic and religious groups and other non-state actors for political dominance 
in world affairs. Nor does neomedievalism connote worldwide chaos and 
anarchy; the global system will persist in a durable disorder that contains rather 
than solves problems. The implications of this are enormous, suggesting that 
international relations in the twenty-first century may have more in common 
with the twelfth century than with the twentieth. 
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Neomedievalism is not necessarily a pejorative condition yet one 
disturbing aspect is the commodification of conflict: offering the means of war 
to anyone who can afford it will change warfare. Like the Middle Ages, there 
will be advantages and disadvantages to this new way of war, and it would be 
wrong to reflexively dismiss this development as wholly unwelcome. Those 
brought up to see war in purely ideological terms, namely as an armed contest 
between two or more states, might assume the privatisation of conflict 
guarantees greater violence, yet this overlooks the obvious: that some of the 
bloodiest wars in history, such as World War I and World War II, were fought 
at the apex of the Westphalian order. For others, this growing dependence on 
PMCs and the increasing private-public partnership in warfare is actually a next 
stage of modernity, not a regression, as society redistributes the risks of war 
more broadly.783  
Moreover, like the condottieri of old, modern PMCs require some 
modicum of law and order to function, such as a reliable banking system, 
contract enforcement mechanisms, a physical headquarters, a safe base of 
operations and other accoutrements of stability. As Coker reminds us: 
‘transnational companies like stable, not fragile states’.784 Qualified PMCs could 
provide much-needed soldiers to the United Nations, which faces an ever-
increasing demand for peacekeeping missions. Peacekeeping will no doubt 
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become a niche market for PMCs, and the United Nations could lead the way 
in developing PMC best practices, a registration and licensing program and a 
regulatory framework to ensure quality control for privatised peacekeeping. 
Lastly, the private sector can find more efficient and effective ways of 
achieving war aims, sometimes sparing blood and treasure. 
However, the benefits should not disguise the darker side of private 
warfare, also demonstrated in the Middle Ages. Linking armed conflict with 
profit motive incentivises private armies to elongate and expand war for 
financial gain. On-demand military services can lower the barriers to entry into 
conflict, making war more likely. Similarly, military supply can generate 
demand through racketeering and extortion. Contract warfare is also fraught 
with difficulties, especially in enforcing the contract’s terms when the client is 
unarmed and the contractor is. A PMC can exploit asymmetries of information 
between itself and its client, to the profit of the company and the detriment of 
overall peace and stability. These dilemmas are only the beginning of a brave 
new world that looks remarkably old; yet today’s private military industry may 
move beyond even the condotierri’s ambitions. 
Peace Through Profit Motive? 
The 1961 Japanese movie Yojimbo, directed by Akira Kurosawa, tells the story 
of Sanjuro, a masterless samurai or ronin, who arrives at a small town torn 
asunder by two competing criminal gangs. The ronin persuades each crime lord 
to hire him as protection from the other, and through skillful political 
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manipulation and the bloody use of his sword he successfully pits the rival 
gangs against each other. The gangs are soon annihilated in battle while the 
ronin enriches himself; he then moves on to the next crime-ridden town. By 
acting in his economic self-interest, the ronin brings peace to the town, albeit 
with much collateral damage. 
 The future of private armies may look like the plot of Yojimbo. It is 
certainly conceivable that a PMC today could secretly and simultaneously serve 
two clients at war with each other, as did the ronin in Yojimbo, expanding the 
conflict for profit until both sides destroy each other, after which the PMC 
would move on to the next conflict and business opportunity. More nuanced 
scenarios also abound. A human rights organisation such as Amnesty 
International could hire a PMC to stage a humanitarian intervention in a place 
like Darfur or the DRC to save lives, justified by the responsibility to protect 
doctrine in a ‘liberal vigilantism’.785 This in turn could prompt the invaded 
government to hire an opposing PMC––sourced from a country like China, 
which has a troubled human rights record––to counter the first PMC and help 
‘pacify’ the area. If PMCs are truly profit-maximising entities, it is also likely 
they would cut deals among themselves, either explicitly or implicitly, to 
promote their own business interests, namely spreading conflict for the sake of 
profit.  
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action,” BBC News, March 29, 2011. 
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 The result could be two or more PMCs fighting an artificially 
prolonged proxy war in Africa for state and non-state actors, with far-reaching 
implications for international relations. Such a situation would signal the 
existence of a truly free market for force, the erosion of states’ monopoly of 
force and the corrosion of national sovereignty. Furthermore, the 
commercialisation of conflict would introduce the possibility of international 
vigilantism, as the means of warfare would become available to non-state 
actors, undermining the current international system of state-based global 
governance. In sum, it would herald––if not create––neomedievalism.  
Not Just Fantasy 
The above scenario may sound like a movie script but it is not. In 2008, 
millionaire actress Mia Farrow approached Blackwater and a few international 
humanitarian NGOs to end the genocide in Darfur, where approximately 
300,000 people have died since it began in 2003.786 The plan was simple. 
Blackwater would stage an armed intervention in Darfur and establish so-
called islands of humanity, refugee camps protected by PMC firepower for 
civilians fleeing the janjaweed and other militants. During this time, the human 
rights group would mount a global name-and-shame media campaign to goad 
the international community into ending the genocide once and for all with a 
robust Chapter VII UN peacekeeping mission. There were two critical 
                                                
786 Harvey Morris, “Activists Turn to Blackwater over Darfur,” Financial Times, June 19, 2008. See also: 
Anna Schecter, “Breakfast with Blackwater: Mia Farrow and Blackwater CEO Prince Met to Discuss A 
Possible Collaboration,” ABC News, August 20, 2008, accessed April 5, 2009, 
http://abcnews.go.com/print?id=5617186.  
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questions, however: could Blackwater actually stage an armed intervention in 
Darfur, and, if so, was this desirable?  
 The answer to the first question was certain: Blackwater could feasibly 
stage a humanitarian intervention. In 2005 it launched a subsidiary company 
called Greystone that could rapidly deploy a military force anywhere in the 
world to create a more secure environment for its customers. In the words of 
the company, ‘Greystone is an international security services company that 
offers your country or organisation a complete solution to your most pressing 
security needs…. Customer satisfaction is our primary focus, and we deliver 
superior services with professionalism and flexibility’. The company website 
lists humanitarian peacekeeping as a primary service that ‘provides a light 
infantry solution that is self-contained and self-sufficient. The Greystone 
peacekeeping program leverages efficiency of private resources to provide a 
complete cost effective security solution’.787 Also discussed was the possibility 
of training and equipping Darfurians or African Union peacekeepers to better 
defend against Sudanese aggression. Lastly, a range of offensive combat 
operations were contemplated that would disrupt or damage the Sudanese 
military’s and janjaweed’s ability to conduct the genocide. After preliminary 
research, independent experts verified that Greystone probably could stage a 
humanitarian intervention in Darfur for days and perhaps even weeks.788 
                                                
787 “Company Website,” Greystone LTD, accessed April 11, 2009, http://www.greystone-
ltd.com/index.html. 
788 The author served as an independent expert on a pro bono basis to a non-governmental organisation 
considering this course of action in 2008. 
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 The answer to the second question was not as certain. Even though 
Blackwater could stage a humanitarian intervention in Darfur, there were 
doubts as to whether it should. The action would brazenly violate international 
law, although some in the NGO community argued this was justified by state 
and UN failures to enforce human rights laws. However, there were many 
concerns. First, on a pragmatic level, the intervention could trigger additional 
violence and reprisals in the region, worsening the situation for local 
Darfurians in the long run. It would also certainly undermine ongoing 
diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict peacefully, even if those efforts were 
paltry, and possibly drag the United States into a war with Sudan, since 
Blackwater was an American firm. Also, Blackwater employees conducting the 
operation could be tried by the ICC for war crimes, which both Blackwater 
and the NGOs found bitterly ironic given their mission to protect human 
rights and the ICC’s arrest warrant for the president of Sudan for propagating 
genocide.  
 On a theoretical level, a private military humanitarian action would set 
a precedent that many states would not welcome––the possibility of 
international vigilantism––that would challenge the state’s monopoly of force 
and ultimately undermine the Westphalian system of state-based global 
governance, if left unchecked. This was exactly what the NGO and others 
were hoping for; they assumed the international community of states, in 
addition to condemning Blackwater, would have to reassert its collective 
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monopoly of force via a Chapter VII peacekeeping mission, as international 
law demands. Allowing Blackwater to remain on the ground would validate the 
most extreme of neomedieval precedents: non-state actors hiring private 
military organisations to achieve private purposes. 
Ultimately, all parties decided not to pursue the possibility of a private 
military intervention. However, it is possible––even probable––that in the 
future, individuals and organisations will overcome such reservations and 
retain less fussy PMCs to do their bidding. A tycoon seeking an altruistic legacy 
might hire a PMC from, say, Chechnya, which has a surplus of unemployed 
fighters and a deficit of respect for the laws of war, to stage a similar operation 
for the purposes of posterity. If successful, it could trigger similar undertakings 
that would cement the free market for force and provide the final piece of the 
neomedieval puzzle.  
A neomedieval market for force is closer than many might suppose. 
After the Iraq and Afghanistan bubbles burst, PMCs will seek new markets 
and develop new services or go out of business, and multi-billion dollar 
industries like PMCs tend not to go bankrupt without a fight. This new market 
will be in Africa since––like Northern Italy in the Middle Ages––that is where 
the conflict and instability is, and thus where PMC services are in highest 
demand. In the abstract, it is natural that supply should seek demand and vice 
versa, yet in reality, introducing an industry vested in conflict into the most 
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conflict-prone continent in the world is vexing, given the possible 
consequences for the people who live there.  
Moreover, in the coming years, the market is likely to change. Supply 
of military services probably will diversify, as PMCs develop from Russia, 
China and elsewhere, offering greater combat-oriented possibilities and 
working for the highest bidder with scant regard for human rights or 
international law. Supply can create demand, which can also diversify as new 
clients emerge from the new cast of neomedieval characters on the world 
stage: fragile states and tyrannical regimes augmenting their forces, UN 
missions requiring additional peacekeepers, MNCs and shipping lines 
protecting their assets, NGOs needing security, opposition groups seeking 
regime change and the whims of super-empowered individuals. Africa could 
begin to look very neomedieval––in the worst ways––and it might spread to 
other continents that know war. Few would like to see an unbridled market for 
force emerge in the twenty-first century. Yet such a neomedieval world is 
already upon us.  
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Glossary 
 
AFL Armed Forces of Liberia 
 AFRICOM  US Africa Command 
AIT Advanced Individual Training 
AQIM Al Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb 
AR Army Regulation 
ARTEP Army Readiness Training Evaluation Program 
AU African Union 
BTC Barclay Training Center 
CEO Chief Executive Officers 
CIA Central Intelligence Agency 
COIN Counter-Insurgency 
COTR Contracting Officer’s Technical Representative 
CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
DAMC Demobilization Advisory Monitoring Committee 
DDR Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration 
DDRR Disarmament, Demobilisation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration 
DOD US Department of Defense 
DOS US Department of State 
DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo 
EBO Effects-Based Operations 
ECOMOG Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group 
ECOSOC Economic and Social Council 
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States 
EO Executive Outcomes 
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EU European Union 
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 
FDI Foreign Direct Investment 
FTX Field Training Exercise 
FY US Fiscal Year 
GAO Government Accountability Office 
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
GC General Contractors 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
GNP Gross National Product  
ICC International Criminal Court  
ICJ International Court of Justice 
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross 
IDIQ Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity contract 
IDPs Internally Displaced Persons  
IET Initial Entry Training (AKA military ‘Basic Training’) 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
IO International Organisation 
ISAF International Security Assistance Force (NATO-led security mission 
in Afghanistan) 
ISI Pakistan Inter-Services Intelligence agency  
ISOA International Stability Operations Association (formerly the 
International Peace Operations Association or IPOA) 
JPB Joint Personnel Board 
JSR Justice Sector Reform 
LOAC Laws of Armed Conflict 
LOGCAP Logistics Civil Augmentation Program  
LTTE Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
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LURD Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy 
MEJA Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act 
MNC Multinational Corporation 
MOD Ministry of Defence or Ministry of National Defence 
MODEL Movement for Democracy in Liberia 
MOS Military Occupation Speciality 
MPRI Military Professional Resources Inc. 
MSF Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctor’s Without Borders) 
NCO Non-Commissioned Officers 
NDS National Defence Strategy 
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation 
NPFL National Patriotic Front of Liberia  
NTGL National Transitional Government of Liberia 
NTP Notice to Proceed 
ODC Office of Defense Cooperation 
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
OSCE Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
PAE Pacific Architects and Engineers  
PDC Peace And Development Committee 
PKO Peacekeeping Operations 
PMC Private Military Company 
PNTL Timor-Leste National Police Force  
PRC People’s Redemption Council 
PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team 
PSC Private Security Company 
R2P Responsibility to Protect 
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RFP Request for Proposal 
RMA Revolution in Military Affairs 
RPG Rocket Propelled Grenade Launcher 
RUF Revolutionary United Front 
SIGAR Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction 
SIGIR Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 
SOW Statement of Work 
SSR Security Sector Reform 
TCN Third Country National 
TNC Transnational Corporation 
TO&E Table of Organisation and Equipment 
TRC Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
TRIPS Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights  
UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
UK United Kingdom 
UN United Nations 
UNDP UN Development Programme 
UNDPKO UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations 
UNHCR UN High Commissioner for Refugees 
UNMIL UN Mission in Liberia 
UNOSOM UN Operation in Somalia 
US United States of America 
USAID United States Agency for International Development 
USD US Dollars 
VOA Voice of America 
VOC Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (Dutch East Indian Company) 
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WAEC West African Examinations Council 
WPPS Worldwide Personal Protective Services 
WTO World Trade Organisation  
 
  
 431 
Annexes 
 
Annex A: Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
The selection below is from the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), also 
known as the ‘Accra Accords’ because it was signed in Accra, Ghana, between 
warring parties of the Liberian civil war. This mandates SSR of the AFL.  
 
 
 
COMPREHENSIVE PEACE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE 
GOVERNMENT OF LIBERIA AND THE LIBERIANS UNITED FOR 
RECONCILATION AND DEMOCRACY (LURD) AND THE 
MOVEMENT FOR DEMOCRACY IN LIBERIA (MODEL) AND 
POLITICAL PARTIES ACCRA, AUGUST 18, 2003 
 
PART FOUR  
SECURITY SECTOR REFORM  
 
ARTICLE VII  
DISBANDMENT OF IRREGULAR FORCES, REFORMING AND 
RESTRUCTURING OF THE LIBERIAN ARMED FORCES  
 
1. The Parties agree that: 
 
a. All irregular forces shall be disbanded. 
 
b. The Armed Forces of Liberia shall be restructured and will 
have a new command structure. The forces may be drawn from 
the ranks of the present GOL forces, the LURD and the 
MODEL, as well as from civilians with appropriate 
background and experience. The Parties request that 
ECOWAS, the UN, AU, and the ICGL provide advisory staff, 
equipment, logistics and experienced trainers for the security 
reform effort. The Parties also request that the United States of 
America play a lead role in organising this restructuring 
program. 
 
2. The following Principles shall be taken into account in the formation of 
the restructured Liberian Armed Forces: 
 
a. Incoming service personnel shall be screened with respect to 
educational, professional, medical and fitness qualifications as 
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well as prior history with regard to human rights abuses; 
 
b. The restructured force shall take into account the country’s 
national balance. It shall be composed without any political 
bias to ensure that it represents the national character of 
Liberia; 
 
c. The Mission of the Armed Forces of Liberia shall be to defend 
the national sovereignty and in extremis, respond to natural 
disasters; 
 
d. All Parties shall cooperate with ECOWAS, the UN, the AU, 
the ICGL and the United States of America. 
 
3. All Parties together shall organise Information, Education and 
Communication (IEC) programs to sensitise the Liberian public as to 
the mission and activities of the restructuring plan. 
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Section B 
SECTION 8 
SUPPLIES OR SERVICES AND PRICES/COSTS 
B.1 The Contractor shall perform any and all services required 
for Peacekeeping,. Capacity Enhancement and Surveillance Efforts 
within the continent of Africa. The specific projects and 
scopes of work shall be tasked, via task order, in writing by 
the Contracting Officer and shall be in conformance with the 
contract clauses and special conditions contained herein. 
The professional services to be provided will include, but are 
not limited to, logistics, transportation of personnel, training 
of host country personnel, supply and establishment of field 
operations/services, maintenance, communications, and any other 
related service necessary to meet the department's needs, as well 
as administration and coordination of the various disciplines 
involved. See Section C for the Statement of Work. 
B.2 This is an Indefinite Quantity/Indefinite Delivery contract 
containing fixed hourly rates. The term of Contract S-LMAQM-03- 
C0034 is one base year, with four, 12-month option yearg to be 
renewed at the government's discretion. The contract may be 
renewed by modification under the same terms and conditions as 
the base year, except as provided in section E.5 Prices/Costs). 
The actual amount of work to be performed, the time of such 
performance, the deliverables, and the location of the work will 
be determined by the Contracting Officer, who will issue executed 
task orders to the Contractor. The only work authorized under 
this contract is that which is performed after receipt of such 
task orders and a written Notice to Proceed (NTP) from the 
Contracting Officer. A written NTP may be transmitted by 
facsimile or electronic mail (e-mail). 
8.3 The Contractor shall, upon receipt of a duly executed task 
order, perform all services as required in this contract and such 
further requirements as may be contained in task orders for 
projects described therein. The Contractor shall complete all 
work and services under this contract within the period of time 
specified in task orders, except that no task order shall be 
issued hereunder after the expiration of this contracts. . 
Performance, the deliverables, and the location of tbe'work will 
be task order specific. 
8.4 The Government makes no guarantee as to the number'of orders, or actual amount of services which will be requested above the 
guaranteed minimum value of $5,000,000.00 for the life of the 
contract (1 base year plus all four option years). 
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Section 8 
8.4.1 If two or more contracts are awarded under this 
solicitation, the Government reserves the right to compete or 
assign individual task orders to a particular contractor. 
8.4.2 The maximum dollar value for the life of this contract (1 
base year plus all four-option years) is $100,000,000.00. 
8.4.3 The minimum value for the contract that is exercised is 
$5,000,000.00 for the life of the contract (1 base year plus all 
four-option years). 
8.4.4 The minimum dollar value of any awarded task order is 
$50,000.00 and the maximum amount of any awarded task order is 
55,000,000.00 (Refer to Section I, Contract Clause 52.216-19, 
Ordering Limitation.) These limits may be waived by bilateral 
agreement between the government and the awarded contractor. 
B.4.5 Reserved 
8.4.6 The Prime contractor shall not subcontract more than 50% 
of the total value of this contract. 
8.5 PRICES/COSTS 
The Contractor shall provide professional services as directed by 
individual task orders executed by the Contracting Officer. In 
establishing the prices for individual task orders, the rates for 
the required services shall be in accordance with the fixed fully 
burdened hourly labor rates•submitted by the Offeror (See B.5.1). 
8.5.1 The Offeror shall submit a Cost Volume that contains 
unburdened direct hourly rates for each professional category, as 
(The remainder of this page intentionally left blank) 
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Section s 
well as fully burdened hourly rates for each labor category of 
each required discipline. The burdened rates shall include 
direct hourly rates, overhead, G&A, profit, and all employee 
fringe benefits, such as retirement, withholding for FICA and 
taxes (NOTE: DBA Insurance is not to be included in the burdened 
rate), unemployment, workman's compensation, etc. Submit these 
rates in the form of a chart, detailing each component of the 
burdened rate. Please include a rate for any category you feel 
which may be utilized during the performance of Task Orders under 
,this contract. All rates shall be submitted for each of the 
basic years and each option year. The submission of the option 
year rates shall not bind the Government to exercising the option 
year, nor should it be construed by the Offeror as the 
Government's intention to do so. Submit the same information for 
all proposed subcontractors, if possible. 
8.5.2 Submit a legend depicting the individual labor category 
and its requirement (e.g., Project Manager - 10 to 12 years 
relative experience, minimum of 4 year degree(s), X 
certification(s)). 
B.5.3 Submit a copy of the most recent audit completed on your 
company by another Government agency. If a copy cannot be 
provided, please providethe cognizant agency's name and a 
contact point. 
8.5.4 For cost/price evaluation under this contract, see Section 
L, M and Appendix I. For evaluation purposes under this 
contract, the prices submitted in accordance with Appendix I will 
be analyzed. The rates used in Appendix I will be extracted from 
the Cost Volume submitted in accordance with B.5.1 and B.5.2 and 
same shall be affixed to Section B of the resulting contract. 
NOTE: Following the completion of negotiations and prior to the award of any Task Order, you will be required, where necessary, 
and if not waived by the Contracting Officer, to complete a 
Certificate of Current Cost and Pricing Data. 
13.6 COST OF MATERIALS/EQUIPMENT 
The cost of any materials or equipment required to be furnished 
and used in conjunction with the services rendered hart:an, shall 
be included in the price of each task order unless otherwise 
noted in the task order. 
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B-7 TRAVEL 
In determining the cost of travel, the terms and conditions of 
the Federal Travel Regulations/Joint Travel Regulation (FTR/JTR) . 
Shall apply to all travel and travel-related matters authorized 
under this contract; travel and travel-related expenses shall not 
exceed the maximum allowable under the FTR/JTR. In connection 
with authorized travel, the following items may be included in 
the price of the task order: 
' (1) The cost of domestic economy-class (coach) air fare; (ii) 
the cost of hotel or housing accommodations, meals, and other 
incidentals when travel is undertaken; and (iii) miscellaneous 
expenses incurred in connection with the travel. For 
international travel, see Section H.14 Reimbursable Expenses. 
8.8 GOVERNMENT-FURBISBED PROPERTY 
Government furnished property, if provided, will be identified in 
any issued or executed task order. 
B.9 DEFENSE BASE ACT INSURANCE COST 
The requirements of the Defense Base Act apply to this contract 
and any subcontracts under this contract. The Contractor shall 
provide Defense Base Act (DBA) insurance coverage in accordance 
with FAR clause 52.228-03 Workers' Compensation Insurance 
(Defense Base Act).. Rates for DBA will be task order specific. 
8.10 DEFINITIONS 
In this contract, the terms Contractor or Prime Contractor are 
used interchangeably unless the context indicates otherwise. 
Each shall mean the Contractor identified on Cover sheet of this 
contract. 
13 -4 
UNCLASSIFIED 
 439 
Annex C: Contract Amendment (raises contract ceiling) 
NEXT PAGE 
Source: U.S. Department of State, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/136427.pdf (accessed 21 June 2011) 
 
UNCLASSIFIED 
OMB MOOS MUNI 
ra....tACT ID CODE PAGE OF PAGES 
• AMENDMENT OF SOLICITATION/MODIFICATION OF CONTRACT 1 I  2. AMENDMENTMODIFCATION NO. p. EFFECTIVE DATE 4. MMUMITIONTAMCWASE REG MI 5. PROJECT Nemsnmmeto 
Three (3) I March 30, 2005 N/A I .  
6. ISSUED BY Coot! 7. ADJAIMSTERED BY (V cam Pan Ram I) am 
S. Department of State 
Tice of Acquisition 
.0. Box 9115, Rosslyn Station 
Arlington, VA 22219 
a. NAME ANDADORESS OF CONTRACTOR (Ns. nig cool* Sin MS BP: Code) 
DynCorp 'International, LLC 
6500 West Freeway, Suite 600 
Ft. Worth, TX 76116-2187 
(4) M ALENOMENT OF SOLICITATION NO. 
"B. DATED (SEE REM t f) 
IDA. WORCAlION OP COMPACT/ORDER NC. 
S-LNAQM-03-C‘0039 
toe. DATED (SEE REM iN CODE 'Maury Cote May 27, 2003  
11. THIS ITEM ONLY APPLIES TO AMENDMENTS OF SOLICITATIONS  
0 The above numbered solkaation la amended as sal lathIn Rem It The hour me dale Speedied for receipt or Ohm 0 Isemerwes. D Is not extended. Offerors must .knowledge mesa of Ws amendment NW to Me haw and date specified in the sokitawn a n emended, by one Ole Mowing methods: 
la) By seadeelng items II end 1a and seaming males of Vie wheats:int lb) By aclusmANNIng Metre anis arnencMint on earn copy d IS offer subedited; or (s)  By upends lifter or telegram Mich ktaudes a relate:Ks lo fOliatele° and amendrneet norrbem. FAILURE OF YOUR ACKNOWLEDGMENT TO BE RECENED AT WE PLACE DESIGNATED FOR THE RECEIPT OF OFFERS PRIOR TO THE HOUR AND DATA SPECIFIED MAY RESULT IN REJECTION OF YOUR OFFER. II by virtue if Ws smegulment you dean to change an offer Steady aubmilled. such change may be made by telegram Of Mkt provided each lelemarn or letter makes reference to the solloblIon and Ws amendment and Is noelved prior lo the opening hour and dale specified. 
12. ACCOUNITNG AND APPROPRIATION DATA (mown 
N/A . 
13.THISITEMAPPLIESONLYTOMODIFICATIONSOFCONTRACTS/ORDERS, 
ITMODIFIESTHECONTRACTIORDERNO.ASDESCRIBEDINITEM14.  
THIS CHANGE ORDER IS USED PURSUANT TO: (Spg* subway) TIE CHANGES SET FORTH IN ITFJA 14 ARE MADE IN THE CONTRACT/ORDER Na IN REM 1St 
1  O. OTHER (Spray hpe clamoblIcatim end autnorRe B. THEABOWNUMBEREOCONITUCT/ORDERISMODIFTEDTOREFLECTTHEAMemSTRATIWCHANGESMenesamgaskeefelallotoppoOdamatsre/SET FORTH IN (TEA Ie.  RIRSOWT TO THE AUTHORITY OF FAR 43.1030e • C. THIS SuPPLEMENIAL AGREEMENT IS ENTERED INTO MMSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF: X Mutual Aoreement of the Parties 
E IMPORTANT: ContractornisnotXismqWnxibsignOlsdearmslandmitiAn 3 coplatoltmissuingoMoL  
14. DESCRIPTION OF AMENDMENTAIDOWICATION Myst, by UCF action hactingt iscbding sokaaboatontnet subpd maw Mon fesubJej 
The purpose of this modification is to increase the five year ceiling amount on 
subject contract from $100,000,000 to $500,000,000 through the end of the period of performance which is May 26, 2008, if all options are exercised. 
at provers' MM. al Ismis tee sondlikma of Ins ticeunme mead In men IAN ter. as waken 
MA. NAME AND TIRE OF SANER Mew Nish" 
Timothy J. Crawley" 
VP Contracts Management 
swot romans mensteed end In me tame and apt 
• MA. NAME AND TRLE OF CONTRACTING OFFICER (type or 
Edward G. Muller 
Contracting Officer 
-tinacTOROFFEROR we UNITED STATES OFAJAER/CA 
(77  ' 
'SC. DATE SIGNED 16C. DATE SIGNED 
Vsieu. 
famabre flSem surtettmd (Rowam eriCalluew Cam/ 
NSN 151041452a070 
PREVIOUS EDITION UNUSABIE 
.2fr.o.e. /d v 
STANDARD FORM 30 (REV 10.83) 
Pulsated by GSA 
FAR141 CFR) 53.243 
UNCLASSIFIED 
UNCLASSIFIED 
OINIMmovoln0161.1 
AMENDMENT OF SOLICITATION/MODIFICATION OF CONTRACT 
rallTue.:110 CODE PAGE OF PAGES 
I i2.  AMENDMENT&ICOIECATIONNO. 
Four (4) 
3. EFFECTIVE DATE 
May 27, 2005 
4. REOUISITOMPURCHASEREO. NO. 
.N/A 
r. PROJECT MG fif *Oita*/ 
7. AOMIMSTERED BY Ow Amp new d CODE 
6. ISSUED BY COOEI 
Department of State 
:e of Acquisition 
t.... Box- 9115, Roselyn Station 
Arlington, VA 22219 
8. NAME ANC ADORESS OF CONTRACTOR (Mo. Skeet en* Mato ex I VP. Code)  
DynCorp International, LLC 
6500 West Freeway, Suite 600 
Fort Worth, Texas 76116-2187 
14) BA. AMENDMENT OF SOLICITATION NO. 
OS. DATED (SEE ITEM SI) 
10A. MODIFICATION OF CONTRACT 10140ER NO. 
X S-LMAQM-03 -C-0034  
waso(eSSITEM ea) cooE 'FACILITY CODE May 27, 2003  
11. THIS ITEM ONLY APPLIES TO AMENDMENTS OF SOLICITATIONS 
❑ 
• • ne awn xemboret mediae is amended as set tend In Benin. The hour and Oren 'peened for noMPI of offers D Is ardand* 0 Is not extended.. Offerors mum seknoWedge receipt ed this amendment prey to the hair and date speeded in the sollcietbn or as amended. by one dare following methods: 
(a) By can Neeng sans a and I3 , and returNno own ellhomervirmmt (b) By wept of INs amendment on mall ROY IN Maar eubedemt or (e) BY seawall leder or  Niemen which Maude, a reIerenee to Me sotictlaSon and amendment numbers. F E OF YOUR ACKNOWLEDGMENT TO BE RECEIVED AT THE PLACE DESIGNATED FOR ME RECEIPT OF OFFERS PRIOR TO THE HOUR AND DATA SPECIFIED MAY RESULT IN REJECTION OF YOUR OFFER. W by vette of this amendment you deske to change an erter already submitted BLED change may be made by Wpm st ewe Wadded flab beg= or teller makes reference to 1w soidtadon and this amendment and Is teceteed prior to the opening hour and data opened. 
It ACCOUNTING AND APPROPRIATION DATA phseuevd) 
N/A 
13. THIS ITEM APPLIES ONLY TO MODIFICATIONS OF CONTRACTS/ORDERS, 
IT MODIFIES THE CONTRACT/ORDER NO. AS DESCRIBED IN ITEM 14. 
es CHARGE ORDER IS ISSUED PURsuANT TO (SpoelyauMen1y) THE CHANGES SET FORTH IN ITEM 14 ARE MADE IN THE CONTRACT/ORDER NO, IN ITEM int 
1). THE ABOVENUMBERED commorionoen IS MOWED TO REFLECT THE ADMIMBIRATIVE CHANGES Mural chaegn t mot* ace Aperopislon dare, .CJ SET FORTH r ITEM 14. RESUME TO TIE AUMORITY OF FAR 43.103(14  C MIS SUPPLEMENTAL AGREEMENT IS ENTERED INTO PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF: 
X 
D. OTHER fSpargyene et moddlceden fad authOdy) 
FAR X2.217-09 OPTION TO EXTEND THE TERM OF THE CONTRACT • E. IMPORTANT: Contractor is not requited to sign this docurnent and return copies to the issuing office. 
A. DESCRIPTION OF AMENDMENT/MODIFICATION (Orgenhed by UCP seal neadems, haludIng saliMagontontrect whin matter Mare ease..) 
The purpose of this modification is to exercise Option Year Two Of subject 
contract effective May 27, 2005 through May 26, 2006. 
EmPI M scoNess ten.. SI tams and a:00bn of Me dam" remoras M nem BA r 10A. es herMadere erreeeett remake unenneted and la rug mete and flea' 13A NAME NO TITLE OF =NM (Type aped) MA. NAME AND mu oFCONTRACTIM3 OFFICER Oka orprem 
Edward G. Muller 
Contracting Officer 
SC. DATE stoma ISO, CONTRACTCROFFEROR 
(Swain *Wan stets ler 
NON 714041-1324070 
PREVIOUS EDITION taeUSASIS 
BY 
-----I—NlgashnetCotnNsm 0004 
30-105 STANDARD FORM 30 (R .10-83) 
'nutted EOM 
FAR (4 CFR) 53243 
IS. WEED STATES Of AMERICA 
C4'rd7 
180. DATE SIGNED 
/J, AV 
UNCLASSIFIED 
A. NAME AND TITLE-OF CONTRACTING OFFIUM ffv•• or smati 
. Colleeri M. Koons 
Contracting 0.fficer 
 
At ONITO 
n• vat fakery 
C7 ^TES - 00 Able ICA ' SC.OATE SIGNED r  
Cfrt`c4 ) CY4 Lic rwi .3 '..);) -rig 
• MNO•sio POEM 30 411W. 1043) Peednlem by OSA 
SAN NM mid is 243 
♦r /N • • 
-1.• 
ED 
BY 
'wean I. wedded mein. net wend and clumliliont al the deaudwii evidenced Is he 9A et 104, ea hedielene chentmeb camas .reigned and en ha mon and .Ilea.  dr . NXME ANN TtP SIGNER ITS,* ri•• mits, C, Ai 4.104.1. 
(11410ebad   
iN /140.074151-11070 
IEVIOUS INTION 1111Hf MAE 
UNCLASSIFIED 
SENT BY: DYNCOEP; 
TI/12/04 FRI 13:01 FAL . . . _ 
8177315482; Mat n411:511; -409.2 PAGE 2/2 
eon 
AMENDMENT OP SOLICITATION/MODIFICATION OF CONTRACT 
z AMF.NOwfw AWOWICAT 1 FEC 
One (1) 'ee Block 16- N/A 
SUED BY MOE 
U.S. Department of State  
Office of Acquisition Management 
P.O. Box 9115, Rosslyn Station 
Arlington, VA 22219 
CONTRACT III CODE PAGE OF PAGES 
PROJECT NO. lif apprecaded 
RELEASED IN PART 
B4 
7. ADMINISTERED BY Al other then Muff 64 CODE I   
B. NAME AND ADDRESS OP CONTRACTOR Mu.. Sven County, Sr. • and ZIP Cods' 
DynCorp International 1LC 
6500.Weet Premway, Suite 600 
Pt. Worth, TX 76116-2187 
J I DA. AMENDMENT 01 SOLICITATION NO. 
DATED Int REM rev 
MODICA Imre OF CONTRACT/ORDIA 
s-Lmm4-0 3-c-to 034 
1011. DATED on ITEM 131 
CODE FACILITY CODE May 27, 2003 
11. THIS ITEM ONLY APPLIES TO AMENDMENTS OFICSICITATIONS  rj The add mendeeve sokhedwi is amended a sat ,.na In Item 14. Om hem one .4.t. *pealed I., rededi at PIM 0 ie winondea. 
❑ 
p net it 
unidd. 
Allah a.at k•linatletty. ,.alp el UNE :NOMMEN enw la the how and mete meciiied N the diked den ea a. andenla. IIY ons if Sc Iallertne indendle; 
ST emIMOMMI test • ens IF. cad golw0140_ copies el Ma ormentineak 64 Ed evekneModiNg main of ddt eniandatent en sect tepy of ins and edneinode ee MI  Ed soft lion a tithes 1.Aubm • reference le the MeiCilefiell end eimmilevent monebere. flaunt OF YOVA ACideowliDISMON TO 4T !menu AT 1141 HALE DISIONATED realm Accarr DP ORM •100110 THE NOUS AND GATE  SPEW= MAY MEW P ELBC11011 Of YOUR OMR. If en *We ei nib einandirand You Make Ie *Mem m edge Moe* ,.iSn.d. is dump n be MUM By Wegnen M lance. medided sub inborn er Miet ANN eahrente  to th• sollslation and ems seneneweett, she enneved Rehr to the  MEDMAS MANES Sof EDIAMEIC •  
12.. ACCOUNTING ANU APPROPRIATION DATA RI r•qUiffill 
N/A,  
11. THIS ITEM APPLIES ONLY TO MODIFICATIONS OF CONTRACTS/ORDERS, 
  IT MODIFIES THE CONTRACT/ORDER NO. AS DESCRIBED IN STEM 14. 
A. THIS CHANGE ORDER IS ISSUED PURSUANT To: NArmysostmdtp/ TMC CHANGES SET FORTH on( ITEM I4 ARE MADE Bl THE C0147-.  TRACT ORDER NO. 1/4 11 EM I OA. 
•   . THE ABOVE NUMBEREDCONTRACT/ORDER IS MODIFIED 10 REFLECT ME ADMIMETRATIVE CHANGES Such es change: la paying offices eppreptiagran ete, arc./ SET FORTH IN ITEM IS. PURSUANT 70 7N1 Antiwar. OF FAR 43.103 AT       
. THIS SUPPLEMEYTAL AGREEMENT IS ENTERED INTO PURSUANT TO AutptoAnv on 
Mutual Agreement of the Parties  
. OTHER (Spear),  Ivo,. at mocil•calmn and audiellffI  
X             
E. IMPORTANT: Earflap, 0 IA not, El Is rooked to sign IbIs 410climonl and ecturn_ 3  conies to the laming ernes. 
1e. DESCRIPTION OF ANENDMENT/MODINCATION 10manand by UCP :anon heavfm#1. wocludinp sadtationlowney Jukes 1 matter wily. kantwej 
'PLEASE SEE ATTACHED  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE 
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA 
DATE/CASE ID: 06 SEP 2007 200604275 
UNCLASSIFIED 
B. NAME AND ADDRESS OF CONTRACTOR (No., Sum. County. State and Zig Code) 
DynCorp International, LLC 
6500 West Freeway, Suite 600 
Fort Worth, Texas 76116-2187 
) SA. AMENDMENT OF SOLICITATION NO. 
94 DATED !SEE ITEM 111 
10A. MODIFICATION OF CONTBACTIORDER 
NO. 
S -LMAQM-03 -C -0034 
IDE. DATED MEE ITEM 
UNCLASSIFIED 
AMENDMENT OF SOLICITATION/MODIFICATION OF CONTRACT. 
2. AMENDMENT/MODIFICATION NO. 
Five (5)  
1. CONTRACT 10 CODE PAGE OF PAGES 
5. PROJECT NO. (If appeceblel 13. EFFECTIVE DATE 4. REQUISITION/PURCHASE REEL NO. !See Block 16 N/A  
6. ISSUED BY CODE 
U.S. Department of State.  
Office of Acquisition 
P.O. Box 9115, Rosslyn Station 
Arlington, VA 22219 
7. ADMINISTERED BY (If other then Item 61 • CODE 
CODE 1FACIUTY CODE May 27, 2003 
11. THIS ITEM ONLY APPLIES TO AMENDMENTS OF SOLICITATIONS .  0 The above numbered solicitation is amended as set tannin Item N. The how and date specified for receipt of Offers El is extended: ❑ is not me 
tended. 
011eee must acknowledge receipt of Has amendment prior to the hew and dem specified in the solicitation of as emended, by one of d'd nanadind methade: fat By completing Rams I and M. and returning copies of the amendment: MI By aeknowlmIlling receipt of this emendmon1 ch each copy of U., ether submitted: or 1c) By separate letter ci telegram which include a releteme TO Ws solicitation and ameadment numbers. FAILURE OF YOUR ACKNOWLEDGMENT TO BE RECEIVED AT THE PLACE DESIGNATED FOR THE RECEIPT OF OFFERS PRIOR TO THE HOUR AND OATS SPECIFIED MAY RESULT IN REJECTION OF YOUR OFFER. If by Mum of this amendment you desk* to change an over already submitted. such change may be node by telegram or letter. provided each lelegram or lens, makes nolennes to the soMilation end this amendment, and is received prior to the opening how and this mangled. 
12. ACCOUNTING AND APPROPRIATION DATA Of mewed; 
• N/A  
13. THIS ITEM APPLIES ONLY TO MODIFICATIONS OF CONTRACTS/ORDERS, • 
IT MODIFIES THE CONTRACT/ORDER NO. AS DESCRIBED IN ITEM  14. ij ) A. THIS CHANGE ORDER IS ISSUED PURSUANT TO. (Spat:fly authority! THE CHANGES SET FORTH IN ITEM 14 ARE MADE IN THE CON-TRACT ORDER NO. IN ITEM 10A. 
HE ABOVE NUMBERED CONTRACT/ORDER IS MODIFIED TO REFLECT THE ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGES (such as changes in paying 
•  
office, appropriation date, etc.) SET FORTH IN ITEM 14. PURSUANT TO THE AUTHORITY OF FAR 43.103 It). 
C. THIS SUPPLEMENTAL AGREEMENT IS ENTERED INTO PURSUANT TO AU .TII OF. 
D. OTHER (Specify type of modification and authority) 
copies to the Issuing office. 
14. DESCRIPTION OF AMENDMENT/MODIFICATION (Organized by LICF section headings. including solichation/consict subject matter where fees/Died 
The U.S. Army Corp of Engineers, North Atlantic Division is hereby authorized 
to place delivery orders against Contract S -LMAOM -03 -C -0034 with DynCorp. The 
maximum order limitation will not exceed $10,000,000 per order. Only the 
below named contracting officer is hereby authorized to place orders against 
subject contract for the U.S. Army Corp of Engineers, North Atlantic Division. 
Bethany A. Mills 
Maw aserevided herein. eV terms end COntbdOns of Idle dOCUS41/0 utatenced in Item EA at 10.0. as heretofore changed. rentekts unchanged end Si full MN,  and Ulna 
15A. NAME AND TITLE OF SIGNER (Type co pang IBA. NAME AND TITLE OF—CONTRACTING OFFICER (Type aping 
Colleen M. Xosar 
rantrart ina Off ger 150. CONTRACTOR/OFFEROR 
• 
15C. DATE SIGNED 168. 
BY 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IBC-DATE SIGNED 
fiAtifaCKW4. Latte-V2/1 ' Wrongs of p wutRomed to Nookbey ISIgnsture of Contracting weal irl - NSN /540.01-152•1170 
PREVIOUS EDITION UNUSABLE 30•10S STANDARD FORM 30 !REV. 10831 
Prescribed by GSA 
PAR PIS CFRI 53 243 
X 
E. IMPORTANT: arstactor is not, [3 Is required to sign this document and retur   
UNCLASSIFIED 
CODE 
AMENDMENTOF SOLICItATIONMODIFIC.ATION OF -CONTRACT raBITRACT ID CODE OP PAGES 
NO 1 V DA 4. MI I REG. 
Six (6) See Block 16C  
ISSUED BY 
CODE I.ADMINISTERED BY Of elAa then in U.S. Department of State 
Office of Acquisition 
P.O. Box 9115, Rosslyn Station 
Arlington, VA 22219 
1 Al • • t. • 
UNCLASSIFIED 
I. NAME AND ADDRESS OF CONTRACTOR (NR. ant 444•812.02NSFE ETP C040 
DynCorp International, LLC 
6500 West Freeway, Suite 600 
Fort Worth, Texas 76115-2187 
9A. AMENDMENT OF SOLICITATION NO. 
90.OATEO MS Eli I I) 
MODIFICATION OF corrennereonoo( 
Z-LMAQM-03-C-0034  
zoo. DATED (Sit WILVIJ) CODE 'FACILITY ;ODE May 77 . nun  11. THIS ITEM ONLY APPLIES TO AMENDMENTS OF SOLICITATIONS  
❑ TM abate number's) seachetIon It amimaid mat forth In non It The hour and date spadfIsd for nalgt of Of We D. ',nod, ❑ b not ea- undid. 
Offen must ocknowlapp receipt of CAB itmandment paw to to hour and dab 1844Ified in nu solldtstIon or asamended, by one of the following matins: 
IN By "Ohltehltinli items II and IL and month, mho of on amsndm.nt an By seknentolohni mono of this omondmont on men cope of the afar subrnittad: or 0.1 By .grab leter at Penn which Mends • reforms to the solicitation and smendrnsat number'. FAILURE OF YOUR ACKNOWLEDG-MENT TO BE RECEIVED AT THE PLACE DESIGNATED FOR THE RECEIPT OF OFFERS PRIOR TO THE HOUR AND DATE SPECIFIED MAY RESULT ' IN REJECTION OP YOUR OFFER. If by Haus of thbormadmat you desire to change In afar oubmIttl4. Web einleN nay be made by 114•01 m or PTINIed etch Sewn or letter maker Sena to Eta mechstion end this smandmant. and is moist nlor to th• Newby hour and des stmelflud. 12. ACCOUNTING ANO AVPROFRIA r ION DATA Of NossimR) 
N/A 
13. THIS ITEM APPLIES ONLY TO MODIFICATIONS OF CONTRACTS/ORDERS, 
IT MODI F IES THE CONTRACT/ORDER NO. AS DESCR 18 ED IN ITEM 14.  
A. THIS CRAWAIRCIATIA Rat VIED PURSUANT TOI WIND obsonen THE CHANGES SET FOR rwiWininTXTE MADE IN THE CON. 
O. THE ABOVE NUMBERED CIMYRACT/ORDER P
URSUANT TO REFLECT THICADMINISTRATIVE CHANGES (Rah se donee in nine oft., numterfatlow Ans. ale.)5ET FO ATI IN ITEM 14. P U NT TO THE AUTHORIVf OP FAR 43.10311). 
C. THIS SUPPLE MENTAL AGREEMENT IS ENTERED INTO PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY 0 II 
0. OTHER WPeMD DIN emmilATRERTI Tag mittuwign  4. 
L 
E. IMPORTANT: Contractor g Is not. ❑ 0 required to sign this document and (stunt copies to the issuing office. 
ASs 
The below named Contracting Officers are hereby authorized to place orders against subject contract for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, North Atlantic Division. 
Leslie L. Bearden 
Theodore M. Eunzog 
and 4thott. Except at Wele a. d henn all Rpm NWS SORdlOGRS at ms dOcuMeal reiwoneed In Item 9A of 104. NT eee cense tea di , s unmmed se In lull form 
ISA. NAME ANO TITLE OF SIGNER itype sr p nT 
1SC- DATE SIGNED 
uI 
X 
1SS. CONTRACTOR/OFFEROR 
(2 tee W pumas sethatsd 
IGO. UNITED ETAT OF APAErsca 
BY e  
NA. NAME AND TITLE OP CONTRACTING OFFICE 
Colleen M. Rosar 
Contracting Officer  
The orprbO  
ailleaW• it Can Dining Omen) 
NRIMMMSMNOO . 
 I 44. ZLIC 
TUN 9340414524090 ' • 
PREVIOUS EDITION UNUSABLE  30•10S STANDARD FORM al then. 1•43) Prow.tim• tw GSA 
PAR (48 CFR) 53.243 
UNCLASSIFIED 
 445 
Annex D: Liberia Military DDR-SSR Program Timeline 
 
January 
2003 
DynCorp International (DynCorp) and Pacific Architects and Engineers (PAE) 
are both awarded a State Department five-year IDIQ contract to support 
peacekeeping and security efforts in Africa (contract solicitation number S-
LMAQM-03-C-0034, see Annex B). Its minimum guaranteed expenditure is $5 
million and maximum is $100 million, later expanded to $500 million (see 
Annex C). 
  
August 2003 
Charles Taylor flees Liberia and 1,000 ECOWAS peacekeepers and 200 US 
troops arrive. The interim government and rebels sign the CPA (see Annex A). 
Gyude Bryant is chosen to head the NTGL under the title ‘Chairman’ rather 
than ‘President’. 
 
September–
October 
2003 
US forces pull out, and UNMIL begins the peacekeeping mission, deploying 
thousands of troops and encompassing the ECOWAS forces. 
December 
2003 
UNMIL begins DDRR for rebel combatants only. AFL personnel are disarmed, 
but not demobilized, rehabilitated and reintegrated. After riots at one DDRR 
site, UNMIL shuts down the program. 
 
January 
2004 
US sends a six-person SSR pre-assessment team to Liberia, 21–29 January. The 
United States is responsible for the SSR of the AFL, as agreed to at Accra 
during peace talks. The State Department is the lead agency within the US 
government. 
 
February 
2004 
International donors pledge more than $500 million in reconstruction aid to 
Liberia. 
 
April 2004 
UNMIL commences the DDRR process and it continues without serious 
incident. UNMIL also begins SSR for civilian elements of the security sector, 
such as the Liberian national police. State Department plans a SSR assessment 
mission to Liberia involving State Department, DOD and contractors.   
 
May 2004 
State Department leads a ten-day assessment mission of SSR for the AFL. The 
team consists of experts drawn from State Department, DOD and two 
contractor teams: DynCorp and PAE. Additionally, PAE subs MPRI owing to 
its PMC expertise (PAE is a GC firm whereas DynCorp and MPRI are PMCs 
with relevant SSR expertise). DDR of the AFL is not considered because the 
NTGL is responsible for this. A member of the assessment team is murdered in 
his hotel room while being robbed. 
 
June 2004 
DOD determines it cannot conduct the SSR program and State Department 
decides to outsource the SSR program entirely to the private sector. 
Accordingly, it asks both DynCorp and PAE to submit their assessments and 
recommendations for SSR. 
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July 2004 
After reviewing the assessments, State Department decides to divide SSR 
responsibilities between the two companies based their expertise. DynCorp is 
responsible for reconstituting the AFL and MOD. PAE is tasked with 
constructing most of the military bases and also provide specialty training, 
equipment, logistics and base services. 
 
September 
2004 
State Department tenders a task order RFP and SOW to DynCorp and PAE 
entitled ‘Liberia Security Sector Reform’. The SOW states that they must create a 
2,000 person military, scalable to 4,300 personnel if funding permits, and an 
MOD. 
 
October 
2004 
DynCorp and PAE submit their proposals to State Department on October 7. 
State Department awards the task order to both companies with a division of 
labour as outlined in July. DynCorp is required to be on the ground initially with 
PAE to follow once sufficient units are fielded. Riots in Monrovia leave 16 
people dead; UNMIL says former combatants and AFL veterans were behind the 
violence. 
 
January 
2005 
State Department authorizes DynCorp to deploy a small planning team to Liberia 
to engage stakeholders and design the SSR program. It becomes clear that the 
NTGL lacks the capacity to conduct DDR of the AFL and State Department 
asks DynCorp to take on this task.  
 
UNMIL imposes a curfew on several southeastern provinces owing to ritual 
human sacrifices and cannibalism, including the involvement of provincial 
governors. 
 
February-
March 
2005 
Consultations with major stakeholders regarding the mission and composition of 
the future AFL. This includes civil society, the standing AFL, former warring 
parties and political factions, UNMIL, the NTGL, civil society through the 
NTGL and other entities.  
 
A comprehensive recruiting and vetting plan is devised intended to screen out 
human rights abusers from joining the AFL.  
 
April 2005 
The NTGL releases its AFL Restructuring Policy. Consultations with 
stakeholders continue. Topics include mission and force structure of the future 
AFL, location of training bases, sensitization campaign for civil society and 
arrears owed unpaid AFL veterans.  
 
May 2005 
The demobilisation plan is drafted and presented to Chairman Bryant. He signs 
Executive Order Number Five on May 15, authorizing the full demobilisation of 
all legacy AFL units as of 30 June 2005. State Department issues DynCorp a 
formal task order for the demobilisation of the AFL, releasing full payment to the 
contractor. DynCorp makes preparations for DDR operations outside of 
Monrovia and plans to conduct the demobilisation, recruiting staff both locally 
and internationally, and builds up their program (and presence) in Liberia. PAE is 
to begin its portion of the program once training commences. 
 
July 2005 
DynCorp builds a demobilisation site outside Monrovia. The demobilisation and 
reintegration of the legacy soldiers commences.  
 
The US government approves DynCorp’s blueprint for the new AFL’s force 
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structure and TO&E in Washington, DC.  
 
Construction of AFL training facilities starts but is slowed by the heavy rainy 
season. 
 
September 
2005 
The NTGL agrees to allow the international community to supervise its finances 
in an effort to reduce corruption. 
 
October 
2005 
Recruiting and vetting for the new AFL begins. Over 12,000 applicants will be 
processed in the two years to come.  
 
November 
2005 
Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf becomes the first woman to be elected as an African head 
of state. She takes office the following January.  
 
December 
2005 
Construction of the new training base remains suspended as Liberia, the United 
States and UNMIL debate over its location, costing the program money and 
time. 
 
January 
2006 
DDR of 13,770 AFL soldiers finishes. Recruiting and vetting begins at the 
Barclay Training Center (BTC) in downtown Monrovia. 
 
Johnson-Sirleaf is sworn in as president and the NTGL is no more. Brownie 
Samukai replaces Daniel Chea as Liberian Minister of Defence. 
 
February 
2006 
The demobilisation of the AFL is successfully completed, perhaps the first time 
in modern African history that an entire standing military was safely demobilized 
without significant incident. 
 
March 
2006 
Johnson Sirleaf calls for Nigeria to hand over Taylor, which it does. Upon his 
arrival in Monrovia, he was transferred to the custody of UNMIL and 
immediately flown to Sierra Leone to stand trial before the UN-backed Sierra 
Leone Special Court on charges of crimes against humanity.  
 
April 2006 
MOD transformation begins at BTC. 400–500 former AFL soldiers conduct a 
violent protest outside the MOD, claiming nonpayment of salary arrears and 
retirement benefits, and clash with UNMIL peacekeepers sent to contain the 
unrest. 
 
Taylor appears before the Sierra Leone Special Court.  
 
May 2006 
Samukai spends a week in Washington, DC with State Department, DOD and 
DynCorp to discuss the progress of SSR and formulation of the Liberian 
National Defence Strategy.  
 
June 2006 
State Department issues an updated SOW. DynCorp assists the MOD in a first 
draft of the national defence strategy. It is written based on the concept of 
human security, seeking to align the AFL’s mission with the goals of 
development for durable stability and security.  
 
Progress is limited because the NTGL, UNMIL, the United States and others are 
delayed with the national security strategy. The UN Security Council eases a ban 
on weapons sales so that Liberia can import small arm for government purposes 
only. An embargo on Liberian timber exports is lifted shortly afterward. 
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A TRC is set up to investigate human rights abuses between 1979 and 2003. 
Tensions transpire between the TRC and SSR program as the TRC requests 
access to SSR vetting records, but the SSR team denies this request since it might 
compromise sources and methods, possibly resulting in reprisal killings of victims 
who spoke to the SSR vetting team on condition of anonymity about human 
rights abuses of some AFL candidates. 
 
The ICC at The Hague agrees to host Taylor’s trial.  
 
July 2006 
The first class of AFL basic training or IET begins at BTC. It comprises 110 
candidates, most of whom are selected for their leadership potential to fill the 
leadership ranks first.  
 
The former US Voice of America transmitter site is finally selected as the AFL’s 
main training base, located at Careysburg and rechristened the Sandee S. Ware 
Military Barracks. DynCorp begins construction once the occupying UNMIL 
units move offsite. Construction is slowed by the heavy rainy season. 
 
DynCorp begins the process of purchasing and importing arms into Liberia for 
the AFL.  
 
President Johnson-Sirleaf switches on generator-powered street lights in the 
capital, which has been without electricity for fifteen years. 
 
August 
2006 
DynCorp orchestrates the first major shipment of arms, which arrives at 
Monrovia for the AFL. It is the first legal shipment in over fifteen years. 
 
November 
2006 
The first AFL basic training class of 102 graduates. AFL training of future classes 
is halted owing to US funding shortfalls. 
 
March 
2007 
119 civilian MOD employees graduate a seventeen-week SSR program training 
course. Following this the MOD reform program is prematurely terminated 
owing to US funding shortfalls. 
 
April 2007 
The UN Security Council votes to lift its ban on Liberian diamond exports. The 
ban was imposed in 2001 to stem the flow of blood diamonds, which helped 
fund the civil war. 
 
May 2007 The United Nations urges Liberia to outlaw trial by ordeal.  
June 2007 
Taylor’s war crimes trial begins at The Hague, where he stands accused of 
instigating atrocities in Sierra Leone. 
 
September 
2007 
639 total trained. Owing to cost overruns, State Department shortens IET from 
eleven weeks to eight weeks by cutting three weeks that were devoted to human 
rights, civics, and laws of war training.   
 
January 
2008 
1,124 total trained. 
April  
2008 
1,634 total trained. 
September 2,113 total trained. 
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2008 
2009 PAE conducts unit training for the battalions culminating in an ARTEP. 
December 
2009 
The TRC releases its final report. 
January 
2010 
DynCorp’s and PAE’s contract for SSR ends and a team of sixty US Marines 
begin a five-year mentorship program with the AFL in Operation Onward 
Liberty.  
 
In a new task order (worth $20 million if all options are exercised), DynCorp is 
selected to provide the AFL with operations and maintenance services. This task 
order is awarded under the new five-year State Department IDIQ contract called 
the Africa Peacekeeping Program (AFRICAP), contract solicitation number 
SAQMMA08R0237. Awardees under AFRICAP include DynCorp International, 
PAE Government Services, AECOM and Protection Strategies Incorporated.   
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